Filed 9/16/26 P. v. Sanchez CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B341937
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA157508
v.
CHRISTOPHER SANCHEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Debra Cole-Hall, Judge. Affirmed.
Nicholas Seymour, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Colleen M. Tiedemann and Zachary
John Crvarich, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Appellant Christopher Sanchez was convicted of the first
degree murder of Daniel Valdez-Carranza. (Pen. Code,1 § 187,
subd. (a).). At trial, Sanchez’s primary defense was that if he was
guilty of any crime, it was voluntary manslaughter, not murder.
On appeal, Sanchez contends he was deprived of a fair trial
because the prosecution misstated the law regarding
manslaughter. He also argues that the trial court erroneously
gave an ambiguous manslaughter jury instruction. Alternatively,
with respect to each of his contentions, Sanchez argues his trial
counsel rendered prejudicially ineffective assistance of counsel.
We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Sanchez and Valdez-Carranza were both Florencia 13 gang
members, as was Frank Vargas. Vargas witnessed the events
leading up to Sanchez shooting Valdez-Carranza. He also
witnessed the shooting itself. Although Vargas did not testify at
trial, a recording of statements he made to the police two and a
half months after the shooting was admitted into evidence. The
following facts are based almost entirely on statements Vargas
made to the police.
On March 11, 2021, Sanchez, Valdez-Carranza, and Vargas
attended a memorial service for their mutual friend who had
recently passed away. Valdez-Carranza was drinking alcohol; he
had a tendency to get angry when he was drunk. An argument
ensued at the memorial between Sanchez and Valdez-Carranza.
The three men left the memorial in Vargas’s car. During
the drive, Sanchez and Valdez-Carranza continued to argue and
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The jury also found Sanchez personally used a firearm in the
commission of the murder. (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).)
2
swear at each other. They also continued to argue once they
arrived outside Vargas’s house. Vargas tried to calm them down
because he was worried they were about to fight. He encouraged
them to cool off and get sober instead of fighting.
Sanchez and Valdez-Carranza did not want to fight outside
Vargas’s home and disturb his daughter, so they agreed to meet
on a nearby street and fight there instead. Sanchez drove off in
his car, Valdez-Carranza followed separately in his car, and
Vargas followed them separately in his own car. At one point,
Vargas pulled up next to Sanchez’s car and tried to convince him
to deescalate the fight and go home, but Sanchez refused, saying
Valdez-Carranza had called him a “[demeaning derogatory
name].” Valdez-Carranza called Sanchez on the phone and said
something that made Sanchez more angry, though Vargas, who
witnessed the call, did not know exactly what Valdez-Carranza
said.
Sanchez and Vargas kept driving and eventually located
Valdez-Carranza. Valdez-Carranza was already standing outside
his car when they pulled up to him. Valdez-Carranza walked
toward Sanchez’s car, took off his shirt, called Sanchez a
demeaning name, and told Sanchez to get out of the car. Sanchez
shot Valdez-Carranza from inside the car. Valdez-Carranza
suffered four gunshots to the chest and one to the hand. He was
pronounced dead at the scene.
Vargas drove away immediately after he saw the gunshots.
The following day, Sanchez admitted to Vargas that he had
“[messed] up” and stated Valdez-Carranza had been “out of line.”
Two weeks after the murder, Sanchez transferred title of his car
to his cousin’s boyfriend.
3
Two days after the murder, Sanchez received a phone call
from an inmate in Los Angeles County Jail. During the call,
Sanchez said he planned on going to Mexico because “it was hot
out there” for him, perhaps implying he suspected the police were
after him, or perhaps that he was in danger related to his gang.
In January 2022, Sanchez was arrested at the San Ysidro point of
entry as he entered California from Mexico.
