Filed 8/14/26 P. v. Rish Investments CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B341206, B344147
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23STCV18514)
v.
RISH INVESTMENTS, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Alison Mackenzie, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Frank A. Weiser, Frank A. Weiser, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney, Denise C. Mills, Chief
Deputy City Attorney, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Chief Assistant City
Attorney, Shaun Dabby Jacobs, Assistant City Attorney, and
Merete Rietveld, Deputy City Attorney, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Appellant Rish Investments, Inc. (Rish) appeals from a
judgment entered against it in a lawsuit brought by the People
pursuant to the Red Light Abatement Law (Pen. Code, §§ 11225–
11235) (the B341206 appeal). Rish separately appeals from an
amended judgment awarding costs to the People (the B344147
appeal). On our own motion, we have consolidated the appeals
for purposes of oral argument and disposition. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Rish owns a property located on South Figueroa Street in
Los Angeles (the property). Rish began operating the property as
a motel in 2006. In October 2022, Rish leased the property to
Gazi Islam and Ismat Islam, who then took over motel
operations.
In August 2023, the People filed suit against Rish for
violations of the Red Light Abatement Law. The complaint
alleged that the property was a public nuisance within the
meaning of the Red Light Abatement Law based on ongoing
prostitution activity at the property. The complaint sought to
enjoin Rish from allowing the property to be used as a public
nuisance and to abate the nuisance by closing the property for
one year.1
In February 2024, the People moved for summary
judgment. In support of the motion, the People submitted
evidence that Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers had
arrested numerous people for prostitution and violent crimes at
or near the property. For example, according to LAPD detective
Dana Harris, who had 35 years of law enforcement experience,
1 The complaint also named Gazi Islam as a defendant. Gazi
Islam defaulted and is not a party to this appeal.
2
the property was “one of the worst prostitution motels,” and
“criminals of all types . . . are not questioned, interfered with or
in any way deterred by motel ownership, management or private
security.” Detective Harris declared that LAPD had conducted
16 investigations connected to the property, “resulting in at least
that many prostitution-related arrests” and at least one arrest for
sex trafficking of a minor. According to detective Harris, LAPD
officers and attorneys from the Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office
(City Attorney) met with Rish’s representatives in March 2022,
discussed the illegal activity occurring at the property, and asked
Rish to implement several measures to reduce crime. Detective
Harris visited the property numerous times after that meeting
and observed that “few, if any, of these measures were
implemented.”
In April 2024, Rish removed the case to federal district
court, and the state court took the summary judgment motion off
calendar. The district court remanded the case back to state
court in June 2024.
Meanwhile, Rish and the Islams agreed to terminate their
lease as to the property on September 1, 2023. In May 2024, Rish
leased the property to Soul Housing, a non-profit homeless
housing organization.
In July 2024, Rish filed its opposition to summary
judgment. As relevant to this appeal, Rish argued that the City
Attorney lacked authority to prosecute it because the Los Angeles
City Council (City Council) had not directed the City Attorney to
bring the action. Rish cited Code of Civil Procedure, section 731,
which provides that “[a] civil action may be brought in the name
of the people of the State of California to abate a public
nuisance . . . by the city attorney of any town or city in which the
3
nuisance exists,” and that the city attorney “shall bring an
action . . . whenever directed by the . . . legislative authority
of the town or city.”2
Rish also asserted that the case was stayed as a matter of
law because Rish had appealed the federal district court’s
remand order. Next, Rish contended that its due process rights
had been violated because the People’s summary judgment
motion relied on some redacted materials. Rish also argued that
the Red Light Abatement Law is unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad. Finally, Rish asserted that any injunction or closure
was unnecessary, because Rish had had abated the nuisance by
terminating the Islams’ lease and by entering a new lease with
Soul Housing.
The trial court granted the People’s summary judgment
motion in August 2024. It rejected each of Rish’s arguments. As
for section 731, the court concluded that the statute gave a city
attorney authority to bring suit to abate a nuisance in the city,
even without a mandate from the local legislative authority. The
court also concluded that Rish’s appeal of the federal district
court’s remand order did not stay the post-remand state court
proceedings. Next, the court acknowledged that Rish might have
a due process right to receive unredacted evidence, but the court
found no due process violation because it did not rely on any of
the redacted materials in granting summary judgment. The
court also rejected Rish’s constitutional challenge to the Red
Light Abatement Law. Finally, the court concluded that Rish’s
attempts to abate the nuisance after the complaint was filed did
2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.
4
not preclude the court from finding that the property was a public
nuisance and imposing an appropriate penalty.
