Filed 8/19/26 P. v. Richards CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B346155
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24EMCF00071)
v.
MICHAEL ALLEN RICHARDS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Victor D. Martinez, Judge. Affirmed.
Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Maggie Lee, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
Michael Richards appeals from a judgment of conviction
after a jury found him guilty of felony taking or driving of a
vehicle without the owner’s consent in violation of Vehicle Code1
section 10851, subdivision (a). Richards argues substantial
evidence does not support his conviction, the court erred in
denying his motion to dismiss the charge under Penal Code
section 1181.1, and the court prejudicially erred in sentencing
him by imposing the upper term based on an aggravating
circumstance that had neither been admitted to by Richards nor
found true by a jury. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Evidence at Trial
On February 2, 2024, at 5:30 p.m., Salvador Torres parked
his truck on the street near his home in Chatsworth, Los Angeles.
He locked the doors and left only a pair of work shoes and a
pillow inside the car. The truck did not have any damage to its
ignition, front bumper, or back window.
The next morning, at 7:30 a.m., Torres discovered his truck
was missing. He had in his possession the only pair of car keys,
and he did not give anyone else permission to drive the truck.
Torres reported to the police that his truck had been stolen.
The next day, at 7:15 p.m., Officer Steven Armstrong with
the El Monte Police Department was on patrol when dispatch
notified him of Torres’s stolen truck. At some point later,
Armstrong saw Richards driving the truck and followed behind it
for two miles until it stopped at a shopping center in Rosemead,
1 All statutory references are to the Vehicle Code unless
otherwise stated.
2
Los Angeles. Armstrong then conducted a traffic stop and
ordered the occupants of the truck to exit the vehicle. Richards
exited from the driver’s side door, and a female passenger exited
from the passenger side door.
Armstrong searched the truck and saw that the ignition
was heavily damaged and had metal shavings in it. Inside the
car were a shaving tool, two screwdrivers, several keys, four or
five bags that belonged to the female passenger, a bicycle, a bottle
of soda, and a portable cup. None of the keys found inside the
car worked to start the car. Additionally, the front bumper was
damaged, and the back window had a hole in it that was covered
with a trash bag. No fingerprints were lifted from the truck,
shaving tool, or screwdrivers.
Armstrong testified that an ignition normally has “specified
markings” on it that correspond with a particular key, and only
that key can turn the car on. However, the markings can be
shaved off, allowing other devices, such as a screwdriver, to turn
the car on. In fact, one of the screwdrivers from inside Torres’s
truck successfully turned the car on. Based on the condition of
the truck, Armstrong concluded that the truck was stolen.2
B. Charges and Verdict
The People charged Richards with one count of felony
taking or driving of a vehicle without the owner’s consent.
(§ 10851, subd. (a); count 1.) They alleged Richards had a prior
conviction for the same offense within the meaning of Penal Code
2 Richards did not testify or call any witnesses.
3
section 666.5, subdivision (a),3 and five other prior felony
convictions.
At trial, at the end of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, the
defense moved for acquittal on count 1 under Penal Code section
1118.1. The court denied the motion, finding sufficient evidence
to support the conviction.
The People argued, and the trial court instructed the jury
on, only one theory of liability for violating section 10851,
subdivision (a): posttheft driving. The trial court instructed the
jury with CALCRIM No. 1820 that to find Richards guilty of
unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle, the People had to prove
that: (1) Richards “drove someone’s vehicle without the owner’s
consent”; (2) when Richards “drove the vehicle, he intended to
deprive the owner of possession or ownership of the vehicle for
any period of time”; and (3) “[t]he driving occurred after a
substantial break from the original theft of the vehicle.”
During deliberations, the People amended the information
to include two circumstances in aggravation: Richards’s prior
convictions were numerous or of increasing seriousness (Cal.
Rules of Court,4 rule 4.421(b)(2)), and he served a prior prison
term (rule 4.421(b)(3)). The court advised Richards of his right to
3 Penal Code section 666.5, subdivision (a), provides, in
relevant part: “Every person who, having been previously
convicted of a felony violation of section 10851 of the Vehicle
Code, … is subsequently convicted of [this offense] shall be
punished by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of section
1170 for two, three, or four years, or a fine of ten thousand
dollars ($10,000), or both the fine and the imprisonment.”
4 All rules references are to the California Rules of Court.
4
a jury trial on the aggravating circumstances, and Richards
waived that right.
The jury found Richards guilty on count 1. Richards
admitted the prior conviction under Penal Code section 666.5 and
the five other felony convictions, and the court found them to be
true. He also admitted the two aggravating factors, and the court
found them to be true.
