Filed 9/14/26 P. v. Robbins CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B345927
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. PA099501)
DEMETRIUS FREDERICK ROBBINS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, David W. Stuart, Judge. Affirmed.
Karyn H. Bucur, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Megan A. Donovan,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Demetrius Frederick Robbins appeals the trial court’s
denial of his motion for pretrial mental health diversion. (Pen.
Code,1 § 1001.36.) Robbins contends the court abused its
discretion by finding that he presented an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety if treated in the community because there
was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion, because substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
public safety finding. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Preliminary Hearing
1. S.G.’s Testimony
At a preliminary hearing held on January 9, 2024, S.G.
testified that Robbins is the father of her three minor children.
In December 2022, S.G. had custody of the children. Robbins was
permitted to have day-to-day involvement in the children’s
activities and could come to S.G.’s house to visit the children.
S.G.’s father L.G. had stage four cancer that had metastasized to
his spine and bones. L.G. moved in with S.G. and the children in
2018, when Robbins moved out. S.G. was his caretaker.
On December 8, 2022, Robbins was in Las Vegas and said
that he planned to come to Los Angeles to see the children in a
Christmas concert, but he did not show up. Robbins called S.G.
Robbins sounded like he was high. S.G. told him he lost his
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2
chance to see the kids and said, “ ‘Don’t even show your face
around here.’ ” Later she texted Robbins that the kids had been
looking out the window all day for him. S.G. said Robbins was
horrible.
At about 2:00 a.m. on December 9, 2022, S.G.’s daughter
woke her up to get her a glass of water. S.G. was half-asleep.
She reached for her cell phone, which she had put in the charger
next to her bed, but it was not there. She did not think much of it
at the time. S.G. went downstairs to the kitchen to get the water.
When she got downstairs, she saw Robbins’s carry-on bag and a
pair of shoes. There were a bunch of beer bottles, and there were
more beer bottles on the kitchen counter.
S.G. got the cup of water for her daughter and went back
upstairs to use the bathroom. When she opened the bathroom
door, Robbins was on the toilet watching pornography on her
phone and masturbating. S.G. asked what he was doing and told
Robbins to leave her house. S.G. then grabbed her phone from
Robbins and walked away. Robbins ran after S.G. He screamed
and attacked her. Robbins punched S.G. in the back of the head
repeatedly. He punched her so hard that the phone flew out of
her hands. S.G. screamed for help. S.G.’s father, L.G., woke up
and came to help her. L.G. said, “ ‘Whoa. Whoa. Whoa. What is
going on? Get off of her.’ ” Robbins began attacking L.G. S.G.
screamed for Robbins to stop. The kids came out and began
screaming. Robbins hit L.G. in the face repeatedly. S.G. tried to
stop Robbins, but he would not stop hitting L.G. S.G.’s son yelled
for Robbins to stop. L.G. crouched down and tried to protect
himself, but Robbins just continued punching him and refused to
stop.
3
There was a baby gate at the top of the stairs that was
latched shut, which made it difficult to escape from Robbins. As
soon as she was able, S.G. opened the gate and ran to her
neighbor’s house. She banged on the door and screamed “ ‘Help.
Help. Call the police.’ ” Robbins ran outside after S.G. and told
the neighbors that S.G. was a liar and that she hit him first. He
told the neighbors no one was hurt and not to call the police. S.G.
ran back inside her house and bolted the door. Robbins pounded
on the door and yelled for S.G. to let him in. He said his keys
were inside the house. S.G. and her children were screaming for
Robbins to leave. Robbins said that he would leave, but that he
needed his keys. S.G. left the top latch closed, but unbolted the
door and opened it a few inches. She was going to ask Robbins
where his keys were. Robbins broke the door down, breaking the
top latch. Robbins began punching S.G. repeatedly in the face
again. S.G. immediately had a lump on the left side of her face
from the punches, and her ears started ringing. She started to
black out and fell onto the stairs.