DISCUSSION
I. The prosecution’s legally erroneous statements
regarding manslaughter
Sanchez contends the prosecution committed reversible
error by making legally erroneous statements during closing
argument concerning the proper standard for determining
whether he committed manslaughter rather than murder. He
further argues reversal is required because his trial counsel was
prejudicially ineffective in not objecting to the prosecution’s
erroneous statements. We are unpersuaded. Although we agree
with Sanchez that the prosecution made legally erroneous
statements concerning the proper legal definition of provocation
under People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935 (Beltran), we
discern no reversible error.
A. Relevant law
1. General legal principles regarding
manslaughter
Voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of
murder. (People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 181.) “An
unlawful killing with malice is murder[,]” but “an intentional
killing is reduced to voluntary manslaughter if other evidence
negates malice.” (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 583
(Manriquez).) “ ‘Malice is presumptively absent when the
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defendant acts upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion on
sufficient provocation’ ” (Ibid., citing § 192, subd. (a).) “The
provocative conduct by the victim may be physical or verbal, but
the conduct must be sufficiently provocative that it would cause
an ordinary person of average disposition to act rashly or without
due deliberation and reflection.” (Manriquez, at pp. 583–584.)
“ ‘Heat of passion arises when “at the time of the killing, the
reason of the accused was obscured or disturbed by passion to
such an extent as would cause the ordinarily reasonable person of
average disposition to act rashly and without deliberation and
reflection, and from such passion rather than from judgment.” ’ ”
(Id. at p. 584.)
2. Principles on manslaughter law articulated in
People v. Beltran
In Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th 935, our Supreme Court
clarified the proper standard for determining whether a
defendant was adequately provoked to justify a finding of
manslaughter rather than murder. (Id. at pp. 946–953.) The
court rejected the Attorney General’s argument that the proper
legal standard would require “such provocation that the ordinary
person of average disposition would be moved to kill.” (Id. at p.
949, italics in original.) In doing so, the court explained that
“provocation is sufficient not because it affects the quality of one’s
thought processes but because it eclipses reflection.” (Id. at
p. 950.) “Framed another way, provocation is not evaluated by
whether the average person would act in a certain way: to kill.
Instead, the question is whether the average person would react
in a certain way: with his reason and judgment obscured.” (Id. at
p. 953, italics in original.) “The proper focus is placed on the
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defendant’s state of mind, not on his particular act.” (Id. at p.
949.)
The Supreme Court ended its opinion by “reaffirm[ing] the
standard for determining heat of passion” it had adopted nearly a
century earlier: “Provocation is adequate only when it would
render an ordinary person of average disposition ‘liable to act
rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and from this
passion rather than from judgment.’ ” (Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th
at p. 957, citing People v. Logan (1917) 187 Cal. 45.)
Under the harmless error standard articulated in Beltran,
“ ‘a defendant must show it is reasonably probable a more
favorable result would have been obtained absent the error.’ ”
(Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 955, citing People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) This harmless error test “ ‘focuses not
on what a reasonable jury could do, but what such a jury is likely
to have done in the absence of the error under consideration. In
making that evaluation, an appellate court may consider, among
other things, whether the evidence supporting the existing
judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a
different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no
reasonable probability the error of which the defendant
complains affected the result.’ ” (Beltran, at p. 956.)
3. First degree murder
The unjust killing of a human being is presumed to be
murder in the second, rather than first, degree. (People v.
Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 25, 73.) First degree murder has
the additional elements of willfulness, premeditation, and
deliberation. (People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 282.) “These
elements require ‘more than a showing of intent to kill; the killer
must act deliberately, carefully weighing the considerations for
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and against a choice to kill before he or she completes the acts
that cause the death.’ ” (Ibid.)
“The very definition of ‘premeditation’ encompasses the
idea that a defendant thought about or considered the act
beforehand.” (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 443.)
“ ‘ “Deliberation” refers to careful weighing of considerations in
forming a course of action; “premeditation” means thought over
in advance.’ ” (People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 824,
disapproved on another ground in People v. Dalton (2019) 7
Cal.5th 166, 214.) “Premeditation and deliberation can occur in a
brief interval.” (People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 863.)