C. Sentencing
The court imposed the upper term after stating the
following: “[The] court does find the factors in aggravation of
defendant’s prior convictions are numerous and that he has
served a prior term in county jail under [Penal Code] section
1170[, subdivision] (h). The court does not believe those factors
in aggravation are mitigated by factors in mitigation. In this
particular case, the court does not believe the defendant is being
punished for going to trial. At this time the defendant has not
admitted any culpability in these, taken any responsibility for his
actions. As I indicated, he has numerous aggravating factors,
and I don’t find any factors in mitigation. As a result of that, the
court will be intending to impose the high term.”
Richards timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supports Richards’s Conviction
Under Section 10851, Subdivision (a)
Richards argues there was insufficient evidence of his
conviction for unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle based on a
theory of posttheft driving. He specifically disputes the
sufficiency of the evidence as to two elements—that the driving
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occurred after a substantial break from the original theft and
that Richards had the requisite intent. We disagree.
1. Relevant legal principles
“ ‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in
the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ [Citation.] We determine ‘whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] This
determination ‘presumes in support of the judgment the existence
of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the
evidence.’ ” (People v. Cardenas (2025) 18 Cal.5th 797, 821.) “We
do not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or
reevaluate the credibility of witnesses.” (People v. Jacobo (2019)
37 Cal.App.5th 32, 42.)
Section 10851, subdivision (a), provides, in relevant part:
“Any person who drives or takes a vehicle not his or her own,
without the consent of the owner thereof, and with intent either
to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner thereof of his or
her title to or possession of the vehicle, whether with or without
intent to steal the vehicle, ... is guilty of a public offense ....”
The statute “can be violated by a range of conduct.” (People
v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1128, 1135 (Lara).) Specifically, a person
can violate section 10851 in three ways: (1) by taking a vehicle
from the owner with the intent to permanently deprive the
owner of title or possession (vehicle theft); (2) by taking the
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vehicle from the owner with the intent to temporarily deprive the
owner of title or possession (joyriding); or (3) after a theft of the
vehicle is complete, by driving the vehicle with the intent to
deprive the owner permanently or temporarily of title or
possession (posttheft driving). (People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th
866, 871; People v. Gutierrez (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 847, 854.)
Posttheft driving requires proof of a “ ‘ “substantial break”
between the taking and the driving.’ ” (Lara, supra, 6 Cal.5th at
p. 1136.) Thus, to be guilty of posttheft driving, the People must
prove (1) the defendant drove a vehicle without the consent of the
owner, (2) the defendant had the intent to deprive the owner of
title or possession, and (3) a substantial break occurred between
the taking and the driving of the vehicle. (§ 10851, subd. (a);
Lara, at p. 1136; People v. Gutierrez, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at
p. 854.)
2. There was a substantial break
Richards contends there was insufficient evidence of a
substantial break between the taking and the driving of the
truck. He asserts the People “never offered facts showing that
[Richards’s] driving was a separate and distinct episode of
unlawful conduct.” The record shows otherwise.
A substantial break occurs between the original taking and
the posttheft driving “when the driving is not ‘part of the original
taking’ [citation]; when the driving is ‘an act distinct from the
taking’ [citation]; when the driving is ‘for purposes unconnected
with the original taking’ [citation]; ‘when the driving is no longer
part of a “ ‘continuous journey away from the locus of the theft’ ” ’
[citation]; or when the driving is not part of the escape from the
scene of the theft.” (People v. Calistro (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 387,
395 (Calistro).) To guide our determination of whether a
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substantial break occurred, we consider several factors, including
if there was a separation in time, driving for purposes unrelated
from the original taking, a separation in location, or a change in
the condition of the vehicle. (See Lara, supra, 6 Cal.5th at
p. 1138; Calistro, at pp. 394-395; People v. Strong (1994)
30 Cal.App.4th 366, 375 (Strong); People v. Malamut (1971)
16 Cal.App.3d 237, 242 (Malamut).) There was evidence of each
of the relevant factors here.
When Officer Armstrong found Richards driving the truck,
approximately 36 hours had passed since the truck was originally
stolen. Such a time gap can qualify as a substantial break.
(Calistro, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 403 [substantial break
where “[f]ive hours had passed since the car was stolen”].)
In addition, Armstrong drove behind Richards for two
miles, during which time “[n]othing suggested [Richards] was
still in the process of taking the car or fleeing the scene of the
crime.” (Calistro, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 403.) For example,
there is no evidence Richards “appeared to be in [a] hurry” or
tried to “avoid detection” while he drove. (Ibid. [sufficient
evidence of substantial break where, five hours after the theft,
defendant stopped for gas and lingered in the stolen car].)
