Filed 7/6/26 P. v. Scott CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B340478
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. BA499541)
TERRY EDWARD SCOTT, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Alison S. Matsumoto, Judge. Affirmed.
Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Julie A. Harris, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________________
A jury convicted Terry Scott (appellant) of forcible rape of a
child over the age of 14 and kidnapping to commit rape. He was
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) under
the One Strike law (Pen. Code, § 667.61).1 He argues this
sentence must be reversed based on what he contends was an
incomplete verdict form. We reject his contention and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the evening of September 26, 2021, 16-year-old Serenity
F. waited for the train home in downtown Long Beach. While she
sat at the station with earbuds in, listening to music, appellant
approached her and tried to talk to her. She told him to leave her
alone, and he backed off. When the train arrived, appellant
stepped into the closest car, while Serenity entered the train a
few cars down to avoid appellant.
Appellant then walked through the cars to find Serenity
and sat across from her. When she eventually got off the train to
catch the bus home, appellant followed her. She did not notice
him. Appellant followed her off the bus as she began walking
home, which was only blocks away. He crept up behind her,
grabbed her by the neck with the crook of his arm, and choked
her. She tried to escape by tripping him, and they both fell onto
the ground multiple times. A couple of people walked by, and
Serenity reached out for help, but they kept walking.
Appellant dragged Serenity behind an apartment building
to a poorly lit parking area. He told her he would kill her if she
did not comply. He then sexually assaulted her from about 9:00
p.m. until 4:00 a.m.
Appellant was charged with the forcible rape of a child over
the age of 14 (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)) and kidnapping to commit
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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another crime (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)). As to the rape count, it was
further alleged that the victim was a minor at least 14 years old
who had been kidnapped (§ 667.61, subds. (d), (l)). As to both
counts it was alleged that appellant had three prior serious or
violent felonies (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)) and that
various aggravating factors applied (Cal. Rules Court, rule
4.421).
On April 30, 2024, a jury found appellant guilty on both
counts, found true that the victim was a child over the age of 14
and was kidnapped, and found true the prior convictions and
aggravating factors.
The trial court sentenced appellant to LWOP for the rape
under the One Strike law. It imposed but stayed a sentence of 25
years to life for the kidnapping.
DISCUSSION
Appellant argues that the verdict forms show that the jury
did not make the finding that “the movement of the victim
substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim over and
above that level of risk necessarily inherent in the underlying
[rape]” (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(2)), which was necessary to support
his LWOP sentence under the One Strike law. We agree with the
People that appellant forfeited this claim “ ‘by failing to object to
the form of the verdict when the court proposed to submit it or
when the jury returned its finding.’ ” (People v. Johnson (2015)
61 Cal.4th 734, 784; People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 330
(Bolin).) But we exercise our discretion to reject appellant’s claim
on its merits.
“Like a sentencing enhancement allegation, a ‘One Strike
allegation exposes a defendant to greater punishment than would
be authorized by a verdict on the offense alone.’ ” (In re Vaquera
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(2024) 15 Cal.5th 706, 718.) “Without a true finding on a One
Strike allegation, the court may not apply the lengthier sentences
provided for in the One Strike law.” (Ibid.) Thus, “the
prosecution must provide the defendant ‘fair notice of the
qualifying statutory circumstance or circumstances that are
being pled, proved, and invoked in support of One Strike
sentencing.’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th
735, 754.) A penalty provided under the One Strike law “shall
apply” only if the circumstance warranting it is properly alleged
“and is either admitted by the defendant . . . or found to be true
by the trier of fact.” (§ 667.61, subd. (o); In re Vaquera, at p. 718.)
Relevant here, the One Strike law requires a sentence of
LWOP for a defendant who “kidnapped the victim [who is a
minor 14 years of age or older] of the present offense [of rape
under section 261, subdivision (a)(2)] and the movement of the
victim substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim over
and above that level of risk necessarily inherent in [rape].”
(§ 667.61, subds. (d)(2), (l), (n).)
The jury here was specifically instructed that if it found
appellant guilty of rape, it “must then decide whether the People
have proved the additional allegation that the [defendant]
kidnapped Serenity F., increasing the risk of harm to her,” which
in turn required proof that “the movement of Serenity F.
substantially increased the risk of harm to her beyond that
necessarily present in the rape.” The verdict form unequivocally
shows that the jury found true this One Strike allegation.
Appellant urges otherwise based on the verdict form’s phrasing
(“the victim was a child over the age of 14 and was kidnapped”),
which lacked explicit reference to the substantial increase in the
risk of harm requirement. The form’s failure to reference this
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particular requirement does not render invalid the jury’s true
finding, which it made after receiving correct instructions on the
One Strike allegation. (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353,
426 [“a verdict form need not restate the legal principles provided
in proper instructions”]; People v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th
1004, 1014 [we assume jurors are intelligent and capable of
correlating and understanding all jury instructions given].) What
matters is that “[i]n returning the verdict form, the jury clearly
manifested its intention to find true the allegation charged.”
(People v. Jackson (2014) 58 Cal.4th 724, 750; People v. Webster
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 447 [“technical defects in a verdict may be
disregarded if the jury’s intent to convict of a specified offense
within the charges is unmistakably clear, and the accused’s
substantial rights suffered no prejudice”]; accord, Bolin, supra, 18
Cal.4th at p. 31.) To the extent that the omission of the
substantial increase in harm language was error—which we are
not persuaded it was—such error was harmless under any
standard for determining prejudice.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
CHAVEZ, J.
GOORVITCH, J.
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