Filed 10/22/26 P. v. Saucedo CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E085693
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF2404922)
DAVID MAURICE DEAN SAUCEDO, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. F. Paul Dickerson III,
Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
Garrick Byers, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
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Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Monique
Myers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant David Saucedo was involved in an argument with his
girlfriend during which he smashed her cellular telephone, causing damage to the screen
and the frame, rendering most of the functions inoperable. He also choked and pushed
her. He was found guilty of felony vandalism due to the jury finding the phone exceeded
$400 in value, and was also found guilty of misdemeanor battery.
On appeal, defendant contends that insufficient evidence was presented to show
that the phone was worth over $400 and the conviction should be reduced to a
misdemeanor charge of vandalism. In addition, he claims the trial court improperly
imposed the upper term on his felony vandalism conviction based on aggravating factors
not found true by the jury as required by Penal Code1 section 1170, subdivision (b), and
he did not properly waive his right to a jury trial. The People concede that remand for
resentencing is necessary. We find substantial evidence supports defendant’s conviction
of felony vandalism, and we reverse his sentence and remand for a new sentencing
hearing.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant was found guilty of felony vandalism (§ 594, subds (a), (b)(1)), and
misdemeanor battery on a spouse or cohabitant (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)). He was additionally
found to have suffered four prior serious and violent felony convictions (§667, subds. (c)
& (e)(2); § 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)).
Two aggravating factors were alleged in the information that (1) defendant had
served a prior term in prison; and (2) his prior convictions and sustained petitions in
juvenile delinquency proceedings were numerous and increasing in seriousness. In a
bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found these two aggravating factors true; they were
not tried by the jury. Defendant was sentenced to the upper term of three years on the
vandalism count doubled due to the prior strike convictions.
B. FACTUAL HISTORY
1. PEOPLE’S CASE-IN-CHIEF
Doe and defendant dated between December 2023 and August 2024. In August
2024, Doe was living in Virginia. She was in Riverside on August 21, 2024, because
defendant paid for her to fly to where he was staying.
On August 21, 2024, during an argument, defendant told Doe that he was going to
record her and when she responded that she was going to record him, he grabbed her
phone and broke it by throwing it on the floor. He then charged toward her and pushed
her down onto the couch. He got on top her and tried to hold her hands down. She tried
to push him off her. He eventually got up and turned around. She hit him on the back of
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his neck. He turned around, picked her up, and threw her to the ground and choked her
with both hands while on top of her. She reached for his face and scratched his nose. He
eventually got off her and told her he would get her a new phone so she could leave and
go back to Virginia.
Defendant offered to take her to the T-Mobile store. They drove there but never
went inside. She could not use any of the buttons on her broken phone but could use the
voice activation to make a phone call to her mother. She could not text or use the
internet. She had an iPhone 14 model. After the incident, she had looked at the T-
Mobile website or her account and determined that a new iPhone would cost her between
$1,200 and $1,400. Doe did not get a new phone until she went back home to Virginia.
She had an insurance plan for the phone. She did not have to pay the full value of the
phone due to the insurance. She only had to pay $249.
Zenia Alberto and Doe had been friends for four years. Alberto had previously
met defendant and Doe introduced him as her boyfriend. Doe contacted Alberto the
morning of August 21, 2024, and told her that she was in Riverside visiting defendant.
Alberto met up with Doe and they had brunch and then Alberto went to work. Later that
day, after she got off work, she went to visit Doe where she was staying with defendant.
She encountered Doe outside the house; she looked like she had been crying. Doe got
into Alberto’s car. They sat in Alberto’s car but eventually Doe got out and got into
defendant’s car. Defendant and Doe drove to a T-Mobile store and Alberto followed
them. When they arrived, defendant and Doe were arguing in the parking lot about Doe’s
phone. Doe walked to Alberto’s car and defendant came with her carrying Doe’s
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luggage. Defendant offered Doe $200 to take care of the cost of the phone. She
observed defendant hand Doe two $100 bills. Doe got into Alberto’s car and was very
frustrated. They did not go into the T-Mobile store but returned to defendant’s residence
where defendant gave Doe another $200. Alberto took Doe to the airport the following
morning.
