Filed 9/14/26 P. v. Salazar CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H052318
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C2202308)
v.
ALFREDO RUIZ SALAZAR,
Defendant and Appellant.
Pursuant to a negotiated plea disposition, defendant Alfredo Ruiz Salazar pleaded
no contest to felony false imprisonment and misdemeanor battery to resolve charges
stemming from allegations that he committed two separate sexual acts against his
then-14-year-old daughter S.D. At sentencing, the trial court exercised its discretion
under Penal Code section 290.0061 to order Salazar to register as a sex offender. Salazar
requests that we remand the matter for a new sex offender registration hearing, arguing
that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to register as a sex offender
because it did not adequately comply with the statutory requirements of section 290.006.
For the reasons we explain below, we will affirm the judgment.
1
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Preliminary Hearing
S.D. testified that her father, Salazar, committed two separate inappropriate sexual
acts against her when she was 14 years old.
S.D. stated that the first incident occurred in 2008. S.D. recalled that Salazar
entered her room when her siblings were sleeping, and, without saying anything, crawled
under her blanket, pulled down her pants and underwear, and opened her legs. S.D.
testified that Salazar then laid on top of her and penetrated her vagina with his penis
while firmly covering her mouth with his hand, leaving her unable to move or alert
anyone. S.D. stated that “when [the assault] was over, [Salazar] just rolled back on his
left side, laid on the bed for a few minutes, and then got up and walked out of the room.”
Once Salazar left, S.D. hit herself in the stomach multiple times to prevent an unwanted
pregnancy and realized that Salazar had taken her virginity when she found blood in her
underwear. After S.D. finished recounting the first sexual assault incident, the trial court
noted that she was “visibly shaking.” The prosecutor similarly observed that S.D. was
upset stating, “I can see you’re crying again.”
S.D. testified that the second incident occurred in 2009, just before she turned
15 years old. As to that incident, S.D. stated that Salazar pulled her towards him, sat her
on his lap without her consent, and told her he was going to “show [her] how to kiss for
when [she] had a boyfriend.” Salazar then used his hand to pull S.D.’s face towards him
and kissed her on the lips. S.D. recalled feeling “disgusted,” “shaky,” and “anxious”
during that incident.
S.D. did not tell anyone about either incident because she was scared her family
would not believe her. S.D. also recalled “[Salazar] making comments about not saying
anything,[sic] that [she] wouldn’t want to hurt [her] mom’s feelings.” As an adult, S.D.
disclosed the two incidents to her therapist which led to a police investigation.
2
B. Charges and Convictions
The Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office filed an information charging
Salazar with forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)) and lewd and lascivious act with a child
14 or 15 years of age by a person at least 10 years older (§ 288, subd. (c)(1)). The
information further alleged aggravating circumstances as to each count, that Salazar took
advantage of a position of trust and confidence to commit the offenses (§ 1170, subd. (b);
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(11)) and that he committed the offenses for the
purposes of sexual compulsion and sexual gratification (§§ 296, subd. (a), 290.001).
Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Salazar pleaded no contest to
misdemeanor battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)) and false imprisonment (§ 236) with an
aggravating circumstance that he took advantage of a position of trust to commit the
offense. Though these offenses did not subject Salazar to mandatory sex offender
registration, the parties mutually agreed that the trial court would decide at sentencing
whether discretionary sex offender registration was warranted. At the plea hearing, the
trial court agreed to assess the sex offender registration issue at the sentencing hearing.
The trial court also informed Salazar that it might rely on the preliminary hearing
transcript, the victim’s statement, and other sources of information to help inform its
decision on whether to impose discretionary sex offender registration pursuant to
section 290.006. Salazar consented. The trial court accepted Salazar’s pleas and set a
date for sentencing.
C. Sentencing Hearing
Before the sentencing hearing, the Probation Department filed a probation report.
Relevant here, the probation report stated that Salazar’s criminal history consisted of
13 misdemeanor convictions but no felonies. The probation report also included a
Static-99R evaluation, which it described as an “actuarial risk assessment tool that
measures the risk of sexual offense recidivism.” The probation department’s Static-99R
3
assessment concluded that Salazar posed a below average risk2 of “being charged or
convicted of another sexual offense within five years after he is released on probation.”
