Filed 9/30/26 P. v. Sanchez CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F090163
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. SF018769A)
v.
FRANCISCO SANCHEZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Brian M.
McNamara, Judge.
Carlo Andreani, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and
Kari Ricci Mueller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Hill, P. J., Franson, J., and Snauffer, J.
Appellant Francisco Sanchez was convicted by jury of two counts of lewd and
lascivious acts with a child under the age of 14. He was originally sentenced to two
consecutive terms of 25 years to life under the “One Strike” law (Pen. Code,1 § 667.61).
Following our Supreme Court’s decision in In re Vaquera (2024) 15 Cal.5th 706, this
Court remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing, finding Sanchez had not
been put on notice of the potential 25-year-to-life terms his offenses carried. (People v.
Sanchez (Nov. 25, 2024, F077527) [nonpub. opn.].)
At resentencing, the trial court rejected trial counsel’s request to impose
concurrent terms, and instead sentenced Sanchez to two consecutive terms of 15 years to
life under the One Strike law. Sanchez appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its
discretion by relying on improper sentencing standards and factors to impose consecutive
term sentences. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 31, 2016, the Kern County District Attorney filed an information
charging Sanchez with two counts of sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child under the
age of 10 (§ 288.7, subd. (a); counts 1 & 3), and two counts of lewd and lascivious acts
with a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 2 & 4). As to counts 2 and 4,
the information further alleged a multiple victim enhancement (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(4)).
On April 5, 2018, a jury found Sanchez guilty on counts 2 and 4 and found the
multiple victim enhancements to be true. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on
counts 1 and 3, and the court declared a mistrial on those counts.
On May 17, 2018, the trial court sentenced Sanchez to an aggregate term of 50
years to life in state prison, consisting of two consecutive terms of 25 years to life.
Sanchez appealed, arguing inter alia, that his sentence violated his due process rights
1 All further undefined statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.
2.
because he had not received sufficient notice that he would be sentenced under the One
Strike law pursuant to section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2). This Court initially affirmed in
March 2022. However, Sanchez filed a petition for review, and following our Supreme
Court’s decision in Vaquera, the matter was transferred back to this Court with directions
to vacate our decision and to reconsider the case. On remand, this Court agreed that
Sanchez’s sentence needed to be reversed based on Vaquera’s holding, and we remanded
the matter back for a resentencing hearing.
On July 17, 2025, the trial court held a resentencing hearing. After hearing
argument from the parties, the court resentenced Sanchez to an aggregate term of 30
years to life, consisting of two consecutive terms of 15 years to life.
A timely notice of appeal followed.
The Underlying Conviction
The following statement of facts is taken from this court’s unpublished opinion in
People v. Sanchez, supra, F077527:
“The Prosecution’s Case
“John Doe No. 1 (JD1) and John Doe No. 2 (JD2) were born in 2010
and 2006 respectively. On August 28, 2016, JD1 and JD2 independently
told their mother, A.E., that Sanchez, her mother’s roommate, had sexually
abused them. JD1 specifically said Sanchez had ‘put his private part in –
behind him.’ A.E. reported the disclosure to police.
“On September 12, 2016, A.E. took JD1 and JD2 for forensic
medical examinations, performed by forensic nurse Sara Cooper. During
the examination, JD2 stated that Sanchez had put ‘his front privates into my
butt’ and that ‘it hurt.’ He also stated that he was scared of Sanchez.
“Because the alleged abuse had occurred approximately two years
prior, Cooper did not administer swabs for the perpetrator’s DNA. Cooper
made no findings as a result of the examinations. However, she explained
that the absence of an injury does not mean sexual abuse did not occur.
Approximately 95 percent of the forensic examinations conducted yielded
negative results.
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“On October 4, 2016, law enforcement recorded a pretextual
telephone call between A.E. and Sanchez. Sanchez repeatedly denied any
wrongdoing and maintained his innocence. He also denied giving JD2
money in exchange for JD2’s silence. A.E. confronted Sanchez about an
occasion where he had allegedly abused one of the children in the bath, and
Sanchez instructed him not to tell A.E. Sanchez denied any wrongdoing
and told A.E. to have the children ‘tested.’
“A.E. also confronted Sanchez about a prior incident wherein he
took her outside the City of Lost Hills to ostensibly get a hamburger. A.E.
claimed Sanchez made sexual comments to her during the encounter and
that he had touched her leg. A.E. was 15 years old at the time.
