Filed 9/30/26 P. v. Readus CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
D085834
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. SCD255514)
v.
PIERRE RENEE READUS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
David J. Danielsen, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with directions.
Sylvia W. Beckham, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Evan Stele, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Pierre Renee Readus pled guilty in 2015 to voluntary manslaughter
and admitted various prior conviction and sentencing enhancement
allegations. He now appeals from the trial court’s order resentencing him
under Penal Code1 sections 1172.75. We affirm the judgment and remand to
the trial court for corrections to the amended abstract of judgment.
BACKGROUND
I.
Charges, Guilty Plea, and Sentencing
In August 2015, a grand jury indicted Readus on charges of murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)) with gun and gang allegations (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(5),
12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d)), and possession of a firearm by a felon
(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). In an amended indictment, the grand jury added two
prison prior allegations (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668), one prior serious felony
conviction allegation (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c)), and one
strike prior allegation (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 668, 1170.12).
In October 2015, Readus pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter (§ 192,
subd. (a)) and admitted allegations that he personally used a firearm
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and committed the offense for the benefit of, at the
direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang with the intent to
promote, further, and assist criminal conduct by gang members (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1)). He also admitted allegations that he suffered one prior strike
conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 668, 1170.12), one prior serious felony
conviction (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c)), and one prison prior
1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
(§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668). In exchange for his plea, the People dismissed the
remaining charges and allegations.
The trial court sentenced Readus to the stipulated sentence of 42 years
in prison, consisting of the high term of 11 years for voluntary manslaughter
(§ 192, subd. (a)), doubled to 22 years for the strike prior, plus 10 years for
the gang enhancement, four years for the gun enhancement, five years for the
prior serious felony conviction enhancement, and one year for the prison prior
enhancement.
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II.
Proceedings on Motion for Resentencing
In March 2025, Readus filed in the trial court a motion for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.75. He requested the court dismiss the prison prior
sentencing enhancement that had been invalidated by recent changes in the
law and exercise its discretion to further reduce his sentence by imposing a
low term sentence for voluntary manslaughter and dismissing the strike
prior and the remaining sentencing enhancements. The People conceded that
changes in the law required the court to strike Readus’s one-year prison prior
and 10-year gang enhancements but argued that reducing his sentence
further would endanger public safety.
At a hearing on the motion, the court found Readus entitled to a recall
of his sentence because his prison prior enhancement was no longer
authorized by law. The court further explained the standard for proving a
gang allegation pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), had changed
since Readus’s sentencing and, because the People committed to not retrying
the allegation, it intended to strike the gang allegation. Readus then
requested the court to further reduce his sentence by dismissing his strike
prior and the serious felony and gun enhancements.
The court struck the then-unauthorized one-year prison prior
enhancement and the 10-year gang enhancement. In considering whether to
further reduce Readus’s sentence, the court stated it “considered the entirety
of . . . [Readus]’s record,” including a summary of Readus’s performance in
prison; his age, both currently and at the time of his offense; his parole
eligibility date; and the circumstances of Readus’s commitment offense and
his prior strike. Considering the entire record, the court found a further
reduction in Readus’s sentence would endanger public safety.
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The court imposed a new sentence, again selecting the upper term of 11
years for voluntary manslaughter, doubled to 22 years for the prior strike,
plus four years for the gun enhancement and five years for the prior serious
felony enhancement. From the original sentence of 42 years, the court
imposed a reduced term of 31 years.
DISCUSSION
I.
The Trial Court Did Not Err by Reimposing the Upper Term Sentence
Readus argues the trial court could have imposed no more than the
middle term sentence for voluntary manslaughter because there exist no
properly proven aggravating factors to support a high term. He recognizes a
split of authority on this issue, which the California Supreme Court has
taken under review, but urges us to adopt the authority that has held in his
favor. The People counter that this court should follow the authority that
supports the trial court’s resentencing order and, in any event, Readus
forfeited this argument by failing to adequately object below. We reject
Readus’s claim on the merits and thus do not address the People’s forfeiture
argument.
One-year prior prison sentencing enhancements that were imposed
prior to January 1, 2020, such as Readus’s, now are legally invalid, and
section 1172.75 provides a mechanism for resentencing individuals serving
judgments that include one or more of those enhancements. (§ 1172.75,
subds. (a)–(c).) In imposing a new sentence, the trial court shall consider
“any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial
discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity
of sentencing.” (Id., subd. (d)(2).)
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After Readus’s original sentencing, the Legislature amended
section 1170, subdivision (b), to make the middle term the presumptive
determinate sentence. (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 742.) Now,
courts may only impose an upper term sentence based on a defendant’s prior
convictions as proven by a certified record of conviction (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3))
or on other supporting aggravating factors that “have been stipulated to by
the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by
the jury or by the judge in a court trial” (id., subd. (b)(2); Lynch, at p. 742).
When a trial court is resentencing a defendant pursuant to section 1172.75,
“[u]nless the court originally imposed the upper term, the court may not
impose a sentence exceeding the middle term[.]” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(4),
italics added.)