The defense obtained an independent evaluation of Salazar’s psychological
functioning from Carolyn Murphy, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist, to “help address
whether [sex offender] registration [was] necessary for community safety.” Dr. Murphy
conducted a Static-99R evaluation and determined that Salazar posed an “average risk” of
re-offending, “which is associated with low risk for recidivism.” Dr. Murphy ultimately
opined that Salazar did not “pose an identifiable risk of physical harm to the victim” and
that “community safety would [not] be improved by . . . requiring Salazar” to register as a
sex offender because he was “clearly not . . . considered a high-risk offender” given his
recidivism risk was “quite low.” At defense counsel’s request, Dr. Murphy updated her
original report to include the kissing allegation and concluded that the “additional
consideration of kissing d[id] not alter the risk assessment, diagnostic considerations, or
ultimate conclusions” in her evaluation report.
The defense submitted a memorandum opposing sex offender registration, arguing
that Salazar posed a low risk of recidivism and that registration would be detrimental as it
would affect Salazar’s ability to secure housing for himself and his family. The People’s
sentencing brief maintained that discretionary sex offender registration was appropriate
because Salazar committed two inappropriate sexual acts against S.D. through sexual
compulsion and for purposes of sexual gratification. (§ 290.006, subd. (a).)
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor read into the record S.D.’s victim impact
statement where she recounted the negative effects that the two incidents had on her life.
Defense counsel acknowledged the alleged behavior was “absolutely horrific” but stated
2
The Static-99R has five risk level categories: Level I (Very Low Risk) for scores
of -3 to -2; Level II (Below Average Risk) for scores of -1 to 0; Level III (Average Risk)
for scores of 1 to 3; Level IVa (Above Average Risk) for scores of 4 to 5; and Level IVb
(Well Above Average Risk) for scores of 6 or higher.
4
that “Salazar has denied those allegations from the beginning.” Defense counsel also
noted that, to the extent it factored into the trial court’s analysis, Salazar was not S.D.’s
biological father.3
After the parties submitted the matter, the trial court stated that it considered
several sources of information to determine whether imposition of discretionary sex
offender registration was appropriate in this case, including the parties’ extensive
briefing, Salazar’s criminal record, S.D.’s victim impact statement, and the defense’s
supplemental evaluation. The trial court acknowledged the defense had concerns about
S.D.’s veracity given her admission at the preliminary hearing that she had filed a false
report at Salazar’s behest, accusing the family’s then landlord of sexual assault to avoid
eviction. However, the trial court determined it did “not doubt[] [S.D.’s] statements and
her recitation of what happened to her many years ago.”
Turning to the analysis, the trial court confirmed it had considered Dr. Murphy’s
report but stated it “was concerned by her dismissive treatment of the [kissing incident],
and that . . . cause[d] [it] to call into question her overall assessment of the situation.”
The trial court found that “Salazar [did] not present a risk to the victim,” noting that the
relevant offenses occurred “many years ago” and that the two Static-99R reports
determined that Salazar presented a low to average risk of re-offending. With respect to
the nature of the crimes and Salazar’s conduct during the sexual assault incidents, the trial
court stated: “A rape of any kind is a violent act in and of itself, but here, in this
situation, [Salazar] also acted forcefully in [the first incident by] prying open [S.D.’s] legs
3
It is unclear from the record whether Salazar was S.D.’s biological father or her
stepfather. S.D. testified that Salazar was her biological father and referred to Salazar as
her “father” throughout the preliminary hearing. During an interview with a defense
investigator, S.D.’s brother asserted that he and S.D. “ha[d] different dads.”
Dr. Murphy’s report states that Salazar has four children with his current partner, “three
biological children and one stepchild”—presumably S.D.—who “he raised as his own
and consider[ed] to be his own child[].” The record does not indicate whether the issue
of paternity was resolved.
5
and gripping her mouth so she could not scream.” The trial court also determined that
Salazar acted forcibly during the second incident because he “forc[ed] [S.D.] onto his
lap[,] . . . telling her that he was going to teach her how to kiss her boyfriend.” The trial
court concluded that “given these forceful, violent, sexual acts of a
father . . . against . . . [his 14-year-old] daughter, it is clear that [Salazar] committed the
acts as a result of sexual compulsion and for his own gratification.”
