Filed 7/8/26 P. v. Ruiz CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H051161, H051551
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 21CR001219)
v.
RICHARD RUIZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Richard Ruiz was convicted by jury of first degree willful, deliberate,
and premeditated murder. He was sentenced to 26 years to life in prison and, following a
later restitution hearing, ordered to pay $4,727.39 in victim restitution. He has separately
appealed from the judgment of conviction and the post-judgment restitution order. As to
the conviction, he contends his conviction must be reduced to second degree murder due
to insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation. As to the restitution order,
appointed counsel has filed an opening brief summarizing the restitution proceedings but
raising no issues. As we will explain, we agree with that defendant’s first degree murder
conviction must be reduced to second degree murder and will therefore reverse the
judgment. Having reviewed the record of the restitution proceedings, we find no
arguable issue and will affirm the restitution order.
I. TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
Defendant was charged with murder for the killing of Gabriela Guzman. It was
alleged that defendant personally used a knife in committing the offense. (Pen. Code,
§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) Two aggravating factors were also alleged: that the crime
involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or other acts
disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(a)(1)) and that defendant was armed with or used a weapon at the time of the
commission of the crime (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(2)).
A. TRIAL EVIDENCE
1. Defendant’s Relationship with Guzman
Defendant and Guzman began dating in 2018 and lived together in Salinas starting
in 2019. Guzman’s son testified that he noticed “negative changes” in his mother’s
demeanor after she began dating defendant. Guzman’s daughter-in-law described
defendant as “accusatory” and “controlling” toward Guzman.
Guzman called 911 in June 2019. She did not say anything to the dispatcher, but
could be heard asking defendant to leave. Police responded to their apartment and
interviewed both of them. Guzman said defendant had “snapped” while they were
watching television, yelled at her, and grabbed her face. She was scared and wanted him
to leave, but he would not. According to Guzman, defendant had attributed his conduct
to “a voice” he was hearing. Defendant told officers he had verbally “confronted”
Guzman about “a hickey on her butt” but had not touched her.
Guzman called 911 again in April 2020. She told the dispatcher that her “ex-
boyfriend” (referring to defendant) was not letting her leave the home but that nothing
physical had happened “yet.” When police responded, Guzman told an officer that
defendant would not let her go to work because he believed she was cheating on him.
Guzman said she was “tired of the fighting” and that defendant should know she was not
seeing anyone else, because he was constantly tracking her location to know where she
was at all times.
The couple broke up in August 2020 and resumed their relationship in October or
November. Guzman’s daughter-in-law described that while she was on vacation with
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Guzman in October, defendant “constantly had to be in contact with her, via video,
and/or texting, and/or calling her.”
Guzman called 911 a third time in November 2020. She told the dispatcher that
her “ex” (defendant) was “being aggressive” and “threatening” her. In Guzman’s words,
defendant was “being violent” and “getting in my face,” and she believed it would “get
worse.” Based on security footage that was not visible on Guzman’s phone, defendant
again accused Guzman of cheating on him.
In December 2020, defendant and Guzman bought a truck together. By February
2021, Guzman was applying for jobs in the state of Washington (where her son and
daughter-in-law lived) and planning to move there. Guzman’s son had talked to her
about the planned move to Washington, but they did not discuss whether defendant
would also be moving. Defendant testified that Guzman had planned for both of them to
move together, but he decided not to move with her because he knew their relationship
would not last.
A neighbor testified that he had talked to defendant in early February 2021 while
they were both retrieving mail from a communal mailbox. Defendant told his neighbor
that “his fiancée was cheating on him” and “he was concerned about that.” The neighbor
“offered to pray with him and try to bring a little bit of peace into his mind,” and
defendant agreed. During the conversation, defendant said he was unemployed and
Guzman was financially supporting him. After praying with his neighbor, defendant
“said he felt peace” and walked away.
2. The Murder and Investigation
When Guzman did not show up to work on February 17, 2021, her boss called her
son, who had not spoken with his mother since February 12. Guzman had previously
shared the location of her cell phone with her daughter-in-law, who saw that the phone’s
last recorded location was Guzman’s home. After Guzman’s son and daughter-in-law
tried unsuccessfully to contact her, they called police. Responding officers found
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Guzman’s body in an upstairs bedroom of her home. She appeared to have been dead for
some time. She had been stabbed multiple times in the face and neck, and there was
blood on the floor as well as blood spatter on the walls. Her head also showed signs of
blunt force trauma. A Starbucks cup was on the floor, and there was a brown stain next
to it.
