Filed 9/11/26 P. v. Robles CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B351807
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA097961)
v.
RAMON ROBLES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Debra Cole-Hall, Judge. Affirmed.
James R. Bostwick, Jr., under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Ramon Robles was 16 when he shot two people. A jury
convicted him of two counts of premeditated attempted murder.
In 2009, the court sentenced him to life with the possibility of
parole plus 25 years to life. In 2024, Robles petitioned to recall
that sentence under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)
(section 1170(d)(1)), and People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th
608 (Heard), arguing his sentence is the functional equivalent of
life without the possibility of parole.1 The superior court found it
is not and denied the petition. Appointed counsel filed a brief
raising no issues under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo). Robles filed a supplemental letter. We find no error
and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Robles was born in October 1988. The charged offenses
occurred on March 13 and May 15, 2005. Robles was 16 years old
on both dates.
The information alleged as to both counts of attempted
murder that the offenses were willful, deliberate, and
premeditated. A jury convicted Robles of both counts (§§ 664,
187, subd. (a)) and found true as to each that he personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). Two counts of assault with a firearm were
dismissed. In January 2009, the court imposed life with the
possibility of parole on each attempted murder count, to run
concurrently, and 25 years to life on each firearm enhancement,
consecutive to the life terms and concurrent with one another.
An inmate serving a life sentence must serve at least seven
calendar years before parole eligibility. (§ 3046, subd. (a)(1).)
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Under the sentence as imposed, the minimum term before parole
eligibility was therefore 32 years.
In December 2024, Robles petitioned in propria persona for
recall and resentencing. He alleged he was 16 at the time of his
crimes, that he had been incarcerated for at least 15 years, that
he had no disqualifying juvenile adjudication, and that he had
shown rehabilitation. The court appointed counsel. Counsel filed
a supplemental brief arguing that a 32-year minimum term is the
functional equivalent of life without parole because Robles would
be 48 years old before any potential release.
At the hearing on January 12, 2026, counsel acknowledged
a split of authority and asked the court to find the sentence
functionally equivalent. The People responded that Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation records show a parole eligibility
date of November 2028. The court found the sentence is not the
equivalent of life without the possibility of parole and denied the
petition. Robles filed a timely notice of appeal.
Appointed appellate counsel filed a brief on June 23, 2026,
stating he found no arguable issues. On June 24, 2026, the clerk
notified Robles of his right to file a supplemental brief or letter.
Robles filed a letter on July 17, 2026.
DISCUSSION
I. The Order Denying the Petition Is Appealable
Counsel asks us to decide whether the order is appealable
under section 1237, subdivision (b). It is. Section 1170(d)(1)
authorizes a defendant to petition the sentencing court, and an
order denying that petition forecloses a reduced sentence. That is
an order made after judgment affecting substantial rights, and
its appealability turns on the nature of the claim and the court’s
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ruling on it rather than on whether the claim has merit. (Teal v.
Superior Court (2014) 60 Cal.4th 595, 600–601.)
II. We Decline to Conduct an Independent Review of
the Record
Because this appeal is from an order denying
postconviction relief, Robles has no constitutional right to
appointed counsel, and we are not required to review the record
independently. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 226–227,
231–232.) Robles filed a supplemental letter. We therefore
evaluate the arguments it presents and issue this opinion. (Id. at
p. 232.) We do not undertake an independent review of the
record.
III. Robles is Not Entitled to Relief Under
Section 1170(d)(1)
Section 1170(d)(1) permits a petition for recall and
resentencing by a defendant “who was under 18 years of age at
the time of the commission of the offense for which the defendant
was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of
parole” and who “has been incarcerated for at least 15 years.”
Robles was not sentenced to life without parole. Nevertheless,
Robles contends he is eligible for relief pursuant to
section 1170(d)(1) because his sentence of 32 years to life is the
functional equivalent of life without parole. Robles relies on
Heard and People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435 (Sorto), to
support his argument.
In Heard, the court concluded that an aggregate sentence of
103 years to life imposed on a juvenile offender was the
functional equivalent of life without parole. (Heard, supra, 83
Cal.App.5th at p. 614.) The Heard court held the defendant was
therefore similarly situated to juvenile offenders sentenced to life
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without parole who are eligible for relief under section 1170(d)(1).
(Heard, at pp. 628–631.) The court concluded that denying the
defendant the opportunity to petition for relief under
section 1170(d)(1) violated his equal protection rights. (Heard, at
pp. 633–634; see also Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 440
[sentence of 10 years plus 130 years to life].)
There is now a split of authority in the Courts of Appeal as
to whether denying eligibility for section 1170(d)(1) relief to a
juvenile offender sentenced to a term that is lengthy but does not
exceed the offender’s natural life expectancy violates equal
protection guarantees, and whether a juvenile offender serving a
lengthy sentence who is eligible for youth offender parole is
serving a sentence that is the functional equivalent of life without
parole within the meaning of section 1170(d)(1). The California
Supreme Court will have the final say on these issues. (See, e.g.,
People v. Garner (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 779, petn. for review
pending, petn. filed Aug. 10, 2026; People v. Isayev (2025) 113
Cal.App.5th 1117, review granted Nov. 12, 2025, S292860; People
v. Thompson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1058, review granted
Sept. 24, 2025, S292540; People v. Ortega (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th
1252, review granted Sept. 17, 2025, S292070; People v. Munoz
(2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499, review granted June 25, 2025,
S290828; People v. Cabrera (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 650.)
