Filed 10/1/26 P. v. Ruvalcaba CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085496
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(San Diego Super. Ct.
v. No. SCS319128)
JUAN ANTONIO RUVALCABA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Garry G. Haehnle, Judge. Affirmed.
Shay Dinata-Hanson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Robin Urbanksi and Stephanie H. Chow, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Juan Antonio Ruvalcaba took an 18-pack of beer from a 7-Eleven.
When the clerk followed him out of the store, Ruvalcaba pointed a rifle at
the clerk and fled with the beer. A jury convicted Ruvalcaba of robbery
(Pen. Code,1 § 211) and found true two firearm enhancements (§§ 12022.5,
subd. (a) [personally used a firearm in the commission of a felony]; 12022.53,
subd. (b) [personally used a firearm in the commission of a robbery].)
In this appeal, Ruvalcaba challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
to support his robbery conviction on the basis that he used “fear” in self-
defense and not for the purpose of permanently depriving the clerk of the
beer. But self-defense is not a defense to robbery and the evidence, viewed
most favorably to the verdict, supports a conclusion that Ruvalcaba used
“fear” in order to recapture the beer.
Ruvalcaba also contends the trial court erred by refusing his request
for a pinpoint instruction, answering a jury question during deliberations,
and imposing a midterm sentence when he was presumptively entitled to
the low term. For reasons we explain, we reject each of these additional
contentions.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In August 2021, Julio V. was working as a cashier at a 7-Eleven. He
saw Ruvalcaba enter the store with a cloth covering his face, while carrying
two gym bags, one of which was longer and light colored. Ruvalcaba walked
to a cooler, removed an 18-pack of beer, and exited without paying. Julio
grabbed a wooden broom stick and quickly followed Ruvalcaba outside.
Ruvalcaba immediately turned to face Julio, dropping the beer and
causing the cans to spill from the carton. Julio told Ruvalcaba to return the
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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beer while simultaneously hitting the stick on the ground and bending over
to collect the beers. As Ruvalcaba backed away, Julio’s stick broke leaving a
sharp point on the end.
Ruvalcaba suddenly reversed direction and approached Julio, stating,
“ ‘You want to hit me?’ ” Julio answered, “ ‘No. I just want the beer back.’ ”
Ruvalcaba, whose face mask was now down, countered, “ ‘Okay. If you want
to hit me, you’re going to see.’ ” He held up the light colored bag, exposing
what Julio believed to be a rifle, which he pointed at Julio and threatened,
“ ‘That’s it for you. This is the end of you.’ ” Julio responded, “ ‘I’m going to
poke your eyes out’ ” and angled the stick toward Ruvalcaba. Ruvalcaba
motioned to hit Julio with the weapon,, causing Julio to retreat. Ruvalcaba
picked up the beers and fled. Video surveillance of these events, without
audio, was played for the jury.
About two hours later, police found Ruvalcaba nearby in possession of
the beers. Julio identified Ruvalcaba in a curbside lineup.
After Ruvalcaba was found guilty in a jury trial, the court sentenced
him to 10 years in prison, consisting of a midterm sentence of three years for
the robbery conviction doubled to six years for a prior strike, plus a midterm
of four years for the section 12022.5, subdivision (a) gun enhancement. The
court struck the remaining gun enhancement, plus a second strike offense
and two serious felony priors found true by the jury.
DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Ruvalcaba challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
robbery conviction. He contends evidence of the “force or fear” element of
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robbery was insufficient because he used force against Julio to defend
himself and not to facilitate taking the beer.
“ ‘In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ ” (People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1249.) We resolve “neither
credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts” (People v. Young (2005) 34
Cal.4th 1149, 1181 (Young)) and draw all logical inferences from both direct
and circumstantial evidence in favor of the verdict, even if we would have
concluded otherwise (see People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 411; People v.
Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 241).2
“Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession
of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will,
accomplished by means of force or fear.” (§ 211.) Because the record would
not support a finding that Ruvalcaba used physical force, we narrow our
focus to fear. This element requires the prosecution to show the defendant
took the property “by means of ... fear with the specific intent to
permanently deprive him of that property.” (Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at
pp. 1176–1177.) “ ‘The element of fear ... is satisfied when there is sufficient
fear to cause the victim to comply with the unlawful demand for his
property.’ ” (People v. Morehead (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 765, 774–775.)
2 Relying on civil cases involving summary judgment, Ruvalcaba invites
us to apply a de novo standard of review to the surveillance video. We
decline to do so, however, finding no authority or basis to depart from the
well-established principles governing review for sufficiency of the evidence in
criminal cases.
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A jury can infer fear from the circumstances in which the property is taken.
(Id. at p. 775.)
A defendant who does not use fear in the initial taking of the property
may still be guilty of robbery if he uses fear to retake stolen property, retain
it, or carry it away. (People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 28.) “It thus
is robbery when the property was peacefully acquired, but force or fear was
used to carry it away.” (People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 994.)
When fear is not used until after the perpetrator has taken the property,
the robbery is “commonly referred to as [an] ‘Estes robber[y].’ ” (Miller v.
Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 216, 223.)
Here, credible evidence of solid value supports the finding that
Ruvalcaba committed an Estes robbery. Julio testified that Ruvalcaba
initially took the beer peacefully and exited the store without paying, a theft
crime that is colloquially referred to as shoplifting. But when Julio followed
Ruvalcaba into the parking lot attempting to retake the beer, Ruvalcaba
pointed a rifle at him and threatened to hit him with it. This caused Julio to
retreat toward the store, at which point Ruvalcaba immediately collected the
beers and left. From this course of events, jurors could reasonably infer that
Ruvalcaba used fear—pointing the rifle at Julio and then threatening to hit
him with it—because he wanted to retain the beers. Julio’s version of events
was corroborated by video surveillance of the entire incident.
Ruvalcaba, however, contends that a reasonable doubt exists whether
he used fear to accomplish the taking because the evidence supports he was
acting in self-defense, no rifle was ever found, the video supports his
version of events, and inconsistencies riddled Julio’s testimony. Regarding
Ruvalcaba’s position that the force and fear element was not met because
the record indicates he was acting in self-defense, we note that self-defense
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is not a recognized defense to robbery. (People v. Costa (1963) 218
Cal.App.2d 310, 316.) As our Supreme Court has recognized, a robbery
defendant cannot “shift the blame to the victim.” (People v. Gomez (2008) 43
Cal.4th 249, 264.) Rather, “[i]t is the conduct of the perpetrator who resorts
to violence to further his theft, and not the decision of the victim to confront
the perpetrator, that should be analyzed in considering whether a robbery
has occurred.” (Ibid.; see § 490.5, subd. (f)(2) [shopkeeper can use reasonable
nondeadly force to prevent loss of property].)
But even if self-defense could be used to negate the element of force
and fear, Ruvalcaba’s argument essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence
and reassess Julio’s credibility in his favor, contrary to our standard of
review, which we cannot do. That the evidence might also support a
contrary finding consistent with Ruvalcaba’s self-defense theory does not
warrant reversal when the same evidence reasonably supports the jury’s
verdict. (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 961 [“ ‘ “ ‘If the trier of fact’s
findings are reasonably justified by the circumstances, … that a contrary
finding might also reasonably be reconciled with the circumstances does not
warrant reversing the judgment’ ” ’ ”].)
Moreover, none of the evidence Ruvalcaba cites in support of his
theory is the type of evidence that would justify reversal: that Julio’s
testimony contained some inconsistencies and a firearm was never found
does not make the evidence in support of the conviction inherently
improbable or physically impossible. And having reviewed the surveillance
video, it is evident the trier of fact could have reasonably viewed it as
consistent with Julio’s testimony. (See, e.g., Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at
p. 1181 [“[U]nless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently
improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a
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conviction”].) Accordingly, Ruvalcaba’s sufficiency of the evidence claim
fails.
