Filed 7/15/26 P. v. Sandifer CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B343905
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA085003)
v.
JASON ISAAC SANDIFER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Emily J. Cole, Judge. Affirmed.
Thomas Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and David A. Wildman, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
The trial court denied Jason Isaac Sandifer’s motion for
pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code
section 1001.36,1 finding diversion was not feasible given
Sandifer would be in prison on a prior commitment for at least
six more months and that he would pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety if treated in the community. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Offense
In August 2021, while Sandifer was incarcerated in state
prison for solicitation to commit murder, correctional officers
found a note in his pocket stating he could obtain fentanyl,
heroin, methamphetamine, and cell phones. They then found
methamphetamine in incoming mail addressed to Sandifer. The
envelope listed a return address of a law office. Sandifer
admitted authoring the note and stated, “This is on me, I take
responsibility for all of it.”
In May 2023 officers searched Sandifer after he attempted
to enter a housing unit to which he was not assigned. He was
carrying a nine-inch-long, one-inch-wide metal cylinder
sharpened to a point at one end.
In October 2023 the People charged Sandifer with
conspiracy to furnish contraband (controlled substances) (count 1,
§§ 182, subd. (a)(1); 4573.9, subd. (a)) and custodial possession of
a weapon (count 2, § 4502, subd. (a)). It was further alleged that
Sandifer committed the offenses while in state prison (§ 1170.1,
subd. (c)) and that he had four prior strike offenses (§§ 667,
subd. (d); 1170.12 subd. (b)). Those convictions included
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
three convictions for assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1)) and one conviction for solicitation to commit murder
(§ 653f, subd. (b)). Sandifer pleaded not guilty.
B. Sandifer Seeks Mental Health Diversion
In April 2024 the trial court found Sandifer eligible and
suitable to receive services through collaborative drug treatment
court. The court ordered him to enroll in and complete the eight-
week Substance Transition and Re-Entry Treatment (START)
program in the Los Angeles County Jail run by the Los Angeles
Centers for Alcohol and Drug Abuse (L.A. CADA). However,
Sandifer’s initial referral to the START program was closed after
he was involved in a fight while in custody, which affected his
security level. Once Sandifer’s classification level was reduced,
the court issued a new START referral, and Sandifer enrolled in
and completed the program.2 But because Sandifer had pending
rules violation hearings based on his two charged offenses that
would likely result in losing custody credits and lengthen his
time in prison, the prosecution no longer agreed that Sandifer
was an appropriate candidate for the collaborative court, and
Sandifer’s case was transferred to another court for trial.
The same month Sandifer filed a motion for mental health
diversion under section 1001.36. He submitted a psychological
evaluation prepared by Dr. Joel Leifer, a court-appointed
2 According to L.A. CADA, the START program provides up
to nine hours a week of substance use disorder counseling (group,
individual, and crisis), alcohol and drug education, and case
management services.
3
psychologist, who concluded Sandifer met the criteria for
diversion under section 1001.36, subdivisions (b)-(c), for count 1.3
Leifer opined that (1) Sandifer suffered from a qualifying
mental disorder, (2) the disorder played a significant role in the
offense charged in count 1 (but not count 2), (3) his symptoms
would respond to treatment, and (4) he would not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the
community.
Leifer diagnosed Sandifer with substance use disorder
(alcohol, opioid (heroin), and stimulants (methamphetamine)),
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and generalized anxiety
disorder. Sandifer had a “severe form” of substance use disorder,
which began with using alcohol at age 10 and progressed through
his 20s to abusing morphine, oxycodone, heroin, and
methamphetamine. Leifer opined that Sandifer’s substance
abuse had been “an integral factor in his criminal history.” Leifer
determined Sandifer’s PTSD stemmed from being sexually
abused as a teenager while in custody, stabbed twice in prison,
and repeatedly assaulted while living on the streets. Sandifer
described an ongoing fear of similar assaults that affected both
3 The supplement to Sandifer’s petition for diversion that
contained Leifer’s report indicates it was proposed to be filed
under seal in the trial court, but the record on appeal does not
include a motion to seal or a sealing order as required by
California Rules of Court, rule 8.46(b)(2). Moreover, Sandifer’s
publicly available brief quotes and summarizes Leifer’s report
extensively. Accordingly, we do not deem the report “a record
sealed by order of the trial court” and determine we need not file
a public version of this opinion that redacts references to the
contents of Leifer’s report. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.46(b)(2),
(g).)
