Filed 6/17/26 P. v. Ringo CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B341256
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No.
XSWYA096940)
CARY MARTIN RINGO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Hector M. Guzman, Judge. Affirmed.
Brian C. McComas, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Jonathan J. Kline and Melanie
Dorian, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Penal Code section 1001.36 gives the court discretion to
postpone a criminal prosecution to allow the defendant to receive
mental health treatment, provided the defendant satisfies certain
statutory criteria.1 The trial court denied Cary Martin Ringo’s
motion for mental health diversion under section 1001.36, finding
he failed to meet one of those criteria: that the defendant “not
pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” while
undergoing treatment in the community. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)
A jury convicted Ringo of several domestic violence-related
crimes, and he appealed from the judgment
Contrary to Ringo’s arguments, the trial court applied the
correct legal standard, and substantial evidence supported the
court’s findings. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Ringo’s Extensive Criminal History Includes Multiple
Domestic Violence Convictions
Ringo had an extensive criminal history, with over
20 convictions by the time he committed the offenses in this case.
Ringo initially committed relatively minor crimes, but his
criminal conduct escalated to include battery, burglary, robbery,
dissuading a witness by force or threat of force or violence,
making a criminal threat, and inflicting corporal injury resulting
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
in a traumatic condition on someone with whom he had a dating
relationship.
Several of Ringo’s prior convictions involved domestic
violence. One of those convictions resulted in a 16-year prison
sentence that ended in November 2015. After his release Ringo
rekindled a friendship with a childhood friend, Cheryl S., that
eventually became romantic.
The relationship soon took a dark turn. In October 2016—
11 months after Ringo’s release from prison—Cheryl reported to
the police that Ringo had violently assaulted her for three days.
Cheryl said he choked her, beat her, and left her with severe
bruising over her body.
As Cheryl later described the incident to her friend
Priscilla R.,2 over the three-day period Ringo beat Cheryl until
she was unconscious and, when she regained consciousness, beat
her some more. Cheryl told Priscilla that Ringo “choked her,”
“beat her with the belt,” “punched her in the face,” and “threw
her through a glass table in the living room.” Cheryl said Ringo
put her in the car, drove to Long Beach, and continued to beat
her. Priscilla said Cheryl frequently called her for help, and the
two had a secret signal to indicate when Priscilla should call the
police.
The People charged Ringo with three counts of inflicting
corporal injury on Cheryl (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). He pleaded guilty,
and in June 2017 the court released him to a drug rehabilitation
program. Ringo, however, did not comply with the program’s
requirements (he went missing from the program and had
2 Priscilla testified about this conversation at the
preliminary hearing.
3
a positive drug test), and the trial court gave him multiple
opportunities to rejoin the program.
B. Ringo Attacks Cheryl and Priscilla in 2017
In September 2017, when Ringo was supposed to be
participating in the court-ordered program, Cheryl, Priscilla, and
a roommate were at home when Ringo walked in looking for
Cheryl. Ringo and Cheryl began to argue, with Ringo yelling
about Cheryl’s bank accounts. Cheryl walked into the living
room; Ringo followed her, threw a chair across the room, and
said, “You think Priscilla can save you? She can’t save you.”
Ringo threatened Cheryl and Priscilla with a long grill lighter.
Ringo went to the kitchen, grabbed a butcher knife, raised it
above his head, and threatened to kill Cheryl and everyone else
in the house.
Priscilla started having a panic attack. The women begged
Ringo to let them call for help, but Ringo said he did not care if
Priscilla died and continued to threaten them. When the women
tried to leave, Ringo followed them, trapped them in the laundry
room, and continued threatening them with the knife until he
ordered them back to the living room.3 Priscilla fainted. Cheryl’s
roommate managed to secretly call the police from her bedroom,
and officers eventually arrived, ending the two-hour ordeal.
The police arrested Ringo several days later. Cheryl did
not want Ringo prosecuted and, fearing retaliation, declined to
cooperate with law enforcement. Priscilla, however, cooperated.
3 At trial, which occurred after the court denied Ringo’s
motion for mental health diversion, Priscilla testified Ringo
stabbed a container of detergent so violently she feared Ringo
had stabbed Cheryl.
4
The People charged Ringo with two counts of making a criminal
threat (one against Cheryl and the other against Priscilla) (§ 422,
subd. (a)); two counts of false imprisonment by violence (again,
against both women) (§ 236); and one count of dissuading or
intimidating a witness (Priscilla) (§ 136.1, subd. (b)).
C. The Trial Court Denies Ringo’s Motion for Mental
Health Diversion
In June 2018, nine months after Ringo’s arrest, the
Legislature enacted section 1001.36, which authorized diversion
for defendants with diagnosed mental disorders. (§ 1001.36,
stats. 2018, Ch. 34, § 24; see People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618,
624; People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 447 (Moine).)