After “weighing all of the circumstances and all of the considerations that [it was]
able to take into account,” the trial court found that sex offender registration was
appropriate. The trial court therefore ordered Salazar to register “as a [t]ier [one]
offender pursuant to . . . [s]ection 290.006.”4 The trial court then suspended imposition
of sentence, granted probation with the condition that Salazar serve 364 days of county
jail, deemed the sentenced served, and released Salazar from custody. Before concluding
the hearing, the trial court asked the parties if there “was anything else that . . . need[ed]
to [be] address[ed]” to which defense counsel responded, “No, Your Honor.”
Salazar timely appealed the trial court’s sex offender registration order.
II. DISCUSSION
Salazar contends the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to register as
a sex offender because the trial court: (1) did not provide sufficient reasons for its
finding that he forcibly committed the sexual acts against S.D. and (2) failed to
adequately consider all the relevant factors for ordering discretionary sex offender
registration (§ 290.006). We conclude that Salazar did not preserve his section 290.006
claim for appeal, and in any event, remand for a new hearing on the matter is not
warranted because the trial court properly exercised its discretion in ordering Salazar to
register as a sex offender.
4
A tier one offender is subject to registration for a minimum of 10 years, a tier two
offender is subject to registration for a minimum of 20 years, and a tier three offender is
subject to registration for life. (§ 290, subd. (d).)
6
A. Legal Principles
The California Sex Offender Registration Act (§ 290 et seq.) requires persons
convicted of certain specified sex offenses while residing, attending school, or working in
California, to register as sex offenders. (§ 290, subds. (b), (c).) Sex offender registration
is designed to prevent recidivism, ensure sex offenders “ ‘ “ ‘ shall be readily available
for police surveillance at all times because the Legislature deemed them likely to commit
similar offenses in the future’ ” ’ ” and “notify members of the public of the existence and
location of sex offenders so they can take protective measures.” (People v. Hofsheier
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1196 (Hofsheier), overruled on other grounds in Johnson v.
Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 888 (Johnson).)
Section 290 contains mandatory and discretionary provisions. (People v. Mosley
(2015) 60 Cal.4th 1044, 1048.) Section 290, subdivision (b) mandates lifetime
registration for anyone convicted of an offense listed in subdivision (c) of the statute.
However, section 290.006, subdivision (a) permits the trial court to impose discretionary
sex offender registration if: “[T]he court finds at the time of conviction or sentencing that
the person committed the offense as a result of sexual compulsion or for purposes of
sexual gratification” and “state[s] on the record the reasons for its findings and the
reasons for requiring registration.” (§ 290, subd. (a); see Mosley, at p. 1048 [when a
“conviction is for an offense other than those automatically requiring registration, the
[trial] court may nonetheless exercise its discretion to impose a registration requirement if
the court finds the offense was sexually motivated or compelled, and that registration is
justified by the defendant’s risk of re[-]offense”].)
“By requiring a separate statement of reasons for requiring registration even if the
trial court finds the offense was committed as a result of sexual compulsion or for
purposes of sexual gratification, the statute gives the trial court discretion to weigh the
reasons for and against registration in each particular case.” (Hofsheier, supra,
7
37 Cal.4th at p. 1197.) We review a trial court’s order imposing discretionary registration
for abuse of discretion. (People v. Eastman (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 638, 648-650.) “[A]
trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that
no reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,
377.)
B. Forfeiture
Preliminarily, we address the Attorney General’s contention that Salazar forfeited
his section 290.006 claim by failing to object in the trial court on the same grounds
asserted on appeal. We agree.
A defendant cannot raise for the first time on appeal, “claims involving the trial
court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices.
Included in this category are cases in which . . . the court purportedly erred because
it . . . failed to state any reasons or give a sufficient number of valid reasons.” (People v.
Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 352-353 (Scott).) The rationale behind the forfeiture rule is
that such a failure “ ‘deprives the trial court of the opportunity’ to create a record and to
‘correct potential error in the first instance.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Romero and Self
(2015) 62Cal.4th 1, 24.) “ ‘Traditional objection and waiver principles encourage
development of the record and a proper exercise of discretion in the trial court.’
[Citation.]” (Scott, at p. 355.)
“Although the court is required to impose sentence in a lawful manner, counsel is
charged with understanding, advocating, and clarifying permissible sentencing choices at
the hearing. Routine defects in the court’s statement of reasons are easily prevented and
corrected if called to the court’s attention.” (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 353.) The
forfeiture rule applies so long as the defendant was afforded a meaningful opportunity to
object. (Id. at p. 356.) “[A] meaningful opportunity to object means that the defendant
[must] be given the opportunity to address the court on the matter of sentence and to
8
object to any sentence or condition thereof imposed by the court.” (People v. Zuniga
(1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 81, 84.)
