P. v. Sapien CA2/6

Filed 9/1/26 P. v. Sapien CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B342052
(Super. Ct. No. 2020013576)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)

v.

JESUS ANDREW SAPIEN,

Defendant and Appellant.

Jesus Andrew Sapien appeals from the judgment after a
jury convicted him of 13 counts of lewd acts on a child under the
age of 14 (Pen. Code,1 § 288, subd. (a)). The jury also found true
enhancements for multiple victims (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(4)), victims
under age 14 (§ 667.61, subd. (j)(2)), substantial sexual conduct
with a victim under age 14 (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)), and
allegations that he took advantage of a position of trust or
confidence (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(11)), and the
victims were particularly vulnerable (id., rule 4.421(a)(3)). The

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
trial court sentenced Sapien to prison for 325 years to life.
Sapien contends the trial court erred when it admitted
evidence of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome
(CSAAS), and that the jury instruction regarding CSAAS was
erroneous. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Sapien lived with his girlfriend, Kristen B.2 Kristen B.’s
family had a very close relationship. Her sisters Melissa B. and
Kathleen B., her cousin Stacey G., and all their children were
frequently at Sapien and Kristen B.’s home. Sapien committed
lewd acts on two of Kristen B.’s nieces (A.G. and I.B.) and on
Stacey G.’s daughter (D.G.).
A.G. (counts 1–9)
A.G. and her mother Melissa B. lived in Kristen B. and
Sapien’s home around 2018 to 2019. A.G. and Melissa B. then
moved nearby but visited Kristen B. and Sapien’s home daily.
A.G. saw Sapien as a father figure and referred to him as “Uncle
Jesse.” Sapien was sometimes the only adult in the house with
A.G.
In May 2020, when A.G. was six years old, her mother
noticed what appeared to be dried blood on A.G.’s underwear.
She asked A.G. if anyone had touched her “private parts.” A.G.
began crying and said Sapien had touched her “private areas,”
pointing to her vagina. She said he had done it “many times.”
The first time occurred in 2018 or 2019. The most recent
incident was a week before Melissa B. found the blood on her
underwear. She told her mother that in one incident, Sapien took

2 We refer to the victims and family members by their
initials or first name and last initial to protect their privacy.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4), (10), & (11).)

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her to a bedroom, blocked the door with a chair, and licked her
“private area” (count 3). A.G. said Sapien “told her not to tell
anybody. It was their secret,” and “she could get into trouble.”
Melissa B. called the police. A.G. told a detective she was
scared to disclose the abuse because she “thought [she] was going
to go to jail and get in trouble.” She described acts of sexual
abuse Sapien committed against her in bedrooms (counts 1, 2, 4).
She described his additional acts of sexual abuse against her in a
closet (counts 5–8). She told the detective she tried to defend
herself but Sapien was too strong for her. She then “had to just
do it and get it over with.”
A.G. testified about acts of sexual abuse committed in
bedrooms (counts 1–4, 9). She was “pretty sure” he licked her
“privates” in the closet (count 7), and did not remember if he
licked her “bottom” in the closet (count 8). But she confirmed
that what she told the detective was true.
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked if A.G. would
lie to the detective. He asked if she would “make up stories about
somebody else” or would “tell him about something that
happened to someone else.” On cross-examination of Melissa B.,
defense counsel solicited testimony that A.G. never complained
about having to stay at Kristen B.’s house, and never said she did
not want to be around Sapien.
D.G. (counts 10–11)
After A.G.’s disclosures, Kristen B. called her cousin,
Stacey G., and told her to check with her daughters to see if
Sapien had done anything to them. Her daughter, D.G., age 16,
began crying and said Sapien had touched her inappropriately
when she was younger.
When D.G. was eight or nine years old, she slept at Kristen