The trial court entered a final judgment in favor of the
People on September 13, 2024. The judgment found that the
property constituted a public nuisance and ordered Rish to abate
the nuisance. It also ordered the property to be closed for one
year pursuant to Penal Code section 11230, subdivision (a)(1).
Rish timely appealed from the final judgment.
The final judgment awarded costs to the People, but
included a blank space for the amount, to be ordered in
accordance with the People’s memorandum of costs. The People
filed a memorandum of costs on September 30, 2024. In
November 2024, the trial court entered an “AMENDED (ONLY
ADDING COSTS) FINAL JUDGMENT.” Rish timely appealed
from the amended judgment.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal framework and standard of review
The trial court may grant summary judgment if there are
no triable issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. (§ 437c, subd. (c); Regents of
University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607,
618.) We review an order granting summary judgment de novo.
(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860.)
Many of Rish’s arguments implicate questions of statutory
interpretation and other pure questions of law, which we also
review de novo. (Smith v. LoanMe, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 183,
190 (Smith).)
Rish also argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by ordering the property closed for one year. We review that
5
aspect of the judgment for abuse of discretion. (People ex rel.
Sorenson v. Randolph (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 183, 190 (Sorenson).)
II. Rish has not established any legal error
A. Section 731 authorizes a city attorney to bring
an action to abate a nuisance without a
mandate from the local legislative authority
Rish first argues that the City Attorney lacked authority to
bring a public nuisance suit against it under section 731. This
argument turns on the interpretation of a statute, meaning our
review is de novo. (Redondo Beach Waterfront, LLC v. City of
Redondo Beach (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 982, 993.)
“In construing a statute, a court’s objective is to ascertain
and effectuate legislative intent. [Citation.] To determine
legislative intent, a court begins with the words of the statute,
because they generally provide the most reliable indicator of
legislative intent.” (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 871.) “If
the statute’s text evinces an unmistakable plain meaning, we
need go no further.” (Beal Bank, SSB v. Arter & Hadden, LLP
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 503, 508.)
Section 731 governs nuisance actions. It states that an
action “may be brought in the name of the people of the State of
California to abate a public nuisance, . . . by the city attorney of
any town or city in which the nuisance exists.” (§ 731.) Thus, by
its plain language, the City Attorney has the authority and
discretion to bring an action in the name of the People to abate a
nuisance in the City of Los Angeles. That is precisely what the
City Attorney did in this case.
The statute separately specifies that the “city attorney of
any county or city in which the nuisance exists shall bring an
6
action . . . whenever directed by the legislative authority of the
town or city.” (§ 731.) Citing this language, Rish argues that
under section 731, the City Attorney may not ever prosecute an
action to abate a public nuisance without a mandate from the
City Council. But this interpretation ignores the plain language
in the statute, quoted above, expressly and unconditionally
authorizing the City Attorney to bring such an action. Tellingly,
Rish fails to even acknowledge this aspect of the statute, focusing
on and quoting only the sentence describing the role of the local
legislative authority. Interpreting section 731 in this manner
would violate the “maxim of statutory interpretation that courts
should give meaning to every word of a statute and should avoid
constructions that would render any word or provision
surplusage. [Citations.] ‘An interpretation that renders
statutory language a nullity is obviously to be avoided.’
[Citation.]” (Tuolumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance v.
Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1029, 1038–1039.)
Rish also appears to argue that we should interpret the
statute to require a legislative mandate for any nuisance
abatement action brought by a city attorney, because this
approach would protect property interests and ensure due
process of law. But even if we agreed that this interpretation “is
preferrable as a matter of public policy, it would be inappropriate
for us to override the clear words of the statute . . . .” (Bitner v.
Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 1048, 1064.)
7
B. The trial court did not err in declining to stay
the case pending Rish’s appeal of the remand
order
Next, Rish argues that the underlying lawsuit was stayed
as a matter of law while Rish appealed from the federal district
court’s order remanding the case to state court. However, “[t]he
appeal of a remand order does not deprive the state court of
jurisdiction unless a stay is obtained from the federal court.”
(People v. Bhakta (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 631, 636 (Bhakta).)
Rish does not argue that it obtained such a stay.
Rish cites several federal authorities for the proposition
that an appeal from a federal district court ruling stays
proceedings in the district court. (Cf. Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski
(2023) 599 U.S. 736, 740 (Coinbase) [“a district court must stay
its proceedings while the interlocutory appeal on arbitrability is
ongoing”]; Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons
(1985) 470 U.S. 373, 379 [“In general, filing of a notice of appeal
confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the
district court of control over those aspects of the case involved in
the appeal.”].) But these authorities do not address whether
related state court proceedings are stayed during an appeal from
a remand order.3
3 For the first time at oral argument, Rish asserted that the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted Coinbase to require a
stay not just in appeals involving arbitration, but also appeals
from remand orders. (City of Martinsville v. Express Scripts, Inc.
