Filed 9/17/26 P. v. Robinson CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B349205
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA118180)
v.
BRADLEY CHRISTOPHER
ROBINSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
Bradley Christopher Robinson (defendant) appeals from the
order denying reinstatement of probation and ordering execution
of a previously imposed six-year state prison sentence. His
appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979)
25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), raising no issues and asking this court to
independently review the record. On June 1, 2026, we notified
defendant of his right to file written argument on his own behalf,
and he has done so.
We have reviewed the record and considered defendant’s
contentions. We find no arguable issue warranting reversal and
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In early February 2018, defendant drove with a blood-
alcohol concentration of 0.33 percent and collided with a sheriff’s
patrol car. The patrol car went airborne and landed on the center
median of the roadway.
On April 11, 2019, defendant entered a negotiated guilty
plea to driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent
or more and causing injury, in violation of Vehicle Code section
23153, subdivision (b), and also admitted an allegation under
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Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a), that he personally
inflicted great bodily injury on the victim. Under the agreement,
the court imposed a six-year state prison sentence—three years
for the offense and a consecutive three years for the great bodily
injury enhancement—but suspended execution of that sentence
and placed him on five years of formal probation.
Before accepting the plea, the court explained the charges,
enhancement, negotiated disposition, probation conditions, and
consequences of a serious violation. Defendant stated that he
understood the court’s advisements and waived his constitutional
rights before pleading guilty and admitting the enhancement.
His counsel joined the plea and stipulated to a factual basis for it.
The court found the plea and admission knowing, intelligent,
voluntary, and factually supported.
Included in the terms of probation was that defendant must
(a) obey all laws and (b) not drive with any measurable alcohol in
his system.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2
In January 2022, while defendant was on probation, he was
charged in case No. BA513707 with another alcohol-related
driving offense. The new case involved a collision with a parked
vehicle. At a pretrial hearing, the prosecutor informed the court
that defendant was found asleep in the driver’s seat while the
vehicle was in drive, displayed signs of intoxication, and had two
breath test results of 0.29. The court summarily revoked
probation in the present case pending further proceedings in the
new case.
In August 2025, the court conducted a hearing on
defendant’s motion to reinstate probation. Defendant asked the
court to reinstate probation rather than execute the suspended
six-year sentence. The court acknowledged defendant’s efforts
and the favorable material submitted on his behalf, but denied
his request. The court considered defendant’s prior driving under
the influence (DUI) history—the January 2022 incident was his
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fifth DUI conviction since 2004; the seriousness of the 2019
offense; the terms of the original negotiated disposition; and the
new felony DUI committed while defendant remained on felony
DUI probation. It found the new violation was not minor or
technical and concluded that execution of the previously
suspended sentence was warranted.
Defendant was sentenced to six years in prison in case No.
KA118180: three years for the Vehicle Code section 23153,
subdivision (b), offense and three additional years for the
admitted section 12022.7, subdivision (a), enhancement. The
2 On July 1, 2025, defendant pleaded guilty to driving with a
blood-alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more in violation of
Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b).
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court stated that it was selecting the upper term “pursuant to the
plea agreement.” A two-year concurrent term in case No.
BA513707, was also imposed per a negotiated plea.
Defendant timely appealed and obtained a certificate of
probable cause.
DISCUSSION
When a trial court imposes a sentence but suspends its
execution and places the defendant on probation, the court has
discretion, after revoking probation, to reinstate probation or
terminate it. (Pen. Code, § 1203.2, subds. (a), (b)(1), (c); People v.
Medina (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 318, 321.) We review the court’s
decision whether to reinstate probation for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Bolian (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1421.) If the court
terminates probation after having previously imposed a sentence
and suspended only its execution, it must order that sentence
into effect; it does not select a new sentence. (People v. Howard
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1095; Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.435(b)(2).)
A defendant who pleads guilty or no contest may not
ordinarily challenge the factual basis of the conviction as though
the matter had proceeded to trial. (People v. Palmer (2013) 58
Cal.4th 110, 114–115 [defendant who pleads guilty may challenge
the trial court’s procedure in eliciting a factual basis for the plea
but may not challenge issues relating to guilt, such as whether
the conviction is supported by sufficient evidence].) Although
defendant obtained a certificate of probable cause, that certificate
does not establish the merits of his challenges to the plea or
enhancement admission. (§ 1237.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.304.)
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In his two-page supplemental letter filed June 24, 2026,
defendant raises three arguments.
First, defendant contends that the court and his lawyer’s
appellate brief inaccurately stated that he struck or broadsided
the patrol car, asserting instead that the deputy’s vehicle struck
defendant’s vehicle while he was making a legal turn. He claims
the error affected sentencing.
To the extent defendant seeks to relitigate the facts
underlying his 2019 conviction or enhancement admission, his
guilty plea, express waivers of a preliminary hearing and trial,
and stipulation to a factual basis foreclose the claim. To the
extent he claims the court relied on materially false information
in denying reinstatement of probation, the record shows no
reversible error. The court relied on multiple considerations,
including defendant’s DUI history, the seriousness of the 2019
offense, the plea agreement’s terms, and—most significantly—his
new felony DUI, collision, and reported high alcohol readings
while on felony-DUI probation. Nothing in the record suggests
the court’s decision depended exclusively or materially on
whether defendant struck or was struck by the patrol car in 2018.
Defendant has not shown that the court abused its discretion in
declining to reinstate probation.
Second, defendant contends the three-year enhancement
was improper because he did not personally inflict great bodily
injury, asserting that the patrol car struck him and that the
injury was not sufficiently serious to qualify as great bodily
injury.
Defendant’s contention fails because he expressly admitted
personally inflicting great bodily injury within the meaning of
section 12022.7, subdivision (a). A knowing and voluntary
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admission is binding on the defendant. (People v. Thomas (1986)
41 Cal.3d 837, 844 & fn. 6.) The prosecutor stated the allegation,
defendant confirmed that he understood it, admitted its truth,
and stipulated to a factual basis with counsel. The court found
the admission knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Defendant
identifies no basis for withdrawing or invalidating that
admission. His present disagreement with the underlying facts
and unsupported assertion that the injury did not qualify as
great bodily injury do not overcome it.
Third, defendant argues that the court was required to
impose the middle term for the Vehicle Code offense because it
did not identify aggravating circumstances supporting the upper
term.
The contention misconstrues the sentence. The record
establishes that the upper term was part of the negotiated
disposition. In 2019, defendant agreed to a disposition consisting
of the three-year upper term and the three-year great bodily
injury enhancement, for an aggregate six-year sentence. The
court suspended execution of that sentence and placed defendant
on formal probation. When the court later denied reinstatement,
it ordered the previously imposed sentence into effect. It did not
select a new base term. The court’s statement that it was
selecting the upper term “pursuant to the plea agreement”
confirms this understanding. Defendant was not entitled to
renegotiate the agreed sentence after violating probation.
Lastly, defendant asks this court to consider his service in
the United States Navy, his efforts in rehabilitation, and other
mitigating circumstances and impose an appropriate lesser
punishment. We may not substitute our judgment for that of the
superior court merely because defendant identifies circumstances
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that might have supported a different discretionary decision.
Defendant has not shown that the court relied on an
impermissible factor, applied an incorrect legal standard, or acted
arbitrarily or irrationally in declining to reinstate probation and
ordering execution of the previously suspended sentence. We
therefore find no arguable issue that warrants reversal.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
KUMAR, J.*
We concur:
MOOR, Acting P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
* Retired Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.
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