When S.G. regained consciousness, she saw Robbins
punching L.G. again. L.G. was holding a cloth to his face to stop
the bleeding from the earlier punches. Robbins continued
punching L.G. L.G.’s whole face was bleeding—his eyes, nose,
and mouth. Both of L.G.’s eye sockets were fractured. Robbins
said to L.G., “ ‘Who’s weak now? Who is weak now? You think
I’m still weak?’ ” Robbins grabbed his things and left.
Paramedics transported L.G. to the hospital by ambulance.
S.G. had to care for the children, so she was not able to go to the
hospital until the next day. When she went to the hospital, S.G.
was diagnosed with a concussion. She had severe bruising and
abrasions all over her body and a blood vessel in her eye had
4
burst. S.G.’s teeth had been cracked and chipped and she lost a
crown in one tooth. S.G.’s eye did not improve after four to six
weeks, so she returned to the hospital in February 2023. S.G.
had to see a dentist and a neurologist. She had a bruise that
persisted for almost a year, and she had difficulty remembering
words and names due to her head injuries. The dentist removed
the tooth that had been crowned because it was too small to
repair. The dentist also bonded several cracked teeth and
prepared them for implants. S.G. saw a neurologist because the
attacks affected her memory. S.G. was not able to work for most
of 2023.
S.G. testified that Robbins called S.G. on January 14, 2023,
in violation of a protective order.2 S.G. hung up the phone right
after Robbins identified himself. A friend of Robbins’s named
Mickey called around the same time and asked S.G. to get on a
three-way call with him and Robbins. S.G. refused. S.G. told
Mickey that there was a restraining order in place and that
Mickey should not have called. Mickey tried to persuade S.G. to
accept the call and record it, but she again refused. S.G. reported
the contacts to the police. Robbins called her a few other times
from a blocked phone number. Robbins also called from a phone
number that S.G. did not recognize on Father’s Day. S.G. told
Robbins never to call again and said that he was dead to her.
She hung up on Robbins.
On cross-examination, S.G. testified that several domestic
violence charges had been filed against Robbins in the past, but
that S.G. had agreed to drop a restraining order against Robbins
2 The court took judicial notice of a protective order issued
on January 6, 2023, that prohibited Robbins from contact with
S.G.
5
during child custody proceedings and mediate the matters
instead. S.G. had not given Robbins a key to her house. After
the attack occurred, she realized that he had taken her spare key.
S.G. testified that she grabbed Robbins’s scrotum when he
was punching her father, but that Robbins did not stop attacking
L.G. When L.G. came to help, S.G. had fallen to the floor and
was in the fetal position. Robbins was punching her. Robbins
stepped over S.G. to attack L.G. L.G. told Robbins to stop
attacking S.G. L.G. did not punch Robbins; he was too weak.
Robbins knew that L.G. had cancer. Robbins had watched the
children when S.G. took L.G. to chemotherapy.
2. L.G.’s Testimony
At the preliminary hearing, L.G. testified that in December
2022, he was living with his daughter S.G., who was his
caretaker. His activity was limited by his illness and he rarely
left his room. S.G. had to help him put on his socks and shoes.
Robbins knew that L.G. had prostate cancer.
On December 9, 2022, L.G. woke up to a commotion. He
heard the children screaming. When L.G. came out of his room,
Robbins was beating S.G. and screaming. L.G. told Robbins to
stop and tried to intervene by attempting to pull Robbins off of
S.G. L.G. did not hit Robbins. Robbins hit L.G. in the nose and
continued to punch him seven or eight times. L.G. testified, “I
was bleeding all over [the] place. There was blood all over the
place.” S.G. escaped and told the neighbor to call the police.
Robbins followed her outside. S.G. was able to get back inside
the house and lock the door. Robbins kept saying he needed his
keys. S.G. opened the deadbolt but kept the latch on the door to
6
give Robbins’s keys to him. Robbins kicked the door in and
started punching S.G. again. Robbins came in and punched L.G.
again, too. L.G. was bleeding heavily, but Robbins hit him in the
face three more times. L.G. thought Robbins realized he was in
trouble, because he ran out of the house, got into his car, and
drove away.