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B. and Sapien’s home once or twice a month. She loved being
with her cousins there. When Kristen B. would go to work, D.G.
and one of her young cousins would be left alone with Sapien to
watch them. Sapien began sexually abusing D.G. when she was
eight or nine years old. D.G. eventually told her mother that she
refused to stay over at the residence anymore, but at that time
she did not tell her about the abuse.
D.G. testified that in one incident, she tried to move her
hand from Sapien’s penis but he moved it back. In another
incident, she told him she didn’t like it and to stop. He told her,
“to not cry, it’s going to be okay,” and continued touching her. He
told her, “to not tell anyone.” She did not tell her parents about
the abuse because she was scared and didn’t understand what
had happened.
I.B. (counts 12–13)
I.B. and her mother, Kathleen B., lived with Kristen B. and
Sapien in 2017. I.B. loved and “looked up to” Sapien because he
would take them to the park and “do fun things” with her and the
other children. I.B. enjoyed sleepovers at Kristen B. and Sapien’s
home with the other children. After Kathleen B. and I.B. moved
out, when I.B. was four years old, Kathleen B. would drop I.B. off
at Kristen B. and Sapien’s house to take care of her. Sapien was
sometimes the only adult in the house with I.B.
In 2019, when I.B. was six, she cried when her mother
dropped her off at Kristen B.’s and said she didn’t want to go.
She said Sapien made her uncomfortable because “she felt like he
was going to bite her face off.” Two or three days later, she told
her mother that Sapien had sexually abused her. After that,
Kathleen B. did not allow I.B. to be alone with Sapien. But she
did not report the abuse to the police at that time.

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A detective interviewed I.B. after Melissa B. went to the
police. I.B. said she went to Sapien’s house 20 times, and he
sexually abused her every time. She said she had told her
parents about the abuse but had “cut some of it off.”
I.B. testified she considered Sapien her uncle and “used to
love” him. She “tr[ied] not to think about” the abuse. On cross-
examination, counsel asked if she told the detective the truth and
didn’t “make up stories.” On redirect, I.B. admitted that she did
not tell the detective everything. For example, she told the
detective Sapien licked her belly button, but did not disclose that
Sapien also licked her “private area.”
Motions in limine
The prosecution made a motion in limine to admit expert
testimony regarding CSAAS. The motion summarized the
victims’ statements to police. The defense did not object to the
motion in general, but made a motion in limine to exclude
testimony that it is rare that children lie about being molested.
The court granted the prosecution’s motion to admit
CSAAS evidence. The court also granted the defense motion to
exclude evidence that child molest victims seldom lie.
CSAAS testimony
Jody Ward, Ph.D., a clinical and forensic psychologist,
testified about CSAAS as an expert witness for the prosecution.
Sapien did not object to her qualifications or to her testifying.
She testified that she did not know the facts of the case, and was
not testifying whether the victims were telling the truth or
whether Sapien committed the alleged crimes. She testified that
CSAAS does not diagnose whether sexual abuse occurred, but
helps understand a child’s reaction to abuse by someone with

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whom they have an ongoing relationship.
Dr. Ward testified that CSAAS has five components:
secrecy, helplessness, entrapment and accommodation, delayed
unconvincing disclosure, and recantation or retraction. Secrecy
means the abuse occurs outside others’ presence. It also means
the victims keep the abuse secret for long periods based on
embarrassment and “gentle reminders” to not tell, like saying
they or the abuser will get in trouble.
Helplessness refers to the power imbalance between adults
and children, and the dependency of children on adults. Adults
are also bigger and stronger than children. Younger children
without knowledge of sex may not realize the conduct is wrong.
Entrapment and accommodation allow the abuser to repeat
the abuse. The victims may acquiesce to the abuse because they
want to maintain the status quo of keeping the family together,
to keep other children from being abused, and to continue
receiving the positive aspects of the relationship such as care and
the provision of material or emotional needs. Victims may try to
not think about the abuse and try to forget about it, which may
interfere with their memory of the abuse.
Delayed, unconvincing disclosure is based on helplessness.
Victims may disclose a little at a time to “[t]est the waters” of the
other person’s reaction. Retraction or recantation occurs in “a
substantial minority of cases” as a reaction to the effects of the
disclosure.
Sapien’s statement
The prosecution introduced portions of Sapien’s interview
by police. He initially denied ever touching the victims
inappropriately. He suggested that if he had done so, his older
daughter would have “stood up and said something a long time

