Filed 9/29/26 P. v. Rose CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Siskiyou)
THE PEOPLE, C101557
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 23CF02373)
v.
DAWN LYNETTE ROSE,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Dawn Lynette Rose pled guilty to carjacking, kidnapping, assault, and
driving under the influence. On appeal, Rose contends the trial court abused its
discretion by exercising its residual discretion to deny mental health diversion because
the court’s reasons were inconsistent with the statutory goals of diversion and it
misapplied the statute. We will affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background1
The victim reluctantly agreed to let Rose drive them in the victim’s car on a short
drive. Instead, Rose entered the freeway and drove erratically at over 100 miles per hour
for more than 100 miles. The victim pleaded with Rose to stop driving and to let her out,
1 The facts are derived from the preliminary hearing transcript, police reports, and
probation report, which the parties stipulated to as the factual basis of Rose’s plea.
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but Rose hit her face and shoulder and continued driving over 110 miles per hour and
recklessly weaving in and out of traffic. Eventually, Rose braked hard because of traffic,
and the victim got out of the car while it was still moving, taking “quite a tumble.” The
victim yelled that Rose was trying to hurt, kill, and kidnap her. Witnesses restrained
Rose and took the car key, but Rose kicked, hit, and bit one of the witnesses, drawing
blood and leaving a bite mark on the witness’s hand. Rose unsuccessfully attempted to
get a ride away from the scene. She appeared to be under the influence of drugs.
California Highway Patrol officers responded to the scene. Rose walked towards
the officers, ignoring commands to stop walking until an officer aimed his gun at her.
Rose was detained and transported to a medical center for a blood draw pursuant to a
warrant. Rose refused to cooperate for the blood draw, so officers held her down.
Observing “objective signs of drug use,” an officer attempted to perform a drug
recognition evaluation, but Rose kicked his left shoulder and torso, preventing a complete
evaluation. Based on his observations and experience, the officer believed Rose was
under the influence of drugs and unsafe to drive. Rose was arrested and provided false
identifying information.
An information charged Rose with kidnapping for carjacking (Pen. Code, § 209.5,
subd. (a); count 1), carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a); count 2), kidnapping (Pen.
Code, § 207, subd. (a); count 3), false imprisonment by violence (Pen. Code, § 236; count
4), assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245,
subd. (a)(4); count 5), driving under the influence of a drug (Veh. Code, § 23152,
subd. (f); count 6), giving false information to a police officer (Pen. Code, § 148.9,
subd. (a); count 7), and resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, § 69; count 8). It was
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further alleged as to counts 1 through 6 that Rose was ineligible for probation (Pen.
Code,2 § 1203, subd. (e)(4)). Various factors in aggravation were alleged
II. Mental Health Diversion Proceedings
A. Written motions
Rose sought pretrial mental health diversion under section 1001.36. Her written
motion alleged that she met the criteria for eligibility and suitability and provided a
mental health evaluation by Jeremy Goldsmith, a licensed clinical social worker. In
preparing his report, Goldsmith reviewed the complaint; initial discovery; a crisis
evaluation, dated March 26, 2023;3 Dana Anderson’s competency evaluation, dated
July 31, 2023;4 and Dr. Kent Caruso’s evaluation, dated August 9, 2023.5 Rose reported
she had been previously diagnosed at Shasta Community Health Center with PTSD,
anxiety disorder, and major depressive disorder. She further reported that she had
previously undergone residential addiction treatment twice,6 methadone treatment for one
year, and mental health treatment from Shasta Community Health Center.
2 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3 The crisis evaluation did not include any diagnoses of Rose.
4 Anderson opined that Rose suffers from a stimulant use disorder, “an underlying
mood disorder possibly Bipolar Disorder,” “an unspecified personality disorder,” and
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
5 Dr. Caruso noted that Rose “was very much aware that there is a significant
association if not cause and effect relationship between her use of street drugs and her
mental health problems.” Dr. Caruso opined that Rose presented as “at least a moderate
Borderline personality,” highly prone to addiction, driven by chronic PTSD in
decisionmaking, and exhibits various psychotic symptoms when under the influence or
overly stressed.
