Filed 9/28/26 P. v. Rose CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D086796
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCD136724)
v.
JAMES MARTIN ROSE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
David J. Danielsen, Judge. Affirmed.
James Martin Rose, in pro. per.; and Melanie L. Skehar, under
appointment of the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
James Martin Rose appeals from a judgment entered after the trial
court held a resentencing hearing under Penal Code1 section 1172.75. His
appointed appellate counsel filed an opening brief raising no arguable issues
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
and requesting that we exercise our discretion to review the record for
potential issues under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo),
People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), and Anders v. California
(1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders). Rose also filed a supplemental brief on his own
behalf.
We have independently reviewed the record and find no arguable issue
that would result in a modification or reversal of the trial court’s judgment.
We also conclude Rose’s arguments provide no basis for relief. Accordingly,
we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1999, James Martin Rose was convicted of three counts of forcible
rape, kidnapping, false imprisonment, and conspiracy to commit a crime,
involving two 16-year-old girls. He admitted a serious felony prior, two
prison priors, and a strike prior.
The trial court sentenced Rose to 80 years to life, plus six years for the
serious felony prior and first prison prior,2 and the judgment was affirmed on
appeal in 2000. (People v. Rose (Apr. 25, 2000, D033445) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2023, California’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
identified Rose as someone whose sentence might have included a legally
invalid enhancement under section 1172.75. The trial court held a hearing
and resentenced Rose in August 2025. At the resentencing hearing, the court
struck Rose’s two prison priors as legally invalid under section 667.5,
subdivision (b), and exercised its discretion to strike the serious felony prior
under section 667, subdivision (a)(1). The court declined, however, to strike
2 The additional year for the second prison prior was stayed.
2
Rose’s strike prior under section 1385 and People v. Superior Court (Romero)
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). The court resentenced Rose to a term of 80
years to life.
Rose appealed from the judgment entered after his resentencing.
In May 2026, Rose’s appointed appellate counsel filed a brief raising no
issues under Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216. Counsel identified two issues
for potential review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in
declining to strike the strike prior; and (2) whether there was “ineffective
assistance of counsel . . . when the defense attorney neglected to refute a false
allegation that the People raised in their briefing relating to appellant’s
C-file.”
This court informed Rose of his attorney’s Delgadillo brief and his right
to file a supplemental brief. Rose submitted a supplemental brief in
response.
DISCUSSION
Appellate counsel’s brief indicates counsel has not been able to identify
any arguable issues for reversal on appeal. Counsel recognizes that under
Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216, the procedures followed in cases controlled
by Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738 are not
required in cases such as this, but she asks this court to exercise discretion to
undertake independent review of the record. We have exercised our
discretion to review the record under Wende and Anders. (See Delgadillo, at
p. 232.) We have also considered the potential issues identified by Rose’s
appellate counsel. We have not discovered any arguable issue that would
result in a reversal or modification of the trial court’s ruling. Competent
counsel has represented Rose in this appeal.
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We next consider the three arguments Rose sets out in his
supplemental brief. Rose first argues the trial court failed to exercise
informed discretion in resentencing him. His second argument is that the
prosecutor engaged in misconduct by “interfering with appellant[’]s
presentation of mitigating exonnerating [sic] evidence.” (Capitalization
omitted.) Finally, Rose argues that his trial counsel at the resentencing
hearing was ineffective in failing to present mitigating and, in Rose’s view,
“potential[ly] exculpatory evidence.” (Capitalization omitted.) The
“potential[ly] exculpatory evidence” to which Rose is referring is a document
that he asserts is a handwritten statement by someone named Darnisha
Johnson.3 In the statement, Johnson states she was “coerced by the San
Diego District Attorney’s Office, along with the San Diego police to lie on
James Rose (a.k.a. Pokey) to secure his conviction during the times of 1997
and 1998.”
With respect to Rose’s first argument, he contends that at resentencing,
the trial court “failed to appreciate the breadth of it[s] authority under
sections 1172.1, 1172.75 & 1385.” He further asserts that if the court had
“considered the relevant evid[en]ce now before the court, including evidence
of factual innocence, false imprisonment, and extraordinary mitigations,”
there is a chance the court would have chosen to further reduce his sentence.
We conclude Rose has not demonstrated error in connection with the court’s
understanding of its authority on resentencing.
Rather, the record reflects the court was aware of the discretion it
possessed in connection with the resentencing proceeding. For example, the
3 The document appears to have been notarized to establish the
declarant’s identity.
