Filed 7/22/26 P. v. Ranjbar CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084692
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCN419188)
v.
PEDRAM RANJBAR,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Kelly C. Mok, Judge. Affirmed.
Stephen M. Lathrop, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Andrew Mestman and Jon S. Tangonan, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
A San Diego jury convicted Pedram Ranjbar of eight counts of sexual
assault and found true allegations that he administered a “controlled
substance analog” in the commission of four of the offenses. He challenges
the jury’s true findings on two grounds. First, he contends the prosecution’s
expert witness was not qualified to testify that the drugs he administered
during the assaults were controlled substance analogs within the meaning of
Health and Safety Code section 11401. In his view, the expert’s testimony
was therefore speculative and unfounded. Second, he contends the trial court
judge failed to independently act as a thirteenth juror when evaluating the
expert’s testimony in response to his motion for a new trial. We conclude
both contentions lack merit and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
Statement of the Case
On July 28, 2022, by amended information, the San Diego County
District Attorney charged Ranjbar with two counts of forcible sexual
penetration (Pen. Code,1 § 289, subd. (a); counts 1 and 2), and two counts of
forcible oral copulation (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(A); counts 3 and 4). With respect
to each count, the information alleged that Ranjbar administered a controlled
substance analog in the commission of the offense in violation of
section 12022.75. This allegation made each offense subject to an
indeterminate sentence of 15 years to life under the One Strike law.
(§ 667.61, subds. (b), (c), (e)(6).) The information further charged Ranjbar
with four counts of sexual battery by restraint (§ 243.4, subd. (a); counts 5 to
8).
The first jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict and retrial
commenced on March 6, 2024. The second jury found appellant guilty on all
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
counts. They also found true the one strike allegations that Ranjbar
administered a controlled substance analog in the commission of the first four
counts.
The trial court sentenced Ranjbar on July 5, 2024. The court imposed
indeterminate terms of 15 years to life on each of the first four counts,
running counts 1 and 2 consecutive and counts 3 and 4 concurrent. For the
remaining counts, the court imposed the upper term of four years on counts 5,
6, and 8. The court ran counts 6 and 8 concurrent, and imposed a consecutive
one-year term (one-third the middle term) on count 7. The total aggregate
sentence was 5 years plus 30 years to life.
II.
The Prosecution’s Case
A. Background
In the spring of 2020, Jane Doe was 21 years old. For a little more than
a year, she had been living with her adoptive father, Ranjbar, while she
attended college. During this time, Ranjbar’s behavior made Jane
increasingly uncomfortable. He regularly entered her room and hugged her
inappropriately in an extended way for a couple of minutes at a time. He did
so even when she told him not to and tried to resist.
During the COVID-19 lockdown, in late May or early June 2020,
Ranjbar left for a week on a trip for work. While he was away, Jane had a
“Zoom wine night” with friends. Ranjbar did not approve of alcohol
consumption, and so, Jane hid the empty bottle in her closet along with an
empty bottle of prosecco she had consumed when she tried it for the first time
on her 21st birthday.
When Ranjbar returned the next evening, he immediately told Jane she
looked hungover and accused her of drinking. Jane eventually admitted she
3
had some wine, and he became enraged. He searched her room and accused
her of betraying him. He told her he was going to “treat [her] like an
alcoholic . . . in rehab” and “humiliate” and “punish” her.
After this incident, during the month of June, Ranjbar began
“interrogating” Jane about her friends and alcohol consumption, he
demanded to look through the email and text messages on her phone four or
five times a day, he threatened to harm her friends with a machete he kept in
the garage, and he hit her a few times “out of nowhere,” one time knocking
the wind out of her. He had never behaved like this before. He also regularly
searched her computer.
Later that month, Ranjbar confiscated Jane’s personal journal after
discovering entries about him. He also directed her to send him an email
listing all the times she consumed alcohol, saying “he was thinking about
using it to sue [her] friends and [her] friends’ parents.”
But, on June 26, 2020, when San Diego County Sherriff’s deputies came
to Ranjbar and Jane’s house for a welfare check regarding an unrelated
matter, she told them she was “okay” and denied being abused. She later
explained, “I didn’t know how to answer the question. I didn’t know what
counted.”
