Filed 9/24/26 P. v. Reeves CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D086695
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCD306935)
v.
AARON REEVES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Francis M. Devaney, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and
remanded with instructions.
Aude Ruffing, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Donald W.
Ostertag, James Spradley, Seth M. Friedman, Connor O. Sakati and Sahar
Karimi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Aaron Reeves entered a negotiated plea for carrying a concealed dirk or
dagger in violation of Penal Code § 21310,1 and the trial court sentenced him
to formal probation. Reeves raises several contentions regarding the
1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
conditions of his probation. He asserts the trial court erred by relying on his
juvenile record to impose certain gang conditions; that the gang conditions
are either unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent), or
unconstitutionally overbroad; that the trial court improperly delegated its
authority to the probation department by ordering counseling if directed by
the probation officer; and that the trial court abused its discretion by
ordering him to pay for such counseling.
We agree that there is not sufficient nexus with the current offense or
with future criminality to justify the imposition of the gang conditions. In
addition, the People concede, and we agree, that payment for counseling
cannot be a condition of probation. However, we do not agree that trial court
improperly delegated its authority by ordering counseling if directed by the
probation officer. We direct the trial court to strike the gang conditions and
to modify the counseling provision to clarify that payment of costs is not a
condition of probation. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At 5:40 p.m. on March 3, 2025, a San Diego Police Department officer
responded to a call of a disturbance at the Horton Plaza parking garage. The
reporting party indicated that the subject, later identified as Reeves, was
holding a knife, refusing to leave the area, and had been observed being
aggressive with security earlier in the day. The officer detained Reeves and
patted him down for weapons. The officer found a fixed blade kitchen knife
with a serrated edge in Reeves’s left front pants pocket, a glass narcotics pipe
in his right front pocket, and a small bag of white, crystalline substance in
his sock.
The People charged Reeves with carrying a concealed dirk or dagger
(§ 21310—count 1) and possession of paraphernalia used for narcotics
(Health & Saf. Code § 11364— count 2). They alleged that Reeves had three
2
felony priors. Reeves pled guilty to count one and the People agreed to
dismiss the remaining charges and agreed to a stipulated sentence of credit
for time served plus two years of formal probation. As contemplated by the
plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Reeves to time served and entered
an order granting formal probation.
Relevant to the present appeal, paragraph 7 of the formal probation
order entered by the trial court contains the following conditions related to
treatment, therapy, and counseling, which we will refer to herein as the
counseling conditions:
“a. Take psychotropic medications if prescribed / ordered by
doctor.
“b. Participate in treatment, therapy, counseling, or other
course of conduct as suggested by validated assessment
tests.
“c. Provide written authorization for the P.O. [probation
officer] to receive progress or compliance reports from
any medical/mental health care provider, or other
treatment provider rendering treatment/services per
court order under the terms of this grant of probation.
“d. Attend and successfully complete Psychiatric-IF,
Individual-IF, Group-IF cognitive behavior-IF
counseling program approved by the P.O. if directed by
the P.O. Authorize the counselor to provide progress
reports to the probation office or court when requested;
all costs to be borne by defendant.”
In addition, paragraph 12 contains the following conditions related to
gangs, which we will refer to herein as the gang conditions:
“b. Do not associate with any person who you know, or who
a P.O. or other law enforcement officer informs you, is a
West Coast Crips gang member. ‘Gang’ means a
‘criminal street gang’ as defined in Pen Code 186.22(e)
and (f).
3
“e. Do not knowingly display any gang signs or gestures.
“i. Do not knowingly wear, display, use, or possess any
insignias, photographs, emblems, badges, buttons, caps,
hats, jackets, shoes, flags, scarves, bandanas, shirts, or
other articles of clothing evidencing affiliation with /
membership in the West Coast Crips gang.”
After the trial court entered the formal probation order, Reeves filed a
motion to reconsider and to modify the terms of probation, asserting that the
trial court should exclude the gang conditions because there was insufficient
nexus to the underlying conviction. The trial court refused to strike the gang
conditions in their entirety but did modify the probation order to specify:
“Defendant cannot associate/affiliate with any West Coast [Crips] gang
members unless they are relatives of the defendant.”
Reeves filed a timely notice of appeal, limited to the probation
conditions.