“In response to further questioning, Sanchez claimed that JD1 and
JD2 had fabricated the allegations. Sanchez told A.E. that if she had the
‘evidence in [her] hands [to] go for it.’ He warned her that she might be
‘lock[ed] up again’ if she pursued the allegations against him.
“The Interrogation
“On October 11, 2016, Kern County Sheriff’s Senior Deputy Lovan
interviewed Sanchez at the Delano police substation. Sergeant Ollague also
participated in the interview and acted as a Spanish language interpreter
between Lovan and Sanchez. At the beginning of the interrogation, Lovan
confirmed that Sanchez had been transported to the police station
voluntarily, that he was not placed in handcuffs, and that he was not under
arrest. He also explained the door to the interview room was closed for
privacy reasons, but that Sanchez could end the conversation at any time if
he needed to.
“During the interrogation, Sanchez initially claimed the pretextual
phone call placed by A.E. was about how he was taking care of the children
while A.E. was in jail. Sanchez explained he was from Chiapas, Mexico,
and that he used to be in charge of a church youth group for older kids. He
stated that he stays away from A.E. because he is a church person, and A.E.
drinks and goes out with men. Sanchez claimed A.E. was intoxicated
during the phone call so he eventually hung up on her.
“When confronted with further details about the phone call, Sanchez
admitted A.E. ‘was accusing [him] of something serious.’ Moments later,
Lovan announced, ‘I think we’re ready to go ahead and switch gears.’ He
told Sanchez that he and another detective were listening to the phone call,
that they knew what Sanchez had said during the call, and that he should
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start telling the truth. Lovan noticed that Sanchez appeared to be
uncomfortable.
“Ollague added that because Sanchez was a church guy, he had to
start telling the truth. Ollague stated that he and Lovan were going to try to
remove the weight from Sanchez’s shoulders. He further explained that
they had already spoken with the children and that the children had already
gone to the doctors. Ollague stated they also knew what Sanchez had done
to A.E. when she was younger.
“Sanchez initially denied sexually abusing JD2, but admitted the
abuse almost immediately thereafter. Sanchez claimed that when JD2 was
seven years old, JD2 told Sanchez that another boy had ‘poked’ JD2 from
behind. JD2 told Sanchez that he liked being poked by other children. JD2
would follow Sanchez around and ask Sanchez to poke him. Sanchez
clarified that JD2 was asking Sanchez to have anal sex with him. Sanchez
admitted that he ‘poked’ JD2 on two separate occasions. Sanchez explained
JD2 had pulled his own pants down and Sanchez had inserted his penis into
JD2’s anus. He did not feel his penis go all of the way inside of JD2’s anus.
JD2 screamed and Sanchez hugged him. Sanchez said, ‘Forgive me son, I
don’t know what I’m doing.’ JD2 was seven years old at the time of the
incident.
“The second time occurred when JD2 was nine years old. Sanchez
stated that on this occasion, he touched the inside of JD2’s buttocks with
his penis.
“Sanchez admitted that when JD1 was approximately four-and-a-
half years old, he did the same thing to JD1. JD1 was playing in the water
tubs where they washed vegetables. Sanchez removed JD1 from the tub,
pulled down JD1’s shorts, and inserted his penis into JD1’s anus.
“At the conclusion of the interrogation, Lovan asked Sanchez
whether he had asked God for forgiveness for what he had done to the
children. They gave Sanchez a notepad to write apology letters to JD1 and
JD2. The letters mentioned ‘abuse’ but did not specify how JD1 and JD2
had been abused. Sanchez was arrested at the end of the interrogation.
“JD1’s Testimony
“JD1 identified Sanchez as the defendant. JD1 stated that Sanchez
had touched him in a bad way. JD1 did not recognize himself in a video
wherein he was being interviewed by the forensic interviewer. However, he
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remembered telling the interviewer that Sanchez had ‘put his thing on top
or inside of [his] butt.’
“JD2’s Testimony
“JD2 was 11 years old at the time of Sanchez’s trial. He lived at his
grandmother’s house for a period of time, where Sanchez lived as well. JD2
identified Sanchez as the defendant at trial.
“JD2 testified that Sanchez had touched him with his front private
part and his fingers. He explained that Sanchez had used ‘his front private
part’ to touch JD2’s back part and that Sanchez’s front private part went
inside. This occurred approximately three times and it hurt JD2. Sanchez
told JD2 not to tell anyone and he gave him money.