4
his sleep and waking life and was exacerbated by incarceration.
Sandifer’s generalized anxiety disorder caused “excessive worry,
irritability, muscle tension, sleep disturbance, and elevated heart
rate.” Leifer also noted that Sandifer had spent 11 days in a
mental-health crisis bed in May 2023 and had been prescribed
antipsychotic and anti-anxiety medications.
Leifer reported Sandifer’s mental disorders played a
significant role in count 1 (conspiracy to furnish controlled
substances in prison) because Sandifer suffered from a “chronic,
and unremitting addiction to substances.” As to count 2
(possession of a shank), however, Leifer found no evidence that
Sandifer’s mental illness contributed to the offense. Specifically,
Leifer indicated he “found no documentation describing any
symptoms of Mr. Sandifer’s mental illness playing a role in this
offense. Moreover, at the time of our interview, in his description
of the facts surrounding this offense, [Sandifer] failed to describe
experiencing any symptoms of a mental disorder that would play
a significant role in this offense.”
Leifer stated Sandifer’s symptoms would respond to
treatment. He attributed Sandifer’s continued substance use
while incarcerated to “the lack of intensive drug treatment
available in the prison system.” And the psychotropic medication
regimen provided while he was incarcerated was “inadequately
mitigating his psychiatric symptoms (anxiety, post-traumatic
stress).” Sandifer reported he was currently taking the
medication Sublocade by injection and it was helping him to
manage his cravings for drugs. However, Leifer concluded that
Sandifer required a more comprehensive treatment program than
what he was receiving in prison.
5
Sandifer had received drug treatment from 2007 to 2010
(presumably while out of custody) as well as residential
treatment at Henry Ohloff House. Sandifer had typically
relapsed shortly after discharge from treatment, but Leifer
attributed those relapses to a lack of “ongoing support and
supervision.” Leifer noted Sandifer wished to return to the same
residential treatment at Henry Ohloff House, and Leifer agreed
placement there would be appropriate provided the program
“executes the recommendations” in Leifer’s report.
Those recommendations included “[c]omprehensive,
residential dual diagnosis (psychiatric/substance abuse)
treatment” that was “long term” and “highly structured.” The
necessary treatment components included weekly individual
therapy, group psychotherapy two to three times per week,
substance-abuse counseling several times per week, psychiatric
medication management (consisting of weekly meetings with a
psychiatrist at first, tapered down to monthly once Sandifer was
stabilized), cognitive-behavioral strategies for pain management
and anxiety reduction, and drug testing.
Leifer concluded that “if Mr. Sandifer is treated in the
community that addresses these components [of his suggested
treatment plan], he would not pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety” and is “unlikely to commit a super-
strike.” Leifer reported that Sandifer demonstrated insight into
his criminal history, substance abuse, and the challenges he
would face in maintaining sobriety. Leifer also noted Sandifer
had strong family support from relatives in Louisiana and
Florida, and he had two longtime friends in recovery who would
support him.
6
Sandifer submitted a letter from L.A. CADA confirming he
had completed the START program. Sandifer “actively
participated in group sessions,” “was respectful and receptive to
the material,” “acknowledge[d] the severity of his addiction[,] and
recognize[d] that his drug/alcohol use has been influenced by the
lack of coping skills and knowledge of what having a[n] addiction
means.” The letter also noted Sandifer “expressed interest in
continuing treatment upon his release.”
At the January 29, 2025 hearing on the diversion motion,
defense counsel indicated he originally expected Sandifer to have
a parole hearing that month but now Sandifer would not be
considered for parole until June 2025. Counsel noted he had
provided the court with a letter from the Amity Foundation
(Amity), but the record does not contain that letter. Defense
counsel stated he believed Amity had “treatment programs in the
jail,” and then once Sandifer was paroled, Amity would help
Sandifer “with a placement.”
The People opposed Sandifer’s motion, arguing he would
not respond to treatment, as evidenced by his numerous refusals
to come to court, and would pose an unreasonable risk to public
safety if treated in the community. The People highlighted his
2017 conviction for solicitation to commit murder. The People
also argued there were “serious practical problems” with placing
Sandifer on diversion because he would be released in June 2025
at the earliest, if his in-prison rules violations did not result in
him serving additional time.