Yet, no court has concluded that a juvenile offender serving
a sentence of 32 years to life, or any sentence of similar length, is
eligible for section 1170(d)(1) relief, under any theory. (See
People v. Olmos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 580, 583 [33 years to life
is not the functional equivalent of life without parole for
§ 1170(d)(1) purposes].) While in People v. Contreras (2018) 4
Cal.5th 349 (Contreras), the California Supreme Court concluded
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that a sentence of 50 years to life is the functional equivalent of
life without parole when imposed on a juvenile nonhomicide
offender for Eighth Amendment purposes, no California court has
reached that conclusion as to a sentence similar to Robles’s,
which is far shorter. (Olmos, at p. 583 [33-years-to-life sentence
not the functional equivalent of life without parole]; People v.
Perez (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 49, 51, 58 [30-years-to-life sentence
and eligibility for parole at age 47 not the functional equivalent of
life without parole].)
The reasoning of Contreras, and the United States
Supreme Court authority on which it relies, does not apply to a
defendant whose sentence affords him the opportunity for release
at 48 years old, at the latest. The Contreras court reasoned that,
to be consistent with Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, a
sentence imposed on a juvenile nonhomicide offender must
provide a “sufficient period to achieve reintegration as a
productive and respected member of the citizenry”; give an
incentive for the juvenile offender to become a responsible
individual; and provide a realistic hope of release. (Contreras,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 368; see id. at pp. 369, 373.) Parole
eligibility after 32 years provides these things.
The trial court did not err in rejecting Robles’s petition for
recall and resentencing under section 1170(d)(1).
IV. Robles’s Remaining Contentions Do Not Establish
Error
Robles argues that because he has been incarcerated since
he was 16, denying him the benefit of section 1170(d)(1), together
with Proposition 57 and section 3051, denies him the
opportunities available to similarly charged individuals. He
relies on Sorto. But Heard and Sorto extended section 1170(d)(1)
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to juvenile offenders serving the functional equivalent of life
without parole. Robles is not serving such a sentence, so those
decisions do not entitle him to relief. He argues in the same vein
that the Legislature cannot have meant to extend relief only to
juvenile offenders who would otherwise certainly die in prison,
while withholding it from those who will have no realistic
opportunity to reintegrate after serving most of their lives in
custody. That is the argument Heard accepted, and it fails here
for the same reason. His request that his case be certified to
juvenile court under Proposition 57 depends on recall of his
sentence, which has not occurred.
Robles next argues the court failed to consider People v.
Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, before ruling. Franklin held that
section 3051 gave the juvenile offender there a parole hearing
during his 25th year of incarceration, and that his sentence was
accordingly “neither LWOP nor its functional equivalent.”
(Franklin, at p. 280.) Franklin does not create eligibility under
section 1170(d)(1). To the extent Robles seeks a proceeding to
preserve evidence of youth-related factors for a future parole
hearing, the proper procedure is to file a motion in the superior
court under section 1203.01, not this appeal. (In re Cook (2019) 7
Cal.5th 439, 451.)
Robles also invokes Graham and Miller v. Alabama (2012)
567 U.S. 460, and says no court weighed mitigating
circumstances before imposing the harshest available penalty on
him. Graham forbids life without parole for juveniles convicted of
nonhomicide offenses; Miller forbids mandatory life without
parole for juveniles convicted of homicide offenses. Robles
received neither sentence. He was sentenced to a parole-eligible
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term, and the record reflects a parole eligibility date within his
lifetime.
Robles states the sentencing court “threw out counts 2 & 4
due to plea bargain which I didn’t even know is a thing.” The
minute order does recite that those counts were dismissed due to
plea negotiation. The record otherwise does not support that
recital: the same minute order states that Robles was found
guilty by a jury, and the sentencing transcript reflects no plea
agreement. In any event, the dismissal of two counts did not
increase his sentence, and a challenge to the 2009 judgment is
outside the scope of an appeal from the order denying his 2024
petition.
Finally, Robles argues that recall and resentencing would
entitle him to the benefit of later ameliorative changes in the law,
citing People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, and he asks for
relief in the interest of justice given childhood trauma, trauma he
says he has experienced in custody, and his mental health.
Padilla held that a judgment becomes nonfinal when the
sentence is vacated, and that ameliorative changes then apply at
resentencing. Robles’s sentence has not been vacated, so Padilla
does not assist him. His remaining allegations concern matters
outside the record and do not establish error in the order before
us.
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, P. J.
We concur:
HANASONO, J.
ASHWORTH, J.*
* Retired Judge of the El Dorado Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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