Filed 7/16/26 P. v. Rivers CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B346201
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA065451-01)
v.
MARTIN RIVERS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Victor D. Martinez, Judge. Affirmed.
John F. Schuck, under appointment of the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________________
Defendant and appellant Martin Rivers appeals from the
trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing under
Penal Code section 1172.6.1 We affirm.
The People charged defendant with the murder of Patrick
Clark (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), and with being a felon in
possession of a firearm (§ 29800, former § 12021; count 2).
Firearm use allegations were alleged as to count 1 (§ 12022.53,
subds. (b)–(d)). It was also alleged defendant had suffered two
prior convictions for serious felonies within the meaning of the
“Three Strikes” law.
At the preliminary hearing on March 26, 2004, George
Clark,2 the father of the victim, testified. George testified that on
December 24, 2003, he and Patrick were in the garage of one of
Patrick’s friends. There were three other people with them, and
they were all playing darts while having a beer. The group had
been playing darts for 35 to 40 minutes when Rivers came to the
garage and spoke to Patrick. Patrick told defendant, “You owe
me money, Marty.” Then Patrick and Rivers left the garage and
walked down the driveway. They walked to a location where
George’s view was obstructed by shrubs, and then George heard
three gunshots, coming from the location where defendant and
Patrick had been standing. George ran over and saw Patrick
lying on the grass. Patrick was injured, and George saw
defendant getting into a silver truck. Defendant had a gun and
asked George, “Did you want some, too?” George also identified
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2 We refer to George Clark and his son Patrick, the decedent,
by their first names for clarity.
2
Rivers as the shooter in a photograph in the presence of law
enforcement.
Detective Scott Fines of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department went to the location to investigate a homicide.
Patrick’s remains were on the grass and sidewalk when he
arrived.
During his investigation, Fines interviewed Jose Pineira.
Pineira told Detective Fines that he had guests at his home.
Then something happened between Patrick and a person he knew
as Robert or Travieso. Patrick took a swing at Robert, and they
continued down the driveway until they were out of view. Then
Pineira heard three gunshots and realized Patrick had been
wounded. Pineira identified defendant as the person he knew as
Travieso.
Detective Fines also interviewed Henry Ayala. Ayala said
that Travieso, also known as Marty, told him that someone tried
to rob him and he was forced to shoot him. Ayala identified
defendant as the person he knew as Travieso from a DMV photo.
The parties stipulated the cause of death for Patrick was
gunshot wounds perforating the heart.
The case proceeded to a jury trial in June 2004. On July 1,
2004, during voir dire, the parties notified the court that a plea
agreement had been reached. Defendant, with the assistance of
counsel, entered a plea to second degree murder. Consistent with
the plea, the trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years to life
with 185 days of custody credits. The trial court dismissed
count 2 and the special allegations based on the plea agreement.
On June 3, 2022, Rivers filed a petition under
section 1170.95, since renumbered to section 1172.6. In opposing
defendant’s petition for resentencing, the prosecution identified
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defendant as “Martin Rivers, ‘Travieso’ ” in the title of their
pleading. On February 5, 2025, the trial court found defendant
made a prima facie showing for relief and ordered an evidentiary
hearing on the petition.
On May 7, 2025, the trial court conducted an evidentiary
hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). The trial court
reviewed the abstract of judgment, the charging document, and
the preliminary hearing transcript. Defendant, through counsel,
objected to hearsay testimony from Detective Fines. The People
agreed they would not rely on any hearsay testimony. The court
granted the request to exclude hearsay testimony, noting, “Any
Prop 115 will not be relied upon by the court.” After hearing
argument, the court denied defendant’s petition, explaining,
“[T]he court finds the defendant was the actual shooter beyond a
reasonable doubt. He was the one who actually shot the victim.
… [¶] In addition, the defendant, as he was getting in the vehicle,
he pointed the gun at the witness and said would you want some
too.”
On February 22, 2026, defendant’s counsel filed a brief
identifying no appealable issues under People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216. On March 26, 2026, defendant filed a
supplemental brief. We granted defendant leave to file an
amended supplemental brief. Defendant filed his amended
supplemental brief on May 18, 2026, and then filed a letter
explaining his filings which he framed as an ex parte motion.
The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) to eliminate murder liability under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine and to limit
application of the felony-murder rule. (People v. Curiel (2023)
15 Cal.5th 433, 448–449 (Curiel).) Now, except in cases of felony
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murder, a principal must act with malice aforethought to be
convicted of murder, and malice “shall not be imputed to a person
based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188,
subd. (a)(3).)
In addition to changing the law of murder prospectively,
Senate Bill 1437 allowed defendants convicted of murder under a
now-invalid theory to petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 449–450.)
The Legislature later enacted Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.), which clarified that defendants convicted of
attempted murder or voluntary manslaughter under a now-
invalid theory are entitled to the same postconviction relief.
(People v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, 335.)