The statute authorized the trial court to grant diversion to allow
a defendant to receive mental health treatment if the court
found: (1) the defendant suffers from a qualifying mental
disorder; (2) the mental disorder was a significant factor in the
commission of the charged offense; (3) a qualified mental health
expert states the symptoms motivating the criminal behavior
would respond to treatment; (4) the defendant consents to
diversion and waives his or her speedy trial rights; (5) the
defendant agrees to comply with treatment; and (6) “the
defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety, as defined in [s]ection 1170.18, if treated in the
community.” (§ 1001.36, former subd. (b)(1)(A)-(F)4; see Moine, at
pp. 447-448.)
4 These references are to the version of section 1001.36 in
effect in March 2020, when the trial court ruled on Ringo’s
motion.
5
The Legislature defined an “unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety” as an unreasonable risk the defendant will commit
one of the violent felonies enumerated in section 667,
subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv), if treated in the community. (§ 1001.36,
former subd. (b)(1)(F); § 1170.18, subd. (c).) The enumerated
violent felonies, often referred to as “super strikes,” include
murder and attempted murder. (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(IV); see
§ 1001.36, former subd. (b)(1)(F); § 1170.18, subd. (c); Moine,
supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 449.) The statute required the
defendant to make a prima facie showing of all the diversion
requirements. (§ 1001.36, former subd. (b)(3).)
Ringo filed a motion for mental health diversion in
December 2019. He submitted two psychological evaluations in
support of his motion, though neither directly addressed the
statutory criteria in section 1001.36. One report was prepared
in 2017 in connection with the October 2016 assaults. The other
was a more recent psychological evaluation of whether Ringo was
competent to stand trial in the current proceedings and his
general need for mental health treatment.
Both evaluations concluded Ringo had symptoms
associated with depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and
substance abuse, among other potential clinical diagnoses. Both
evaluations recommended dual-diagnosis treatment, but were
equivocal about whether the treatment would be successful. One
psychologist observed that the recommended therapeutic
techniques “can help with cognitive restructuring” and that this
treatment goal “may be achieved” through dual-diagnosis
programming. The other psychologist—who prepared the report
in connection with the October 2016 domestic-violence incident—
said only that she was “hopeful” the treatment plan would allow
6
Ringo to “resolve his history of trauma and live peacefully in
society.”
In opposition to Ringo’s motion the People described the
hostage-taking incident and Ringo’s threats to kill Cheryl and
Priscilla, the October 2016 domestic-violence incident, and
another, unreported domestic-violence incident where Ringo also
threatened to stab Cheryl. The People also summarized Ringo’s
criminal history, highlighting his serious or violent felony
convictions and his four convictions that, though they were not
for violating section 273.5, involved domestic violence. The
People argued Ringo was a danger to public safety.5
In denying Ringo’s motion the trial court, too, focused on
public safety, stating that to grant the motion the court “would
have to be satisfied that [Ringo] will not pose an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community.” The
court stated it was “not able to make that finding on this record,”
citing Ringo’s “extensive history of violence” and his statement to
one of the mental health examiners that he was “not afraid to
die.” The court found that “the prospect of a murder/suicide is a
very real possibility” and that Ringo “does pose an unreasonable
risk to public safety.” The court denied the motion for mental
health diversion “on that basis.”
After the court denied Ringo’s motion for mental health
diversion, but before his trial in 2023, the Legislature amended
section 1001.36. The statute now separates the six criteria into
two “eligibility” and four “suitability” factors. (§ 1001.36,
5 The People question Ringo’s eligibility and suitability on
other grounds, but they did not raise those grounds in the trial
court, and the trial court did not address them.
7
subds. (b), (c); see People v. Tourville (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 439,
452.) Public safety is one of the suitability factors, and the
description of that factor is largely unchanged. (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c)(4).) The public-safety criterion still requires, as it did at
the time of the March 2020 hearing on Ringo’s request for mental
health diversion, the court to find the defendant “will not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in
[s]ection 1170.18, if treated in the community.” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c)(4); see Tourville, at p. 452.)6 And the defendant still has
the burden to make a prima facie showing he or she meets the
statutory requirements. (§ 1001.36, subd. (e); Tourville, at
p. 452.) Ringo did not renew his motion after the Legislature
amended section 1001.36.
D. The Jury Convicts Ringo of Various Crimes, and the
Trial Court Sentences Him
The jury convicted Ringo on all five counts—two counts of
making a criminal threat (§ 422, subd. (a)), two counts of false
imprisonment (§ 236), and one count of knowingly and
maliciously dissuading or intimidating a witness by force or by an
express or implied threat of force or violence (§ 136.1, subds. (b),
(c)(1)). The jury found true allegations that Ringo used a deadly
or dangerous weapon in committing his crimes (§ 12022,
6 The only changes to the public-safety factor since the
March 2020 hearing are that the statute (1) no longer has
language specifying the court must be “satisfied” a defendant
does not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety and
(2) now provides the court “may consider” the defendant’s
treatment plan in evaluating risk. (Compare § 1001.36,
subd. (c)(4), with § 1001.36, former subd. (b)(1)(F).)