Indeed, Richards admits in his opening brief that he “complied
with the stop without attempting to flee.”
Further, Richards parked in a shopping center in
Rosemead, a different area from the site of the original theft in
Chatsworth, suggesting “the driving [was] not part of the escape
from the scene of the theft.” (Calistro, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at
p. 395; see Malamut, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d at p. 242 [sufficient
evidence of a substantial break where police discovered car “in an
entirely different location”]; Strong, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at
8
p. 375 [same where defendant was found driving the stolen
vehicle in an area that was not on a continuous journey away
from the location of the theft].)
Lastly, the condition of the truck was materially different
from when it was stolen. The front bumper was damaged, and
inside the truck were several personal belongings, including a
bicycle, a bottle of soda, and a portable drinking cup—none of
which belonged to Torres. The jury could have reasonably
inferred from the changed condition of the truck that the theft
was completed, and sufficient time had passed for other
intervening events to occur. (See, e.g., Strong, supra,
30 Cal.App.4th at p. 375 [sufficient evidence of a substantial
break where “[i]tems [the victim] had left in the pickup were
missing; in their place were cassette tapes, magazines, a blanket,
a knife, and a compressed air tank, none of which belonged to
[the victim]”]; Malamut, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d at p. 242 [“major
alteration of the vehicle” demonstrated that “[t]he theft was
definitely completed”].) Thus, considering the factors together,
the evidence was sufficient to show a substantial break between
the original theft and the posttheft driving.
Richards also contends there was “no direct evidence” of a
substantial break. But direct evidence is not required.
“[C]ircumstantial evidence is as sufficient as direct evidence to
support a conviction. [Citations.] ‘Whether the evidence
presented at trial is direct or circumstantial, ... the relevant
inquiry on [substantial evidence review] remains whether any
reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d
1194, 1208; accord, People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 339
[“ ‘ “Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and
9
any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.” ’ ”].) As
noted, there was circumstantial evidence of each of the relevant
factors.
3. Richards had the requisite intent
Richards argues there was insufficient evidence that he
had the specific intent under section 10851, subdivision (a), to
“permanently or temporarily deprive the owner … of his or her
title or possession of the vehicle.” His argument lacks merit.
“Specific intent to deprive the owner of possession of his car
may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances of the
particular case.” (People v. Clifton (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 195,
200.) “Knowledge that the vehicle was stolen, while not an
element of the offense, may constitute evidence of the defendant’s
intent to deprive the owner of title and possession. [Citation.] [¶]
Possession of recently stolen property itself raises a strong
inference that the possessor knew the property was stolen; only
slight corroboration is required to allow for a finding of guilt.”
(People v. O’Dell (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1574 (O’Dell);
accord, People v. Green (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 165, 180-181;
Clifton, at p. 200.) “[T]he slight corroboration that permits an
inference that the possessor knew that the property was stolen
may consist of no explanation, of an unsatisfactory explanation,
or of other suspicious circumstances that would justify the
inference.” (O’Dell, at p. 1575; see Clifton, at p. 200 [“possession
of the recently taken vehicle by the defendant with slight
corroboration through statements or conduct tending to show
guilt is sufficient to sustain a conviction”].)
There was sufficient evidence Richards had the specific
intent to deprive Torres of possession of his truck. It is
undisputed that Richards was in possession of a recently stolen
10
truck. As noted, this leads to a “strong inference” that Richards
knew the truck was stolen. (O’Dell, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1574.) The condition of the truck, namely that the window was
broken and the ignition was so heavily damaged that only the
screwdriver could turn it on, additionally supports the inference
Richards knew the truck was stolen. As Armstrong testified, it is
“common” for stolen cars to have damaged ignitions. (See People
v. Green, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 181 [“evidence of a tampered
ignition” “coupled with other evidence may support a finding of
intent to deprive the owner of possession”].) Moreover, there
were personal belongings in the car that the jury could have
reasonably inferred belonged to Richards, given Torres’s
testimony they did not belong to him. From that evidence, the
jury could further conclude Richards was treating the car as his
own and using it to transport his things, which in turn supports
the inference he intended to deprive the owner of possession.
Richards points to specific evidence in the record, including
that there were no fingerprints recovered; that Richards “did not
attempt to flee, did not switch seats, and complied with the
officers’ commands”; and that “[t]he truck still bore its original
rear license plate.” He asserts “[t]hese are not the classic indicia
of someone knowingly driving a stolen truck.”
“That other inferences might be drawn from the evidence
at trial is not to say insufficient evidence supports the verdict.”
(People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 945.) In fact, defense
counsel made a similar argument during closing to the one
Richards makes on appeal, which the jury necessarily rejected.