II. DISCUSSION
Reeves argues, as he did in the trial court, that the gang conditions are
invalid as unreasonable under Lent and that they are unconstitutionally
overbroad. He asserts that trial court erred in considering his juvenile record
when it refused to strike those conditions. Although he objected only to the
gang conditions in the trial court, Reeves asserts further that the counseling
condition in paragraph 7(d) should also be struck, because it improperly
delegates authority to the probation department and because it requires him
to pay for counseling despite a demonstrated inability to pay.
A. Relevant Legal Principles and Standards of Review
When a trial court grants probation, section 1203.1, subdivision (j)
provides that “[t]he court may impose and require any or all of the terms of
imprisonment, fine, and conditions specified in this section, and other
reasonable conditions, as it may determine are fitting and proper to the end
4
that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach
of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and
generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the
probationer . . . .” Accordingly, courts have “broad discretion to impose
conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety.” (People
v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.)
However, there are limits to the conditions a court may impose. Under
Lent, a condition of probation will be invalid if it “ ‘(1) has no relationship to
the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is
not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not
reasonably related to future criminality . . . .’ ” (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at
p. 486.) “This test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a
reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45
Cal.4th 375, 379 (Olguin).)
We review the trial court’s decision to impose a given probation
condition for an abuse of discretion, considering the facts of the underlying
offense and the defendant’s background. (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 379;
People v. Patillo (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1576, 1579.) We review constitutional
challenges to specific conditions of probation—including assertions that a
condition improperly delegates the trial court’s authority—de novo. (People
v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902 (Smith).)
B. The Gang Conditions
We turn first to the gang conditions in paragraph 12 (b), (e), and (i).
Reeves asserts the trial court erred by considering his juvenile record in
imposing these conditions, and that they are unreasonable under Lent and
unconstitutionally overbroad.
5
1. Additional Background
The Probation Department recommended the gang conditions in the
probation officer’s report that it submitted to the trial court. The report
stated, under a “Gang Affiliation” heading, that Reeves “has been affiliated
with the West Coast Crips his entire life. Members of his father’s side of the
family are also affiliated with the gang.”
Reeves objected to the gang conditions at the sentencing hearing and
asserted that there was insufficient nexus to the underlying crime. The trial
court responded, “Given his admitted affiliation with the West Coast Crips,
I’m going to order those.”
The trial court noted this same statement at the hearing on the motion
to modify the terms of probation. Defense counsel argued that statement
alone was not sufficient nexus to impose the gang conditions, that Reeves was
only associated with the gang “because of his family ties,” and that there was
nothing to suggest that the crime he pled to was gang related, or that any of
his prior offenses were gang related. The prosecutor agreed and stated “we
don’t see a nexus as well as to the particular facts of this case and to the gang
conditions. Although we do note what probation had indicated in their
report.”
The trial court also agreed “that this was not a gang-related offense”
but pointed the parties to page 8 of the probation report. The probation
report noted that Reeves had three prior juvenile offenses, in 2012 and 2013.
On page 8, it stated that Reeves was supervised on juvenile probation from
2012 to 2015, that he sustained several probation violations, including
“failing to adhere to his gang conditions[ and] failing to register as a gang
member,” and that “his overall performance on juvenile probation is deemed
unsatisfactory.”
6
Defense counsel asserted that the juvenile information should not have
been made public without a Welfare and Institutions Code section 827
petition. The court acknowledged the argument but continued to discuss the
circumstances of the juvenile offenses. The trial court noted that Reeves had
been arrested with a group of males when he was 16 years old, and stated, “I
don’t have to be, you know, a wizard to read between the lines. I know what
was going on.”
The trial court modified the probation order to specify that Reeves
could associate with known West Coast [Crips] Gang members if they were
relatives of Reeves and otherwise denied the motion.
2. Analysis
First, Reeves asserts that the trial court should not have considered his
juvenile record without obtaining the juvenile court’s authorization under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 827.
“In general, juvenile court records are confidential.” (City of Eureka
v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 755, 761.) Welfare and Institutions
Code section 827 governs the release of juvenile court records. It enumerates
a list of persons who may inspect a juvenile case file without a court order,
which includes, among others, “[c]ourt personnel,” “the district attorney, a
city attorney, or city prosecutor authorized to prosecute criminal or juvenile
cases under state law,” “attorneys for the parties, judges, referees, other
hearing officers, probation officers, and law enforcement officers who are
actively participating in criminal or juvenile proceedings involving the
minor,” and “[a]ny other person who may be designated by court order of the
judge or the juvenile court upon filing a petition.” (§ 827, subd. (a)(1)(A), (B),
(E) and (Q), italics added; see also City of Eureka, at p. 761.)