“Defense’s Case
“Sanchez waived his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination and testified at trial. He stated that he is from Chiapas,
Mexico, a rural area, that he does not have much of an education, and he
has never been convicted of any crimes. Sanchez claimed that he did not
understand the Spanish that was spoken to him by the Spanish-speaking
deputy. He further claimed he did not mean to confess to child molestation
and denied ever molesting anyone. Sanchez stated JD1 and JD2 had lied to
the forensic interviewer and during their testimony at trial.”
The Resentencing Hearing
Trial counsel filed a sentencing brief asking the court to impose Sanchez’s
convictions on counts 2 and 4 concurrently, rather than consecutively. Trial counsel
observed that Sanchez had no prior criminal history, he had incurred no disciplinary
violations since his incarceration, and that Sanchez was making efforts toward
rehabilitation by participating in self-help groups, being active in church, and working as
a porter. Counsel further observed that Sanchez’s age and his time in person has reduced
his risk for future violence, and that Sanchez has shown remorse for his actions.
The prosecutor, in turn, argued for imposition of consecutive sentences. He stated
that the record contained a victim impact statement dated May 16, 2018, that was written
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by the victims’ mother. The prosecutor encouraged the court to review the probation
officer’s report again which included the victim impact statement.2
The prosecutor observed that the crimes involved two separate victims who were
both young, that Sanchez was in a position of trust and authority relative to the victims,
and that the victims were defenseless. He added that on the spectrum of lewd conduct
cases, Sanchez’s conduct was on the extreme end, explaining that both victims described
being sodomized by Sanchez.3
The trial court agreed that imposition of consecutive term sentences was
warranted. The court stated it had read the probation officer’s report and had considered
the matter carefully, endorsing the prosecutor’s arguments regarding the victims’ age and
emphasizing its own experience presiding over similar cases. The court acknowledged
that it had no updated information on the victims’ recovery, but considering their ages
and the potential lifelong impact of the offenses on their ability to deal with life, their
relationships, and their goals, the court characterized the effect on the victims as “a [l]ife
sentence[.]”
After a brief interruption caused by a lost phone connection with Sanchez, the
court continued. It again emphasized the impact of Sanchez’s crimes on the two young
victims, while commending Sanchez on his post-sentencing rehabilitation efforts. The
court stated that Sanchez’s age was significant, and that his positive institutional record
2 The victim impact statement states the following:
“My children are in fear of being alone and around males. My
oldest son is having issues in school, and does not want to attend.”
“I believe [Sanchez] deserves more time for the innocence he has
taken from my children.”
“There is no time that will heal the pain, he deserves life. I don’t
want him free and hurting other innocent children.”
3 The trial court clarified that the sodomy charges had been dismissed.
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would likely benefit him at future parole proceedings. However, the victims should not
be overlooked in the context of the resentencing proceedings.
DISCUSSION
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY IMPOSING
CONSECUTIVE TERM SENTENCES ON COUNTS 2 AND 4
Sanchez contends the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive
rather than concurrent term sentences. The Attorney General argues that Sanchez
forfeited his claim by failing to object below, and that Sanchez’s contention fails on the
merits. We agree that Sanchez’s claim fails on the merits. Consequently, we need not
and do not address forfeiture.
A. Applicable Law
“It is well established that a trial court has discretion to determine whether several
sentences are to run concurrently or consecutively.” (People v. Bradford (1976) 17
Cal.3d 8, 20; § 669, subd. (a).) Accordingly, a trial court’s decision whether to impose
concurrent or consecutive sentences is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
(Bradford, supra, at p. 20.) Abuse of discretion will only be found in limited
circumstances, such as where a trial court is “unaware of the scope of its discretion”
(People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 694), “considered impermissible factors”
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378), or renders a decision “so irrational or
arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Id. at p. 377.)
The burden is on the party attacking the sentence to show error. In the absence of
such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted legitimately. (People v.
Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977, superseded by statute on other
grounds as indicated in People v. Lynall (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1108.)
B. Analysis
Various rules promulgated by the Judicial Council, including the California Rules
of Court, guide a trial court’s decision whether to impose consecutive or concurrent
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sentences. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 349.) California Rules of Court, rule
4.425 identifies several factors relevant to that determination. These factors are
guidelines rather than mandatory requirements. (People v. Calderon (1993) 20
Cal.App.4th 82, 86–87; People v. Lepe (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1347, 1351.)
Under California Rules of Court, rule 4.425, consecutive sentences may be
imposed where the crimes and their objectives are independent of one another, involve
separate acts of violence or threats of violence, or occur at different times or in separate
places rather than so closely connected in time and place as to indicate a single period of
aberrant behavior. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.425(a).) The court may also consider
aggravating factors (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421), except where they are elements of
the crime or have already been used to impose an upper term or enhancement. (Cal.
