Filed 8/7/26 P. v. Salazar CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E086417
v. (Super.Ct.No. FSB026920)
WILLIAM GILBERT SALAZAR, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ronald M.
Christianson, Judge. (Retired judge of the San Bernardino Super. Ct. assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Dismissed.
Jeffrey S. Kross, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Defendant and appellant William Gilbert Salazar appeals from the trial court’s
summary denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. (All
further undesignated statutory references are to this code.) Defendant filed his petition in
propria persona, but had the assistance of appointed counsel in seeking an evidentiary
hearing and resentencing. On appeal, this court appointed appellate counsel on
defendant’s behalf, and, upon finding no issues of arguable merit to raise to challenge the
trial court’s decision, counsel filed a no-issue brief under People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo). (See People v. Johnson (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 106, 109
[“an arguable issue” requires “a reasonable potential for success” on appeal].) We gave
defendant the opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief. He did not do so, despite
notice it could result in dismissal. (See Delgadillo, at p. 232 [absent briefing, appellate
court “may dismiss the appeal as abandoned”].) As we briefly explain, dismissal is the
appropriate disposition here.
BACKGROUND
An amended information filed in April 2002 charged defendant in count 1 with the
murder of Richard Mendez with malice aforethought (§ 187, subd. (a)), and in count 2
with the attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder of Joel Martinez (§§ 664,
subd. (a), 187, subd. (a)). The information alleged firearm and gang enhancements on
both counts (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b) & (d), 186.22, subd. (b)), but did
not allege defendant acted in conjunction with any coperpetrators or accomplices in
committing the murder or attempted murder.
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In May 2002, a jury convicted defendant of counts 1 and 2 as charged, setting the
murder at second degree, and found the firearm enhancements true on both counts. The
jury found defendant did not commit either offense for the benefit of a criminal street
gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate
indeterminate term of 40 years to life on counts 1 and 2, which included 25 years to life
for the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm enhancement on count 1, plus a
consecutive determinate 10-year term for the firearm enhancement under
section 12022.53, subdivision (b) on count 2. This court affirmed defendant’s conviction,
with directions to correct the abstract of judgment. (People v. Salazar (E031903, July 8,
2003) [nonpub. opn.].)
In August 2023, defendant filed his section 1172.6 form petition in which, among
other contentions, he asserted he could not under present law be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes made to sections 188 and 189, effective January 1,
2019. After defense counsel and the prosecutor filed their respective briefs, the trial court
held a hearing on whether defendant established the requisite prima facie case to proceed
under section 1172.6. At the hearing, the parties submitted the matter based on their
briefing, and the court subsequently issued a detailed ruling in which it denied
defendant’s petition.
Reviewing the court file for defendant’s conviction, the court explained: “The
instructions to the jury show that, as to the murder, the Defendant was tried on the theory
that the Defendant was the actual killer, acting with express or implied malice, and that
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the Defendant himself intentionally discharged the firearm. [¶] As to the attempted
murder, the jury was instructed that in order to convict, the Defendant must have had a
specific intent to kill the victim. Further, in order to find the attempted murder willful,
deliberate and premeditated, the attempted murder must be accompanied by a clear and
deliberate intent to kill.”
The court continued: “The Defendant was interviewed by the probation officer as
part of the pre-sentence report. In his statement to probation, the Defendant admitted he
was the person who shot the murder victim and admitted that he was the person who fired
a shot at the attempted murder victim. [¶] In conclusion, the record of conviction in this
case unequivocally establishes that the Defendant was the actual killer of the murder
victim and was the person who actually shot at the attempted murder victim. The
Defendant was not prosecuted on any theory of murder or attempted murder that has now
been invalidated.”
After the court denied defendant’s petition in July 2024, he refiled essentially the
same form petition in May 2025, checkmarking the same boxes next to the same
preprinted allegations as the same alleged basis for resentencing under section 1172.6.
A week later, in late May 2025, the trial court summarily denied defendant’s
second petition. The court’s minute order recited the procedural history regarding its
denial of defendant’s earlier petition “for failing to state a prima facie case.” Denying the
second petition, the court explained: “The current petition is identical to the previous
petition. It does not assert any new facts or changes in the law. The new petition is
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denied without any further hearing, the Court’s previous ruling is the law of the case.”
Defendant appealed.
APPEAL, GOVERNING LAW, AND DISMISSAL
As noted, following appointed appellate counsel’s review of the record and the
law, counsel filed a Delgadillo brief. Counsel did not argue against his client, but instead
set forth a statement of the case and attested he found no issues to advance on appeal,
including after consultation with Appellate Defenders, Inc. Counsel did not identify any
potential issues for our review.
We have confirmed the law of the case precluded relief for defendant’s duplicative
second petition. We have reviewed the jury instructions and confirmed none were given
regarding felony murder nor that otherwise might permit conviction for murder or
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or any other
theory of imputed malice prohibited by changes to the law of murder made by Senate Bill
No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) and subsequent legislation or
caselaw. Nor has the law changed barring actual killers from resentencing relief under
section 1172.6. We conclude nothing warrants our further review for arguable
postconviction error or further expenditure of judicial or party resources; there are no
issues of arguable merit on which to request merits briefing by the parties. Given
defendant’s decision not to file a supplemental brief, dismissal is the appropriate outcome
here.
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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
LEE
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
RAPHAEL
J.
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