An ambulance arrived and transported L.G. to the hospital.
L.G. was hospitalized for three or four days. The doctors prepped
him for immediate surgery. His skull was crushed in and his
nose was broken. The doctors put six plates in his face to repair
the damage. They were unable to put a plate in the bridge of his
nose. “[W]hen they tried to put the screw there, there was just
dust. There was nothing there.” L.G. spent the next couple of
days in the hospital before he was released under his doctor’s
care. L.G. was still suffering from pain caused by the attack at
the time of the hearing. He had a hard time speaking. Robbins
dislocated L.G.’s jaw and damaged his teeth. His eyes were
constantly watery and tearing.
B. Charges
In an information filed on January 23, 2024, Robbins was
charged with two counts of injuring a child’s parent (§ 273.5,
subd. (a), counts 1 & 5), two counts of elder abuse (§ 368, subd.
(b)(2), counts 2 & 6), two counts of assault by means of force
likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4), counts 3
& 7), one count of first degree residential burglary (§ 459,
count 4), and two counts of misdemeanor violation of a domestic
relations court order (§ 273.6, subd. (a), counts 8 & 9). As to
counts 1 and 5, it was alleged that Robbins personally inflicted
7
great bodily injury upon S.G. (§ 12022.7, subd. (e).) As to counts
2 and 6, it was alleged that L.G., who was 61 years old at the
time, suffered great bodily injury. (§ 368, subd. (b)(2).) As to
counts 2, 3, 6, and 7, it was alleged that Robbins personally
inflicted great bodily injury upon L.G. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) As
to counts 1 through 7, the information alleged that Robbins had
suffered a prior strike conviction for criminal threats. (§ 422.)
The information alleged aggravating factors pursuant to Rules of
Court rule 4.421, subds. (a)(1), (a)(3), (b)(1), and (b)(2). Pursuant
to Rules of Court rule 4.425, subd. (a)(2), it was alleged that the
offenses involved separate acts of violence and threats of violence.
C. Robbins’s Motion for Mental Health Diversion
On December 13, 2024, Robbins filed a motion requesting
mental health diversion pursuant to sections 1001.35 and
1001.36. Robbins argued that he was eligible for relief because
he was diagnosed with complex post-traumatic stress disorder,
major depressive disorder, and cocaine use disorder, which all
played a significant role in his commission of the crimes. Dr.
Kimberly Smith, who evaluated Robbins, concluded that
Robbins’s mental health conditions significantly impacted his
actions at the time of the offenses. Dr. Smith opined that
Robbins would respond to mental health services and treatment.
Robbins consented to diversion, waived his right to a speedy trial,
and agreed to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion.
Robbins asserted that he did not pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety if treated because there was not an
8
unreasonable risk that he would commit a “super strike.”3
Robbins had a single strike conviction that was not for a super
strike, which he suffered in 2002. His other convictions were
drug-related. Dr. Smith opined that Robbins posed a low risk to
the safety of the community if he committed to and participated
in both mental health and substance abuse treatment. Robbins
stated that he had secured a space at Fred Brown Residential
Treatment Center that would provide appropriate treatment.
Robbins attached to the motion the psychological report of
Dr. Smith and a letter of conditional acceptance from the Fred
Brown Residential Treatment Center.
The psychological evaluation reflects that Robbins reported
he was bullied as a child due to a skin condition, and that he was
verbally and physically abused by his father. Growing up,
Robbins ran drugs for his father. Robbins began using cocaine
socially when he was 20 or 21 years old. Robbins reported that
he had a decade-long relationship with S.G., who was verbally
abusive. He used cocaine to help him cope with S.G. and her
family and to combat his feelings of low self-worth. Robbins had
3 “ ‘As used throughout th[e] [Penal] Code, “unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety” means an unreasonable risk that
the petitioner will commit a new violent felony within the
meaning of’ section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv).’ ” (People v.
Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 351.) Section 667, subdivision
(e)(2)(C)(iv) enumerates “particularly serious or violent felonies,
known colloquially as ‘super strikes.’ ” (Ibid.) Super strikes
include “any homicide offense, solicitation to commit murder,
assault with a machinegun on a police officer or firefighter,
possession of a weapon of mass destruction, or any serious or
violent felony punishable by life imprisonment or death.”
(Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 892,
fn. 4 (Sarmiento).)
9
never been treated for mental illness or substance abuse. He had
often tried to stop using cocaine on his own but was unsuccessful.
Dr. Smith diagnosed Robbins with three qualifying mental
disorders: complex post-traumatic stress disorder, major
depressive disorder, and cocaine use disorder. She opined that
Robbins’s mental disorders played a significant role in the alleged
offenses but that his mental disorders would likely respond to
appropriate treatment. Dr. Smith stated that Robbins agreed to
comply with treatment as a condition of diversion and that he
posed a low risk to public safety if treated in the community. Dr.
Smith administered the Historical, Clinical, and Risk
Management-20, Version 3 and the Violence Risk Appraisal
Guide. Both instruments rated Robbins as a low risk for
recidivism and violence. Dr. Smith opined that based on the
records available, her interviews of Robbins, and Robbins’s
testing results, “I do not believe Mr. Robbins is imminently
dangerous to commit a super strike.”
D. The People’s Opposition
On February 4, 2025, the People filed an opposition to the
motion for mental health diversion on the basis that Robbins
presented an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. The
People argued that Robbins attacked his former romantic partner
in front of his children and also twice attacked a sick elderly man
without provocation. It was sheer luck that neither victim
suffered life-threatening brain injuries. Robbins had a history of
substance abuse and escalating domestic violence allegations that
culminated in a horrific attack. The People urged the court not to
permit the pattern to continue.
10
The People further argued that the nature of the crime was
sufficient to establish without the need for a hearing that
Robbins posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.
Robbins’s current offenses include a series of strike offenses,
which were vicious, violent, largely unprovoked, and left the
victims severely injured. The People asserted that the proposed
treatment plan was not suitable because Robbins was unlikely to
abstain from cocaine use given his past history. The record
reflected that, contrary to the statement in the psychological
evaluation, Robbins had been placed in drug treatment as a
condition of his conviction for possession of controlled substances
in 2013. The psychiatric evaluation’s conclusion that the incident
was precipitated by PTSD that stemmed from a skin condition
and S.G.’s past mistreatment of Robbins was incredible. The
facts demonstrated that Robbins broke into S.G.’s home in the
middle of the night, stole her phone, and began watching
pornography and masturbating in her bathroom. His rage was
triggered when S.G. retrieved her phone. The incident would not
have occurred absent Robbins’s actions. Finally, the People
argued that the court had residual discretion to deny diversion in
the interests of justice even if Robbins met all other
requirements. In light of the emotional distress and physical
violence inflicted on the victims, such an exercise of discretion
would be appropriate.
11
E. The Probation Report
A probation report4 reflected that there had been prior
domestic violence incidents between Robbins and S.G. The
probation report’s account of the offenses was consistent with
S.G. and L.G.’s testimony at the preliminary hearing. It further
stated that after the incident Robbins posted to S.G.’s Facebook
account “ ‘You’re an idiot.’ ” and “ ‘See you soon.’ ” Robbins also
texted S.G. and referenced the incident in his texts.
The probation report included Robbins’s criminal history,
and reflected that Robbins had five prior convictions, including a
strike conviction for criminal threats. The probation report
stated that Robbins was an extremely violent and callous person
who caused the victims severe injuries and showed no remorse.
Robbins traumatized the victims and his three children, and
continued to pose a great threat of danger to them. The report
recommended “nothing less than a long term state prison
commitment[.]” It listed multiple factors in aggravation and no
mitigating factors.