(See ibid.) As the California Supreme Court has made clear,
“ ‘ “ ‘[i]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s findings,
the judgment may not be reversed simply because the
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circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997,
1118.) The circumstances here reasonably support the jury’s
finding that Richards had the required intent.5
B. The Court Did Not Impose the Upper Term Based on an
Aggravating Factor That Was Neither Admitted by
Richards nor Found True by a Jury
At sentencing, the People asked the court to impose the
upper term of four years pursuant to Penal Code section 666.5.
Defense counsel asked for the middle term of three years, arguing
there was no violence, the People’s offer before trial was three
years, and “Richards should not be penalized for exercising his
right to jury trial.” The court imposed the upper term.
Richards contends the court prejudicially erred by imposing
the upper term based in part on an aggravating factor—that he
failed to take responsibility—without his admission or a jury
finding on the aggravating factor, as required by Penal Code
5 For the same reasons, we reject Richards’s contention the
trial court erred in dismissing the charge under Penal Code
section 1118.1 for lack of sufficient evidence. “ ‘ “The standard
applied by a trial court in ruling upon a motion for judgment of
acquittal pursuant to [Penal Code] section 1118.1 is the same as
the standard applied by an appellate court in reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction[.]” … The
sufficiency of evidence is tested at the point the motion is made.’ ”
(People v. Lamb (2024) 16 Cal.5th 400, 442.) Richards made the
motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the People’s case-in-chief,
which is the same point at which we test the sufficiency of the
evidence in this case, given Richards did not present any
evidence.
12
section 1170, subdivision (b)(2).6 The People argue Richards
forfeited this challenge because he did not object at sentencing.
We need not determine whether Richards’s claim is forfeited
because, assuming there is no forfeiture, Richards has not shown
the court relied on Richards’s failure to take responsibility to
impose the upper term.
The People alleged, and Richards admitted, two
aggravating factors: that Richards’s prior convictions were
numerous or of increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)), and that
he served a prior prison term (rule 4.421(b)(3)). The court found
the factors true, stating it “does find the factors in aggravation of
defendant’s prior convictions are numerous and that he has
served a prior term in county jail under section 1170
[subdivision] (h).” The court then stated: “The court does not
believe those factors in aggravation are mitigated by factors in
mitigation. In this particular case, the court does not believe the
defendant is being punished for going to trial. At this time the
defendant has not admitted any culpability in these, taken any
responsibility for his actions. As I indicated, he has numerous
aggravating factors, and I don’t find any factors in mitigation. As
a result of that, the court will be intending to impose the high
term.”
6 Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), provides: “The
court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only
when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that
justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the
middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have
been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.”
13
Richards contends that when the court stated “the
defendant has not … taken any responsibility for his actions,” the
court was relying on that additional fact to impose the upper
term. We are not persuaded.
Before the court mentioned Richards’s failure to take
responsibility, it stated multiple times that the two factors that
the People alleged—that Richards’s prior convictions were
numerous and that he had served a prior prison term—were
factors in aggravation. First, in finding the two factors true, the
court referred to them as “the factors in aggravation.” Then, the
court immediately referred to them again as “those factors in
aggravation” when it discussed weighing them against any
mitigating factors.
In contrast, when the court mentioned Richards’s failure to
take responsibility, it did not identify that fact as an aggravating
factor. Instead, the court made the statement after it referred to
the “factors in mitigation.” It appears that at most, the court
treated Richards’s failure to take responsibility as evidence that
no mitigating factors were present. Indeed, one of the
enumerated factors in mitigation is that “[t]he defendant
voluntarily acknowledged wrongdoing before arrest or at an early
stage of the criminal process.” (Rule 4.423(b)(8).) Moreover, the
court’s final statement, “As I indicated, he has numerous
aggravating factors,” can reasonably be interpreted as referring
back to the court’s earlier finding on the two alleged aggravating
factors, not to the court’s statement that Richards failed to take
responsibility. The introductory phrase “As I indicated”
naturally points to the court’s earlier statements about the
aggravating circumstances.
14
Nothing in the record suggests the court mistakenly
believed it could impose the upper term based on additional facts
beyond the properly proven aggravating circumstances. “In the
absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the court
‘knows and applies the correct statutory and case law.’ ” (People
v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 361; see also People v. Andrade
(2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 651, 654, fn. 1 [“ ‘ “A judgment or order of
the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and
presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which
the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.” ’ ”].)
Richards has not demonstrated the court relied on facts not found
true by a jury or admitted by him in sentencing him to the upper
term.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
STONE, J.
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
FEUER, J.
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