B. The Sexual Assaults
On July 2, 2020, Ranjbar bought three “LIZVIE HD spy camera”
devices from Amazon. The shipping confirmation email described each of the
devices as a “mini hidden nanny cam . . . with remote viewing night vision.”
On July 5, Ranjbar installed applications on his phone to enable remote
viewing through the cameras.
4
On July 8, 2020, about a week after Ranjbar bought the cameras, Jane
met her friend Sophia at a park for a social-distanced picnic. Sophia
described Jane as “very quiet,” and “distant.”
When Jane returned home from the picnic, Ranjbar became enraged
and said she was forbidden from that point forward from seeing friends and
leaving the house unsupervised. He accused her of downplaying the number
of times she had experimented with drinking alcohol. He confiscated her
phone, car keys, credit cards, and driver’s license, and he used the banking
application on her phone to withdraw her entire savings of $2,500 from her
bank account.
That night, Ranjbar told Jane “she couldn’t be trusted to be wandering
about the house at night,” and he gave her “a big, pale pill” around the time
that she normally went to sleep. He stood close by and watched as she took
the pill with water. He also put a dropper of what he described as
cannabidiol (CBD) oil under her tongue. The pills made her feel “tired, floaty,
and not in her body.”
The next day, Jane felt “slower than usual,” and not “as alert as [she]
usually felt in the morning.” Sometime during that day, Ranjbar gave her “a
round green pill,” and told her it would help with her allergies and anxiety.
Ranjbar continued directing Jane to take the pale pill and oil each
night and the green pill each morning from July 8 to July 15, 2020. In
addition, after the first two or three days, he increased the number of pale
pills from one to two, saying that “she wasn’t falling asleep fast enough.”
According to Jane, “It seemed like the longer I took [the pills] and the more of
them he made me take, . . . the fuzzier I was in the morning. Like the harder
it was to think straight. And . . . once I fell asleep at night, I couldn’t wake
back up. And it took a really long time for me to wake back up.”
5
On one of the days between July 8 and July 15, 2020, Jane could not
remember which one, Ranjbar ordered her to lie face-down on a beanbag in
the living room because he was angry with her. When she complied, he hit
her at least five times on the buttocks through her clothing. He then pulled
her pants and underwear down and continued hitting her even harder until
he suddenly said, “I think that’s enough.”
Sometime in mid-July, Ranjbar took Jane’s passport and birth
certificate away. He said she would be accompanying him to Arizona for
work later that month because she “couldn’t be unsupervised.” Ranjbar also
began regularly summoning Jane to kiss him on the mouth in a way that
made her scared he was going to hurt her in a sexual way.
On July 12, 2020, Ranjbar received the surveillance cameras he had
ordered in the mail. He hid two of them in the bathroom where Jane
showered. He hid another one downstairs in the living room. After Ranjbar
received the cameras, one of the applications that enabled remote viewing on
his phone was “opened at least 25 times” on July 15. The other was used on
July 16 at 9:29 a.m. Ranjbar took pictures of Jane sleeping and showering.
On July 16, 2020, the day before she was supposed to travel to Arizona,
Jane awoke at about 5:00 a.m. She began thinking about how she could get
away from Ranjbar at the airport even though she did not have any money or
identification. However, as had been the case since she started taking the
pale-colored pills, her “body was really heavy and [she] couldn’t think very
fast.” She eventually fell back asleep.
When she woke up again, around 10:00 a.m., Ranjbar instructed her to
make breakfast. After going on errands with him, Jane felt nauseous when
she returned home. She lay down to rest on the beanbag, but Ranjbar
6
directed her to change into “something more comfortable” and then
summoned her to “get affection.”
Ranjbar instructed Jane to lay her head on his lap, but when she did,
he suddenly pulled it back. The pull was “forceful” and it scared her. He said
she had to obey him and led her to the coat closet in the dining room. Jane
saw he had placed “her sister’s old mattress” on the floor of the closet.