F. Hearing and Ruling on the Motion for Mental Health
Diversion
On February 13, 2025, the court held a hearing on
Robbins’s mental health diversion motion. Defense counsel
submitted on her brief, and also provided the court with a
mitigation package that she had given to the prosecution, which
4 The probation report was delivered on February 8, 2025,
and filed on March 10, 2025.
12
included certificates that Robbins completed while in custody and
letters of support. The People stated that the violence Robbins
inflicted on the two victims and the seriousness of the crimes
warranted denial of his request for mental health diversion.
S.G. made a victim impact statement. S.G. stated that
Robbins was not a man suffering from untreated mental health
illness who was in need of rehabilitation. Robbins was a violent
predator who had nothing to lose and would kill her if given the
chance. Robbins had previously claimed in court to be a
respected businessman. His current claim of mental illness was
disingenuous. Robbins had been to doctors for physical
treatment repeatedly and had never been diagnosed with mental
illness. S.G. suspected that he was depressed after spending the
last two years in jail. Robbins broke into S.G.’s home and
brutally attacked her and her father, who was a stage-four cancer
patient, in front of their children who were 6, 7, and 8 years old
at the time. The trauma Robbins inflicted was permanent and
his actions proved Robbins was a danger to everyone around him.
Robbins’s attack was violent and relentless. He could have
stopped when S.G. locked the door to the house, but he instead
kicked down the door while his own children were screaming in
fear and begging him to stop. Their six-year-old child was
cleaning blood from the floor as Robbins attacked S.G. and L.G.
Robbins had every opportunity to walk away, but he chose to
continue the attack. If he was willing to inflict this violence in
front of his children, S.G. did not know what would stop him in
the future. If the court granted mental health diversion it would
show her daughters that men can abuse women and the justice
system would not protect them. The damage was lasting. L.G.
had 32 screws in his face, S.G. still suffered memory loss, and the
13
children had nightmares and wet their beds in fear of their father
being released. Robbins had a long history of abusing women and
family members. He abused every woman he dated. This was
not a mental health crisis. It was a pattern of control and abuse.
Robbins was raised to be violent and if released, S.G. believed he
would kill her.
L.G. also made a victim impact statement. L.G. stated that
Robbins’s attack was brutal and that every morning he still felt
like he had been punched in the face. L.G. feared for his life,
S.G.’s life, and his grandchildren’s lives. At the beginning of the
case Robbins claimed innocence but at the hearing he claimed he
suffered from mental illness. It was just a means of avoiding
trial and accountability. L.G. had to have plastic surgery to
insert six plates and 32 screws into his face. He was on his knees
bleeding and Robbins continued to hit him ten times directly in
his face. Robbins left, but then returned and hit L.G. again.
Defense counsel objected to the court considering the victim
impact statements. The court overruled the objection because the
victim statements were relevant to the court’s public safety
findings.
The court ruled that Robbins was eligible for mental health
diversion, but that the court had grave concerns about public
safety. Robbins had a prior strike for criminal threats and his
conduct was escalating. The attack in the present case was
brutal, prolonged, and could have killed L.G. The offenses
involved two separate attacks. Robbins hit L.G. when he was on
his knees and had already been punched multiple times, which
could have killed him. The probation report noted that Robbins
had since made a veiled threat to S.G. on Facebook, stating
“ ‘You’re an idiot. C U soon.’ ” The brutality of the crimes, the
14
escalation, and the decision to continue the attack when he had
the opportunity to reflect and stop all evidenced that Robbins was
likely to commit a super strike in the future—murder. Robbins
escalated the attack, kicked in the door, punched L.G. again, and
caused severe injuries. The court found that it would not be
appropriate to treat Robbins in the community and denied the
request for mental health diversion.
G. Robbins’s No Contest Plea and Sentencing
On March 10, 2025, pursuant to a plea agreement, Robbins
pleaded no contest to injuring a child’s parent (§ 273.5, subd. (a),
count 1), assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily
injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4), count 3), and violation of a domestic
relations court order (§ 273.6, subd. (a), count 8). As to count 3,
Robbins admitted that he personally inflicted great bodily injury.