As relevant here, under section 1172.6, a defendant
convicted of murder may petition the sentencing court to have his
conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining
counts. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708.)
The defendant must allege: (1) the information allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of murder or attempted
murder in which malice is imputed to the defendant based solely
on his participation in a crime under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine; (2) the defendant was convicted following
a trial or accepted a plea in lieu of trial at which he could have
been convicted of murder or attempted murder; and (3) the
defendant could not now be convicted of murder or attempted
murder because of changes to the law made by Senate Bill 1437.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
If the defendant files a facially sufficient petition
requesting appointment of counsel, the trial court must appoint
counsel and hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner
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has made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief. (§ 1172.6,
subds. (b)(3) & (c).) If the defendant makes a prima facie
showing, the court must hold an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d).)
We address defendant’s arguments in turn.
First, defendant argues the trial court relied on
inadmissible hearsay in finding him ineligible in the evidentiary
hearing. Defendant is correct that hearsay testimony from the
preliminary hearing, that is otherwise not admissible under an
exception to the hearsay rule, is inadmissible at an evidentiary
hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). However, the
trial court granted defendant’s request to exclude any hearsay
evidence from the preliminary hearing. Thus, the record reflects
the trial court did not rely on hearsay testimony. Rather, George
presented extensive nonhearsay testimony, and the trial court
properly relied on this evidence.
Second, defendant argues there was insufficient evidence
that he was the shooter in two related arguments. He contends
that (1) George identified him in a photo as the shooter because of
an officer’s coercion; and (2) evidence that he held a gun after the
shooting is insufficient to identify him as the shooter. On the
first point, the record is silent regarding the details of how
George identified defendant in the photo, except that he made the
identification in the presence of law enforcement. Thus, there is
no basis in the record to conclude that any officer improperly
coerced George to identify defendant, and defendant’s speculation
is insufficient to establish error. (People v. Thomas (2012)
54 Cal.4th 908, 932.) Second and relatedly, substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s finding that defendant shot Patrick.
The trial court properly relied on George’s testimony that he
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heard three gunshots and saw defendant holding a gun after
seeing Patrick lying injured on the grass nearby. In addition, the
trial court also could properly treat defendant’s question to
George, “Did you want some, too?” as an admission. From these
facts, the trial court could reasonably infer the evidence
supported a finding that defendant shot Patrick. As the fact
finder, the trial court could make reasonable inferences from the
evidence, and we must defer to those inferences. (People v.
Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 890.) Moreover, there is
substantial evidence in support of the trial court’s conclusion that
defendant was the shooter even if George did not actually see the
shooting. (Ibid.)
Third, in his amended supplemental brief, defendant
argues that Detective Fines, the prosecutor, and defense counsel
violated section 745 of the California Racial Justice Act of 2020
(Racial Justice Act) by referring to him as “Travieso” during the
preliminary hearing. He provides no further argument regarding
how the detective’s and lawyers’ use of this nickname violates the
Racial Justice Act, although we note the nickname is a word in
Spanish that Google Translate website translates to mean
mischievous with additional translations to include naughty,
playful, impish, prankish, puckish, roguish, frolicsome, and
willful. (Google.com <https://translate.google.com> [as of July 15,
2026].)
Regardless, Detective Fines initially used the nickname
because both Pineira and Ayala stated that they knew defendant
by the name of Travieso. Thereafter, Detective Fines, the
prosecutor, and defense counsel used the nickname Travieso
when discussing what Pineira and Ayala communicated to
Detective Fines. Because this nickname identified defendant in
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the evidence, we see no violation of the Racial Justice Act by
these limited references. (People v. Chhuon and Pan (June 1,
2026, S105403) __ Cal.5th ____ [2026 Cal. Lexis 3009, 104–106];
see also § 745, subd. (a)(2) [“if the person speaking is relating
language used by another that is relevant to the case” there is no
violation of the Racial Justice Act].)
In rejecting an argument the defendant’s gang nickname
“ ‘invoked the perpetual foreigner stereotype’ ” in violation of the
Racial Justice Act, the Supreme Court noted that “numerous
witnesses knew and used his nickname.” (People v. Chhuon and
Pan, supra, __ Cal.5th ____ [2026 Cal. Lexis 3009, 105–106].)
While there is no evidence in the record here that Travieso is a
gang nickname, there is evidence that two witnesses identified
defendant by his nickname. Finally, without argument,
defendant also points out that the prosecution included the
Travieso nickname in the heading in their response to his
petition for resentencing. We note however that the nickname
was not used in the text of the pleading and was presented in
quotes next to defendant’s full name only once. In addition, this
nickname was used in the preliminary hearing, and could serve
to identify defendant in the record. Thus, there is insufficient
context, evidence, or argument to establish a violation of the
Racial Justice Act.
Finally, we decline to exercise our discretion to
independently review the record. (People v. Delgadillo, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 226.)
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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying defendant’s petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6 is affirmed.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
SCHERB, J.
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