P. v. Sandoval CA2/2

Filed 10/16/26 P. v. Sandoval CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B344048

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. BA501195)

CARLOS ALBERTO SANDOVAL,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Ray G. Jurado, Judge. Affirmed.
Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and
Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorneys General, Idan Ivri
and Maggie K. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
___________________________________
Carlos Sandoval was convicted of sexually abusing his
stepdaughters and sentenced to 85 years to life in prison. He
claims instructional error at trial. We find no error. First,
CALCRIM No. 3516 does not apply because appellant was
charged with continuous sexual abuse and specific acts of sexual
abuse in different time frames. Second, CALCRIM Nos. 1190 and
330 correctly instructed the jury on witness testimony. We
affirm.
FACTS
Appellant lived in Los Angeles with his wife and young
stepdaughters F.S. (born in 1996) and K.S. (born in 1997). F.S.
and K.S. considered appellant to be their father. They initially
were happy and had a good relationship with him.
Sexual Abuse of F.S.
Appellant began to groom F.S. when she was seven years
old and in elementary school. When she sat on the side of his lap,
he would move her to his groin area. She could feel his erect
penis against her buttocks while he rubbed her back and forth
against him, over clothing. This happened “very often.”
While F.S. was still seven, appellant entered her bedroom,
locked the door, touched her breasts under her clothing and put
his finger in her vagina. He showed her pornography and
emulated what was on the screen, including sucking on her
breasts. He told F.S. it was good for her and she would benefit
because it would make her breasts bigger. He also rubbed her
vagina against his penis while they were naked in a bathtub.
The touching continued until F.S. reached puberty.
F.S. had a vivid memory of one incident. Appellant said he
had “a surprise” for her and instructed her to get on her knees,
close her eyes, and open her mouth. She felt liquid in her mouth

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and saw that appellant was holding his penis and “peeing in my
mouth” while laughing. She was seven years old at the time.
F.S. distinctly remembered driving with appellant at night,
when she was in elementary school, after he told his wife that
they were going to buy food. At an abandoned house, he told her
to perform oral sex on him. She began crying. Appellant became
angry and told her “to do it.” He eventually gave up and drove
home when she could not stop crying.
Appellant began having sexual intercourse with F.S. when
she was 12 or 13 years old and in middle school. Intercourse
always took place on a massage table. She would lie on her
stomach looking at her laptop to disassociate herself, while
appellant stood behind her, held her legs, and had sex with her.
Intercourse took place weekly. On one occasion, K.S. entered the
room, then quickly left when she saw them. When F.S. was 15 or
16 and a high school freshman, she moved away from home to
escape appellant and his abuse.
F.S. did not tell others about the abuse because appellant
threatened her. When she was small, he said if she told anyone
what he was doing, “bad things were going to happen to me and
my family.” F.S. testified, “I was really scared, because I thought
that meant that we were all going to die.”
In ninth grade, F.S. told her friend Carla E. that appellant
inappropriately touched her and K.S. Carla testified that F.S.
seemed sad, angry, and hurt. Carla did not mention the abuse to
anyone, feeling that the decision to speak out was up to F.S.
F.S. told her mother about appellant’s abuse. Her mother
“said that it was a lie.” F.S. no longer has a relationship with her
mother, who stayed with appellant after F.S. disclosed the abuse.
F.S. tried to report appellant when she was in high school, but a