(4th Cir. 2025) 128 F.4th 265; but see California ex rel. Harrison
v. Express Scripts, Inc. (9th Cir. 2025) 139 F.4th 763, 766, fn. 2,
cert. den. sub nom. Express Scripts, Inc. v. California (2026) __
U.S. __ [146 S.Ct. 1507, 223 L.Ed.2d 507] [distinguishing City of
8
Rish also notes that “[o]nce a defendant complies with
§ 1446,” which governs removal of civil actions, “a state court
may not proceed ‘further unless and until the case is remanded.’
28 U.S.C. § 1446(d).” (BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore (2021) 593 U.S. 230, 240.) Here, the federal district
court remanded the case, meaning the state court was permitted
to proceed. Rish nonetheless asserts that BP P.L.C. held that
this rule “includes appellate review” of the remand order.
However, the case did not actually address or decide whether the
state court lacks jurisdiction over a remanded case while the
remand order is appealed to the federal court of appeals. We
therefore follow Bhakta in concluding that the state court
retained jurisdiction pending Rish’s appeal of the remand order.
(Bhakta, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 636.)
Martinsville and concluding Coinbase is limited to arbitration-
related appeals].) Appellate courts ordinarily will not consider
arguments raised for the first time at oral argument. (Archdale
v. American Internat. Specialty Lines Ins. Co. (2007) 154
Cal.App.4th 449, 472.) Even if this point were not forfeited on
that basis, we would still reject it. In City of Martinsville, the
court held that once a party appeals from a remand order, the
district court must refrain from mailing that order to the state
court. (City of Martinsville¸ at p. 271.) Because a state court
cannot proceed until it receives the remand order, this rule
effectively stays state court proceedings until the federal appeal
is resolved. (Id. at p. 267; 28 U.S.C. § 1447, subd. (c).) But in this
case, the district court mailed its remand order to the state court
more than two weeks before Rish appealed from that order.
Thus, even under City of Martinsville, the district court was
permitted to mail the order at that time. And once the state
court received the order, it was permitted to proceed. (28 U.S.C.
§ 1447, subd. (c).)
9
C. Rish has not established any due process
violation in connection with the People’s
evidence
Rish also argues that its due process rights were violated
because the People’s summary judgment motion relied on
redacted documents. It is difficult to assess this argument
because Rish failed to provide record citations to any of the
redacted materials. (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37
Cal.App.5th 270, 277 (Hernandez) [appellant’s burden is to
support arguments with record citations]; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [same].) Rish’s briefing also does not describe
the redacted evidence, even at a high level; nor does it explain
how the redactions impacted the proceedings below. Rish simply
recites a litany of legal standards and asserts that those
standards were violated, without applying the law to the facts of
this case. This “conclusory assertion of legal error . . . results in
forfeiture of the claim.” (Siskiyou Hospital, Inc. v. County of
Siskiyou (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 14, 39; Dills v. Redwoods
Associates, Ltd. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 888, 890, fn. 1 [appellate
court will not develop appellant’s arguments].)
Even if Rish had not forfeited this point, we would still
reject it. The trial court acknowledged that Rish might be
entitled to unredacted versions of certain evidence, but the court
expressly stated that it did not rely on any redacted materials in
granting summary judgment for the People. And Rish has not
argued, let alone established, that the judgment would have been
affected if Rish had obtained the unredacted materials. Rish
therefore has not demonstrated any prejudice. (F.P. v. Monier
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099, 1108 [reviewing court may not set aside
judgment based on nonprejudicial error]; Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13
10
[judgment will not be reversed in the absence of miscarriage of
justice].)
D. Rish has not established that the Red Light
Abatement Law is unconstitutional
Rish next asserts that the Red Light Abatement Law is
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We determine the
constitutionality of a statute de novo. (People v. Roberts (2025)
114 Cal.App.5th 187, 193 (Roberts).) “ ‘ “ ‘A defendant
challenging the constitutionality of a statute carries a heavy
burden: “The courts will presume a statute is constitutional
unless its unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and
unmistakably appears; all presumptions and intendments favor
its validity.” ’ ” [Citations.]’ ” (Ibid.) We conclude that Rish has
not met this high burden.
