Filed 10/6/26 P. v. Sanchez CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B349145
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA108197
v.
JULIO CESAR IBANEZ
SANCHEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Thomas R. Sokolov, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with instructions.
Mher Cholakhyan, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven D. Matthews, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Julio Cesar Ibanez Sanchez appeals the denial of his
motion under Penal Code section 1473.7, subdivision (a), to
withdraw his no contest plea and vacate his conviction. (Further
undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) He
asserts reversal is required because he did not meaningfully
understand the immigration-related consequences of his plea and
that this was prejudicial. The People concede Ibanez Sanchez’s
lack of understanding. And on our independent review, we
conclude Ibanez Sanchez has shown prejudice — that being a
reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea had he
correctly understood its immigration consequences. We,
therefore, reverse the order denying Ibanez Sanchez’s section
1473.7 motion. We remand and direct the trial court to grant his
motion, vacate his conviction, and permit him to withdraw his
plea.
I.
Ibanez Sanchez moved to the United States from Mexico in
1999, when he was about 23 years old. Though he has lived in
the United States for over 25 years, he is neither a citizen nor a
lawful permanent resident.
A pre-conviction probation officer’s report reflects that on
July 13, 2023, police officers responded to burglaries at
neighboring homes in Rolling Hills Estates. A Ring camera
captured Ibanez Sanchez and co-defendant Ashley Valdes
walking through the victims’ properties and, later, running from
the rear of one of the properties with items in their hands.
Responding police officers arrested Ibanez Sanchez and Valdes
after finding them hiding in heavy brush nearby. Valdes had
several phones, laptops, an iPad, a drill, clothes, and a pry bar in
her possession, all of which the victims identified as theirs. A
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search of Ibanez Sanchez’s car turned up a wallet, credit cards,
and a briefcase, none of which belonged to him or to Valdes.
Closets and drawers in the victims’ homes had been ransacked.
Four days later, the People charged Ibanez Sanchez with
two counts of first degree residential burglary (§ 459; counts one
and two) and one count of receiving stolen property exceeding
$950 in value (§ 496, subd. (a); count three). Ibanez Sanchez
initially pleaded not guilty to the charges.
On July 31, 2023, Ibanez Sanchez accepted a plea deal. He
withdrew his not guilty plea on count one and pleaded no contest
to that count. The People dismissed the remaining charges. The
trial court found Ibanez Sanchez guilty of count one and
sentenced him to two years in prison. Before entering this no
contest plea, Ibanez Sanchez answered “[y]es” when asked by the
trial court whether he understood that, if he is not a citizen, “a
plea of guilty or no contest will result in [his] deportation, denial
of naturalization or removal from this country.” He also
answered “[y]es” when asked by the court whether his counsel
“discussed [his] immigration consequences with [him].”
In July 2024, about a year into his prison sentence, Ibanez
Sanchez was released from custody for good behavior.
Immediately thereafter, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
detained him and initiated removal proceedings.
Ibanez Sanchez moved to vacate his conviction under
section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1). He argued he did not fully
understand the immigration consequences of his plea because his
former lawyer and plea counsel, Dana Flaum, did not properly
inform him of those consequences. Specifically, he noted Flaum
advised that a burglary conviction would not subject him to
deportation, but did not tell him that a two-year prison sentence
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would render him ineligible for cancellation of removal, a
discretionary form of relief preventing deportation once it has
been sought, and preclude him from obtaining lawful status. Had
he known his sentence would carry such consequences, Ibanez
Sanchez argued, he would not have accepted the plea deal and
would have instead sought an immigration-neutral alternative.
The People opposed Ibanez Sanchez’s motion to vacate,
arguing his declaration was not credible, as it contradicted his
statements at the plea hearing that he understood his plea would
result in deportation, denial of naturalization, or removal from
the United States, and that he discussed the plea’s immigration
consequences with Flaum. They further asserted: “[T]here is no
indication that Defendant would have done anything differently
at the time of his plea had he known he would be deported, nor
that the People would have offered him any disposition that
would have been more ‘immigration safe.’ ”
Following a hearing, the trial court denied relief. The court
expressed its view that the People had a strong case against
Ibanez Sanchez and had given him “the normal offer” for a person
charged with two counts of residential burglary. Accordingly, the
court explained that, having considered the totality of the
circumstances and “looking at what the . . . results would have
been otherwise,” it could not “fathom . . . that the results in this
case would have been any different” had Ibanez Sanchez rejected
the plea.