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lawyer told her it was “too late for me to do anything.” In 2019,
K.S. reported appellant and police contacted F.S. By then, F.S.
was a mother and in nursing school. Now that she has a
daughter, F.S. realizes it is important to speak up.
F.S. stated that appellant’s abuse was consistent from ages
seven to 15. After witnessing appellant having sex with F.S.,
K.S. told F.S. he was abusing her as well, but F.S. “just didn’t
want to talk about it.” They did not discuss it again.
Sexual Abuse of K.S.
After having a “good daughter/father relationship” with
appellant as a child, their relationship changed. At age 10, she
witnessed appellant having intercourse with F.S., who was bent
over the massage table with her pants down, and appellant was
behind her naked. K.S. closed the door to the room and left.
Appellant came out of the room, rubbed K.S.’s shoulders and said,
“ ‘It’s okay. I’m just massaging [F.S].’ ”
A week later, K.S. said, appellant “started doing it to me.”
He removed her pants and underwear, got behind her, placed his
penis near her vagina while rubbing it and said, “ ‘Is it in? Is it
in?’ ” He “inserted his dick inside me,” which was “awkward,
uncomfortable, it was strange,” K.S. testified. They were home
alone at the time.
Appellant warned K.S. if she told anybody about his
behavior, “my sisters and I would be separated and it would be
my fault.” He made this threat often. Appellant had intercourse
with K.S. on a weekly basis until she was 14 years old.
On other occasions, appellant took K.S. to a laundry room,
reached under her shirt, fondled her breasts, and sucked on her
nipples. He told her that this was okay because “my boobs were

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going to grow.” Appellant fondled K.S.’s breasts “whenever he
felt like it” from ages 14 to 16.
K.S. said appellant would “finger me,” meaning he “would
insert his fingers in my vagina,” starting at age 10. This took
place in the laundry room, though she recalled an incident in
which appellant pushed her against the living room wall, put his
hand under her clothing and inserted his fingers in her vagina.
The molestations continued until she was 14 years old.
K.S. testified that appellant “would make me kneel and he
would take off his pants and underwear and make me suck his
penis.” He made her “grab his penis and rub it back and forth.”
K.S. testified that oral copulation and rubbing appellant’s penis
occurred from ages 10 to 14.
When K.S. was 12, she approached her mother and “told
her what was happening.” Her mother replied, “ ‘You don’t know
what you’re talking about. You don’t know what that is.’ ” K.S.
felt her mother was dismissive and “I couldn’t depend on her.”
The abuse continued. K.S disclosed the abuse to her mother a
second time, when she was 16; her mother still did not believe
her so K.S. did not speak to her again about it.
When K.S. was in high school, she stayed on campus and
did not return home until late. She was ordered to leave home
when she was 18. She has had no contact with her mother since
she was 18, save for one time when her mother asked her to drop
sex abuse charges against appellant. She has had no contact
with appellant.
In 2019, K.S. reported appellant to police. Being married
and having a daughter made her think of what happened, which
had left a mental scar. It felt unfair he faced no consequences for
his conduct, so “something had to be done.” She informed police

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that F.S. may have been a victim as well. The sisters had never
discussed appellant’s sexual abuse.
K.S.’s husband testified that they have been friends since
they were teens. They now have three children. When they were
in high school, K.S. confided that appellant raped her for years.
She begged him not to tell anyone because she feared something
might happen to her or her siblings. K.S.’s voice changed when
she disclosed the abuse; she stuttered and began to cry. They did
not discuss the abuse again until 2019, when K.S. reported it to
police.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
An amended information charged appellant with two
counts of lewd or lascivious acts with a minor under age 14; two
counts of lewd behavior with a minor age 14 or 15; two counts of
continuous sexual abuse; and one count of sexual intercourse
with a minor age 10 or younger. (Pen. Code, §§ 288, subds. (a) &
(c)(1), 288.5, subd. (a), 288.7, subd. (a).)1 It alleged that he
engaged in substantial sexual conduct with multiple victims.
(§§ 667.61, subd. (b), 1203.066, subd. (a)(8).)
A jury found appellant guilty of all charges and found the
allegations true. The court sentenced him to prison for 85 years
to life.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
Instructional error claims are reviewed de novo. “In
reviewing a claim of instructional error, the court must consider
whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the trial court’s

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
We refer to section 288 violations as 288(a) and 288(c).