B. Instructional Errors
Ruvalcaba next raises two claimed instructional errors: the trial court
erred by refusing (1) to give a requested pinpoint instruction to clarify the
“force or fear” element of robbery; and (2) to clarify the jury’s question before
responding with an answer.
1. Pinpoint Instruction
“ ‘ “[A] defendant has a right to an instruction that pinpoints the
theory of the defense … .” ’ [Citation.] The [trial] court, however, ‘may
properly refuse an instruction offered by the defendant if it incorrectly states
the law, is argumentative, duplicative, or potentially confusing [citation], or
if it is not supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (People v. Bivert (2011) 52
Cal.4th 96, 120.) Challenges to the denial of a pinpoint instruction on the
ground it was duplicative are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (See
People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 497 (Mora and Rangel).)
Ruvalcaba claims a pinpoint instruction was necessary and
appropriate to explain to the jury that Ruvalcaba had “to apply the force
or fear for the purpose of accomplishing the taking, not after.” He offered
the following pinpoint instruction for this purpose: “for the crime of robbery
the defendant must apply the force or instill the fear for the purpose of
accomplishing the taking.” But as the trial court recognized, this concept
was highlighted by the pattern instruction that was already being given.
CALCRIM No. 1600 provided, “[W]hen the defendant used force or fear, he
intended to deprive the owner of the property ... [and] defendant’s intent to
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take the property must have been formed before or during the time he used
force or fear.”
Reviewing the requested instruction and CALCRIM No. 1600 side-by-
side, it is evident that both instructions conveyed the same principle and the
requested instruction was, therefore, duplicative. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing it. (See Mora and Rangel, supra, 5 Cal.5th
at p. 497.)
2. Jury Question
Ruvalcaba also challenges the trial court’s refusal to clarify a question
from the jury before responding with an answer. He contends the jury’s
failure to ask a follow-up question after the court’s response could mean
the judge had confirmed their misinterpretation was correct.
a. Additional Background
The verdict form provided to the jury for count 1 (robbery) included
spaces for the jury to render a verdict for robbery, as well as separate spaces
for the jury to find true, or not true, the firearm enhancements under
sections 12022.5, subdivision (a) and 12022.53, subdivision (b). During
deliberations, the jury submitted the following note with respect to the
verdict form: “[I]n terms of count 1 are the verdict options separate? Do
we need to find 2nd & 3rd parts to be true to be able [crossed out.] Do all 3
parts need to coincide? Penal code 211, section 12022.5(a) and 12022.53(b)?”
After hearing unreported arguments from counsel, the court sent a note to
the jury merely directing them to refer to CALCRIM No. 3146 in their
existing set of instructions.
Back on the record at the next day’s court session, Ruvalcaba objected
to the court having provided an answer without first clarifying the jury’s
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question. The judge acknowledged that the jury’s “note was a little bit
confusing,” but indicated he understood the query to seek direction on how
to “deal with that verdict form with three separate parts on it.” The judge
further reasoned that CALCRIM No. 3146 “covers that, so I don’t think we
need to do anything.”3 He added, “[I]n this court’s experience and training,
referring [the jury] to the appropriate instruction is the best way to first
respond to notes like this. And then if they need further clarifying
information, they can write another jury note.” The jury submitted no
additional questions after receiving the court’s direction.
b. Analysis
Under section 1138, a trial court is required to provide information
to the jury when it expresses a “desire to be informed on any point of law
arising in the case.” “Where the original instructions are themselves full
and complete, the court has discretion under section 1138 to determine
what additional explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury’s request
for information.” (People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 97.) While
elaboration on the standard instructions is not required in every instance
(People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1212–1213), it is generally not
acceptable “for a judge to merely repeat for a jury the text of an instruction
it has already indicated it doesn’t understand” (People v. Thompkins (1987)
195 Cal.App.3d 244, 252). A court “must at least consider how it can best
3 Modified CALCRIM No. 3146, titled, “Personally Used Firearm (Pen.
Code, §§ 12022.5(a), 12022.53(b))” provided, in relevant part, “If you find the
defendant guilty of the crime charged in Count 1 [robbery], you must then
decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the
defendant personally used a firearm during the commission of that crime.”