In relevant part, the Red Light Abatement Law provides
that any building in which acts of “lewdness, assignation, or
prostitution, are held or occur, is a nuisance which shall be
enjoined, abated, and prevented . . . .” (Pen. Code, § 11225, subd.
(a).) Rish first argues that the statute is facially unconstitutional
because the terms lewdness, assignation, and prostitution are too
vague to give notice of what conduct is proscribed.
A party seeking to establish that a statute is
unconstitutionally vague on its face must establish that “the
enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.”
(Village of Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. (1982) 455
U.S. 489, 495 (Village of Estates).) Accordingly, “[a] plaintiff who
engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of
others.” (Ibid.) “Under this ‘as-applied inquiry first’ rule, the
facial challenge failed if the statute clearly applied to some or all
11
of the challenger’s conduct.” (People v. Superior Court (J.C.
Penney Corp., Inc.) (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 376, 401 (J.C. Penney).)
Here, the complaint alleged, and the trial court found, that
Rish’s property violated the Red Light Abatement Law based on
prostitution activity. Rish does not dispute the trial court’s
finding that prostitution activity occurred at its property. As
noted above, the Red Light Abatement Law specifies that a public
nuisance exists, and must be abated, at any building in which
acts of “prostitution, are held or occur . . . .” (Pen. Code, § 11225,
subd. (a).) Thus, the trial court’s unchallenged findings establish
that Rish engaged in “some conduct that is clearly proscribed” by
the Red Light Abatement Law. (Village of Estates, supra, 455
U.S. at p. 495.) Rish’s facial challenge therefore fails. (J.C.
Penney, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 401 [facial challenge fails “if
the statute clearly applied to some or all of the challenger’s
conduct”].)
Rish primarily argues that the Red Light Abatement Law
is facially unconstitutional because the term “assignation” is
vague. It relies heavily on Manning v. Municipal Court (1982)
132 Cal.App.3d 825, 830 (Manning), in which the court reached
that conclusion in assessing a different statute. But as we have
discussed, this case does not implicate assignation. And even if
the statute were unconstitutionally vague as applied to other
owners of property at which assignations occurred, Rish “cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of
others.” (Village of Estates, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 495.)
Rish also observes that “arbitrary enforcement” is a
“prominent component of the vagueness doctrine.” However,
Rish fails to apply this aspect of the doctrine to the Red Light
Abatement Law or the facts of this case. “We may and do
12
‘disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported by
pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by
which the appellant reached the conclusions he wants us to
adopt.’ ” (Hernandez, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277.)
Rish also claims that the Red Light Abatement Law is
unconstitutionally overbroad, again citing Manning, supra, 132
Cal.App.3d 825. Although the appellant in Manning raised an
overbreadth argument (id. at p. 828), the appellate court did not
reach the issue. Rish otherwise fails to support its overbreadth
argument with any legal authority or reasoned argument. We
therefore reject this point as forfeited. (Hernandez, supra, 37
Cal.App.5th at p. 277.)
Finally, Rish argues that the Red Light Abatement Law is
“void” on its face and as applied to the facts of this case because
nobody was ever convicted of prostitution based on arrests made
at the property. Rish also argues that it should not be held liable
for conduct that occurred in private hotel rooms, because it did
not know whether any crimes were being committed therein.
Rish failed to cite any evidence in the record to support these
assertions. (Hernandez, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277
[appellant’s burden is to support arguments with record
citations].) And even assuming that the record supports these
claims, Rish forfeited the point by again failing to explain why or
how these circumstances render the statute void or
unconstitutional. (Ibid. [appellate court may disregard
conclusory arguments].)
In sum, Rish failed to overcome the presumption that the
Red Light Abatement Law is constitutional. (Roberts, supra, 114
Cal.App.5th at p. 193.)
13
E. The trial court had jurisdiction to amend the
judgment to award costs pending appeal
In the B344147 appeal, Rish argues that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to enter an amended judgment awarding costs
while Rish’s appeal from the original judgment (B341206) was
pending. We review this question of law de novo. (Smith, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 190.)
Rish correctly observes that “the perfecting of an appeal
stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order
appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected
thereby . . . .” (§ 916, subd. (a).) But Rish omits the rest of this
subdivision, which clarifies that “the trial court may proceed
upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by
the judgment or order.” (Ibid.) “[A]n award of attorney fees as
costs is a collateral matter which is embraced in the action but is
not affected by the order from which an appeal is taken.