Before police entered the house, an officer spoke to defendant on the phone and
asked him for a key. Defendant said he was in Humboldt County and had last seen
Guzman when they “got in an argument” on February 13. Since then, defendant had
“just been driving” and had been involved in a car accident; he had not spoken to
Guzman. Officers later determined that defendant had stayed at a hotel in Eureka on
February 16. On February 14, defendant had struck a pedestrian with his truck at a rest
stop near Emigrant Pass. Defendant apologized, said he was drunk, and asked the
pedestrian not to call the police.
Later on February 17, defendant called 911 in Monterey County. Defendant told
the dispatcher he had been “driving everywhere” since he last saw Guzman on February
13. He said he was driving back from Humboldt and was “almost in Frisco.” According
to defendant, Guzman was dating a Nuestra Familia gang associate named T.A. and her
house was “bugged.” Defendant also mentioned a Nuestra Familia gang member named
H.L.1 He said Guzman and T.A. had “put a hit” on him.
The dispatcher transferred defendant to a detective investigating the case. Before
the detective asked any questions, defendant began explaining his relationship with
Guzman. Defendant said he knew T.A. and H.L. from Gilroy, where he grew up. He
explained that he “got in an argument” with Guzman on February 13. They had planned
to go out to dinner that night, but defendant instead “brought her home” where Guzman
1
Consistent with rule 8.90 of the California Rules of Court, we refer by initials to
individuals whose only apparent connection to the case is defendant’s suggestion that
they may have been involved in Guzman’s murder.
4
told him, “we can’t do this no more.” Defendant said that after the argument, he started
smoking and drinking for the first time since 2008. When the detective asked defendant
where he was, defendant said he was “uneducated” and did not “know how to use a map”
or “know how to use computers.”
Detectives traced defendant’s cell phone to San Martin, where they found his truck
parked on an off-ramp. Defendant was standing nearby, still talking on the phone.
Eventually, he got back on the highway and began driving south. Officers followed him
and attempted to make a traffic stop, but defendant continued driving at or below the
speed limit for over 30 miles until a spike strip deflated his tires. As officers arrested
defendant, he asked them, “ ‘What’s wrong with Gabby?’ ”
Officers found two knives in defendant’s truck, including a buck knife. They also
found two knives at Guzman’s home. All four knives tested negative for blood.
3. Security Camera Footage
Motion-activated cameras recorded Guzman and defendant leaving the house
together shortly before 2:00 p.m. on February 13. They returned to the house shortly
after 3:30 p.m. and Guzman walked upstairs alone at 3:38 p.m. She was holding a cup
and wiped her face with a tissue. After Guzman went upstairs, defendant was recorded
walking up and down the stairs several times. One recording shows him walking upstairs
at 4:02 p.m.; after he reaches the top of the stairs, audio of someone talking can be heard.
He walked upstairs again at 4:11 p.m. and next appeared on video at 4:51 p.m., when he
walked downstairs wearing different clothing. Defendant went in and out of the house
several times and was last captured on video at 6:08 p.m., when he appeared to retrieve
an object from outside and go back into the house.
4. Expert Testimony
A licensed marriage and family therapist testified as an expert on intimate partner
violence. He explained that intimate partner violence may begin with nonphysical
actions like imposed isolation, emotional and verbal abuse, or threats. Physical violence
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typically “starts out low and infrequent” but may escalate over time. Abusive
relationships are often characterized by a cycle of violence wherein tension builds over
time, a violent episode occurs, and the parties then reconcile after the abuser shows
remorse. The cycle may repeat itself numerous times before the relationship finally ends.
5. Defense Case
Defendant testified on his own behalf and denied involvement in the killing. He
said he moved out of the house he shared with Guzman in September 2020 because he
believed Guzman was cheating on him. Defendant moved back in with Guzman in
November 2020. He described an incident he said happened around February 9, 2021,
when he saw Guzman talking to two men outside the house. One of the men was H.L.,
the nephew of a woman with whom defendant had a child. Defendant had not seen H.L.
since 1987 or 1988, when H.L. would have been about seven or eight years old, but had
seen pictures of him and believed H.L. was a Nuestra Familia gang member. He also
believed H.L. had dated Guzman and stolen jewelry from her. After seeing Guzman
talking to H.L., defendant believed H.L. was planning to kill him.