6 Rose subsequently reported the same to the probation officer.
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Goldsmith diagnosed Rose with “Schizoaffective Disorder, Depressive Type,”
PTSD, and “Amphetamine-Type Substance Use Disorder,” which was noted as in
“unstable remission” based on Rose’s incarceration. Goldsmith recommended “teasing
out a timeline further during treatment” for the diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder. The
report provided the following treatment plan: “Attend psychiatric appointments”; “Take
medication as prescribed”; “Attend outpatient therapy as prescribed”; “Complete SUD
assessment”; “Attend diversion groups”; and receive case management services. Rose
attached a letter of acceptance to a 12-month residential relapse prevention program.
In a written opposition, the People listed Rose’s various mental health diagnoses,
including five disorders between 1998 and 2010 and 10 disorders between April 2023
and November 2023, and argued Rose was neither eligible nor suitable for diversion.
The People further maintained that the proposed treatment plan did not meet Rose’s
specialized mental health needs because it did not address all of her diagnoses and was
similar to substance and mental health treatments she underwent in the past. The People
also cited Rose’s lack of success in these previous treatments as evidence diversion under
the proposed treatment plan would not meet the statutory purpose of mitigating Rose’s
reentry into the criminal justice system. The People attached documentation of Rose’s
prior diagnoses and attempted treatment plans, which included dual diagnosis treatment
in the form of receiving mental health services from Shasta County Mental Health while
in an addicted offender program until being sentenced to prison following a probation
violation for driving under the influence. The documentation also included hundreds of
pages of records documenting various substance and mental health treatments since 1999.
B. Hearing
The court held a hearing on the request for diversion at which Goldsmith was the
sole witness. Goldsmith assessed Rose and diagnosed her with schizoaffective disorder
depressive type, PTSD, and substance use disorder stimulant type, specifically
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methamphetamine, though he noted she was not currently using while incarcerated. As
to his diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, Goldsmith explained that he was unable “to
specifically tease out any two-week period of time” in which Rose experienced
“delusions or hallucinations for two or more weeks in the absence of a major episode,”
one of the diagnostic requirements for the disorder. However, he “still felt fairly
confident” with the diagnosis and recommended further assessment. Goldsmith
described his recommended treatment plan as “a starting point psychiatric and medication
management,” in which Rose would meet with a psychiatrist to monitor medication and
participate in medication management services; complete a substance use disorder
assessment and adhere to the resultant recommendations; engage in individual therapy
and a mental health diversion group; and have case management services for her day-to-
day needs.
Goldsmith did not see enough evidence in support of Dr. Caruso’s borderline
personality disorder diagnosis of Rose but acknowledged that he did not have time to go
through all the borderline personality disorder criteria with Rose. Based on the
information he had and the time limitations of his assessment, Goldsmith did not think it
appropriate to include Dr. Caruso’s borderline personality diagnosis in the mental health
diversion assessment. He disagreed that inclusion of a borderline personality disorder
diagnosis to the proposed treatment plan meant someone would not respond to the
treatment recommendations. Goldsmith noted that a borderline personality disorder
diagnosis “can be uniquely difficult” to address, and some treatments are specialized for
this disorder. He further noted that some treatments overlap for borderline personality
disorder and schizoaffective disorder. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court
invited the parties to submit additional briefing and documentation for the court’s
consideration.
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C. Supplemental motions
The People’s supplemental opposition asserted that Rose had previously failed to
avail herself of dual treatment. The motion outlined Rose’s previous substance and
mental health treatments. The People urged the court to scrutinize the adequacy of
Goldsmith’s proposed treatment plan because Goldsmith diagnosed Rose with
schizoaffective disorder despite not meeting all diagnostic criteria. Nor did Goldsmith
indicate which symptoms led to Rose’s crimes, further calling into question the suitability
of the proposed treatment plan and whether it would abate those symptoms.
Rose submitted a reply, again arguing she was both eligible and suitable for
diversion and that her alleged prior failures in drug treatment did “not support a
conclusion that a comprehensive treatment program for co-occurring conditions would
not yield different and more positive results at this time.” Rose urged the court to
consider the remoteness of the People’s evidence.