The trial court denied Sandifer’s motion. The court
explained: “The Court is going to deny the motion for mental
health diversion on two bases. The Court does find the defendant
is an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety; and, second
7
that he is unsuitable for mental health diversion. First, it’s not
just the current charges which, also, in the conspiracy, include
fentanyl, but also his prior history and his history in state prison
of dangerousness.”
Second, the court explained that for the next six months,
Sandifer would still be in prison and would have to “seek out
Amity … on his own. He can’t be ordered like a residential
treatment. He would have to go to Amity, agree to go to Amity.
He would have to be housed in a different setting. And just by
what I’ve witnessed of Mr. Sandifer over the last year of
maintaining his case, I do not think that he would go and do
those things with his constant refusals. And the way that I’ve
observed Mr. Sandifer, he would absolutely not do that.” The
court noted Sandifer’s many past refusals to come to court, and
the fact that the court had to order him brought to court in a
safety chair for the diversion hearing after having to make two
extraction orders for the previous day. The court concluded, “I
don’t find him suitable for the treatment whatsoever.”
After the court denied diversion, the People offered
Sandifer the middle term of three years on count 2 in exchange
for dismissal of count 1 and the strike allegations. Sandifer
pleaded no contest to count 2. The court sentenced him to a
three-year term to run consecutively with his current term. The
court dismissed count 1 and the remaining allegations in the
interest of justice under section 1385.
Sandifer timely appealed, and the trial court granted his
request for a certificate of probable cause.4
4 A defendant may appeal the denial of pretrial diversion
following a plea of guilty or no contest by obtaining a certificate of
8
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Section 1001.36 gives trial courts the discretion to grant
pretrial diversion for individuals with qualifying mental health
disorders. (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 626; People v.
Tourville (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 439, 451 (Tourville).) The court
may postpone prosecution, either temporarily or permanently, to
allow the defendant to receive mental health treatment. (Frahs,
at p. 626; Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124,
133 (Vaughn).) “The Legislature intended the mental health
diversion program to apply as broadly as possible.” (People v.
Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1149 (Whitmill); see Frahs,
at p. 632.)
A defendant must be both eligible and suitable for mental
health diversion. A defendant is eligible under section 1001.36,
subdivision (b), if (1) a qualified mental health expert has
diagnosed the defendant within the last five years with a mental
disorder identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (with limited
exceptions); and (2) the defendant’s mental disorder was a
significant factor in the charged offense. (See Vaughn, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 133; Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024)
98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891 (Sarmiento).)
A defendant is suitable for diversion under section 1001.36,
subdivision (c), if four requirements are met: (1) a qualified
mental health expert opines the defendant’s mental disorder
would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant consents to
probable cause. (People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138,
1147; People v. Padfield (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 218, 228.)
9
diversion and agrees to waive speedy trial rights; (3) the
defendant agrees to comply with treatment; and (4) if treated in
the community, the defendant will not pose an “unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety” as defined in section 1170.18.
(§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)-(4); see Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 891-892.) The defendant bears the burden “ ‘to make a
prima facie showing that the defendant will meet the minimum
requirements of eligibility for diversion and that the defendant
and the offense are suitable for diversion.’ ” (Vaughn, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 134.)
“Assuming the defendant is both eligible and suitable, the
trial court must also be satisfied ‘that the recommended inpatient
or outpatient program of mental health treatment will meet the
specialized mental health treatment needs of the defendant.’ ”
(Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 892; see § 1001.36,
subd. (f)(1)(A)(i); People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067,
1079.) “This is not an additional eligibility or suitability
requirement the defendant must meet. Rather, subdivision (f)(1)
of section 1001.36 read as a whole appears to contemplate an
ongoing assessment to assure that defendants will receive
appropriate treatment for their particular conditions as part of
the diversion program.” (Sarmiento, at p. 892; accord, People v.
Russo (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 134, 138 (Russo); Vaughn, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 134.) “Finding the treatment would not
meet defendant’s specialized health treatment needs is an
appropriate basis to deny diversion, assuming there is no abuse
of discretion with the analysis.” (Russo, at p. 139.)