Alberto observed scratches on Doe’s neck, and bruises on her leg. Doe’s cellular
telephone was “completely shattered.” It was slightly bent and screen was completely
broken. Doe was unable to use the phone normally. Alberto had purchased four iPhones,
and she paid between $800 and $1,200 for those iPhones. They were more than $400
even with a monthly phone plan.
On August 21, 2024, Riverside Police Officer Michael Hinman was working
patrol in Riverside. As he was driving around the city in his marked patrol car, he came
upon Doe, who flagged him down. She was with Alberto. Doe appeared to be upset and
appeared paranoid, looking over her shoulder several times. She was periodically crying.
Doe had a cellular telephone with a “shattered” screen. A photograph of the front
and back of Doe’s phone was shown to the jury. Doe had an abrasion on her left elbow
and one on each side of her neck. There was swelling and redness around these
abrasions. Officer Hinman investigated the potential value of the phone. He searched the
T-Mobile website for the average purchase price of the damaged iPhone she possessed
and the approximate value was $730.
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Based on his investigation and speaking with Doe, Officer Hinman went to find
defendant. He found defendant at a residence on Redlands Court in Riverside. He took
him into custody. Defendant had an injury to his face.
Defendant was interviewed formally at the station. Officer Hinman had a body-
worn camera that recorded his encounter with defendant. The recording of the interview
was played for the jury. When Officer Hinman first encountered defendant at the
Redlands Drive home, Officer Hinman stated he was surprised to see defendant.
Defendant stated that he thought about leaving but decided to stay. He insisted he had no
reason to run. Officer Hinman advised defendant he was going to conduct a more formal
interview at the police station. Defendant stated he had video cameras in his house, and
everything had been recorded. He claimed that Doe had come to his house four times to
get money from him. As they were driving to the police station, defendant made several
statements to Officer Hinman. Defendant claimed he wanted Doe out of his house. She
got mad at him because he wanted her to leave because she was a “bum.”
During the formal interview at the police station, defendant stated that he and Doe
had been dating for seven months. She was just visiting him at his house, and he decided
it was time for her to leave. He insisted she would not leave and was living off of him.
He claimed to have grabbed her arm to get her to leave the house. He was unsure of the
injury on her neck; maybe he grabbed it to get her out of the house. When Office
Hinman told defendant that she seemed scared, defendant insisted it was because she
knew he was now going to break up with her. He gave her money in order to get her to
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go away. When asked about Doe’s phone, defendant responded “I broke the phone, bro.”
He broke it because she was trying to record him. He offered to pay for the phone.
Riverside County Sheriff’s Investigator Samantha Shaw was an expert in domestic
violence; she testified regarding the cycle of domestic violence and how it impacted a
victim’s reporting of incidents.
2. DEFENDANT’S EVIDENCE
Defendant presented no evidence.
DISCUSSION
A. SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF FELONY VANDALISM
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence presented to prove that the
cellular telephone that was destroyed by him had a value over $400. He maintains the
record does not contain specific facts that the amount of damage the vandalism caused
reached the $400 threshold as required by section 594, subdivision (b)(1).
“ ‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] We determine ‘whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’
[Citation.] In so doing, a reviewing court ‘presumes in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ [Citation.]
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‘This standard applies whether direct or circumstantial evidence is involved.’ ” (People
v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 701.)
Section 594 provides, “(a) Every person who maliciously commits any of the
following acts with respect to any real or personal property not his or her own, in cases
other than those specified by state law, is guilty of vandalism: [¶] (1) Defaces with
graffiti or other inscribed material. [¶] (2) Damages. [¶] (3) Destroys.” Subdivision
(b)(1) of section 594 provides, “[i]f the amount of defacement, damage, or destruction is
four hundred dollars ($400) or more,” it is considered a felony.