[Citations.] Consequently, filing of a notice of appeal does not
stay any proceedings to determine the matter of costs and does
not prevent the trial court from determining a proper award of
attorney fees claimed as costs.” (Bankes v. Lucas (1992) 9
Cal.App.4th 365, 369; People v. Bhakta (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th
973, 981 [“it is quite clear that the trial court had jurisdiction to
hear and determine the issues of attorney fees and costs after the
judgment had been entered”].)
Rish also argues that the cost award constitutes a
substantial change to the judgment. Even if true, this would not
mean the court lacked jurisdiction to award costs—it would only
impact the time to appeal and, potentially, appellate jurisdiction.
Specifically, a substantially amended judgment becomes the final
appealable judgment in the matter. But if the amendment is
14
insubstantial, the time to appeal runs from the original
judgment. (Ellis v. Ellis (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 837, 842.)
Relatedly, when the court amends a judgment to include costs
and attorney fees, the amended judgment is separately
appealable. (Nellie Gail Ranch Owners Assn. v. McMullin (2016)
4 Cal.App.5th 982, 1007–1010 [court lacked jurisdiction over fee
award in amended judgment because appellant failed to
separately appeal therefrom].) But the distinction makes no
difference in this case, because Rish timely appealed from both
the original judgment and the amended judgment. Whether the
amendment was substantial or not, we have jurisdiction over
Rish’s appeal from the cost award.
Rish contends that the cost award should be reversed, but
this contention is entirely contingent on the success of Rish’s
arguments challenging the original judgment. Because we affirm
the original judgment, we also affirm the cost award in the
amended judgment.
II. Rish has not established that the court abused its
discretion in ordering the property closed for one
year
Finally, returning to the B341206 appeal, Rish argues that
the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the property
closed for one year. We find no abuse.
If the trial court finds that a nuisance exists in a Red Light
Abatement Law action, “an order of abatement shall be entered
as a part of the judgment in the case, directing . . . the effectual
closing of the building or place against its use for any purpose,
and that it be kept closed for a period of one year, unless sooner
released.” (Pen. Code, § 11230, subd. (a)(1).) Here, the trial court
found that a Red Light Abatement Law nuisance existed. Rish
15
does not challenge this finding on appeal. Accordingly, Penal
Code section 11230, subdivision (a)(1) required the trial court to
enter an order of abatement closing the property for one year.
To be sure, the court had discretion to allow the property to
re-open sooner. (Pen. Code, § 11230, subd. (a)(1); Sorenson,
supra, 99 Cal.App.3d at p. 190 [court has broad discretion to
fashion remedy to abate a nuisance].) But we find that the court
did not abuse its discretion in declining to do so. In finding that
the property violated the Red Light Abatement Law, the court
cited evidence of “rampant” prostitution activity at the hotel from
2017 to 2023 resulting in numerous arrests. It also found that
Rish met with LAPD officers and a Deputy City Attorney in
March 2022 to discuss this illegal activity, and that Rish did not
take remedial steps such as prohibiting hourly rentals or hiring a
private patrol operator. Rish does not dispute these findings on
appeal. Given the “history of police problems, and that prior
warnings had gone unheeded,” and in light of “the broad
discretion conferred on trial courts in fashioning appropriate
remedies to abate public nuisances [citation], we cannot say that
closure for one year was inherently unreasonable, or an abuse of
discretion.” (Sorenson, at p. 190.)
Rish argues that the closure was unnecessary because it
abated the nuisance by terminating its lease with the Islams and
entering a new five-year lease with Soul Housing. Rish fails to
cite any evidence in the record to support this claim. (Hernandez,
supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277 [appellant’s burden is to support
arguments with record citations].) We can discern from record
that Rish did, in fact, terminate its lease with the Islams in
September 2023; and in May 2024, Rish entered a new lease with
Soul Housing. But Rish has not identified or described any
16
evidence in the record establishing that these changes actually
abated the nuisance at the property. “The appellate court is not
required to search the record on its own seeking error. If a party
fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the
record, the argument will be deemed waived.” (LA Investments,
LLC v. Spix (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1044, 1061.)
Finally, even assuming that Rish abated the nuisance in
September 2023 or May 2024, we would still find no abuse of
discretion. Red Light Abatement Law actions “should be
dismissed when a nuisance has been voluntarily abated in good
faith before the complaint was filed.” (People ex rel. Gwinn v.
Kothari (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 759, 766, fn. 3.) The People filed
suit in August 2023, meaning Rish did not attempt to abate the
nuisance until after the complaint was filed.
17
DISPOSITION
The final judgment and amended judgment are affirmed.
Respondent is awarded its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
HANASONO, J.
We concur:
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
KARNOW, J.*
* Retired Judge of the San Francisco Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
18