Finally, even if the defendant makes a prima facie showing
that he or she meets the express statutory requirements, the trial
court retains residual discretion to deny diversion. (People v.
10
Cabalar (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 41, 53; Sarmiento, supra,
98 Cal.App.5th at p. 892.) This residual discretion must be
exercised “ ‘ “consistent with the principles and purpose” ’ ” of the
mental health diversion statutes. (Vaughn, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 135.)
We review the trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for
mental health diversion for abuse of discretion. (Vaughn, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 135; Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1147.) A court abuses its discretion when it makes an
arbitrary decision by applying the wrong legal standard or bases
its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not
supported by substantial evidence. (Vaughn, at p. 135; Whitmill,
at p. 1147.) “ ‘ “Substantial evidence includes circumstantial
evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that
evidence,” ’ ” but the inferences “ ‘ “may not be based on suspicion
alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise,
conjecture, or guesswork.” ’ ” (Vaughn, at p. 135.)
B. The Court Reasonably Concluded Sandifer Would Not
Receive the Necessary Treatment While Completing His
Prison Sentence for His Prior Offense
To grant mental health diversion, the trial court must be
“satisfied that the recommended inpatient or outpatient program
of mental health treatment will meet the specialized mental
health treatment needs of the defendant.” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (f)(1)(A)(i); see Vaughn, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 134.)
In his report, Leifer recommended a comprehensive, long-
term, “highly structured” residential dual diagnosis treatment
program for Sandifer. Necessary treatment components would
include weekly individual therapy, both group psychotherapy and
substance-abuse counseling several times per week, weekly
11
meetings with a psychiatrist, learning cognitive-behavioral
strategies, and drug testing. Leifer concluded that if Sandifer’s
treatment plan included these components, Sandifer was unlikely
to commit a super strike.
At the hearing on the diversion motion, the prosecution
expressed “serious practical problems” with the planned
treatment, particularly given it was possible Sandifer would
serve even longer than six more months after facing
consequences for his prison rule violations based on the conduct
underlying his new charges. Defense counsel acknowledged
Sandifer would not be eligible for release on parole for
six months. Defense counsel stated he “believe[d]” Amity had
treatment programs in the prison that Sandifer could attend, and
Amity would help find a placement for Sandifer once he was
paroled. He stated, “I don’t know if [Sandifer’s] security level …
will need to drop if he is sent back to prison in order to parole and
to make that happen, but that is what we would request. I think
the court does have the ability to have him sent back to state
prison to deal with his [rules violations] and to also attempt to
engage in treatment. I can definitely, as he approaches his
parole date, work on finding appropriate programs, working with
the parole department, or working with the resources that I have
available here.”
The trial court shared the prosecution’s concern that, for at
least the first six months of diversion, Sandifer would be in
prison. During that time he would have to seek out treatment at
a program on his own: “He can’t be ordered like [at] a residential
treatment.” Further, based on Sandifer’s “constant refusals” to
come to court over the past year during which the court had
overseen his case, it did not believe he would avail himself of the
12
available treatment. The court noted he had to be brought to
court in a safety chair for the diversion hearing after previous
orders that he be extracted from his cell (following a series of
refusals) were unsuccessful.
Although the trial court couched its comments as
pertaining to Sandifer’s “suitability” for diversion, the court’s
reasoning “mirrored the analysis under section 1001.36,
subdivision (f)(1)(A)(i),” which requires that the trial court be
satisfied that the recommended treatment program would meet
the defendant’s specialized mental health treatment needs.
(Russo, supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at p. 139.) In its recent decision
in Russo, the Court of Appeal dealt with a similar situation, in
which the trial court “explicitly found defendant was ‘not
suitable’ for diversion,” but the court’s reasoning reflected an
analysis under section 1001.36, subdivision (f)(1)(A)(i), of the
adequacy of the defendant’s proposed treatment. (Russo, at
p. 139) Although the trial court “conflated that analysis with the
suitability analysis,” the appellate court determined the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying diversion because
the proposed treatment would not meet the defendant’s
specialized health treatment needs: the defendant proposed to
return to the very same program he had completed before and
then relapsed, and did not identify anything that would be done
differently the second time. (Id., at pp. 139-140.)