Section 594 “does not itself specify a method for proving the amount of property
damage in a vandalism prosecution.” (In re Kyle T. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 707, 713 (Kyle
T).) In a case involving damage caused by graffiti, the court calculated the amount of
defacement, damage, or destruction as the actual or estimated cost of repair. (Id. at pp.
713-714). Other courts have relied on the cost of “repairing or replacing” the cost of the
property. (In re A.W. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 941, 950.) Further, there is no authority
supporting that defendant is entitled to a windfall on the damage done to property that the
victim was farsighted enough to purchase protective insurance on. (See In re Brittany L.
(2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1387-1388 [in assessing restitution fine, the defendant is not
entitled to a windfall due to the victim purchasing insurance].)
Here, Doe testified that the cellular telephone was inoperable after being thrown to
the ground by defendant. It was shattered on the front and bent. She could not text,
check the internet or make phone calls other than by voice activation. She had checked
either her account or the website for T-Mobile and determined the cost of the iPhone 14
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model would cost between $1,000 and $1,400. She replaced the phone but had insurance
and only had to pay $249, while insurance paid the remaining balance. From that
evidence, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the amount of damage or
destruction to the cellular telephone, based on the estimated purchase price to replace the
cellular telephone, exceeded $400. (In re A.W., supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 950.)
Defendant relies on Kyle T., supra, 9 Cal.App.5th 707, to support his claim that
the value of the cellular telephone was not established by the evidence. In that case, a
minor was alleged to have committed one count of felony vandalism based on graffiti
defacement. At the juvenile court proceeding, an officer testified about the amount of
damages, based on a single-page “ ‘graffiti removal cost list’ ” prepared by an unknown
author, that summarized the costs of removing graffiti in that area, but without reference
to the specific acts committed by the minor. (Id. at pp. 710-711.) The Kyle T. court held
the People failed to present substantial evidence that was specific to the minor’s acts of
vandalism to establish that the actual amount of damage caused by the minor’s act
reached the felony threshold of $400. (Id. at pp. 709, 713-714.) The court noted, “The
most obvious way for the People to prove that [the minor] committed felony vandalism
would have been to introduce at the adjudication hearing an invoice setting forth the
actual cost of repairs to the two properties. No such evidence was introduced.” (Id. at pp.
713-714.)
Here, the value of the cellular telephone was provided by Doe. She noted she
determined the iPhone 14 would cost between $1,000 and $1,400 to replace by either
looking at her account or the T-Mobile website. She only had to pay $249 because she
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purchased insurance but defendant is not entitled to this windfall. The insurance
company paid the remaining amount, and the total of what Doe paid and what the
insurance paid was clearly over $400. This case is unlike the graffiti removal in Kyle T.,
which required a determination of the cost of materials, the size of the graffiti, the labor
and other factors in determining value not just an average cost of graffiti removal but the
actual cost of removing the graffiti. (Kyle T., supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 714.) Further,
Kyle T. did not state that an invoice was necessary to prove value.
A cellular telephone is easily valued based on the cost obtained from the cellular
telephone company. Doe testified to the value, which far exceeded $400, and “unless the
testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a single
witness is sufficient to support a conviction.” (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899,
963.)
We also note that the prosecutor argued to the jurors that they did not leave their
common sense at the door, and “we all know that a new iPhone is worth $400 or more.”
A cellular telephone is an object that is owned by practically every person and it is
common knowledge that an iPhone costs over $400. In Ferrari v. Mambretti (1943) 58
Cal.App.2d 318, the court expressed that the trier of fact could fix the value of damages
for services rendered if it actually possessed common knowledge of the value of such
services. (Id. at p. 328; see also Lundberg v. Katz (1941) 44 Cal.App.2d 38, 46 [“If the
trier of the facts possesses the common knowledge of the value of such services, their
reasonable value may be determined without the aid of opinion testimony”]) Here, it was
common knowledge that an iPhone costs over $400. The evidence supported that the
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cellular telephone was not operable and needed to be replaced. Doe had insurance on her
iPhone 14, and only had to pay out of pocket $249, but the value of the cellular telephone
exceeded $400, and defendant is not entitled to the windfall that Doe had insurance.