Welfare and Institutions Code section 828, subdivision (a)(2) states
further, “A court shall consider any information relating to the taking of a
7
minor into custody, if the information is not contained in a record that has
been sealed, for purposes of determining whether adjudications of
commission of crimes as a juvenile warrant a finding that there are
circumstances in aggravation pursuant to Section 1170 of the Penal Code or
to deny probation.” (Italics added.)
Here, Reeves does not assert, nor is there any indication in the record,
that his juvenile records have been sealed. Thus, court personnel, the
prosecutor, and the probation department were permitted to inspect the
records without court order. (See Welf. & Inst. Code § 827, subd. (a)(1)(A),
(B), and (E).) Moreover, the court was permitted to consider information
related to the taking of Reeves into custody for the purpose of determining
whether to grant or deny probation. (See id., subd. (b).)
Reeves asserts the court was not permitted to consider that same
information in exercising its discretion to set conditions of probation once it
decided not to deny probation, absent a petition and court order pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code section 827, subdivision (a)(1)(Q). We are not
convinced. The trial court did not inspect the entire juvenile case file or
records; rather, it considered information provided by the probation
department relevant to the decision to grant probation, which necessarily
includes setting terms of probation. It is illogical to conclude that the trial
court can consider information in deciding whether to grant probation but
then ignore that same information when setting the terms of probation.
Regardless, though, we do not find Reeves’s juvenile record to be
particularly enlightening in this case. The specific incident that the trial
court referred to occurred in 2013 and the probation violations for failing to
register as a gang member and failing to adhere to his gang conditions
happened sometime between 2013 and 2015. Although Reeves had several
8
additional criminal cases, and associated probation violations, in the ten
years between 2015 and the March 3, 2025 offense at issue in the present
case, none of the facts or charges surrounding those cases suggest any gang
involvement. Rather, they stem primarily from trespassing incidents and
appear to be related to substance abuse. In the case at hand, Reeves was
arrested while trespassing, alone, in a commercial parking garage, with a
kitchen knife and drugs on his person. The trial court noted “that this was
not a gang-related offense” and the prosecutor agreed that there was no
nexus between the particular facts of this case and the gang conditions.
We acknowledge that probation conditions need not relate directly to
the underlying conviction, and may, instead, be reasonably related to future
criminality. (See Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) But here we cannot
conclude that the gang conditions are reasonably related to future
criminality. As discussed, even if appropriately considered, Reeves’s juvenile
record is 10 years old, and in the intervening 10 years, there is no indication
that Reeves has engaged in any criminal activity related to gangs. He told
the probation officer that he “has been affiliated with the West Coast Crips
his entire life,” but the word “affiliated” is vague and, regardless, there is no
indication in the record that the affiliation has resulted in criminal activity
over the past 10 years. Notably, the same probation reports states,
“Acquaintances: [Reeves] sticks to himself and does not have close friends or
acquaintances,” which belies any suggestion that Reeves is actively
associating with members of the West Coast Crips. Moreover, allowing
Reeves to associate with gang members so long as he is related to them
actually undermines the conditions’ connection to future criminality, by
allowing Reeves to maintain a close relationship with those gang members
most likely to influence him.
9
Again, we acknowledge that “courts may properly base probation
conditions upon information in a probation report that raises concerns about
future criminality unrelated to a prior offense.” (In re Ricardo P. (2019)
7 Cal.5th 1113, 1122.) “Yet Lent’s requirement that a probation condition
must be ‘ “reasonably related to future criminality” ’ contemplates a degree of
proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the
legitimate interests served by the condition.” (Ibid.) Thus, “[n]ot every
probation condition bearing a remote, attenuated, tangential, or diaphanous
connection to future criminal conduct can be considered reasonable.” (People
v. Brandão (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 568, 574.) Particularly relevant here,
courts are not authorized to impose “conditions to shield probationers from
exposure to people and circumstances that are less than ideal but are
nonetheless unrelated to defendant’s current or prior offenses or any factor
suggesting a risk of future criminal conduct.” (Id. at p. 577.)