Ibanez Sanchez timely appealed.
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II.
A.
Section 1473.7 permits noncitizens who are no longer in
criminal custody to seek vacatur of a conviction or sentence if
they can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, “[t]he
conviction or sentence is legally invalid due to prejudicial error
damaging [their] ability to meaningfully understand, defend
against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse
immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence.” (§ 1473.7,
subd. (a)(1).) “A finding of legal invalidity may, but need not,
include a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Ibid.)
To obtain relief under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1), “a
defendant must satisfy two elements.” (People v. Curiel (2023)
92 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1172 (Curiel).) “The defendant must first
show that he did not meaningfully understand the immigration
consequences of his plea. Next, the defendant must show that his
misunderstanding constituted prejudicial error. ‘[P]rejudicial
error . . . means demonstrating a reasonable probability that the
defendant would have rejected the plea if the defendant had
correctly understood its actual or potential immigration
consequences.’ ” (People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 319
(Espinoza), quoting People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 529
(Vivar).) If the court finds the defendant has made both of these
showings and has “establish[ed] that the conviction or sentence
being challenged is currently causing or has the potential to
cause removal or the denial of an application for an immigration
benefit, lawful status, or naturalization,” it must grant the
motion and allow the defendant to withdraw the plea. (§ 1473.7,
subd. (f).)
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We independently review a defendant’s entitlement to relief
under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1). (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at pp. 524–525, 527.) In so doing, we “ ‘exercise[ ] [our]
independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the
rule of law.’ ” (Id. at p. 527.) We defer to the trial court’s factual
findings to the extent they turn on the credibility of a witness’s
live testimony. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320.) But
when, as here, “the trial court’s findings ‘derive entirely from
written declarations and other documents,’ the trial court and the
reviewing court ‘ “are in the same position,” ’ and no deference is
owed.” (Id. at p. 320, quoting Vivar, at p. 528.)
B.
Ibanez Sanchez is entitled to relief under section 1473.7,
subdivision (a)(1), because he has shown, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that his misunderstanding of his plea’s immigration
consequences constituted prejudicial error.
Ibanez Sanchez first argues, and the People concede, he has
demonstrated he did not fully understand the immigration
consequences of his plea.
Having reviewed the record, we agree with the parties.
Flaum’s declaration shows he correctly advised Ibanez Sanchez
that a first degree burglary conviction would not automatically
result in deportation, but did not explain that a two-year prison
term would prohibit Ibanez Sanchez from seeking cancellation of
removal to defend against deportation if it was sought. (See
Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 531; see also 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1229b(b)(1)(B) [permitting cancellation of removal where an
alien has shown, among other things, he “has been a person of
good moral character”] & 1101(f)(7) [“No person shall be regarded
as, or found to be, a person of good moral character” if they
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“ha[ve] been confined, as a result of conviction, to a penal
institution for an aggregate period of one hundred and eighty
days or more”].) Ibanez Sanchez’s declaration states that, relying
on Flaum’s advice, he “believed that if [he] served [his] jail time,
[he] would be able to put the incident behind [him] and avoid any
further immigration consequences.”
The question remaining, then, is whether Ibanez Sanchez
has demonstrated prejudice.
“A defendant establishes prejudice by showing that there is
a ‘reasonable probability’ that they would not have entered the
plea if they had ‘correctly understood its actual or potential
immigration consequences’ and their options for defending
against those consequences. [Citation.] ‘A reasonable probability
does not mean more likely than not. [Citation.] Instead, it
means merely a reasonable chance, which is more than an
abstract possibility. [Citation.] In other words, a reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.’ [Citation.] Because immigration consequences
may be more important to a noncitizen defendant than any term
of incarceration, the focus of this inquiry is on ‘ “what the
defendant would have done, not whether the defendant’s decision
would have led to a more favorable result.” ’ ” (People v.
Hernandez (2026) 20 Cal.5th 598, 626 (Hernandez).)