D. Ruling
The trial court found Rose eligible and suitable for diversion but exercised its
residual discretion under section 1001.36, subdivision (a) to deny diversion. It noted
“concerns about … Rose’s past failures to complete mental health treatment, maintain
medication compliance, engage in self-medication, and her prior failure to complete the
dual diagnosis programs she has entered.” The court further noted that “Rose has been
diagnosed by multiple mental health professionals over the years for a myriad of mental
illnesses,” finding that she “most likely does suffer from PTSD” but that “the remaining
diagnoses are all across the map and it is uncertain whether Siskiyou County Behavioral
Health can establish a medication regimen that will assist … Rose, given the different
diagnoses.” Addressing Goldsmith’s admission “that he could not establish that … Rose
suffered from hallucinations for two weeks prior to the arrest or the assessment,” the
court found it put one of Rose’s mental health diagnoses “at risk.” The court indicated
that it “lack[ed] any information as to whether treatment modalities for one of these
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diagnoses are effective for a different disorder.” It expressed concern that Rose only had
two years to complete diversion and obtaining an accurate diagnosis could take a long
time and might require modifying the treatment modality. The court questioned whether
Rose could remain medication compliant, even if a medication regimen addressing her
symptoms could be established, noting her previous medication noncompliance and her
self-medication with various controlled substances. The court noted that Rose had
previously “engaged in residential treatment twice in the past for her addiction issues.”
She was enrolled in an addicted offender program and “provided mental health treatment
and substance abuse treatment” and was subsequently terminated from the program. The
court further found that “[i]n 2014, she enrolled in a dual diagnosis program, but was
dropped for non-compliance.” The court noted that as Rose’s tolerance for prescription
drugs increased, she began using heroin for one year, subsequently received methadone
treatment, and shortly after began using methamphetamine until shortly before her arrest.
The court denied diversion, finding that Rose was “not a good candidate for mental
health diversion” based on her “history of mental illness, failure to maintain medication
compliance, coupled with her illicit street drug use — even after being offered dual
diagnosis assistance, and her failure to successfully complete any program for mental
health or substance abuse.” It further found that it could not “be satisfied that the
proposed treatment will meet the specialized needs of the defendant, given the numerous
and various diagnoses over the past twenty-[f]ive years.”
III. Plea and Sentencing
Rose pled guilty to carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a); count 2), kidnapping
(Pen. Code, § 207, subd (a); count 3), assault with a deadly weapon likely to cause great
bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4); count 5), and driving under the influence of
a drug (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (f); count 6) and admitted various aggravating factors.
Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Rose to 11 years eight months in
prison as follows: nine years (upper term) on count 2 plus consecutive terms of one year
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eight months (one-third the middle term) on count 3 and one year (one-third the middle
term) on count 5. For count 6, the court imposed 10 days in county jail with credit for
time served.
Rose timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Rose contends the trial court abused its residual discretion by denying diversion
because it gave reasons inconsistent with the goals of the statute, and it misapplied the
statute in finding the proposed treatment plan would not meet Rose’s specialized needs.
I. Legal Standards
Section 1001.36 “authorizes pretrial mental health diversion for defendants with
qualifying mental health disorders.” (People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138,
1147 (Whitmill).) Section 1001.36 prescribes a two-step analysis in which the trial court
first considers whether a defendant is eligible for mental health diversion. (§ 1001.36,
subd. (b).)7 Second, if a defendant meets the eligibility requirements, the court also must
find that the defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).)8 Here,
7 The trial court must find eligibility if (1) the defendant has been diagnosed with a
qualifying mental disorder within the last five years by a qualified mental health expert,
and (2) the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the
charged offense. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1), (2).) “If the defendant has been diagnosed
with a mental disorder, the court shall find that the defendant’s mental disorder was a
significant factor in the commission of the offense unless there is clear and convincing
evidence that it was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the
defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).)