(Italics added.)
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aid the jury.” (Beardslee, at p. 97.) We apply the abuse of discretion
standard to the trial court’s decision whether to provide further instructions
in response to a jury’s question. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690,
745–746.)
We find no reversible error in the court’s approach. The jury’s
query reasonably apprised the judge of the source of its confusion: how
to approach the verdict form with three separate parts on it; specifically,
whether “all three parts [of the verdict form on count 1] needed to coincide.”
The court, in its experience, determined that the best way to remedy the
confusion was to refer the jury to CALCRIM No. 3146, which specifically
directed that, “[i]f you find the defendant guilty of the crime charged in
Count 1 [robbery], [only then must you decide]” whether to find true the gun
enhancements. While it might have been better practice to add that jurors
could seek additional guidance if the court’s reference to CALCRIM No. 3146
did not resolve their question, the substance of the court’s response was
adequate.
Ruvalcaba nonetheless asserts that the trial court should have sought
clarification before answering, noting that the jury had also asked about
robbery and CALCRIM No. 3146 only addresses firearm enhancements. In
his view, absent obtaining clarification, a danger remained that the jury
viewed the verdict form as requiring all-or-nothing findings. But as we have
explained, the plain terms of CALCRIM No. 3146 belie this claim. That the
jury did not seek additional clarification after being directed to CALCRIM
No. 3146 supports the inference the jury understood its findings on robbery
and the gun enhancements did not have to “coincide.”
Moreover, even if the trial court should have clarified the jury’s
inquiry, Ruvalcaba has not demonstrated that a different result is
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reasonably probable. (See People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 326
[“Any error under section 1138 ... is subject to the prejudice standard of
People v. Watson [(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818]”].) The jury’s question, while poorly
stated, related to the relationship between robbery and gun enhancements
on the verdict form. Assuming the court had permitted the jury to clarify
its question, the trial court would have provided the jury with the same
information, meaning a different result is highly unlikely.
C. Sentencing
Ruvalcaba’s final challenge is to the trial court’s imposition of the
midterm sentence. He contends the court erred by failing to apply the
presumption in favor of the lower term under section 1170, subdivision
(b)(6).
Effective January 1, 2022, section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) makes
the middle term the presumptive sentence for a determinate term of
imprisonment. (People v. Flores (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1038.)
However, section 1170, subsection (b)(6) provides, notwithstanding section
1170, subdivision (b)(1), that “unless the court finds that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the
lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order
imposition of the lower term if any of the following was a contributing factor
in the commission of the offense: [¶] (A) The person has experienced
psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to,
abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence.”
Ruvalcaba submitted a sentencing memorandum seeking imposition of
the lower term for both the robbery count and gun enhancement, specifically
relying on section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). He contended his history of
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childhood trauma—including domestic violence, neglect, and homelessness—
contributed to the commission of the crime and that the lower term
presumptively applied given that no aggravating circumstances existed. He
appended letters from his mother substantiating the trauma, as well as a
witness interview from an aunt who said Ruvalcaba was not a “malicious
person but rather a victim of abuse he endured throughout his life.” He also
included a psychological evaluation, which noted the history of trauma and
concluded Ruvalcaba suffered from cognitive impairments that caused him
to “behave[] out of impulsivity” without the ability to “think rationally about
the consequences.”
At sentencing, the prosecutor relied on the probation report, which did
not include childhood trauma as a mitigating factor, and sought imposition
of the upper term. Defense counsel countered that the trial court was
“bound to go with the low term” under section 1170. In counsel’s view, given
his “childhood history of abandonment, neglect,” and having been “raised in
the streets,” Ruvalcaba had reacted “in the only way he knows” on the day of
the robbery.