In People v. Bautista (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 865 (Bautista), the defendant
appealed the trial court’s sex offender registration order on the ground that “the court
failed to state reasons for requiring registration.” (Id. pp. 867-868.) The Bautista court
concluded the defendant “waived” his claim on appeal by failing to object on the same
grounds in the trial court. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal reasoned that the trial court
“clearly apprised [the defendant] before imposition of sentence that its reason for
requiring registration would be that the offense was committed with the intent to commit
rape.” (Id. at p. 871.) As such, the defendant was precluded from raising the alleged
defect for the first time on appeal because he had “ample meaningful opportunity” to
“object to the [trial] court’s failure to provide a more complete statement of reasons for
its findings and for requiring registration.” (Id. at pp. 868, 871.) The Bautista court
therefore affirmed the trial court’s sex offender registration order. (Id. at p. 871.)
In this case, we conclude that Salazar forfeited his claim by failing to object.5 As
in Bautista, here Salazar’s trial counsel “objected to the registration requirement, but did
5
Our Supreme Court recently noted: “The term ‘waiver’ has indeed been loosely
used at times . . . to signify what is properly understood as a forfeiture.
[Citations.] . . . ‘Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right,
waiver is the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” ’
[Citations.] Although ‘the two terms on occasion have been used interchangeably’
[citation], ‘they are quite different’ [citation]. . . . ‘Waiver’ is not properly used to
describe a circumstance other than when a party voluntarily relinquishes or abandons a
known right. To dispel any possible lingering confusion, we stress once more that
forfeiture ‘refers to a failure to object or to invoke a right.’ [Citation.] When a party does
not raise an objection in the manner required, their failure to do so, without more,
constitutes a forfeiture, not a waiver.’ [Citations.] We encourage courts and litigants to
use precise terminology and avoid terms like ‘waiver’ . . . when discussing the potential
consequence of failing to take timely action. . . .” (North American Title Co. v. Superior
Court (2024) 17 Cal.5th 155, 177-178.)
9
not object to the [trial] court’s failure to provide a more complete statement of reasons for
its findings and for requiring registration.” (Bautista, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 868.)
Moreover, just like the defendant in Bautista, here, Salazar had a meaningful opportunity
to object to the sex offender registration order in the trial court on the grounds he raises
on appeal, but failed to do so. Indeed, after the trial court rendered its decision on the sex
offender registration issue and before concluding the sentencing hearing, it provided the
parties with an opportunity to address other matters by asking, “Now, anything else that
we need to address this afternoon?” Salazar’s trial counsel did not raise any objections
and instead responded, “No, your Honor.” Had Salazar raised a proper objection, these
“[r]outine defects in the [trial]court’s statement of reasons [could have] easily [been]
prevented and corrected. . . .” (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 353.) Therefore, Salazar is
precluded from raising for the first time on appeal his challenges to the trial court’s sex
offender registration order.
Salazar argues that forfeiture does not apply here because he is raising a
substantive claim as opposed to a procedural claim. We are not persuaded. “Whether
there was an inquiry of the kind required by [a] statute is a procedural question.” (People
v. Voit (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1369.) Whereas “[a] defendant who belatedly
disputes the existence of evidence of [a finding or conviction] is making a substantive,
not a procedural, claim.” (Id. at p. 1370.) Here, Salazar does not assert that there is
insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s ultimate conclusion that discretionary sex
offender registration was appropriate. Rather, Salazar challenges the procedure by which
the trial court reached its ruling since he claims the trial court failed to follow the
requirements of section 290.006. Consequently, Salazar requests that we examine the
process by which the trial court determined that discretionary sex offender registration
Here, Salazar failed to raise a timely objection the trial court’s statement of
reasons. Thus, as our Supreme Court had made clear, “the correct term is ‘forfeiture’
rather than ‘waiver.’ ” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 881, fn. 1.)
10
was appropriate, not to engage in a substantive review of the trial court’s ruling. Thus,
contrary to Salazar’s contention, he raises a procedural—not a substantive—claim.
Accordingly, Salazar forfeited his section 290.006 claim by failing to object in the
trial court. However, we will nonetheless address the merits of Salazar’s claim given the
significance of the liberty interests involved. (See People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th
148, 161, fn. 6 [“An appellate court is generally not prohibited from reaching a question
that has not been preserved for review by a party”], citations omitted.)