8 The trial court considers the following to assess a defendant’s suitability: “(1) In
the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s symptoms of the mental
disorder causing, contributing to, or motivating the criminal behavior would respond to
mental health treatment. [¶] (2) The defendant consents to diversion and waives the
defendant’s right to a speedy trial … . [¶] (3) The defendant agrees to comply with
treatment as a condition of diversion … . [¶] [and] (4) The defendant will not pose an
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the trial court found that Rose was both eligible and suitable for diversion, but as the trial
court noted, that doesn’t end a trial court’s analysis. “Ultimately, … diversion under
section 1001.36 is discretionary, not mandatory, even if all the requirements are met.”
(People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1080.) Even when the statutory
requirements are met, the trial court retains “residual discretion” to deny diversion.
(Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 135; see id. at pp. 134-135;
§ 1001.36, subd. (a).) In order to place a defendant in pretrial diversion, the trial court
must be “satisfied that the recommended inpatient or outpatient program of mental health
treatment will meet the specialized mental health treatment needs of the defendant.”
(§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A)(i); see Vaughn, at p. 134.) This provision “is not an
additional eligibility or suitability requirement the defendant must meet. Rather,
subdivision (f)(1) of section 1001.36 read as a whole appears to contemplate an ongoing
assessment to assure that defendants will receive appropriate treatment for their particular
conditions as part of the diversion program.” (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024)
98 Cal.App.5th 882, 892 (Sarmiento).)
In exercising its discretion, the trial court “must consider the primary purposes of
the mental health diversion statute as set forth in section 1001.35.” (Whitmill, supra,
86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1149.) The purpose of diversion is to promote all of the following:
“(a) Increased diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’
entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety. [¶]
(b) Allowing local discretion and flexibility for counties in the development and
implementation of diversion for individuals with mental disorders across a continuum of
care settings. [¶] (c) Providing diversion that meets the unique mental health treatment
and support needs of individuals with mental disorders.” (§ 1001.35, subds. (a)-(c).)
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in
the community.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)-(4).)
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Furthermore, “[T]he Legislature intended the mental health diversion program to apply as
broadly as possible.” (Whitmill, at p. 1149.) If the court denies pretrial diversion as an
exercise of its residual discretion, “ ‘its statement of reasons should reflect consideration
of the underlying purposes of the statute and explain why diversion would not meet those
goals.’ ” (Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 690.)
We review a trial court’s ruling on a petition for mental health diversion for abuse
of discretion. (Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1147; People v. Moine (2021)
62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448-449.) We review the trial court’s factual findings as to the
enumerated statutory criteria for substantial evidence. (People v. Gerson, supra,
80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1079.) “A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or
capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard [citations], or bases its decision
on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.”
(Moine, at p. 449.) Under this deferential standard of review, “ ‘we must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the
evidence.’ ” (Gerson, at p. 1079.)
II. Analysis
Arguing the trial court improperly exercised its residual discretion to deny
diversion, Rose first asserts the trial court, after finding Rose suitable for diversion,
“essentially found that [Rose] was not suitable for [diversion]” based on her “history of
failed attempts at sobriety” and medication noncompliance “as well as the court’s
concerns that the treatment program will be effective.” In so finding, Rose argues the
trial court “creat[ed] a new requirement for suitability — that the applicant not have a
prior, unsuccessful history of mental health and addiction treatment — that was not
enumerated in the statute.” Rose supports her contentions by citing Sarmiento, supra,
98 Cal.App.5th 882.
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We disagree. As this court stated in People v. Russo (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 134,
139-140: “The court in Sarmiento acknowledged a trial court analyzing its discretion
under section 1001.36, subdivision (f)(1)(A)(i) ‘might reject diversion if it concluded that
the proposed treatment services did not target or could not effectively address the
defendant’s particular diagnosis.’ [Citation.] But this was not satisfied in Sarmiento
because the defendant’s proposed treatment for underlying mental health diagnoses,
coupled with substance abuse treatment, differed from prior failed drug treatment.
[Citation.] The court in Sarmiento explained: ‘[T]he alleged failure of prior drug
treatment programs [said] nothing about any inadequacy of the proposed plan to address
[the defendant’s] mental health needs. Indeed, [the doctor’s] evaluation specifically
explain[ed] why the current proposal [was] significantly different from [the defendant’s]
prior substance abuse-only treatment efforts.’ ” Thus, this court held in Russo that the
defendant “failed to establish the proposed treatment plan was any different than the plan
that originally failed to address his specialized health treatment needs.” (Russo, at
p. 140.)