According to defendant, he and Guzman left the house on February 13, 2021 for a
planned excursion. They had initially planned to visit the Sonora mountains, but Guzman
“changed her mind” and they instead headed south. They planned to eat dinner at
Cracker Barrel and stay on the coast for one or two nights. According to defendant, the
trip was not intended to be a romantic getaway but “was actually a goodbye” and he
“already knew that this would be our last time together.” Defendant and Guzman
stopped at Starbucks on the way; Guzman bought a drink but defendant did not, which
upset Guzman. They argued as they continued driving south, then turned around in
Greenfield and returned to Salinas. Guzman told defendant, “ ‘I can’t do this no more.’ ”
Explaining the security video footage, defendant testified that when he and
Guzman returned to the house, he was planning to gather his belongings and leave. He
walked through the house, debating whether to take the truck that was parked in the
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driveway or a motorcycle that was parked in the garage. Guzman had taken the garage
door remote and a buck knife from the truck, so defendant went upstairs to retrieve them.
Defendant said Guzman would not give him the remote or the knife, but did ask him not
to leave. He recalled changing into thermal clothing because he intended to take the
motorcycle. Before leaving, defendant found a beer bottle outside that he believed had
been left there by H.L. or his companion days earlier. Defendant brought the bottle
inside, intending to take it with him when he left so he would have fingerprint evidence
of H.L.’s visit to the house. He later left in the truck, forgetting the beer bottle.
After leaving Salinas, defendant drove to Watsonville, San Jose, and Half Moon
Bay. He then drove to Reno, where he camped for a night. He recounted an incident
near Emigrant Pass in which a pedestrian falsely claimed to have been struck by
defendant’s truck. After leaving Reno, defendant drove to Eureka and checked in at a
hotel where he also did laundry. On February 16, defendant called Eureka police and
said he was “on the run” from Guzman, T.A., and H.L. Defendant described that after he
notified police, “the dudes” approached him at a mall in Eureka and one of them told
him, “ ‘You’re a rat.’ ” The next day, after learning about Guzman’s disappearance,
defendant began driving back to Salinas and called 911 on the way.
Defendant’s sister, brother, and friend testified to their observations of defendant’s
relationship with Guzman. According to their testimony, defendant and Guzman seemed
happy together.
B. SENTENCING AND RESTITUTION PROCEEDINGS
The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder based on a finding of
premeditation and deliberation. The jury also found true the special allegation that
defendant personally used a knife, as well as both alleged aggravating sentencing factors.
The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life in prison for first degree murder,
consecutive to a one-year sentencing enhancement for his use of a knife. At the
June 2023 sentencing hearing, the court found defendant “young enough and able enough
7
to potentially earn funds in prison” and imposed a $9,500 restitution fine. The court also
ordered victim restitution in an amount to be determined.
At a November 2023 restitution hearing, the prosecution requested $4,727.39 in
victim restitution to Guzman’s family for funeral and burial expenses. Defense counsel
did not object to the trial court’s consideration of the request, presented no evidence, and
made no argument concerning the appropriate amount of restitution. Defendant
personally addressed the court and appeared to reference People v. Dueñas (2019)
30 Cal.App.5th 1157, prompting clarification from the court and defense counsel that
Dueñas addressed a restitution fine rather than direct victim restitution. The court
ordered victim restitution in the requested amount of $4,727.39.
II. DISCUSSION
A. EVIDENCE OF PREMEDITATION AND DELIBERATION
Defendant contends his conviction must be reduced to second degree murder
because the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s finding of premeditation and
deliberation. “In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in
the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297,
331.) We presume the “existence of every fact that the trier of fact could reasonably
deduce from the evidence” to support the judgment. (People v. Medina (2009)
46 Cal.4th 913, 919.) To overturn a jury’s finding, “it must clearly appear that upon no
hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it.” (People v.
Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.) Here, there was not sufficient substantial evidence
from which a jury could find defendant guilty of first degree murder.