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instructions caused the jury to misapply the law in violation of
the Constitution. [Citations.] The challenged instruction is
viewed ‘in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial
record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the
jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.’ ”
(People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.)
2. Forfeiture
Respondent claims forfeiture because instructional defects
were not raised below. Appellant admittedly did not object to the
instructions. He argues that the issue was not forfeited because
the instructions detrimentally affected his substantial rights.
(People v. Mason (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 818, 823; People v.
Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 579–580 [instructional errors
that violate constitutional rights are not forfeited].)
“We decline to decide whether there was any forfeiture;
even if there were, we would exercise our discretion to address
the issue on the merits to forestall a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.” (People v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th
1004, 1014.)
3. Failure to Instruct with CALCRIM No. 35162
Appellant was charged with continuous sexual abuse. The
statute applies to young children molested over a prolonged
period “but the child, because of age or the frequency of the
molestations, or both, often is unable to distinguish one incident
from another in terms of time, place, or other particulars.”

2 “The defendant is charged in Count ___ with ____ and in
Count ___ with ____. These are alternative charges. If you find
the defendant guilty of one of these charges, you must find
(him/her) not guilty of the other. You cannot find the defendant
guilty of both.” (2 CALCRIM No. 3516.)

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(Stats. 1989, ch. 1402, § 1, subd. (a).) The molester, over three or
more months, must engage in “three or more acts of substantial
sexual conduct with a child under the age of 14 years” or “three
or more acts of lewd or lascivious conduct.” (§ 288.5, subd. (a).)
Appellant was also charged with lewd and lascivious acts on a
child under age 14 and on a child age 14 or 15; and intercourse
with a child under the age of 10. (§§ 288(a) & (c)(1), 288.7.)
A defendant may be charged with multiple counts for one
event. CALCRIM No. 3516 applies when the defendant is
charged with specific sexual offenses “during the same date
range” as continuous sexual abuse. (People v. Martinez (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 178, 184.) “[S]ection 288.5, subdivision (c)
clearly mandates the charging of continuous sexual abuse and
specific sexual offenses, pertaining to the same victim over the
same period of time, only in the alternative.” (People v. Johnson
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 240, 248, italics added.)
Here, the pleading and instructions listed time frames for
each count. (1 CALCRIM No. 207; 2 CALCRIM No. 3501.) They
were not pleaded in the alternative because appellant was not
charged with continuous sexual abuse and specific offenses for
the same victim over the same period:
Counts arising from the sexual abuse of F.S.
Count 7: § 288(a) April 26, 2003, to September 19, 2006;
Count 8: § 288.5 September 20, 2006, to April 25, 2010;
Count 9: § 288(c) April 26, 2010, to April 25, 2011.
Counts arising from the sexual abuse of K.S.
Count 10: § 288(a) October 21, 2007, to October 20, 2008;
Count 11: § 288.7 October 21, 2007, to October 20, 2008;
Count 12: § 288.5 October 21, 2008, to October 20, 2011;
Count 13: § 288(c) October 21, 2011, to October 20, 2012.

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The court had no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury with
CALCRIM No. 3516 because individual counts did not overlap
with continuous sexual abuse counts. The charging document
complies with section 288.5, subdivision (c). Neither the
statutory language nor its purpose restrict the prosecution’s
selection of a cutoff date for the defendant’s course of conduct or
require it to allege the entire period during which abuse occurred.
(People v. Cortes (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 62, 76–79; People v.
Anderson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 851, 891 [section 288 violations
“based on generic testimony may be charged in addition to a
violation of section 288.5 where the abuse continues beyond the
three-month period required for a conviction under section
288.5”].)
CALCRIM No. 207 states, “The People are not required to
prove that the crimes took place exactly between the periods
alleged but only that the crimes happened reasonably close to
those periods.” Appellant asserts that this instruction, along
with the victims’ testimony about sex acts occurring over 10
years, “left open the possibility of the jury relying on dates that
overlapped the time periods in the various counts to find
appellant had committed both a specific sex offense and relying
on that same act that he violated section 288.5.” The court did
not admonish the jury that the same acts could not be used to
convict for both specific acts of abuse and continuous abuse.
“CALCRIM No. 207 accurately states the general rule that
when a crime is alleged to have occurred ‘on or about’ a certain
date, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove the offense
was committed on that precise date, but only that it happened
reasonably close to that date.” (People v. Rojas (2015) 237

