Filed 10/16/26 P. v. Salkin CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G065192
v. (Super. Ct. No. 17HF0594)
JORDAN ADRIAN SALKIN, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Kimberly Menninger, Judge. Affirmed.
Heather E. Shallenberger, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Laura Baggett, Robin
Urbanski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Jordan Adrian Salkin appeals from his convictions for attempted
murder and domestic violence battery. He contends the trial court wrongly
admitted evidence about an uncharged act of domestic violence and that
there was insufficient evidence of his intent to kill. We hold the court
permissibly admitted the uncharged domestic violence evidence because the
probative value of the uncharged conduct outweighed any risk of undue
prejudice. And substantial evidence of escalating anger, traumatic injuries,
and consciousness of guilt sufficiently showed intent. We affirm.
FACTS
Salkin and A.F., his girlfriend and business partner, had been
drinking at a restaurant where a bartender saw Salkin “shove his chair” and
“‘storm[ ] out’” without her. Salkin later called A.F.’s aunt, “sounding angry.”
He told the aunt A.F. was a “brat” and he wanted her “out of his house.” The
aunt called A.F., who seemed “normal” and said “‘don’t worry.’”
Salkin called 911 from home less than 10 minutes later. He
falsely told the operator “we were messing around and she slipped and hit
her head.” Before police arrived, instead of following the operator’s direction
to maintain pressure on A.F.’s bleeding head, Salkin hid testosterone
supplements in his gun safe upstairs because he thought he “wasn’t
suppose[d] to have them.”
Police arrived at the home. A.F.’s eyes were “fluttering” and there
was a “pool of blood around her head about two feet.” Salkin had put broken
pieces of ceramic and broken sunglasses inside a shopping bag. He again
falsely claimed A.F. had jumped on him to kiss him, “put her legs around”
him, and they fell. At a police station later that night, photographs of Salkin
were taken showing a scratch on his neck and potential scratches on his
forearm and hand.
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Salkin was released on bail and, in 2020, he threatened a
different romantic partner, S.S., at her home. The tutor of S.S.’s nine-year-old
son heard “extreme yelling” upstairs and the son yelled not to talk to his
mom “like that.” Salkin yelled “‘shut the fuck up you fuckin’ bastard,’”
“screaming that he was going to kill them with his shotgun.” S.S. and her son
came downstairs and Salkin eventually “storm[ed] away” in his car.
Salkin was charged with attempted murder (Pen. Code,
§§ 664/187),1 domestic violence battery (§ 273.5), and a domestic violence
great bodily injury sentencing enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)).
The trial court granted the prosecution’s motion in limine to
admit evidence of the 2020 threat to kill S.S. and her son. The court found
the threat was “definitely more probative than prejudicial under a 352
analysis” and it qualified as domestic violence. Salkin’s counsel emphasized
the factual differences between the charged and uncharged conduct. The
court responded the crimes did not “have to have any similarity.” It
elaborated: “It doesn’t have to be on all fours. It just has to be something that
shows propensity to commit domestic violence. Just like” a parallel statute
about “sex crimes.”
A.F.’s aunt testified about Salkin’s 2017 phone call and the tutor
testified about the uncharged domestic violence incident in 2020.
Salkin testified to a different version of the charged 2017
conduct. He asserted A.F. was mad he had called her aunt and A.F. attacked
him. A.F. threw things and Salkin cleaned up the mess with the bag the
police officer later found. A.F. jumped on his bad back, punched him, and
“had her arm around” his throat. Salkin lost his balance and A.F. “impacted”
1 All undesignated statutory references are to this code.
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a kitchen counter at least twice—he couldn’t “remember if there’s a third
impact.” Salkin did not disclose A.F.’s attack because he “wanted her to get to
the hospital as fast as possible.”
For the uncharged 2020 domestic violence, Salkin denied the
tutor’s version of events. Salkin claimed the tutor never saw him because he
had already left the home to get to an airport. Salkin claimed he only
“bicker[ed]” with S.S., who had been his business partner. Salkin denied
calling her child a “‘F-in’ bastard.’”
Medical experts testified about the seriousness of A.F.’s injuries.
A.F. suffered a severe traumatic brain injury that required a craniectomy and
lobectomy, multiple skull fractures, a displaced shoulder blade fracture, a
spinal fracture, rib fracture, and injuries to her spleen and kidney. The
prosecution presented a neurosurgeon expert witness who testified the
injuries were not “typical of a ground-level fall,” but instead “a strong impact
in really two separate areas” of A.F.’s body, based on the distance between
the injuries. The neurosurgeon who treated A.F. opined the injuries could
have been sustained from “many scenarios,” such as a “fall from a height.”
Salkin’s forensic pathologist expert witness opined that Salkin’s version of
events “likely could have” caused the injuries A.F. sustained.
A.F.’s aunt, who had raised her like a mother, testified A.F. has
remained comatose at the hospital since 2017. She eats through a feeding
tube and can breathe on her own for only a few hours at a time.
The jury was instructed on uncharged domestic violence
evidence. (CALCRIM No. 852A.) It convicted Salkin on both counts and found
true the sentencing enhancement. The trial court sentenced him to 11 years
in prison.
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DISCUSSION
I.