To determine whether a defendant has shown prejudice
entitling him to section 1473.7 relief, we “ ‘consider the totality of
the circumstances.’ [Citation.] ‘Factors particularly relevant to
this inquiry include the defendant’s ties to the United States, the
importance the defendant placed on avoiding deportation, the
defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the
defendant had reason to believe an immigration-neutral
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negotiated disposition was possible.’ [Citations.] Also relevant
are the defendant’s probability of obtaining a more favorable
outcome if he had rejected the plea, as well as the difference
between the bargained-for term and the likely term if he were
convicted at trial. [Citation.] These factors are not exhaustive,
and no single type of evidence is a prerequisite to relief.”
(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 320–321.)
“A defendant must provide ‘ “ ‘objective evidence’ ” ’ to
corroborate factual assertions. [Citation.] Objective evidence
includes facts provided by declarations, contemporaneous
documentation of the defendant’s immigration concerns or
interactions with counsel, and evidence of the charges the
defendant faced.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 321.)
Applying these principles on independent review, we
conclude Ibanez Sanchez has established a reasonable probability
that he would have rejected the plea had he known of its
immigration consequences.
Ibanez Sanchez has shown substantial ties to the United
States that would have caused him to prioritize an immigration-
neutral plea. To demonstrate those ties, Ibanez Sanchez relies on
his own declaration, the declarations by his partner of more than
20 years and his 17-year-old daughter, along with letters of
support from his brother and his sister-in-law. These documents
show Ibanez Sanchez and his entire family have lived in the
United States for over 25 years. He emigrated from Mexico in
1999, when he was 23 years old, in order to reunite with his
mother and siblings, who previously moved to the United States
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. His mother, partner, and
daughter are United States citizens, while his stepfather and
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brothers are legal permanent residents. Ibanez Sanchez’s last
remaining relative in Mexico died more than 20 years ago.
Ibanez Sanchez supports his family financially and
emotionally. Throughout his time in the United States, he has
worked alongside his brothers as a welder on construction
projects throughout the state. His brothers and his elderly
mother, who suffers from a severe heart condition and
Alzheimer’s, rely on him for support.
Until his arrest in July 2023, Ibanez Sanchez lived with his
partner and his daughter, as well as his partner’s five-year-old
grandson, who his partner adopted as a baby and who views
Ibanez Sanchez as a father figure. Besides helping his partner
with expenses, Ibanez Sanchez was heavily involved in the
children’s lives and has strong relationships with them. He cared
for them while his partner worked. He consistently attended his
daughter’s school events and wants to be present for the
children’s milestones in the future.
Such “substantial ties to the United States” are an
“important factor in support of granting relief” and in showing
prejudice. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 322.)
Further, Ibanez Sanchez has sufficiently shown the
plausible availability of alternative, immigration-neutral
dispositions at the time of his plea, despite the evidence
marshalled against him. Ibanez Sanchez points to the
declaration of Sasha Novis, the attorney representing him in his
immigration case, where he is currently contesting removal, and
a self-described expert in “crimmigration,” the intersection of
immigration and criminal law. The declaration of an
immigration law expert can explain whether the defendant “could
have pleaded to alternative, immigration-safe dispositions.”
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(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 321.) Novis opines that at the
time of the plea, Ibanez Sanchez could have pursued “alternative
pleas . . . that would have preserved his eligibility for cancellation
of removal. For example, [he] could have spent more time in
incarceration pre-trial and agreed to a sentence of less than 180
days with probation. Alternatively, he could have also agreed to
two counts of burglary, as initially sought by the District
Attorney’s Office in its complaint, and negotiated a sentence of
less than 180 days total with credit for time served pre-trial
and/or probation. Either of these options would have preserved
[his] eligibility for relief from removal.”
The People assert Novis’s declaration fails to establish the
availability of immigration-neutral alternatives in Ibanez
Sanchez’s case. Employing reasoning similar to that of the trial
court in denying Ibanez Sanchez’s section 1473.7 motion, the
People emphasize the absence of evidence showing those
alternatives “were commonly offered to similarly situated
defendants” or would have been acceptable in negotiations with
the People, given the People’s likelihood of prevailing at trial.
But whether Ibanez Sanchez “could have secured a more
favorable deal or prevailed at trial does not conclusively
determine whether he established prejudice under section
1473.7.” (People v. Padron (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 950, 964.)