Similarly, the trial court here did not abuse its discretion in
denying Sandifer’s request for mental health diversion on the
basis that Sandifer would not receive necessary treatment for at
least the first six months of his diversion while he continued to
serve out his prison term, prior to being paroled. The court could
reasonably conclude the treatment available to Sandifer in prison
13
would not be the type of comprehensive, highly structured
residential treatment program that Leifer determined was
essential for Sandifer’s success. Indeed, Leifer attributed
Sandifer’s continued substance use while incarcerated to “the
lack of intensive drug treatment available in the prison system”
and determined Sandifer was not able to receive a proper
psychotropic medication regimen in prison.
Sandifer contends that the court abused its discretion in
noting Sandifer’s frequent refusals to come to court, including
several times for the hearing on his motion seeking diversion,
and suggesting he was not likely to avail himself of the limited
treatment options that might be available in prison. He contends
his successful completion of the START program demonstrates he
was motivated to engage in treatment.
Sandifer refused to come to court on at least nine different
dates, not counting a number of missed court dates that were
deemed excused because Sandifer claimed he was sick. All were
after Sandifer had completed the START program and had been
taking prescribed medication that he said was helping him.
While Sandifer was successful in the START program, he made
no showing that a program comparable to the highly regarded
START program in Los Angeles County jail would be available to
Sandifer in prison. Defense counsel told the court he believed
Amity had programs in prison, but he provided no specificity
regarding those programs and no evidence such program existed.
Further, Leifer’s report noted Sandifer’s history of relapsing after
past treatments and attributed this to a lack of “ongoing support
and supervision.” The court reasonably determined such
supervision would not be provided in prison.
14
Even if the court improperly considered Sandifer’s pattern
of refusing to come to court as evidence that Sandifer was not
likely to be proactive and successful in treatment offered in the
prison system, the fact remains that the in-prison treatment
would not meet the parameters that Leifer deemed necessary for
Sandifer’s success. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its
discretion in denying diversion because Sandifer would not
receive appropriate treatment in prison.
C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Concluding
Sandifer Was Likely To Commit a Super Strike If Treated
in the Community
The court’s second basis for denying diversion was that
Sandifer would pose “an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety.” A defendant is not suitable for diversion if the court
determines he or she will “pose an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety, as defined in section 1170.18, if treated in the
community.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) The court did not abuse its
discretion.
“ ‘An unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as
defined in section 1170.18, subdivision (c), means “ ‘an
unreasonable risk that the [defendant] will commit a new violent
felony’ ” within the meaning of section 667,
subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv), which felonies are “colloquially referred
to as ‘super strikes.’ ” [Citation.] “Those super strikes are
murder, attempted murder, solicitation to commit murder,
assault with a machine gun on a police officer, possession of a
weapon of mass destruction, any serious or violent felony
punishable by death or life imprisonment, or any sexually violent
offenses or sexual offense committed against minors under the
age of 14.” ’ ” (Tourville, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 452; accord,
15
Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 679;
People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 799 [“[A]
defendant is not suitable for diversion if the defendant is ‘too
dangerous to be treated in the community because he [or she]
would commit a new violent super strike.’ ”].) In determining
whether the defendant is likely to commit a super strike, “[t]he
court may consider the opinions of the district attorney, the
defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider
the defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and
criminal history, the current charged offense, and any other
factors that the court deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c)(4).) The defendant need not be charged with a super
strike for the trial court to determine he or she is likely to commit
a super strike in the future. (People v. Bunas (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 840, 861-862.)
Sandifer contends the trial court “never made a finding
that [he] was likely to commit a ‘super strike’ offense as required
by the statute’s definition of dangerousness.” The court found
Sandifer posed “an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.”
Sandifer is correct that the trial court did not expressly find
Sandifer was likely to commit a super strike, but the statute does
not require the court to use those precise words. “In the absence
of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the court ‘knows and
applies the correct statutory and case law.’ ” (People v. Thomas
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 361.)
The record supports the determination the trial court
understood the narrow meaning of the “danger to public safety”
suitability factor under section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(4).
Leifer’s report stated “[t]he court can be satisfied that the person
is unlikely to commit a super-strike if granted diversion.”