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Cal.App.4th 1298, 1304.) Appellant did not request “ ‘appropriate
clarifying or amplifying language.’ ” (Ibid.)
In closing argument, the prosecutor highlighted incidents
described by the victims to support each count without
suggesting they globally supported all counts. For count 7, the
prosecutor pointed to appellant’s lewd conduct with seven-year-
old F.S., when he rubbed her genitals against his erect penis and
sucked on her breasts. Count 9 arose from lewd conduct when
F.S. was 14 and appellant fondled her breasts and vagina.
Counts 7 and 9 did not overlap with the continuous abuse alleged
in count 8, which the prosecutor identified as weekly sexual
intercourse when F.S. was 12 and 13.
In support of count 10, the prosecutor cited K.S.’s testimony
that appellant took her to the laundry room at age 10, fondled
her breasts and sucked on her nipples. He had intercourse with
her when she was 10, which supported the charge in count 11.
As to count 13, K.S. testified that appellant fondled her breasts
“whenever he felt like it” from ages 14 to 16. Appellant put his
fingers in K.S.’s vagina, forced her to orally copulate and
masturbate him, and had intercourse with her when she was 11
to 14, which supported the continuous abuse charge in count 12.
We must assume that the jury applied the time periods
charged for each count, even if the victims could not recall exact
dates. (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 316.) The jury also
had to follow CALCRIM No. 3501, requiring unanimity that the
wrongful acts took place. No confusion arose because the acts
supporting each count occurred in the time frames set forth in
CALCRIM Nos. 207 and 3501.

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4. CALCRIM Nos. 1190 and 301
Appellant asserts that his due process and fair trial rights
were violated by instructions that bolstered the complainants’
testimony and lightened the prosecution’s burden of proof. The
instructions are CALCRIM No. 1190 (no corroboration is required
for a sex offense complainant) and CALCRIM No. 301 (a single
witness is sufficient).3
The “no corroboration” and “single witness” instructions
correctly state the law. (People v. Gammage (1992) 2 Cal.4th 693,
700 (Gammage).) Gammage explains that the “single witness”
instruction (CALJIC No. 2.27 at the time) “is given with other
instructions advising the jury how to engage in the fact-finding
process”; by contrast, the “no corroboration” instruction (CALJIC
No. 10.60 at the time) “declares a substantive rule of law, that
the testimony of the complaining witness need not be
corroborated. It is given with other instructions on the legal
elements of the charged crimes.” (Gammage, at pp. 700–701.)
The court in Gammage disagreed that “in combination, the
instructions create a preferential credibility standard for the
complaining witness, or somehow suggest that that witness is
entitled to a special deference. The one instruction merely
suggests careful review when a fact depends on the testimony of
one witness. The other tells the jury there is no legal

3 CALCRIM No. 1190: “Conviction of a sexual assault
crime may be based on the testimony of a complaining witness
alone.”
CALCRIM No. 301: “The testimony of only one witness can
prove any fact. Before you conclude that the testimony of one
witness proves a fact, you should carefully review all the
evidence.”

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corroboration requirement. Neither eviscerates or modifies the
other. . . . ‘There was no singling out of the testimony of the
prosecuting witness with a view of giving it undue prominence
before the jury.’ [Citation.] Nor do the instructions ‘dilute[] the
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.’ ” (Gammage, supra, 2
Cal.4th at p. 701.) The court added, “The jury is instructed that
the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
This places a heavy burden of persuasion on a complaining
witness whose testimony is uncorroborated.” (Ibid.)
Appellant concedes that Gammage rejected a challenge
identical to his own but writes, “Gammage was wrongly decided.”
As he notes, we must follow Gammage. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc.
v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) We decline
appellant’s invitation to disagree with Gammage. (People v.
Adames (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 198, 209–210.)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.
We concur:

CHAVEZ, J.

RICHARDSON, J.

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