The California Supreme Court has described premeditation and deliberation as
generally established through: “(1) facts about how and what defendant did prior to the
actual killing which show that the defendant was engaged in activity directed toward, and
8
explicable as intended to result in, the killing -- what may be characterized as ‘planning’
activity; (2) facts about the defendant’s prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim
from which the jury could reasonably infer a ‘motive’ to kill the victim,” and “(3) facts
about the nature of the killing from which the jury could infer that the manner of killing
was so particular and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed according
to a ‘preconceived design’ to take his victim’s life in a particular way for a ‘reason’
which the jury can reasonably infer from facts of type (1) or (2).” (People v. Anderson
(1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26–27 (Anderson).) The evidence of premeditation and deliberation
is generally sufficient “when there is evidence of all three types” or “at least extremely
strong evidence of (1) or evidence of (2) in conjunction with either (1) or (3).” (Id. at
p. 27.) The court has more recently emphasized that the factors discussed in Anderson,
“while helpful for purposes of review, are not a sine qua non to finding first degree
premeditated murder, nor are they exclusive.” (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117,
1125 (Perez).) For example, post-killing conduct that is “inconsistent with a state of
mind that would have produced a rash, impulsive killing” can also be considered. (Id. at
p. 1128.)
Applying the Anderson factors here, we first acknowledge the ample evidence of
defendant’s possible motive to kill Guzman. Defendant and Guzman were in a romantic
relationship characterized by defendant’s abusive and controlling behavior, and the
relationship was at or reaching its end on the day of the murder. Based on defendant’s
conduct throughout the relationship, a jury could reasonably infer a motive to maintain
control by murdering Guzman rather than allowing the relationship to end peacefully.
(Cf. People v. Williams (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 396, 410.) But the existence of a
plausible motive is not alone sufficient to establish premeditation and deliberation.
Although the evidence of defendant’s motive is strong, the other evidence does not
sufficiently complement it. There was no evidence of any planning activity before the
day of the murder. While we acknowledge that “planning activity occurring over a short
9
period of time is sufficient to find premeditation” (People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1,
34), the Attorney General’s assertion that defendant planned the murder immediately
beforehand relies on speculation and not substantial evidence. Even absent any evidence
defendant “was thinking about killing Guzman before their fight began,” the Attorney
General argues “the fight itself was long enough” for defendant to “have reflected on his
actions before escalating the abuse by procuring and using a knife.” But the mere
passage of sufficient time for reflection does not establish that defendant actually used
that time to plan or deliberate. We see no evidence of defendant affirmatively obtaining a
knife for the purpose of attacking Guzman at any point during their argument. (Cf.
People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 471 [jury could infer that Elliot, who “told others
shortly before the killing that he had a new knife,” acquired the knife to carry out the
killing].) Although the Attorney General correctly notes the jury was free to reject
defendant’s testimony that Guzman had taken his buck knife, it does not necessarily
follow that defendant in fact armed himself with that (or any other) knife to carry out a
planned attack on Guzman. “ ‘Disbelief of defendant’s testimony, without more, does
not constitute “other facts” from which logically flows the conclusion, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that defendant did that which he denied doing.’ ” (People v. Boatman
(2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1266, citing People v. Velazquez (2011)
201 Cal.App.4th 219, 231.)
The Attorney General also argues defendant “had time to reflect after stabbing
Guzman the first time, and instead of stopping, proceeded to stab her several more
times.” But the argument presumes without supporting evidence that defendant had an
opportunity to reflect during the fatal attack, and it collapses Anderson’s distinction
between “ ‘planning’ activity” and “manner of killing.” (See Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d
at p. 27.) When evidence about the stabbing itself is viewed properly as relating to the
latter Anderson factor, the evidence is at best ambiguous regarding premeditation and
deliberation. The Attorney General points to cases in which first degree murder
10
convictions were upheld on assertedly similar facts relating to the manner of killing. But
in those cases, unlike here, the killer used multiple weapons (see People v. Cruz (1980)
26 Cal.3d 233, 245; People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 851) or admitted to trapping
the victim in an enclosed space before the killing occurred (see People v. Booker (2011)