Defendant’s felony vandalism conviction was supported by substantial evidence.
B. UPPER TERM SENTENCE
Defendant contends the trial court erred by imposing the upper term sentence on
his conviction of vandalism because it relied on aggravating factors not properly found
true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. Defendant claims the error cannot be proven
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as both aggravating factors—defendant served a
prior prison term and his prior convictions were numerous and of increasing
seriousness—should have been tried to the jury and it cannot be determined whether the
jury would have found both aggravating factors true. Defendant requests that the matter
be remanded for resentencing and the trial court instructed to only rely on those properly
established aggravating factors at resentencing. The People concede that remand for
resentencing is necessary based on the jury not being presented with the aggravating
factors, and finding them true beyond a reasonable doubt. The matter should be
remanded and the People given the opportunity to retry the aggravating factors.
1. ADDITIONAL FACTUAL HISTORY
During a break in the proceedings, the trial court asked defendant’s counsel if
defendant wanted a jury to decide his prior convictions if he was found guilty. The trial
court asked, “What would your client like to do?” Defendant’s counsel responded, “He
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would like a bifurcated trial.” The trial stated, “So the Court to decide that?”
Defendant’s counsel responded, “Yes, your Honor.”
At the end of evidence, the trial court stated that after the jury reached a decision
on the charges, “[w]e will proceed directly to the aggravating factors. There are two.
And the Court has been listening to the evidence.” It also advised the prosecutor it
should be prepared to immediately prove the strike priors. Defendant’s counsel clarified
that if there was a conviction on the felony vandalism count that they would immediately
go into the factors in aggravation. The trial court responded, “Yes.” Defendant’s counsel
clarified also that they then would proceed with the bifurcated proceedings on the prior
convictions. The trial court responded, “Yes. Generally, on the aggravating factors,
because the Court has heard the evidence, both of you would submit to the Court.
Wouldn’t be anybody you would be calling. I’ve had that. And then, the Court makes
the decision.” The parties then discussed that the prosecutor intended to prove the priors
through certified documents and by not calling any witnesses.
After the verdicts were taken and the jury was excused, the trial court immediately
proceeded to the trial on the strike priors. The prosecutor stated he had certified
conviction records from the two robbery convictions in Orange County on January 19,
2017. He had a certified CLETS record for the other two prior strike convictions of
robbery suffered on August 31, 2018. Defendant’s counsel objected to the CLETS record
not being a certified plea form but it was admitted by the trial court. The trial court found
the four prior convictions true pursuant to sections 667, subdivisions (c) through (e)(2),
and 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2).
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The trial court then moved to the aggravating factors, of which it stated there were
two. The trial court asked either party if they wanted to be heard on the factors and both
parties submitted. The trial court found true that defendant had served a prior prison term
within the meaning of California Rules of Court rule 4.421(b)(3) and it found beyond a
reasonable doubt that the prior convictions as an adult for defendant were numerous and
of increasing seriousness within the meaning of California Rules of Court rule 4.421
(b)(2).
At sentencing, the trial court noted that two aggravating factors had been pled and
proven. It found no circumstances in mitigation. The trial court ordered, after balancing
the aggravating and mitigating factors, that the upper term of three years on the
vandalism conviction was appropriate.
2. AGGRAVATING FACTORS RELIED ON BY THE TRIAL COURT
On “January 1, 2022, the Legislature … amended section 1170 to provide that the
trial court ‘shall,’ in its discretion impose a sentence ‘not to exceed the middle term’
[citation] except in the following circumstance: ‘The court may impose a sentence
exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime
that justify the imposition of’ an upper term sentence, and ‘the facts underlying those
circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.’ [Citations.]
Notwithstanding these provisions, the court ‘may consider the defendant’s prior
convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without
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submitting the prior convictions to a jury.’ ” (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730,
748, fn. omitted.)