8
subd. (b)(1)), as well as (in a bifurcated proceeding) several
aggravating factors under California Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(a)(1)-(3), (11), (b)(2) & (3). The jury also found Ringo
had four prior serious or violent felony convictions, within the
meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12,
subds. (a)-(d)). The trial court sentenced Ringo to an aggregate
prison term of 125 years to life.7 Ringo timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review an order denying a motion for mental health
diversion for abuse of discretion. (People v. Tourville, supra,
120 Cal.App.5th at p. 453; Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 448-449.) “A court abuses its discretion when it makes an
arbitrary decision by applying the wrong legal standard or bases
its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not
supported by substantial evidence.” (Tourville, at p. 453.)
“Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any
reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence,” but the
inferences “may not be based on suspicion alone, or on
imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or
guesswork.” (Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
124, 135, internal quotation marks omitted.)
7 The court stayed execution of the enhancement under
section 12022, subdivision (b)(1).
9
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Denying Ringo’s Motion for Mental Health Diversion
Ringo argues the trial court did not understand or
appreciate that the standard for determining whether the
defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety is
whether there is an unreasonable risk the defendant will commit
a super strike. The record belies that argument. The trial court
based its finding Ringo posed an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety on the risk he would commit “a murder/suicide.”8
Murder is a super strike. (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(IV); People v.
Tourville, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 452.) The court applied
the correct standard and made an appropriate finding.
Ringo also argues the court found only that, as a general
matter, in domestic violence cases there is an unreasonable risk
the defendant will commit a murder/suicide, rather than finding
that there was an unreasonable risk he would commit a super
strike. That is not what the court found. The court’s statement
about the prospect of a murder-suicide “in a domestic violence
context” came immediately after the court cited Ringo’s
“extensive history of violence” and his statement he was “not
afraid to die.” The court was not, as Ringo suggests, categorically
excluding from diversion all defendants with a history of
domestic violence. The court was considering Ringo’s history of
8 The trial court found there was “a very real possibility”
Ringo would commit a murder. Ringo does not argue the trial
court erred in finding there was a “very real possibility” he would
commit a super strike, rather than finding he was “likely to
commit a super-strike offense.” (Gomez v. Superior Court (2025)
113 Cal.App.5th 671, 690; see Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 450-451.)
10
increasingly violent crimes, his statement suggesting he had
nothing to lose, and the context in which his violent conduct
occurred. From these facts, the court found there was an
unreasonable risk Ringo, not domestic violence defendants in
general, would commit a murder.
And substantial evidence supported the court’s finding.
Ringo had a long history of increasingly serious criminal
convictions, several of which involved domestic violence (and one
of which caused him to serve over a decade in prison). Less than
a year after his release from that lengthy prison term, Ringo
faced new charges for repeatedly beating Cheryl over three days.
As discussed, he beat and choked her until she lost consciousness,
waited for her to wake up, and then beat her some more. While
he was supposed to be in a residential facility receiving treatment
for the conduct underlying that conviction, Ringo held Cheryl and
Priscilla hostage and threatened to stab them. As the People
informed the court, Ringo made the same threat just two months
before the September 2017 incident. And he told one of the
psychologists he was “not even afraid to die anymore.”
Substantial evidence supported the court’s finding there was an
unreasonable risk Ringo would murder a domestic partner if
treated in the community. (See Vaughn v. Superior Court, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 135.)
The cases cited by Ringo, People v. Whitmill (2002)
86 Cal.App.5th 1138 and Gomez v. Superior Court (2025)
113 Cal.App.5th 671, are distinguishable. In Whitmill the court
held substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s finding
the defendant posed an unreasonable risk to public safety within
the meaning of the statute. (Whitmill, at p. 1150.) The criminal
history of the defendant in Whitmill included convictions for drug
11
crimes and theft, but no convictions for violent crimes, and an
expert concluded the defendant met the section 1001.36
requirements and would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger
to the community during treatment. (Whitmill, at p. 1151.) In
addition, though the defendant in Whitmill discharged a firearm,
the facts suggested it was a “negligent discharge.” (Id. at
p. 1153.) In Gomez the defendant had “no known [prior] criminal
history” and had been out on bail, without incident, for a year
before the hearing on her motion for mental health diversion.
(See Gomez, at pp. 684, 690.) Here, the trial court found there
was an unreasonable risk Ringo would commit a super strike if
treated in the community, neither expert addressed the
section 1001.36 criteria, Ringo’s criminal history included
increasingly violent conduct, and his use of the butcher knife to
threaten Cheryl and Priscilla was hardly negligent.
It is true, as Ringo suggests, the courts in Whitmill and
Gomez acknowledged the defendants in those cases had no
history of committing a super-strike offense. (See People v.
Gomez, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 690 [defendant had no prior
convictions or arrests for super-strike offenses, and the current
charge was not a super strike]; People v. Whitmill, supra,
86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1151 [“It is undisputed appellant’s prior
record, consisting of possession and sales of drugs and thefts,
does not include violent or sexually violent convictions, let alone a
super strike.”].) But Ringo had an extensive, increasingly violent
criminal history that involved physical violence directed to
domestic partners, most recently Cheryl. And Ringo’s current
offenses included threatening to set his victims on fire and to stab
them to death with a butcher knife. Substantial evidence
supported the court’s finding that Ringo’s pattern of violence
12
could further escalate to include murder and that there was an
unreasonable risk he would commit a super strike.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J.
STONE, J.
13