THE TRIAL COURT PERMISSIBLY ADMITTED TESTIMONY ABOUT THE
UNCHARGED 2020 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INCIDENT
Evidence that Salkin committed domestic violence was
admissible to show his propensity to commit domestic violence “if the
evidence [was] not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.” (Evid. Code,
§ 1109, subd. (a); see People v. Jennings (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1315
[“‘exercise of discretion under Evidence Code section 352 will not be disturbed
on appeal unless the court clearly abused its discretion’”].)
To make that determination, the trial court had to balance
probative value against four undue prejudice factors: “(1) the inflammatory
nature of the uncharged conduct; (2) the possibility of confusion of issues;
(3) remoteness in time of the uncharged offenses; and (4) the amount of time
involved in introducing and refuting the evidence of uncharged offenses.”
(People v. Thomas (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 612, 630 (Thomas) [cleaned up].)
Here, the trial court reasonably found the probative value of the
2020 conduct was not outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. (People v.
Johnson (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 520, 531 (Johnson).)
The 2020 conduct was significantly probative. The conduct was
sufficiently “‘similar in character to the charged domestic violence crime.’”
(Johnson, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 532.) “[I]n domestic violence cases . . .
similar prior offenses are ‘uniquely probative’ of guilt . . . because of the
‘typically repetitive nature’ of domestic violence” that “suggests a
psychological dynamic not necessarily involved in other types of crimes.”
(Ibid.) In both 2017 and 2020, Salkin got angry with a live-in girlfriend who
was also his business partner. He attempted to kill A.F. in 2017 and
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threatened to kill S.S. in 2020. These “broad similarities” make the 2017
incident “highly probative.” (People v. Merchant (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1179,
1192.)
The risk of undue prejudice did not outweigh the probative value
of the uncharged conduct. First, given that S.S. did not suffer any physical
injury, the evidence was not inflammatory in the sense of motivating jurors
“to reward or punish one side because of” emotions at the expense of logic.
(Thomas, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 630 [cleaned up].) Second, the evidence
did not risk jury confusion—the charged and uncharged conduct involved
separate victims, witnesses, places, and times. Third, the incidents were only
three years apart so the uncharged conduct was not remote in time. (Cf. Evid.
Code, § 1109, subd. (e) [requiring additional finding for “acts occurring more
than 10 years before”].) Fourth, the uncharged conduct did not unduly
consume trial time—one witness and Salkin testified about the conduct in 99
pages of a trial transcript exceeding 1,000 pages.
We reject Salkin’s contention that the uncharged domestic
violence conduct was unduly prejudicial because the “jury was invited to
collapse the critical distinction between a propensity to commit domestic
violence and the specific intent to kill.”
The jury presumably followed the trial court’s limiting
instruction on how to use the propensity evidence (CALCRIM No. 852A),
which Salkin concedes was “legally correct.” The instruction directed: “If you
conclude that the defendant committed the uncharged domestic violence, that
conclusion is only one factor . . . . It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the
defendant is guilty . . . . The People must still prove the charged crimes . . .
beyond a reasonable doubt.” (See People v. Gonzales (2011) 51 Cal.4th 894,
940 [jury presumed to follow court’s instructions].)
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II.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SHOWED SALKIN’S INTENT TO KILL
“The crime of attempted murder includes the element of intent to
kill.” (People v. Gonzalez (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1552.) ‘“Absent . . .
direct evidence, the intent obviously must be derived from all the
circumstances of the attempt . . . . ”’ (Ibid.) ‘“[O]ur sole function is to
determine if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (Ibid.)
“If the circumstances reasonably justify the findings made by the
trier of fact, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.”
(People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 639.)
Here, substantial evidence showed Salkin’s escalating anger at
the victim. The bartender saw Salkin “shove his chair.” Salkin sounded
“angry” on phone with the victim’s aunt. Salkin told the aunt, in an angry
tone, that he wanted her “brat” niece “out of his house.”
Substantial evidence also showed Salkin inflicted catastrophic
injuries. A.F. was found with eyes “fluttering” and a two-foot pool of blood
around her head. (See People v. Moore (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1114
[injury to “extremely vulnerable area of the body” showed intent]; accord,
People v. Silva (1953) 41 Cal.2d 778 [nature of wound showed intent].) She
sustained a severe traumatic brain injury that required a craniectomy and
lobectomy, multiple skull fractures, a displaced shoulder blade fracture, a
spinal fracture, rib fracture, and injuries to her spleen and kidney. She
remains comatose, unable to eat or fully breathe on her own. The
prosecution’s expert witness testified the injuries were not “typical of a
ground-level fall” and were likely caused by separate impacts based on the
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distance between the injuries. It was the jury’s prerogative as to which
expert, if any, to believe. (People v. Engstrom (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 174,
187.)
Finally, substantial evidence showed Salkin attempted to conceal
his attack. (See In re M.S. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1177, 1186 [trier of fact
“properly considered [defendant’s] various and inconsistent explanations to
determine guilt”]; People v. White (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 758, 772 [jury could
consider falsity of defendant’s statement as “consciousness of guilt”].) Salkin
admitted he falsely told the 911 operator and police officers that no domestic
violence had occurred. He hid his testosterone supplements instead of helping
A.F. in what he knew was a dire situation. He put broken ceramic pieces and
broken sunglasses inside of a shopping bag. (See People v. Coffman and
Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 103 [discarding of documents showed
consciousness of guilt].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
SCOTT, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, P. J.
DELANEY, J.
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