(§ 12022.7.) Robbins also admitted that he suffered a prior
serious or violent felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes
law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(j) & 1170.12, subd. (b)).
The court sentenced Robbins to six years in count 3 (the
middle term of three years, doubled pursuant to the Three
Strikes law), plus three years for the personal infliction of great
bodily injury enhancement. In count 1, the court sentenced
Robbins to two years (one-third of the middle term of three years,
doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes law), and in count 8 the
court imposed a concurrent term of one year, for a total of eleven
years in prison. The court ordered that Robbins have no contact
with the victims or his three children with S.G. for 10 years, and
ordered that Robbins pay restitution to the victims. On the
15
prosecutor’s request, the court dismissed the remaining counts
pursuant to the continued validity of the plea agreement.
Robbins obtained a certificate of probable cause and timely
appealed from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Framework of Mental Health Diversion
“Section 1001.36 gives trial courts the discretion to grant
pretrial diversion for individuals suffering from certain mental
health disorders.” (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 626.)
The statute defines “ ‘pretrial diversion’ ” as “the postponement of
prosecution, either temporarily or permanently, at any point in
the judicial process from the point at which the accused is
charged until adjudication, to allow the defendant to undergo
mental health treatment subject to [enumerated conditions].”
(§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1).) The maximum period of diversion is two
years. (Id., subd. (f)(1)(C)(i).) If the defendant “perform[s]
satisfactorily in diversion,” then “at the end of the period of
diversion, the court shall dismiss the defendant’s criminal
charges that were the subject of the criminal proceedings at the
time of the initial diversion,” and “the arrest upon which the
diversion was based shall be deemed never to have occurred[.]”
(Id., subd. (h).)
“Effective January 1, 2023, mental health diversion
requires trial court findings that the defendant is both eligible for
diversion and suitable for the program. The criteria for each are
specified in the statute. (§ 1001.36, subds. (b) & (c).) Defendants
are eligible if they have been diagnosed with a recognized mental
16
disorder that was a significant factor in the commission of the
criminal offense with which they are charged. (Id., subd. (b).)
They are suitable if: (1) in the opinion of a qualified mental
health expert, the defendant’s mental disorder would respond to
treatment; (2) the defendant agrees to waive their speedy trial
rights; (3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment
requirements; and (4) the defendant will not pose an
‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ as defined in
sections 1170.18 and 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv). (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c).)” (Sarmiento, supra 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 891.)
“[A]n ‘ “unreasonable risk . . . to public safety” ’ means a
likelihood that the defendant will commit one of the violent
felonies specifically enumerated in [section 667, subdivision
(e)(2)(C)(iv), also known as super strikes]. ([People v.] Williams
[(2021)] 63 Cal.App.5th [990,] 1001; see People v. Moine (2021) 62
Cal.App.5th 440, 450 (Moine) [‘risk of danger is narrowly confined
to the likelihood the defendant will commit a limited subset of
violent felonies’].)” (Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 892,
fn. omitted.) In determining whether the defendant poses an
unreasonable risk to public safety, “[t]he court may consider the
opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified
mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s
treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history, the
current charged offense, and any other factors that the court
deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)
“[B]y requiring the trial court to evaluate the ‘risk’ posed to
public safety, the statutory language directs the court to perform
a quintessential discretionary function. (See People v. Frahs,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 639 [noting that ‘the Legislature left it to
trial courts to make fact-specific evaluations of risk under
17
[§] 1001.36, [subd.] (b)(1)(F)’].)” (Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at
p. 448.) “A trial court’s ruling on a motion for mental health
diversion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and factual
findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. (Moine, supra, at
p. 449; People v. Oneal (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 581, 588.) A trial
court has ‘broad discretion to determine whether a given
defendant is a good candidate for mental health diversion.’