As the parties recognize, there currently is a split in the Courts of
Appeal as to whether trial courts must apply section 1170’s new burden of
proof when imposing an upper term sentence, even if the court “originally
imposed” the upper term on the defendant. (Compare People v. Brannon-
Thompson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455, 466–467 (Brannon-Thompson) [“the
Legislature intended the new burden of proof amendments to section 1170,
subdivision (b), apply only if the trial court is imposing the upper term for the
first time at a section 1172.75 resentencing”] with People v. Gonzalez (2024)
107 Cal.App.5th 312, 329 [the new language in subdivision (d)(4) of
section 1172.75 “simply restrict[s] the scope of defendants eligible to receive
the upper term at resentencing to those who previously received the upper
term, instead of creating a condition or exception independently justifying the
imposition of the upper term”].) Our Supreme Court will decide this issue.
(See People v. Eaton (Mar. 14, 2025, C096853) [nonpub. opn.], review granted
May 14, 2025, S289903.) Until then, we will follow Brannon-Thompson.
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Under the reasoning of Brannon-Thompson, because the trial court
originally imposed an upper term sentence on Readus for voluntary
manslaughter, the court was permitted to reimpose the upper term
notwithstanding the new burden of proof required by section 1170,
subdivision (b). (See Brannon-Thompson, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 467.)
Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it resentenced Readus to the
upper term for voluntary manslaughter.
II.
The Trial Court Did Not Err by Declining to Further Reduce Readus’s
Sentence
Readus also argues the trial court erred by declining to further reduce
his sentence by striking the five-year prior serious felony enhancement after
finding that a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.2
The premise of Readus’s argument is unclear. In his opening brief, he
appears first to argue that the trial court erred under section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(1), by finding that further reducing Readus’s sentence would
endanger public safety without considering his potential dangerousness at
the time of his release. He cites subdivision (d)(2) and (d)(3) of
section 1172.75 for additional rules applicable to a court’s decision whether to
further reduce a sentence, apparently under the broader framework of
section 1172.75, subdivision (d). But he also cites section 1385 regarding a
2 Readus also suggests the court should have stricken “additional” or
“multiple” enhancements but does not identify the other enhancements to
which he refers. The only other sentencing enhancement imposed upon
Readus was a four-year gun enhancement, but he does not appear to argue
the trial court should have stricken this enhancement. Regardless, any
challenge to the trial court’s decision not to strike the gun enhancement
would fail for the reasons we shall discuss.
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trial court’s discretion to dismiss a sentencing enhancement. He then
seemingly conflates a trial court’s discretion under section 1172.75,
subdivision (d), with that under section 1385. Readus’s argument is further
muddled when, in his reply brief, he appears to argue his claim is premised
only on the trial court’s exercise of discretion under subdivision (d)(3) of
section 1172.75. Specifically, he argues that the court’s exercise of discretion
under section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(3), “is separate and apart from any
analysis under subdivision (d)(1), which permits a court to resentence a
defendant without any reduction in time if the court ‘finds by clear and
convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public
safety.’ ” Readus makes no mention of section 1385 in his reply brief.
A. Readus Has Not Established Error Under Section 1172.75
Readus has forfeited any argument that the trial court erred under
section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(3), independent from section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(1), because he did not fairly raise this argument until his
reply brief. (People v. Choyce (2025) 18 Cal.5th 86, 114.)
As for an argument that the trial court failed to make an adequate
finding under section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), that further reducing
Readus’s sentence would endanger public safety, he has shown no error.
Section 1172.75 mandates that “[r]esentencing pursuant to this section
shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of
the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger
public safety,” and “shall not result in a longer sentence than the one
originally imposed.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).) When it resentenced Readus,
the trial court struck the invalid one-year prior prison enhancement and the
10-year gang enhancement, thereby reducing his sentence from 42 to 31
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years. Because the court reduced Readus’s sentence, it was not required to
make any dangerousness finding under section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), let
alone one supported by clear and convincing evidence. (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(1) [“Resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser
sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the
repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.”].) In
fact, Readus appears to concede as much when he acknowledges in his reply
brief that section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), “permits a court to resentence a
defendant without any reduction in time if the court ‘finds by clear and
convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public
safety.’ ” (Italics added.)
B. Readus Has Not Established Error Under Section 1385
To the extent Readus intended to argue the trial court abused its
discretion by declining to strike the five-year prior serious felony
enhancement under section 1385 without considering his potential
dangerousness at the time he will be released, we are unpersuaded.
Section 1385, subdivision (c), provides: “Notwithstanding any other
law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of
justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any
initiative statute. [¶] In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the
court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the
defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in
subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of
these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement,
unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1), (2).) In considering a defendant’s
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potential danger to public safety, a court must consider, among other factors,
“the date on which [the defendant] could be released if the [sentencing]
enhancement was dismissed.” (People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th
215, 230–231.)
“We review a trial court’s order denying a motion to dismiss a sentence
enhancement under section 1385 for abuse of discretion. “A trial court may
abuse its discretion where its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it, where the trial court was not aware of
its discretion to dismiss a sentencing allegation under section 1385, or where
the court considered impermissible factors in declining to dismiss.” (Nazir v.
Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 478, 490 [cleaned up].)
At the resentencing hearing, the court made a finding under
section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), that further reducing Readus’s sentence
would endanger public safety. The court did not, however, explicitly address
Readus’s request to dismiss his prior serious felony enhancement under
section 1385. But the court was not required to make express findings or
offer a statement of reasons when denying Readus’s section 1385 request.
(Cf. People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1036, fn. 6 [“section 1385
expressly requires a statement of reasons for a dismissal,” i.e. a grant of a
section 1385 request]; see People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637
(Brugman) [“ ‘The trial court is not required to state reasons for declining to
exercise its discretion under section 1385.’ ”].) In addition, we presume the
court “ ‘considered all of the relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative
record to the contrary,’ ” and “[w]hen, as here, the record is silent as to the
trial court’s reasons for declining to [dismiss an enhancement under
section 1385], we presume that the trial court correctly applied the law.”
(Brugman, at p. 637 [cleaned up].)
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Because the trial court was not required to offer any reasons for its
refusal to dismiss the prior serious felony enhancement under section 1385, it
was not required to make an express finding as to whether Readus would
pose a danger to public safety at the time of his release before denying his
section 1385 motion. Nevertheless, “we find no indication in the record to
rebut the presumption that the trial court properly considered all of the
relevant factors and evidence[.]” (Brugman, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 638.)
To the contrary, the record supports the inference that the court properly
considered future dangerousness. (See People v. Dove (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th
1, 10 [“If the trial court imposes a prison sentence, we will imply the
necessary finding.”].) The court stated it had considered the entire record.
This included Readus’s resentencing motion and his prison record, which
detailed his performance in prison and rehabilitative efforts since his
conviction. It also considered Readus’s date of birth, current age, parole
eligibility date, and the fact that, even considering a reduced sentence, he
would be neither a youthful nor an elderly offender at the time of his release
on parole.
On this record, we cannot find that the trial court’s refusal to strike the
five-year prior serious felony enhancement under section 1385 is irrational or
arbitrary, that it was not aware of its discretion under section 1385, or that it
considered impermissible factors. We thus find no abuse of discretion under
section 1385.
III.
The Abstract of Judgment Must Be Corrected
Last, Readus argues his amended abstract of judgment after
resentencing must be corrected to reflect an additional 3,439 days of custody
11
credits, as ordered by the trial court. The People concede this correction to
the amended abstract of judgment must be made. We agree.
After resentencing Readus, the court stated, “Custody credits are
confirmed as previously ordered. 206 actual days, 30 [Penal Code] 2933.1
credits for a total of 236 days credit. The Court also orders, added to that,
the actual days of custody that have been served since the date of original
sentencing, October 30, 2015 to today’s date. That is an additional 3,439
days.” The amended abstract, however, shows 206 actual credits and 36 local
conduct credits, for a total of 236 credits. It does not show the additional
3,439 days.
“In the event of a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of
judgment and a minute order or an abstract of judgment, the oral
pronouncement controls.” (People v. Gobert (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 676, 689;
People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2.) “It follows that we must
correct the discrepancy by ordering the trial court to modify the minute
order.” (Gobert, at p. 689.) Accordingly, the amended abstract of judgment
must be corrected to reflect the correct number of prior credits and to add the
additional 3,439 credits.
DISPOSITION
We remand to the trial court with directions to correct the amended
abstract of judgment to reflect, as orally imposed, (1) the previously ordered
206 actual credits and 30 local conduct credits, for a total of 236 prior credits;
and (2) 3,439 additional credits for time served since Readus’s original
sentencing. We direct the trial court to prepare and forward a copy of the
corrected amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation. We otherwise affirm.
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DO, J.
I CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J
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CASTILLO, J., Concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join the majority opinion except section I of the discussion because I
disagree with the reasoning of People v. Brannon-Thompson (2024)
104 Cal.App.5th 455. (Maj. opn., at pp. 4-6.)
Subdivision (d)(4) of Penal Code section 1172.75 provides: “Unless the
court originally imposed the upper term, the court may not impose a sentence
exceeding the middle term unless there are circumstances in aggravation
that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle
term, and those facts have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been
found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.” Section 1172.75 was enacted at the same time the Legislature
amended section 1170 to require that circumstances in aggravation used to
justify an upper-term sentence be proven true beyond a reasonable doubt or
admitted by the defendant. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).)
Given this context, I would conclude that under subdivision (d)(4) a
court cannot impose a term exceeding the middle term when resentencing
under section 1172.75 unless both (1) the upper term was originally imposed
and (2) one or more circumstances in aggravation admitted by the defendant
or proven beyond a reasonable doubt justify the upper term. I accordingly
agree with People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, 329, that
subdivision (d)(4) “simply restrict[s] the scope of defendants eligible to receive
the upper term at resentencing to those who previously received the upper
term, instead of creating a condition or exception independently justifying the
imposition of the upper term.” (Italics omitted.) I would therefore conclude
the trial court erred in resentencing Pierre Renee Readus to the upper term
and would remand for resentencing.
CASTILLO, J.
2