The California Supreme Court recently decided People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th
1069 (Wiley), in which it found that aggravating factors must be found by a jury,
including the increasing seriousness of prior convictions and unsatisfactory performance
on probation, to be true beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to support the imposition of
the upper term. (Id. at pp. 1082, 1084-1085.) In making its decision, it noted that the
United States Supreme Court in Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, held that
“ ‘Virtually “any fact” that “ ‘increase[s] the prescribed range of penalties to which a
criminal defendant is exposed’ ” must be resolved by a unanimous jury beyond a
reasonable doubt (or freely admitted in a guilty plea).’ ” (Wiley, at pp. 1080-1081, conc.
opn. of Kruger, J., citing to Erlinger, at p. 834,)
The Wiley court set forth the procedure for finding the aggravating factors as
follows, “Defendants may assert the right to a jury trial, may waive jury in favor of a
court trial, or may waive trial altogether. Subject to the standard rules of evidence both
parties may stipulate to the admission of probation reports or other evidence bearing on a
defendant’s social and educational history, as well as other information relevant to
sentencing, including criminal history. The burden is on the People to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the facts relied on to justify an upper term sentence. If those facts are
properly proven, the court may take them into account and exercise its discretion under
section 1170(b) to determine what sentence to impose, keeping in mind the statutory
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limits on upward departures from the midterm and the requirement for stating its reasons
on the record.” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1086.)
The trial court relied on several aggravating factors in reaching its decision on the
upper term. “[T]he facts supporting every aggravating circumstance upon which the trial
court relies to ‘justify’ imposition of the upper term must be properly proven as the
statute requires.” (People v. Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 757.) The finding regarding
the prior convictions as an adult for defendant were numerous and of increasing
seriousness must be “found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, unless the defendant
stipulates to its truth or waives a jury trial.” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1082-1084.)
Same for the determination of whether a defendant has served a prior prison term. (Id. at
p. 1085 [other than the fact of the prior conviction, a defendant is entitled to a jury
determination on any other aggravating factors that expose him to a sentence more
serious than the midterm sentence].)
The People concede, and the record supports, that defendant never waived his
right to a jury trial on the aggravating factors. The two aggravating factors should have
been tried to the jury but the jury was excused after reaching its decision on the
vandalism and battery charges, and the trial court found the aggravating factors were true.
This was error.
“ ‘[A] sentence imposed under … section 1170(b) must be reversed and remanded
unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that
same standard, would have found true all of the aggravating facts upon which the court
relied to conclude the upper term was justified, or that those facts were otherwise proved
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true in compliance with the current statute.’ [Citations.] Lack of a jury trial is not
harmless under Chapman [v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18] if ‘the record contains
evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding’ with respect to the aggravating
fact at issue.” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1087.)
The People concede the error was not harmless as it cannot be determined whether
the jury would have found the aggravating factors true. We agree. In assessing the
evidence of the aggravating factor of numerous and of increasing seriousness of his prior
convictions, defendant had four prior convictions for robbery in 2017 and 2018. Pursuant
to the probation report, he had convictions in 2024 for Vehicle Code section 23123
violations (using a cellular telephone while driving), which resulted in fines. He also had
a case pending from December 30, 2024, related to this case involving defendant
contacting Doe, in violation of sections 136.1, subdivision (b)(1) (attempting to dissuade
a witness), and 166, subdivision (c)(1) (violating a restraining order). The instant case
involved convictions for vandalism and misdemeanor battery. The jury could have found
the aggravating factor not true “based on the totality” of defendant’s criminal conduct.
(Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1090.)
The trial court relied on the above factor in addition to whether defendant served a
prior prison term. This court need not determine if the jury would have found true the
fact that he served a prior prison term as all factors must be found true beyond a
reasonable doubt to justify the imposition of the upper term. (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 1087.) We will order remand to the trial court for the People to retry the aggravating
factors.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed. We reverse and vacate defendant’s
sentence to allow the People an opportunity to retry the aggravating factors and for
resentencing in accordance with amended section 1170, subdivision (b).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS.
MILLER
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
CODRINGTON
J.
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