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ago.” He said if he had touched D.G., he “would have been in
trouble a long time ago.” He then admitted much of the sexual
abuse but minimized some of it, e.g., by stating he touched them
accidentally or claiming they initiated the conduct. He stated
that in the closet A.G. licked his elbow and kissed his neck and
chest. He also said it was “[p]ossible” he inserted his tongue into
her “butt and vagina” in the closet (counts 7 and 8). He denied
any sexual contact in the closet other than licking.
DISCUSSION
Admissibility of CSAAS evidence
Sapien contends the trial court abused its discretion when
it admitted CSAAS evidence. We disagree.
Sapien did not object to the admission of CSAAS evidence.
He moved only that the court exclude testimony that sexual
abuse victims seldom lie, and the court granted his motion.
Sapien thus forfeited an objection to CSAAS evidence by failing
to object to it in the trial court. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a);
People v. Stevens (2015) 62 Cal.4th 325, 333.)
Forfeiture aside, admission of the evidence was not error.
(People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1300–1302 (McAlpin).)
In McAlpin, our Supreme Court held that “expert testimony on
the common reactions of child molestation victims . . . is
admissible to rehabilitate such witness’s credibility when the
defendant suggests that the child’s conduct after the incident—
e.g., a delay in reporting—is inconsistent with his or her
testimony claiming molestation. [Citations.] ‘Such expert
testimony is needed to disabuse jurors of commonly held
misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and to explain the
emotional antecedents of abused children’s seemingly
self-impeaching behavior.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1300–1301.)

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We are bound by the Supreme Court precedent in McAlpin.
(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450,
455.) As we concluded in People v. Munch (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th
464, 468–472 (Munch), we do not deviate from McAlpin based on
contrary decisions in other jurisdictions. (Accord, People v.
Melgoza (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 632, 655–656.) Nor do we reject
CSAAS based on a purported failure to establish scientific
reliability. (Munch, at pp. 472–473.) And California cases
continue to allow CSAAS evidence. (E.g., Melgoza, at pp. 655–
656; People v. Lapenias (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162, 172–174.)
The record does not support Sapien’s contention that the
prosecutor argued that CSAAS established the abuse occurred.
The prosecutor told the jury: “The law is clear, you can’t use
[CSAAS] to say the defendant is guilty. But you can use that to
see that the way the victims acted in this case is common for
victims of child sexual abuse.” This is a correct statement of the
law. (McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1300.)
Relevance
Sapien also contends the CSAAS evidence was improperly
admitted because it was irrelevant. Again, Sapien’s failure to
object in the trial court forfeits this issue. (People v. Richardson
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1002.) Forfeiture aside, we conclude the
admission of expert testimony regarding CSAAS was not an
abuse of the trial court’s discretion. (People v. Sedano (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 474, 479.)
CSAAS helped explain the victims’ conduct to the jury. For
example, A.G. did not disclose the ongoing abuse because she was
scared. She was helpless, as shown by her unsuccessful attempt
to defend herself against the more powerful Sapien. He told her
not to tell anyone because it was a “secret” and she would “get in

8
trouble.” She accommodated the abuse by continuing to go to
Sapien’s home without complaint.
I.B. reported the abuse to her mother, but only after Sapien
had abused her numerous times. She held back some
information when she described the abuse to her mother and
police.
D.G. did not disclose the abuse until her mother asked her
about it years later. D.G. did not understand what was
happening to her at the time, she was scared, and Sapien told her
not to tell anyone. She was powerless to stop Sapien, as
evidenced by the incident in which she moved her hand away
from his penis and he moved it back. She “tr[ied] not to think
about” the abuse.
This case is unlike People v. Clotfelter (2021) 65
Cal.App.5th 30, upon which Sapien relies. The court there found
CSAAS testimony was irrelevant where “there was no testimony
that those victims delayed reporting or recanted, and Clotfelter
did not question their credibility at trial.” (Id. at p. 64.) Here, all
three victims delayed reporting and exhibited other behavior
explained by CSAAS. They were close to Sapien and considered
him their uncle. They were little girls powerless to prevent a
grown man from abusing them. The CSAAS concept of
accommodation explained why maintaining the status quo of
family relationships, housing, and childcare would motivate the
victims to continue to be around Sapien. Defense counsel raised
the issue of the victims’ credibility, questioning whether A.G. and
I.B. would “make up stories.” CSAAS evidence was thus relevant
and properly admitted.
Jury instruction
Sapien contends the jury instruction regarding CSAAS was