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court understood it had discretion to strike Rose’s serious felony prior under
section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and it exercised that discretion to reduce
Rose’s sentence. In addition, the court was aware that it had the discretion
to strike Rose’s prior strike under Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at page 504, if
doing so would be in furtherance of justice. The court expressly explained its
familiarity with the dictates of People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161
(Williams), in which the Supreme Court provided further guidance for a
court’s consideration of Romero motions. Under Williams, the court is to
“consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of [the
defendant’s] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony
convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects,
the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme's spirit, in whole or in part,
and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted
of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (Ibid.)
The record reflects the trial court undertook this analysis. The court
considered the “age of the strike offense” when Rose committed the “current”
offenses but also considered the “level of violence” in both the strike offense
and the offenses for which Rose was being sentenced. With respect to the
strike prior, the court noted it was based on a 1992 conviction for robbery
with a personal use of a firearm enhancement, which the court believed
demonstrated the use of violence. And the court was particularly troubled by
the “level of violence in the current offense[s].” The court noted the crimes
involved “[t]he degradation of two young women with the threat of violence,
the threat of death,” and specifically noted how one victim “felt justified in
jumping from a moving vehicle to escape,” which demonstrated “exactly how
serious these two crimes were.” In the court’s view, Rose’s two rape
convictions involve “two of the most horrific crimes short of capital murder
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that this court sees on a regular basis.” So, while the court acknowledged
mitigating circumstances such as Rose’s drug addiction, as well as how Rose’s
difficult background led him to his “problems,” ultimately the court believed
“in totality this is a case that falls well within the spirit of the three strikes
law.”
The trial court thus adequately understood the scope of its discretion
and undertook to exercise that discretion consistent with the applicable
standards.
Rose’s second argument is that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct
by “interfering with appellant[’]s presentation of mitigating, exonnerating
[sic] evidence.” (Capitalization omitted.) Rose seeks to rely on the Darnisha
Johnson statement, which he claims was “not available to the defense” at the
time of trial. Rose’s argument lacks clarity as to which proceeding he is
discussing when he contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct—his 1999
trial or the 2025 resentencing proceeding. Regardless of which proceeding
Rose is attempting to challenge, he has failed to demonstrate reversible error.
This is because the current direct appeal has been taken from the
resentencing proceeding in 2025. Thus, to the extent Rose is attempting to
obtain relief regarding alleged conduct undertaken in connection with his
1999 trial, this resentencing appeal does not present a pathway for further
review of his underlying convictions. Further, to the extent he is suggesting
prosecutorial misconduct related to “interfer[ence]” with his ability to present
the Darnisha Johnson statement at the 2025 resentencing hearing, no such
misconduct can be demonstrated. The trial court could not have considered
such evidence at the resentencing: “Far from being a proceeding at which the
trier of fact resolves the issues raised in the case, the sentencing hearing—or
resentencing hearing—follows the entry of the verdict and the discharge of
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the jury, and constitutes the occasion on which the court pronounces the
judgment arising from the verdict.” (Peracchi v. Superior Court (2003) 30
Cal.4th 1245, 1254.) Consequently, “[t]he parties at an ordinary resentencing
hearing do not . . . proffer new evidence on the issues decided by the verdict,
nor does the court disregard the original verdict.” (Id. at p. 1257.) We thus
conclude Rose has not demonstrated prosecutorial misconduct in connection
with his 2025 resentencing.
Finally, Rose argues his counsel’s assistance was constitutionally
ineffective because his attorney failed to “follow-up, investigate or interview”
individuals in connection with the Johnson statement, which he claims is
exculpatory evidence. “When challenging a conviction on grounds of
ineffective assistance, the defendant must demonstrate counsel’s inadequacy.
To satisfy this burden, the defendant must first show counsel’s performance
was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms. Second, the defendant must show
resulting prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different. When examining an ineffective assistance claim, a reviewing court
defers to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions, and there is a presumption
counsel acted within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”
(People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.)
As previously explained, “new evidence” purporting to impugn the
jury’s verdicts is irrelevant to a trial court’s inquiry at resentencing. Because
the court had no reason to consider evidence going to Rose’s guilt or
innocence at the resentencing hearing, trial counsel had no reason to pursue
additional evidence related to the purported exculpatory evidence in
connection with the proceeding underlying this appeal. As a result, counsel’s
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performance in this regard could not have been deficient. Rose’s third
argument therefore also does not provide a basis for reversal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, Acting P. J.
KELETY, J.
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