16
Sandifer’s motion cited the correct statutory definitions of
“unreasonable risk [of danger to public safety]” and argued
Sandifer “does not pose an unreasonable risk of committing a
‘super-strike’ if treated in the community.” These arguments
were included under a heading stating, “The Court Must Find
that the Defendant Does Not Pose an Unreasonable Risk of
Committing a ‘Super-Strike’ if Treated in the Community.”
Similarly, the People’s opposition stated that “[i]n order to grant
diversion, the Court must be satisfied that the individual will not
pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety under Penal
Code section 1170.18, if treated in the community. … ‘ “Public
Safety’ is narrowly defined: ‘unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety’ means an unreasonable risk that the defendant will
commit a new violent felony. (See [§] 667 subd. (e)(2)(c)(iv).)”5
Based on this record, we presume the trial court applied the
correct statutory standard and impliedly found that Sandifer was
likely to commit a super strike if treated in the community. (See
People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449-451 [analyzing
whether record supported “the trial court’s implied finding that
[the defendant] was likely to commit a super strike offense”
following denial of diversion “on the ground that [the defendant]
was too dangerous to be treated in the community”].)
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
determination on this suitability factor. First, the court was
5 The People also argued that “crimes (other than super
strikes) can be unreasonably dangerous to public safety.”
However, as discussed, the People acknowledged in defining the
relevant legal standard that the risk to public safety was
“narrowly defined’ and cited to the applicable provision in
section 667.
17
concerned about Sandifer’s lengthy prior history of violent crime.
(See § 1001.36, subd. (c)(4) [in assessing danger to public safety,
courts may consider “the defendant’s violence and criminal
history”].) In 2005, he was convicted of assault with a deadly
weapon. In 2017, he sustained two additional convictions for
assault with a deadly weapon from conduct on two different
occasions. He also had been convicted of unlawfully causing a
fire of a structure. And at the time of the current offenses,
Sandifer was serving a 16-year prison sentence for solicitation to
commit murder, itself a super-strike enumerated in section 667,
subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv)(V). (See People v. Valencia (2017)
3 Cal.5th 347, 351 fn. 3.) Given this history of serious and violent
conduct, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding
Sandifer posed an unreasonable risk of committing a future
super-strike offense. (Cf. People v. Williams (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 990, 1003 [court abused its discretion in finding
defendant was likely to commit a super strike in part because he
had no prior criminal record]; People v. Moine, supra,
62 Cal.App.5th at p. 451 [record did not support finding
defendant was likely to commit a super strike in part because
“[n]one of [defendant’s] past convictions involved a violent felony,
let alone a super-strike felony”].)
Second, the court relied on the circumstances of the current
offenses. (See Pen. Code, § 1001.36, subd. (c)(4) [court may
consider “current charged offense” in determining if defendant is
likely to commit a super strike]; People v. Graham, supra,
102 Cal.App.5th at p. 799 [court may consider nature and
circumstances of the charged crimes]; accord, People v. Bunas,
supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 861-862.) Count 2 involved
Sandifer’s possession of a nine-inch sharpened weapon in prison.
18
Sandifer points to his PTSD diagnosis and argues “the totality of
the circumstances indicates that appellant had the weapon
because of his PTSD and general anxiety disorder, not merely
because he had a propensity for violence.” However, it is not
irrational to infer that Sandifer possessed the weapon for violent
and non-defensive purposes, particularly given that correctional
officers found it on him as he improperly attempted to enter a
housing unit that was not his own. (See Vaughn, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 135 [substantial evidence includes
circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn
from evidence].)
Finally, the court appropriately considered Sandifer’s
conduct while incarcerated in determining whether he was likely
to commit a super strike. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4) [court may
consider defendant’s “violence ... and any other factors that the
court deems appropriate”].) While housed in the local jail
pending trial, Sandifer’s participation in the START program was
initially delayed because he was involved in a fight, resulting in a
higher security classification. Although Sandifer later lowered
his security risk and completed the program, the incident
nevertheless demonstrated ongoing concerns regarding Sandifer’s
violent behavior and his ability to participate in treatment safely
and effectively. Taken together, Sandifer’s violent criminal
history, his current incarceration for solicitation to commit
murder, his possession of a sharpened weapon in prison, and his
recent custodial misconduct constitute substantial evidence
supporting the trial court’s implied finding that he posed an
unreasonable risk of committing a future super-strike offense if
treated in the community.
19
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
STONE, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
FEUER, J.
20