Here, the record does not establish that the proposed treatment plan addresses
Rose’s specialized mental health needs and is “significantly different from” her prior
treatment. (Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 895; see id. at pp. 894-895.) Instead,
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Rose had previously engaged in
treatment programs like the proposed treatment plan. The record shows that Rose had
twice engaged in residential treatment programs similar to the 12-month residential
relapse prevention program Rose had been accepted into here. Rose received mental
health treatment while in an addicted offender program, which she was subsequently
terminated from following a probation violation for driving under the influence.
Similarly here, Goldsmith’s treatment plan afforded dual diagnosis treatment, including
psychiatric appointments, taking medication as prescribed, attending outpatient therapy,
completing a substance use disorder assessment, and attending diversion groups. Thus,
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the proposed treatment plan is not “significantly different from” previous treatment plans
from which Rose had engaged in without success.
Further, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the proposed
treatment plan would not meet Rose’s specialized needs based on her many and varied
diagnoses over the last 20 years. The record shows that Rose had been diagnosed with at
least 10 different mental health conditions over the course of decades. Most recently,
Goldsmith diagnosed Rose with schizoaffective disorder despite stating he was unable to
establish Rose suffered hallucinations during the two weeks leading to her arrest. The
court found this put the diagnosis “at risk.” Rose had two years to complete diversion,
and given the doubt cast upon her diagnoses, we agree with the trial court that it could
take time to properly diagnose her and possibly modify the treatment modality. Thus, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying diversion based on Rose’s unsuccessful
attempts with similar treatment programs, including her previous inability to maintain
medication compliance as part of those programs, and the concern that the proposed
treatment plan would not meet Rose’s specialized mental health needs.
Rose further asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by failing “to provide
an explanation for why [diversion] would not meet the statute’s goal.” We reject this
assertion. First, Rose claims the trial court did not explain how its exercise of discretion
was consistent with legislative intent. Rose misstates the law. As we have discussed, if
the trial court exercises its residual discretion to deny diversion, “ ‘its statement of
reasons should reflect consideration of the underlying purposes of the statute and explain
why diversion would not meet those goals.’ ” (Gomez v. Superior Court, supra,
113 Cal.App.5th at p. 690, italics added.) Second, aside from noting the trial court did
not explain how its ruling was consistent with the statutory purpose of diversion, Rose
points to nothing that demonstrates that the court failed to follow the law. Absent a
contrary showing, “the trial court is presumed to have known and followed the applicable
law and to have properly exercised its discretion.” (People v. Bradford (2010)
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187 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1355.) Finally, the court’s conclusion that the proposed treatment
plan would not meet Rose’s specialized needs is consistent with the statutory purpose of
diversion as stated in section 1001.35, including that “diversion … meets the unique
mental health treatment and support needs of individuals with mental disorders.”
(§ 1001.35, subd. (c).)
Rose also claims the court misapplied the law, using section 1001.36, subdivision
(f)(1)(A)(i) as “a new requirement for determining eligibility or suitability.” As
mentioned, subdivision (f)(1)(A)(i) looks at whether the court is “satisfied that the
recommended inpatient or outpatient program of mental health treatment will meet the
specialized mental health treatment needs of the defendant.” While we agree with Rose
that Sarmiento indicates “[t]his is not an additional eligibility or suitability requirement”
(Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 892), that is not what the court did here. Rather,
the court’s analysis of this subdivision focused on the adequacy of Rose’s proposed
treatment — not whether Rose was suitable or eligible for diversion. The court
emphasized that while Rose previously underwent treatment programs that are similar to
the proposed treatment plan, ultimately she was terminated from those programs for
noncompliance. This analysis “establishes [the court] was not satisfied the [proposed]
treatment program would meet [the] defendant’s needs,” which “is an appropriate basis to
deny diversion, assuming there is no abuse of discretion with the analysis.” (People v.
Russo, supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at p. 139.) As discussed, we detect no such abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s analysis.
On this record, Rose has not met her burden to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
EARL, P. J.
We concur:
/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
/s/
FEINBERG, J.
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