9
erroneous because it allowed the jury to use the expert testimony
as evidence of guilt. We again disagree.
The trial court advised the jury pursuant to a modified
version of CALCRIM No. 1193:
“You have heard testimony from Dr. Jody Ward regarding
child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome.
“Child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome relates to a
pattern of behavior that may be present in child sexual abuse
cases. Testimony as to the accommodation syndrome is offered
only to explain certain behavior of an alleged victim of child
sexual abuse.
“Dr. Jody Ward’s testimony about child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome is not evidence that the defendant
committed any of the crimes charged against him or any conduct
or crimes with which he was not charged.
“You may consider this evidence only in deciding whether
or not [A.G., D.G., and I.B.’s] conduct was consistent with the
conduct of someone who has been molested, and in evaluating the
believability of the alleged victim.”
Sapien forfeited his claim of instructional error because he
did not object in the trial court. “ ‘A party may not complain on
appeal that an instruction correct in law and responsive to the
evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has
requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language.’ ”
(People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 483.) But in the absence of
an objection, we may review a jury instruction “if the substantial
rights of the defendant were affected thereby.” (§ 1259.)
We conclude Sapien’s substantial rights were not affected
because CALCRIM No. 1193 is a correct statement of the law.
(People v. Page (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1032–1033; People

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v. Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 175–176.) Permitting
the jury to use CSAAS “ ‘in evaluating the believability of the
alleged victim’ ” does not “impermissibly permit[] jurors to
consider CSAAS testimony as evidence of guilt.” (Page, at pp.
1029, 1030.) We agree with Page that using CSAAS to evaluate
witness credibility versus using it as evidence of the truth of the
charges is not “ ‘a distinction without a difference.’ ” (Id. at
p. 1029.)
As we stated in Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at page 474:
“ ‘A reasonable juror would understand CALCRIM No. 1193 to
mean that the jury can use [the expert’s] testimony to conclude
that [the child’s] behavior does not mean she lied when she said
she was abused. The jury also would understand it cannot use
[the expert’s] testimony to conclude [the child] was, in fact,
molested. The CSAAS evidence simply neutralizes the victim’s
apparently self-impeaching behavior.’ ” (Italics omitted.) The
jury instruction here was correct.
Harmless error
Sapien contends the purported errors in admitting and
instructing about the CSAAS evidence were prejudicial. This
contention is without merit.
Sapien contends the admission of CSAAS evidence was
particularly prejudicial regarding counts 5 through 7 because he
did not admit “genital contact in the closet.” But in fact, Sapien
admitted it was “[p]ossible” he inserted his tongue into A.G.’s
vagina in the closet (count 7).
The evidence of guilt was overwhelming. The victims
described the sexual abuse Sapien inflicted on them. Their
testimony was consistent with, and corroborated by, their
statements to detectives, and three victims testified to similar

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acts he committed. Sapien also admitted much of the conduct.
The jury was properly instructed that if it found one or more
counts proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it was a factor to
conclude he committed the other charged offenses. (CALCRIM
No. 1191B; Evid. Code, § 1108, subd. (a); People v. Meneses (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 63, 67–68.)
We conclude any error was harmless under the California
and federal tests. If the CSAAS evidence had not been admitted
or the jury instruction not given, it is not “reasonably probable
that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have
been reached.” (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) We
also conclude “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”
(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

CODY, P. J.

YEGAN, J.

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David R. Worley, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Susan S. Kim, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.