Rules of Court, 4.425, subd. (b)(1)–(3); People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 350, fn.
12.)
Subdivision (a) of California Rules of Court, rule 4.408 further provides that the
criteria identified in the California Rules of Court are not exclusive and that the
sentencing court may consider any other factor reasonably related to the sentencing
decision. Only one valid factor is necessary to support the imposition of consecutive
term sentences. (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 728–729; People v.
Bishop (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 373, 382–383; People v. King (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th
1281, 1323.)
Here, the trial court imposed consecutive term sentences on counts 2 and 4, which
arose from Sanchez’s commission of lewd and lascivious acts upon different victims on
separate occasions. In selecting consecutive term sentences on these counts, the trial
court cited the age of the two victims and the continuing impact the offenses were likely
to have on them. Those considerations were reasonably related to the sentencing decision
made and therefore constituted a proper factor under California Rules of Court rule
4.408.
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Sanchez nonetheless maintains that the trial court erred by relying upon its
experience presiding over similar cases in determining that the crimes likely continue to
affect the young victims. According to Sanchez, “[he] was denied an informed exercise
of discretion when the trial court had no updated report on the actual impact upon the
complainants.” But the authority upon which he relies—People v. Belmontes (1983) 34
Cal.3d 335 (Belmontes), United States v. Tucker (1972) 404 U.S. 443 (Tucker), People v.
Morales (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 537 (Morales), In re Lewallen (1979) 23 Cal.3d 274
(Lewallen), and People v. McInnis (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 853 (McInnis)—do not support
his argument.
Belmontes states the general proposition that “[a] court which is unaware of the
scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise that ‘informed discretion’ than
one whose sentence is or may have been based on misinformation regarding a material
aspect of a defendant’s record.” (Belmontes, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 348, fn. 8.) But the
trial court was not relying upon speculative or incorrect information in concluding that
Sanchez’s crimes will have a lifelong impact on the victims. Rather, it is a fair inference
based on the nature of the crimes, the 2018 victim impact statement, and the court’s
experience.
The harm suffered by the victims here will almost certainly continue to impact
them, and no updated report or victim impact statement was needed to confirm as much.
(See People v. Meeks (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 695, 709 [“Sexual offenses … invade the
deepest privacies of a human being, and thereby may cause permanent emotional
scarring.”]; People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 243 [“ ‘[S]ection 288 was enacted to
provide children with “special protection” from sexual exploitation. [Citation.] The
statute recognized that children are “uniquely susceptible” to such abuse as a result of
their dependence upon adults, smaller size, and relative naivete. [Citation.] The statute
also assumes that young victims suffer profound harm whenever they are perceived and
used as objects of sexual desire’ ”].)
10.
Tucker, Morales, Lewallen, and McInnis likewise fail to advance Sanchez’s
argument as these cases involved materially different circumstances than those present in
the instant matter. In Tucker, the United States Supreme Court held that remand for
resentencing was appropriate where the trial court expressly relied on three prior felony
convictions in sentencing the defendant. Two of the prior convictions upon which the
court relied were constitutionally invalid, and the record suggested the sentence might
have been different had the court been aware of their invalidity. (Tucker, supra, 404 U.S.
at pp. 443–445, 447–448.) In Morales, the court imposed consecutive term sentences
because the defendant plead not guilty, demanded a jury trial, and requested a public
defender. (Morales, supra, 252 Cal.App.2d at pp. 542, 546–547.) In other words, the
defendant was punished more severely for exercising his constitutional rights. Likewise,
in Lewallen, the defendant was also punished more severely for exercising his
constitutional right to a jury trial. (Lewallen, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 277.)
Finally, in McInnis, the sole reason the court imposed consecutive term
sentences—the possibility that the defendant could obtain appellate relief on one or more
counts—was without dispute, an improper factor. (McInnis, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp.
865–866.) But here, the trial court did not rely upon incorrect facts or law in determining
that consecutive sentences were warranted. The court relied upon the victims’ young
ages and the continuing impact of Sanchez’s offenses on them—both appropriate
considerations in imposing consecutive terms.
We conclude that the trial court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences did not
exceed the bounds of reason, nor was it arbitrary or capricious. The court identified valid
sentencing factors, and substantial evidence supports those findings. We therefore find
Sanchez’s assertion to the contrary unpersuasive.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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