The People rely on People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, to assert
that association with a gang is a recognized precursor to criminal activity,
but there, Lopez admitted membership in a gang, and the information before
the court showed an “increasing pattern of criminal behavior.” (Id. at p. 626.)
Here, although Reeves stated that he has always had some affiliation with
gang members, in part due to his familial relationships, there is no indication
he is actually a gang member, and, perhaps more importantly, there is
limited, if any, information in the record to suggest that he has a likelihood of
participating in future criminal activity because of that affiliation. We
acknowledge that past or current gang “affiliation” may support the
imposition of a gang condition based on the totality of the evidence in some
cases, but given the tenuous nature of his stated “affiliation” with a gang, and
his lack of gang-related criminal activity over the past 10 years despite that
10
affiliation, we cannot conclude that the burden imposed on Reeves by the
gang conditions in this case—including restrictions to his rights to free
speech and association—is proportional to the interests served by those
conditions.
Accordingly, we conclude that the gang conditions are not reasonable
under Lent and must be stricken.
C. The Counseling Conditions
We turn next to the counseling condition in paragraph 7(d). Reeves
asserts that this condition improperly delegates the trial court’s authority to
the probation officer and also improperly requires him to pay for any such
counseling.
As an initial matter, Reeves did not object to the counseling provisions
in the trial court. Generally, challenges to probation conditions must be
raised in the trial court, or they are forfeited. (People v. Brand (2021)
59 Cal.App.5th 861, 867.) Constitutional claims raising pure questions of
law, however, are not forfeited by counsel’s failure to object. (In re Sheena K.
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887–889 [preservation by objection not necessary when
appellant raises facial challenge to constitutionality of probation conditions].)
Because Reeves’s improper delegation argument is a facial challenge to the
condition’s constitutionality, we will address the merits of that contention.
(See Brand, at pp. 867–868.) Doing so, however, we conclude that the
contention is without merit.
“The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial.
Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the
others except as permitted by [the] Constitution.” (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3.)
Trial courts have the authority to determine if a defendant is eligible for
probation and if so, which conditions would be appropriate under the
circumstances. (§ 1203, subd. (b)(3); Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 379.) A
11
probation officer may oversee and enforce the trial court’s orders but “may
not create conditions not expressly authorized by the court.” (People v. O’Neil
(2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358.) At the same time, courts have
acknowledged that a trial court “is poorly equipped to micromanage selection
of a [specific treatment or counselling] program, both because it lacks the
ability to remain apprised of currently available programs and, more
fundamentally, because entry into particular program may depend on
mercurial questions of timing and availability.” (People v. Penoli (1996)
46 Cal.App.4th 298, 308.)
Here, although the trial court did select several types of therapy, which
Reeves must participate in if directed by his probation officer, the selected
categories are similar and interrelated. Paragraph 7(d) requires that Reeves
must participate in psychiatric and cognitive behavior counseling, in an
individual or group setting, if directed by the probation officer. Moreover, the
court also mandated, in paragraph 7(b), that Reeves must participate in
treatment, therapy, and counseling as suggested by validated assessment
test. The additional provision in paragraph 7(d) simply allows the probation
officer to manage Reeves’s participation in an appropriate counseling
program(s). Unlike the condition at issue in Smith, the provision does not
permit the probation officer to require Reeves to submit to residential
treatment. (Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th 897.) Nor does the probation
officer have the discretion to determine if counseling was required or to
expand on the type or nature of the requisite counseling. We do not find any
improper delegation of authority in this condition.
As to the clause indicating that all costs are to be borne by Reeves, the
People again assert that he forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in the
trial court but concede that it should be modified to clarify that payment is
12
not a condition of probation. We agree. The “trial court may order a
defendant to pay for reasonable costs of probation; however, such costs are
collateral and their payment cannot be made a condition of probation.”
(Brown v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 313, 321.) Accordingly, we
will direct the trial court to modify the condition with this clarification.
Reeves’s remaining arguments are forfeited. (See People v. Trujillo (2015)
60 Cal.4th 850, 858–859 [defendant waived arguments regarding ability to
pay probation costs by failing to raise them in the trial court].)
III. DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to modify
the order granting formal probation to strike the gang conditions in
paragraph 12(b), (e), and (i) and to clarify that payment of the costs
associated with any counseling program mandated by paragraph 7(d) is not a
condition of probation, such that a failure to cover those costs will not result
in a probation violation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
13