C. Abuse of Discretion
A trial court may exercise its discretion to impose discretionary sex offender
registration if it: (1) finds that the defendant committed the offense as a result of sexual
compulsion or for purposes of sexual gratification and states on the record reasons for its
findings; and (2) states on the record its reasons for requiring sex offender registration.
(§ 290.006, subd. (a).) “In order to make a discretionary determination as to whether or
not to require registration [under section 290.006], the trial court logically should be able
to consider all relevant information available to it at the time it makes its decision.”
(People v. Garcia (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 475, 483, disapproved on another ground in
Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 888, disapproved on another ground in People v.
Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 338-339, fn. 4.) If the trial court exercises its
discretion under section 290.006 to impose a registration requirement, “[t]he person shall
register as a tier one offender . . . unless the court finds the person should register as a tier
two or tier three offender and states on the record the reasons for its finding.” (§ 290.006,
subd. (b).)
“ ‘The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its
conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is
reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.’ [Citation.] A trial court abuses its discretion
11
when its factual findings are not supported by the evidence, or its decision is based on an
incorrect legal standard. [Citation.]” (People v. Thai (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 427, 433.)
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring Salazar to
register as a sex offender because the trial court complied with the two requirements set
forth in section 290.006, subdivision (a). In accord with the parties’ agreement, the trial
court relied on several sources of information to guide its determination, including the
preliminary hearing testimony, the parties’ extensive briefing, Salazar’s criminal record,
S.D.’s victim impact statement, the Static-99R reports, and the defense’s supplemental
evaluation.
First, the trial court found that Salazar committed both alleged inappropriate
sexual acts against S.D. through sexual compulsion and stated its reasons for its findings.
At the preliminary hearing, S.D. testified that she was unable to move or call for help
during the first incident because Salazar was lying on top of her and he had covered her
mouth. S.D. also testified that she felt “shaky and anxious” when Salazar kissed her
without her consent during the second incident. The trial court found credible S.D.’s
“statements and her recitation” regarding the two sexual acts Salazar committed against
her. (See People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403 [“it is the exclusive province of the
trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the
facts upon which a determination depends”].) The trial court was also aware that Salazar
admitted he took advantage of a position of trust in pleading no contest to false
imprisonment to resolve the charges stemming from the sexual assault incidents. Thus,
the trial court provided sufficient reasons to support its finding that Salazar committed
the two inappropriate sexual acts against S.D. through sexual compulsion.6
6
Given our conclusion, we need not address whether the trial court stated
sufficient reasons for its finding that Salazar committed the offenses for the purpose of
sexual gratification. (See § 290.006, subd. (a) [to impose discretionary sex offender
registration, the trial court must find that the defendant “committed the offense as a result
of sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual gratification”], italics added.)
12
Second, the trial court stated on the record its reasons for exercising its discretion
to mandate sex offender registration. The trial court acknowledged that the sexual assault
incidents occurred “many years ago,” that Salazar posed a low to average risk of
re-offending, and did not currently “present a risk” to S.D. The record also indicates that
the trial court implicitly determined Salazar had not been previously arrested for, or
convicted of, a sexually motivated offense given Salazar had only been convicted of
misdemeanor offenses and Dr. Murphy’s report stated that there were “no other reported
victims.” Nevertheless, the trial court determined that Salazar committed “forceful” and
“violent” sexual acts against his 14-year-old daughter, “biological or not,” and agreed
with defense counsel’s assertion that the allegations against Salazar were “horrific.” The
trial court also found that Salazar took advantage of the father-daughter relationship to
commit the two incidents and that he “further inflicted fear by invoking [S.D.]’s
relationship with her mother.” It is evident from the record that the trial court conducted
an individualized assessment of the particular facts of this case and substantial evidence
supports its findings of fact.
Therefore, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in ordering Salazar to
register as a sex offender under section 290.006, subdivision (a) because it stated on the
record its reasons for: (1) finding that Salazar committed the two sexual acts against S.D.
through sexual compulsion and (2) requiring Salazar to register as a sex offender.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s sex offender registration order. (See People v.
Jordan (1986) 42 Cal.3d 308, 316 [a trial court’s discretionary ruling “must not be
disturbed on appeal except on a showing that [it] exercised its discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice”].)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
13
_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________________
Danner, J.
______________________________________
Bromberg, J.
H052318 People v. Salazar