Ranjbar told her to go inside, and he threatened to “keep [her] in there if
[she] didn’t listen to him.”
Once she was inside the closet, Ranjbar told Jane to sit on the mattress
so he could spank her again. After she sat down, he told her “to get onto all
fours.” She complied and he pulled down her pants and underwear and hit
her on the buttocks at least 10 times. He inserted his fingers into her vagina
and said, “at least you’re not all stretched out.” He told her to remove her
shirt, he squeezed her breasts, and he continued digitally penetrating her.
Ranjbar asked Jane why she did not shave her pubic hair, and then
grabbed her hand tightly and directed her upstairs to his bathroom. He told
her to “get in the tub,” and shaved her pubic and anal areas. Jane could
“hear the neighbors outside through the window,” but Ranjbar told her she
“shouldn’t think about screaming because they wouldn’t hear [her].”
After washing Jane off in the shower, Ranjbar picked out a dress from
her closet and got his camera. He directed her to pose for the camera on the
bed in her room while wearing the dress, and he directed her to crawl toward
him on all fours while she was naked as he videotaped her. When she
seemed uncomfortable and made what he called a “stink face,” he said she
“needed to stop making that face unless [she] wanted to learn to suck dick,
too.” He also took close-up pictures of her genitals.
7
Ranjbar put the camera down and again digitally penetrated Jane. He
touched her breasts with his hands and mouth, and he performed oral sex on
her vagina and anus. He did this while repeatedly saying that her “pussy”
and other body parts belonged to him. Eventually, he told her, “I’m not
gonna fuck you today, but I’m gonna cum on you,” and he went to his
bedroom to get lotion.
While Ranjbar was in his bedroom, Jane escaped and ran naked from
the house. She reached the neighbors’ garage next door, which was open, and
told them that Ranjbar had “put his fingers inside me and his mouth on me.”
She said he “was going to come after [her] and that [they] needed to lock the
door.” She appeared “frantic,” “terrified,” and “in a state of panic.”
Describing her, one of the neighbors said, “I’ve never seen anyone that
scared.”
A neighbor wrapped Jane in a towel, took her through the garage into a
pantry or laundry room, and called the police. Three minutes later, Ranjbar
came out of his house and asked one of the neighbors, “ ‘Where is she? I’m
sick of this shit. She’s having an episode. I need to talk to her.’ ” Ranjbar
said Jane “was having an episode because she was autistic and he was
frustrated with her not listening to him.”
Deputies arrived and found Jane wrapped in a towel. She was crying
and “very frightened.” She told them Ranjbar had put his fingers and mouth
on her genitals, and she requested a rape kit. It was approximately 5:55 p.m.
8
C. Law Enforcement Evidence
Blood and urine samples were collected from Jane on July 16, 2020, at
11:50 p.m. and 11:54 p.m., respectively. Both samples tested positive for
gabapentin and hydroxyzine.2 Gabapentin is a prescription antiepileptic
drug that can also be prescribed for nerve pain. Hydroxyzine is a
prescription antihistamine drug that can also be prescribed for anxiety or
nausea. Neither drug is listed on California’s schedules of controlled
substance.3
Sheriff’s deputies searched Ranjbar’s house and found a bottle of pills
that each contained 300 milligrams of gabapentin. The pills were yellow.
They also found CBD oil, a camera, and Jane’s phone. They did not find any
green pills or any substance that could be identified as hydroxyzine, but they
found several empty pill bottles with no labels on them.
D. Expert Testimony About the Effects of Gabapentin and Hydroxyzine
Dr. Rabia Atayee testified at the second trial about the pharmacological
properties of gabapentin and hydroxyzine. She is a professor of clinical
pharmacy at University of California, San Diego (UCSD). She is also a
clinical pharmacist in palliative medicine with more than two decades of
2 The prosecution’s forensic toxicologist explained that Jane’s blood
sample was tested twice. The “comprehensive panel” test did not detect
gabapentin because the “limit of detection for gabapentin for the
comprehensive panel is 1 milligram per liter.” But the other, more sensitive
test detected gabapentin at a concentration of less than 0.5 milligram per
liter.