This is so because “[t]he focus [is] on ‘what the defendant would
have done, not whether the defendant’s decision would have led
to a more favorable result’ . . . .” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 528–529.) Accordingly, our Supreme Court has explained
that in evaluating whether a defendant would have rejected a
plea “ ‘on the hope or expectation of negotiating a different
bargain without immigration consequences,’ ” we “need not
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decide whether the prosecution would actually ‘have offered a
different bargain’ — rather, [we] should consider ‘evidence that
would have caused the defendant to expect or hope a different
bargain would or could have been negotiated.’ ” (Id. at p. 529.)
Ibanez Sanchez could have expected or hoped for a different
bargain. Per the pre-conviction probation report, Ibanez Sanchez
has a minor criminal record, consisting only of two misdemeanor
convictions, both of which occurred more than 10 years before his
arrest in 2023. Specifically, he was convicted of driving under
the influence of alcohol in 2009 and, a year later, suffered a
conviction for driving without a license. (Veh. Code §§ 23152,
subd. (a), 12500, subd. (a).) “[W]ithout an extensive criminal
record,” Ibanez Sanchez “may persuasively contend that the
prosecutor might have been willing to offer an alternative plea
without immigration consequences.” (Espinoza, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 324; see also People v. Rodriguez (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 301, 325 (Rodriguez) [finding defendant may have
sought to obtain an immigration-neutral plea or risked going to
trial because the record did not reflect defendant “had such a
serious criminal record that the prosecution would necessarily
have been unwilling to enter an immigration-neutral plea”].)
Ibanez Sanchez also may have reasonably held out hope for
a different, immigration-neutral bargain for other reasons. He
entered his plea early in the case, only two weeks after the People
filed their complaint against him and before a preliminary
hearing was held. He, therefore, “never tested the prosecution’s
resolve” and could have sensibly believed further negotiations
were possible. (Rodriguez, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 326.)
Further, the People’s willingness to deviate significantly from the
12-year maximum sentence (see § 461, subd. (a) [first degree
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burglary is punishable by two, four, or six years in state prison])
and agree to a two-year sentence suggests this maximum
exposure was theoretical, rather than assured, and there was
room to negotiate an immigration-neutral disposition comporting
with their priorities. And further plea negotiations might have
been fruitful, as criminal defendants convicted of one count of
first degree burglary have received sentences similar to the
immigration-neutral alternatives proposed by Novis. (See, e.g.,
People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1085 [“Defendant was
convicted of first degree burglary (§ 459), but imposition of
sentence was suspended and he was sentenced to five years’
probation on the condition he serve 180 days in jail”]; People v.
Preston (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 415, 420 [following defendant’s
guilty plea to one count of burglary and one misdemeanor count
of false representation of identity to a peace officer, the trial court
suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on five
years’ probation]; People v. Ulloa (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 601, 603
[defendant convicted of first degree, residential burglary,
receiving stolen property, and misdemeanor vandalism sentenced
to three years of formal probation and 120 days in jail]; People v.
Romero (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1423 [defendant convicted of
first degree burglary and, contrary to probation officer’s
recommendation of a two-year prison sentence, given 36 months’
probation and 180 days in jail].)
In sum, having conducted an independent review of the
record and considered the totality of the circumstances, we
conclude there is at least a “reasonable chance” that Ibanez
Sanchez would have rejected the plea “ ‘on the hope or
expectation of negotiating a different bargain without
immigration consequences.’ ” (Hernandez, supra, 20 Cal.5th at
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p. 626; Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529.) His deep ties to the
United States and the possibility of negotiating an immigration-
neutral plea bargain provide sufficient corroboration for his
assertion that he would have rejected the plea had he correctly
understood its adverse immigration consequences. (See Curiel,
supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1180.) Ibanez Sanchez, therefore, has
shown he was prejudiced by his misunderstanding of those
consequences as contemplated under section 1473.7, subdivision
(a)(1).
DISPOSITION
We reverse the order denying Ibanez Sanchez’s section
1473.7 motion. We remand the case to the trial court with
directions to grant his motion, vacate his conviction, and permit
him to withdraw his plea.
SCHERB, J.
We concur:
WILEY, Acting P. J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
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