B. Background
Using CALCRIM No. 570, the trial court correctly
instructed the jury on the proper legal standard for finding
voluntary manslaughter based on sudden quarrel or heat of
passion.2 The prosecution also accurately articulated the
provocation standard to the jury during rebuttal as “whether a
2 The court instructed the jury in relevant part as follows:
A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to
voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed someone
because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion.
The defendant killed someone because of a sudden
quarrel or in the heat of passion if:
1. The defendant was provoked;
2. As a result of the provocation, the defendant acted
rashly and under the influence of intense emotion that
obscured his reasoning or judgment;
AND
3. The provocation would have caused a person of
average disposition to act rashly and without due
deliberation, that is, from passion rather than from
judgment.
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person with average disposition, in the same situation . . . would
have reacted from passion rather than judgment.” Sanchez is
correct, however, that the prosecution made several statements
to the jury during closing argument and rebuttal that were
legally erroneous under Beltran.3 On several occasions, the
prosecutor indicated either explicitly or implicitly that
provocation is evaluated by whether the average person would
act in a certain way: to kill.
The prosecutor stated:
But here’s where it just doesn’t apply. This same
provocation would have to cause a person of average
disposition—not the defendant—a normal person, an
average person—a person of average disposition would have
to think a challenge by a buddy would allow you to shoot
them dead. You cannot do it. Where heat of passion comes
up—and you’ve heard it in the news—this is where it comes
up. You hear these cases—and I don’t mean to be kind of
sexist on the gender, but I’m just using a dad—where you
hear a dad finds out that someone raped his daughter, that
someone touched his kid, and you hear these cases in
the news and the dad goes ballistic—could be a mom,
but I have only heard of the dads—and the dad goes
and confronts the attacker and kills them. That is this.
That is actually the textbook example of heat of passion.
3 Because we acknowledge the prosecution made statements that
were legally erroneous under Beltran, we need not address Sanchez’s
argument that certain statements were also erroneous because they
improperly suggested public safety would be undermined by a finding
of manslaughter.
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It is, the defendant was provoked by an act so grave,
that the provocation overtook a rational mind. But then
an ordinary person—I’m sorry—person of average
disposition would say oh, yeah, I mean if it was my kid, I
might have responded that way.
The other example you hear a lot of is someone walks in
and finds their spouse having an affair. The person that
walks in has a fight with the person having an affair
with their spouse, that turns deadly. That is another
textbook example.
The law makes it so hard to get this. And the reason why
is they don’t allow you to think about what he thought in
that last prong; it’s what an average—a person of average
disposition thought.
If you give him manslaughter on this, what you’re saying—
you’d have to say is that anybody who is challenged to a
fight by a buddy, the law says it’s okay to shoot him four
times. The law is clear that it’s not. It’s why the defense is
not arguing these. They can’t really come to you and say,
oh, my defendant wasn’t there. But just in case you
thought it, there is all this. Because it doesn’t exist. So
there is absolutely no manslaughter in this case. This is a
first or second degree case only.
Defense counsel argued that Vargas, the primary witness
who inculpated Sanchez, was not credible. Counsel further
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argued that even assuming Sanchez had killed Valdez-Carranza,
the killing was manslaughter and not murder.
On rebuttal, the prosecutor argued:
So it’s not simply that the defendant was provoked, and
as a result of the provocation he acted rashly. Right? It’s
this third [element] that’s important.4 What does that
mean? It means it’s not enough that the defendant
simply was provoked. It’s not enough. Just because
you’re in a fight, somebody calls you out, that is not
enough to trigger this heat of passion. It goes further.
For you to give the defendant a voluntary manslaughter,
you have to jump this next hurdle, which you cannot jump,
and here’s why. You have to consider whether a person of
average disposition, in the same situation—not the average
gangster, the average person. It’s not—it is whether an
average—whether a person with average disposition, in the
same situation, knowing the same facts, would have
reacted from passion rather than judgment. That would
mean a person who was called a bitch and called out for a
fight. That’s what that means. If you say that, that would
mean every female that has ever been called a bitch and
called into a fight would have the right, under this, to shoot
and kill somebody. That is not it. That is why the
standard is so high.