(People v. Curry (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 314, 324.) ‘A court abuses
its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision
by applying the wrong legal standard [citations], or bases its
decision on express or implied factual findings that are not
supported by substantial evidence.’ (Moine, at p. 449; see People
v. Bunas (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 840, 848–849 (Bunas).)” (People
v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147.)
B. Analysis
Relying on the appellate court’s ruling in Gomez v. Superior
Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671 (Gomez), Robbins first contends
that the victim’s statements cannot support the trial court’s
finding that he poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety because he has no prior super strike convictions and his
conduct did not result in charges for a super strike offense.
Robbins also cites Dr. Smith’s psychological report in which she
opined that he posed a low risk of danger to public safety if
treated in the community as proof that he does not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger. We reject Robbins’s arguments.
First, Gomez is inapposite. There, the defendant was
charged with a single count of second degree robbery. (Gomez,
supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 680.) The Court of Appeal found
18
that the trial court’s finding that Gomez posed an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety was not supported by substantial
evidence for the following reasons: “First, Gomez has no criminal
history and hence there is no evidence she has a prior super-
strike conviction. (People v. Hoffman ([2015]) 241 Cal.App.4th
[1304,] 1310 [finding the record did not support a finding of
dangerousness under § 1170.18, subd. (c) where the defendant
had no prior criminal history].) There is also no evidence that
Gomez has previously been charged with a super-strike offense.
Second, the pending robbery charge is not a super-strike offense.
Although the victim stated he was afraid that Gomez and her
codefendants would kill him, there was no evidence (or argument
presented) that Gomez ever touched the victim or attempted to
commit a super-strike offense during the commission of the
robbery. Finally, at the time of the hearing, Gomez had been out
in the community for approximately one year and there is no
evidence that any new charges had been filed against her for
committing another offense. There accordingly is no evidence to
support a finding that Gomez was likely to commit a super-strike
offense if treated in the community and the trial court abused its
discretion.” (Id. at p. 690.)
Gomez does not stand for the proposition that a trial court
cannot find the defendant is likely to commit a super strike if the
defendant has not committed a super strike in the past and is not
currently charged with a super strike. There, the Court of
Appeal simply relied on the fact that the defendant had not been
convicted of or charged with a super strike as two of many facts
that undermined the trial court’s finding. Gomez had no prior
convictions. Robbins, in contrast, has a prior strike conviction
and multiple convictions for drug-related offenses. Although the
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drug-related offenses were non-violent and less serious than his
criminal threats conviction, they evidence that Robbins has not
been deterred from drug use despite numerous criminal
convictions, which is particularly relevant given that his cocaine
use was a significant factor in his commission of the offenses.
Moreover, whereas Gomez was charged with a single count of
second degree robbery, Robbins was charged with seven
felonies—including strike offenses—and two misdemeanors.
With respect to the felonies in counts 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7, it was
alleged that Robbins personally inflicted great bodily injury on
the victim. (§ 12022.7, subds. (a) & (e).) In Gomez, the appellate
court relied in part on the fact that there was no evidence that
the defendant ever touched the victim in the commission of the
robbery. Robbins, as we have set forth in detail, brutally and
relentlessly beat the mother of his children and her father in
front of his three minor children and inflicted very serious
injuries that caused lasting harm. Gomez was out in the
community for a year following commission of the robbery and no
new charges were filed against her. Robbins violated the court’s
protective order multiple times after committing the offenses,
and threatened S.G. on at least one of those occasions. Two
charges were brought against him on that basis.
Dr. Smith’s opinion—that Robbins does not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety—does not persuade
us otherwise. The trial court was permitted to consider other
evidence, including witness testimony, victim statements, and
the probation report, all of which demonstrated that Robbins
caused severe injuries without provocation. As the trial court
observed, Robbins’s beating of L.G. in particular is the kind of
conduct that can easily result in death. The fact that L.G.
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survived the vicious attack appears to be a matter of luck.
Robbins’s conduct could have easily resulted in a super strike—
namely, murder. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
findings. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Robbins’s request for mental health diversion.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
BAKER, Acting P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
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