51 Cal.4th 141, 173–174).
“Absent other evidence, a brutal manner of killing is as consistent with a sudden,
random ‘explosion’ of violence as with calculated murder.” (People v. Alcala (1984)
36 Cal.3d 604, 626.) Nothing about the brutality of the killing here is inherently
inconsistent with the mental state required for first degree murder, and it does not
preclude a finding of premeditation and deliberation if accompanied by sufficient
evidence of planning activity. Indeed, first degree murder convictions have been upheld
for similarly brutal knife attacks. (See People v. Nazeri (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1101,
1118, citing Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1117.)2 But the specific method of killing here
(repeated stabbing to the face and neck with a single weapon) “is, at least in a vacuum,
associated with someone losing his mind and going berserk, which is not a state of mind
we associate with premeditation or deliberation.” (Nazeri, at p. 1118.) That is especially
so under the circumstances of the murder, which both parties describe as following a
verbal argument between defendant and Guzman. Without more, the manner of killing
was not “so particular and exacting” as to support an inference that defendant “must have
intentionally killed according to a ‘preconceived design’ to take his victim’s life in a
particular way[.]” (Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 27.)
2
Significantly, although not mentioned by the Nazeri court, the evidence in Perez
supported an inference that the killer attacked the victim in her home with a steak knife
and searched the house for another knife to continue his attack after the steak knife broke.
(Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 1126–1127.) The California Supreme Court described that
conduct as similar to “reloading a gun or using another gun when the first one has run out
of ammunition.” (Id. at p. 1127.)
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Defendant’s post-killing conduct was not “inconsistent with a state of mind that
would have produced a rash, impulsive killing.” (Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1128.)
(We not it is not clear which, if any, portions of the surveillance video footage depict
defendant’s post-killing conduct, as Guzman’s time of death was not established to that
level of specificity.) The Attorney General focuses on the evidence of defendant’s flight
and contends his “attempts to distance himself from the crime supported the jury’s
conclusion that the attack was deliberate, not the result of a rash, unconsidered act.” But
the same evidence is consistent with a conclusion that defendant, having impulsively
murdered Guzman without premeditation and deliberation, only then decided to flee and
concocted a bizarre story about a conspiracy against him in an ill-conceived attempt to
evade responsibility for the unplanned killing. “In the context of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a finding of premeditated and deliberate murder,” the California
Supreme Court has stated that “evidence of a defendant’s attempts to conceal the crime
by cleaning up the crime scene or telling false stories ‘is highly probative of whether
defendant committed the crime, but it does not bear upon the state of the defendant’s
mind at the time of the commission of the crime.’ ” (People v. Thompson (2010)
49 Cal.4th 79, 113, citing Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 33.)
We also note that an unjustified killing is presumed to be second degree murder,
not first degree murder. (Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 25.) The prosecution thus bore
the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was premeditated and
deliberate. (Ibid.) A possible motive for the murder was well established by the
evidence. But as we have explained, other evidence concerning planning activity and the
manner of killing would support a finding of premeditation and deliberation only in
combination with weaker inferences and speculation. We acknowledge that much of that
evidence could under different circumstances be consistent with a finding of
premeditation and deliberation. But on this record, the evidence was not sufficient to
support that finding beyond a reasonable doubt. We will therefore reverse the judgment
12
and direct the trial court to reduce the conviction to second degree murder. (See Pen.
Code, §§ 1260 and 1181, subd. (6) [“When the verdict or finding is contrary to law or
evidence, but if the evidence shows the defendant to be not guilty of the degree of the
crime of which he was convicted, but guilty of a lesser degree thereof, or of a lesser
crime included therein, the court may modify the verdict, finding or judgment
accordingly without granting or ordering a new trial, and this power shall extend to any
court to which the cause may be appealed.”]. See also People v. Bassett (1968)
69 Cal.2d 122, 148: “[W]e find no substantial evidence to support the verdicts of murder
in the first degree. The evidence does support, however, a conviction of murder in the
second degree, and it is our duty to modify the judgment accordingly.”)
B. NO ARGUABLE APPELLATE ISSUE AS TO VICTIM RESTITUTION
In a separate appeal from the post-judgment restitution order, appointed counsel
filed an opening brief summarizing the restitution proceedings but raising no issues. We
notified defendant of his opportunity to submit written argument on his own behalf, and
he has not done so. Consistent with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we have
reviewed the entire record of the restitution proceedings and find no arguable issue on
appeal.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter remanded for the trial court to reduce the
first degree murder conviction to second degree murder and to resentence defendant
accordingly. The restitution order is affirmed.
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____________________________________
Grover, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________
Lie, J.
____________________________
Wilson, J.
H051161, H051551
People v. Ruiz