4 The third element listed in CALCRIM No. 570 is: “The
provocation would have caused a person of average disposition to act
rashly and without due deliberation, from passion rather than from
judgment.”
10
When the defense counsel said, oh, it’s a quarrel, no, it’s
not just a fight, it’s not simple provocation. It must be so
great. That’s that example of walking in—or hearing
that someone hurt your child, you go and confront that
person, there is an immediate fight about that, and then
there is a death.
An average person of average disposition must, under the
same circumstances—you would have to think that a person
of average disposition, when being called that name, would
think it’s okay to shoot four times to the chest.
C. Analysis
1. Sanchez forfeited his argument about the
prosecution’s erroneous statements to the jury
Sanchez did not object to the prosecution’s arguments
regarding manslaughter. “ ‘ “As a general rule, a defendant may
not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a
timely fashion—and on the same ground—the defendant made an
assignment of misconduct and requested that the jury be
admonished to disregard the impropriety.” ’ ” (People v.
Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 894.) “ ‘The reason for this
rule, of course, is that the “trial court should be given an
opportunity to correct the abuse and thus, if possible, prevent by
suitable instructions the harmful effect upon the minds of the
jury.” ’ ” (People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1341.) By
not objecting in the trial court, Sanchez did not give the court
adequate opportunity to correct the prosecution’s erroneous
statements to the jury. We therefore deem his argument forfeited
on that basis.
11
We now turn to Sanchez’s alternate contention that his
trial counsel was prejudicially ineffective by not objecting to the
prosecution’s remarks that were erroneous under Beltran.
2. We reject Sanchez’s ineffective assistance of
counsel argument
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a criminal
defendant must show both: (1) that counsel’s performance was so
deficient that it amounted to a failure to function as the “counsel”
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment; and (2) that counsel’s
deficiencies were so prejudicial that the defendant was deprived
of a fair trial whose result was reliable. (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland); People v.
Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1252.) An attorney’s
performance is deficient under Strickland if his or her conduct
fell below objective standards of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms. (Strickland, at pp. 687–688.) Prejudice
under Strickland is established where the defendant
demonstrates a reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. (Id. at p. 694.) A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the verdict.
(Ibid.)
We decline to conclude, solely on this direct appeal record,
that Sanchez’s trial attorney was constitutionally deficient by not
objecting to the prosecution’s closing argument. Such a
conclusion is rarely drawn, especially in a case involving a failure
to object, because the decision not to do so is inherently tactical.
(People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 172; People v. Hillhouse
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 502.) In any event, we need not decide the
12
issue because Sanchez was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s
failure to object to the prosecution’s argument to the jury.
Although the prosecution made statements to the jury that
were legally erroneous under Beltran, the trial court instructed
the jury on the proper standard using CALCRIM No. 570. The
court further instructed the jury, using CALCRIM No. 200, to
“follow the law as [the court] explain[s] it to you, even if you
disagree with it. If you believe that the attorneys’ comments on
the law conflict with [the court’s] instructions, you must follow
[the court’s] instructions.”
“ ‘When argument runs counter to instructions given a jury,
we will ordinarily conclude that the jury followed the latter and
disregarded the former’ ” (People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th
659, 676 (Centeno)), because “arguments of counsel generally
carry less weight with a jury than do instructions from the court.
The former are usually billed in advance to the jury as matters of
argument, not evidence, [citation], and are likely viewed as the
statements of advocates; the latter, we have often recognized, are
viewed as definitive and binding statements of the law.” (Boyde
v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 384.) “[I]t is [thus] not likely
that the jury applied the prosecutor’s misstatements in an
objectionable fashion.” (People v. Banks (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
376, 387; see also People v. Perez (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 598, 624–
625 [concluding there was no prosecutorial misconduct where
jurors “were properly instructed on the prosecution’s burden of
proof, the elements of the offense[s], and, most importantly, that
the instructions prevailed over any contradictory comments by
the attorneys”].)