Addressing the prosecutor’s argument, the trial court listed multiple
aggravating factors but acknowledged that aside from the use of a weapon
and the fact of prior convictions, none of these factors had been found true
or stipulated. The court declined the prosecutor’s invitation to impose the
upper term. Then, after noting it had read both the probation report and
Ruvalcaba’s sentencing memorandum, the trial court sentenced Ruvalcaba
as follows: “[i]n this case, based on the information provided to the Court,
the consideration of all sentencing rules under [section]1170, as well as all
the information provided to me by [defense counsel] on Mr. Ruvalcaba’s past
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history, looking at Mr. Ruvalcaba’s history, I think the midterm is
appropriate in this case.”
We review a trial court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion.
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376–377.) A defendant is entitled
to a sentencing decision “ ‘ “made in the exercise” ’ ” of the sentencing court’s
“ ‘informed discretion’ ”; a court that is unaware of its discretionary powers
cannot act with such “ ‘informed discretion.’ ” (People v. Salazar (2023) 15
Cal.5th 416, 424.) We presume, however, that a sentencing court is aware of
and applies applicable law unless the record affirmatively shows otherwise.
(See People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042 (Ramirez).) “The burden
is on the party attacking the sentence to show the court misunderstood its
sentencing authority.” (People v. Nielsen (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 816, 823
(Nielsen).)
Ruvalcaba contends a remand is required because the trial court
neither acknowledged the presumptive lower term nor made the requisite
findings that would permit deviation from the low term sentence. We agree
the trial court did not make explicit findings in these regards. But this court
has already rejected the argument that section 1170, subsection (b)(6)
requires express findings that the aggravating factors outweigh the
mitigating ones so as to justify a departure from the low term presumption.
(See People v. Caparrotta (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 874, 905 (Caparrotta).)
Instead, we assume the trial court knows the law and follows it, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary. (Ibid., citing People v. Thomas (2011)
52 Cal.4th 336, 361.) Thus, “[f]ormal incantation of the statutory language
is unnecessary where the record shows, in substance, that the court followed
the dictates of the statute.” (Nielsen, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 828.)
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Absent from the record here is any indication that the trial court did
not follow the mandates of the statute. The court was aware Ruvalcaba
sought imposition of the low term: the court indicated it had read
defendant’s sentencing memorandum, which argued for application of
section 1170, subsection (b)(6); defense counsel advocated for the low term
on the same basis at the hearing; and the court, in imposing the midterm,
expressly stated it was cognizant of defendant’s history provided by counsel.
At the same time, the judge also acknowledged the aggravating factors,
commenting on negative aspects of Ruvalcaba’s history it had referred to
earlier in the hearing. Furthermore, the court expressly indicated it
understood the statutory obligations related to imposition of the midterm
when the low term is presumptive, stating it was aware of all the “all
sentencing rules under [section] 1170.”
Considering all the circumstances, it is evident that the trial court
knew of the statutory requirements and considered all the relevant
information before it, balancing Ruvalcaba’s childhood trauma against other
aggravating factors in determining the midterm was proper. Ruvalcaba
posits that because the court showed lenience by striking a prior strike
and his serious felony priors, the fact that it imposed the midterm suggests
it was not aware of the presumptive low term. But this suggestion is
speculative at best. Absent an affirmative showing that the trial court
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failed to properly apply section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) (see Ramirez, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 1042), Ruvalcaba is not entitled to sentencing relief.4
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DATO, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
RUBIN, J.
4 We note that recent case law upholding sentencing decisions under
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) in the absence of express findings supports
our conclusion. (See Caparrotta, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 905 [court
properly weighed aggravating and mitigating factors under § 1170, subd.
(b)(6) when it stated, “considering all the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, ... I’m going to sentence defendant to the midterm”]; Nielsen,
supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at pp. 825–826 [record supported inference court
weighed aggravating and mitigating factors properly under § 1170, subd.
(b)(6) where it addressed the defendant’s criminal history and childhood
trauma].)
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