In addition, the case against Sanchez that he murdered
Valdez-Carranza was strong and the evidence that he was
13
provoked was weak. This is because of the timing of events.
“ ‘[I]f sufficient time has elapsed between the provocation and the
fatal blow for passion to subside and reason to return, the killing
is not voluntary manslaughter.’ ” (Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at
p. 951.)
The record here shows there was a significant pause
between when Sanchez and Valdez-Carranza initially argued and
when Sanchez shot Valdez-Carranza. During that pause, Vargas
attempted to talk sense into Sanchez. Vargas reminded Sanchez
that he and Valdez-Carranza were part of the same gang and
came from the same neighborhood. Vargas urged Sanchez to “go
home” and “let it go.” Instead of listening to Vargas, Sanchez
drove to a different location, then shot and killed Valdez-
Carranza. These facts are not indicative of a provocation that
would have caused a person of average disposition to act rashly
and without due deliberation. Rather, they reflect that Sanchez
carefully considered killing Valdez-Carranza, then acted with
premeditation and deliberation when killing him.
Our conclusion that the prosecutor’s misstatements of law
were harmless is further supported by the jury’s findings that
Sanchez premeditated and deliberated the killing of Valdez-
Carranza. (People v. Forrest (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1074, 1086
[first degree murder verdict indicated prosecutor’s misstatements
of the law regarding provocation were harmless].) “[S]uch a
‘state of mind, involving planning and deliberate action, is
manifestly inconsistent with having acted under the heat of
passion—even if that state of mind was achieved after a
considerable period of provocatory conduct—and clearly
demonstrates’ ” that Sanchez was not prejudiced by any
misstatements of law by the prosecutor concerning the degree of
14
necessary provocation. (Ibid., citing People v. Wharton (1991) 53
Cal.3d 522, 572.)
We conclude there is no reasonable probability the jury
would have reached a more favorable outcome had defense
counsel objected to the prosecution’s erroneous statements.
II. Trial court’s use of CALCRIM No. 570 to instruct the
jury on voluntary manslaughter
A. Sanchez forfeited his challenge to the trial
court’s instructions
Sanchez acknowledges that CALCRIM No. 570 is a correct
statement of the law. He nonetheless argues that, in light of the
prosecution’s erroneous statements to the jury, the trial court
committed prejudicial error when it instructed the jury using
CALCRIM No. 570. The Attorney General counters that Sanchez
forfeited this argument by not objecting in the trial court. We
agree with the Attorney General.
“ ‘A party may not complain on appeal that an instruction
correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or
incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying
or amplifying language.’ ” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th
616, 671].) Sanchez did not argue below that CALCRIM No. 570
was too general or incomplete, nor did he request a clarifying or
amplifying instruction. Had he done so, the trial court could
have taken action to correct any alleged deficiency in the jury
instruction. Sanchez has forfeited this argument.
B. We reject Sanchez’s ineffective assistance of
counsel argument
Alternatively, Sanchez contends his trial counsel was
prejudicially ineffective by (1) not objecting to CALCRIM No. 570
15
as given; or (2) asking for clarifying amplifying language in light
of the prosecution’s statements to the jury. We disagree.
Any alleged failure by Sanchez’s counsel was harmless.
Our harmless error analysis relating to CALCRIM No. 570 is
very similar to our harmless error analysis of trial counsel’s
failure to object to the prosecution’s erroneous statements
themselves. First, we presume the jury followed the court’s
legally correct instructions and applied them over trial counsel’s
argument. Next, we consider the very strong evidence in support
of first degree murder and the weak evidence of provocation.
Lastly, any purported instructional error or cumulative error was
harmless because the jury expressly found Sanchez premeditated
and deliberated the murder, and in doing so, rejected the theory
that Sanchez was provoked into killing Valdez-Carranza in a
manner that constituted manslaughter and not murder.
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DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
MORI, J.
17