3 The samples did not test positive for GHB, which is a drug that is
commonly used and seen in sexual assault cases.
9
experience. She received her undergraduate degree in pharmaceutical
chemistry from UCSD and her pharmacy doctorate from University of
California, San Francisco. In her clinical practice, she regularly prescribes
both gabapentin and opioids such as codeine, hydrocodone, hydromorphone,
morphine, oxycodone, fentanyl, and methadone.
Atayee was asked to opine as to whether gabapentin causes central
nervous system (CNS) depression that is substantially similar to any of the
medications on California’s Schedule II list of controlled substances as
codified in Health and Safety Code section 11055 (Schedule II). The question
was relevant to determining whether gabapentin or a combination of
gabapentin and hydroxyzine meet the definition of a “controlled substance
analog” within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11401.
Section 11401 provides:
“[T]he term ‘controlled substance analog’ means either of
the following:
“(1) A substance the chemical structure of which is
substantially similar to the chemical structure of a
controlled substance classified in Section 11054 or 11055 or
a synthetic cannabinoid compound defined in
Section 11357.5.
“(2) A substance that has, is represented as having, or is
intended to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic
effect on the central nervous system that is substantially
similar to, or greater than, the stimulant, depressant, or
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a
controlled substance classified in Section 11054 or 11055 or
a synthetic cannabinoid compound defined in
Section11357.5.”
Atayee explained that gabapentin releases a chemical called GABA in
the brain. GABA slows down the brain and can cause dizziness, sleepiness,
10
blurred vision, confusion, and memory loss, and can make a patient “feel[ ]
foggy or like a zombie.” It can also cause respiratory depression. In Atayee’s
opinion, gabapentin’s depressive effect on the CNS is substantially similar to
the effect of the opioids listed on Schedule II, particularly oxycodone,
hydrocodone, and fentanyl, because opioids also increase the level of GABA,
although they also decrease other chemicals that help the brain function.
Atayee testified that patients she has treated with codeine, hydrocodone,
hydromorphone, morphine, oxycodone, fentanyl, and methadone have told
her that gabapentin has made them “just as foggy or foggier than the
opioids.” She further explained that CNS depression is also a side effect of
hydroxyzine, and that combining the two drugs together can increase the
depressive effect from “somebody feeling a little dizzy or sleepy to really
sleepy or their breathing is impacted.”
In addition to her opinion that gabapentin and gabapentin in
combination with hydroxyzine have substantially similar effects to opioids on
the CNS, Atayee evaluated a hypothetical about the likely effects of taking
gabapentin in a manner consistent with Jane’s testimony. Atayee opined
that an individual weighing between 120 and 130 pounds who took 600
milligrams of gabapentin before going to sleep at 11:00 p.m. would feel “very
foggy” the next morning at 9:00 a.m., and there would be “lingering” CNS
“depressant effects” throughout the next day. She also testified that the
amount of gabapentin in Jane’s blood was consistent with taking 600
milligrams 24 hours earlier.
III.
The Defense Case
Ranjbar called one witness, Dr. Charles O’Connell, who testified that
he disagreed with Atayee’s opinion that opioids and gabapentin and/or
11
gabapentin in combination with hydroxyzine have a substantially similar
effect on the CNS. O’Connell is board certified in toxicology and works as an
emergency room physician at both Scripps Health and UCSD. He also
spends two days a month on “toxicology call,” providing consulting services to
four hospitals for overdose patients.
O’Connell agreed that gabapentin and hydroxyzine cause CNS
depression. He also testified that gabapentin, when taken in “higher doses”
and “repeated doses,” can cause clumsiness, unsteadiness, dizziness,
drowsiness, sleeplessness, and “trouble thinking.” But he characterized the
drugs as “both very mildly sedating drugs” as compared to opioids. He
explained that opioids cause frequent overdoses where people are “completely
comatose and not breathing well at all and we have to give reversal agents.”
By contrast, gabapentin and hydroxyzine do not act on the “same receptors,”
and in his experience, do not cause “respiratory depression” and “have very
different clinical effects.” He explained, “we all know these [drugs] can be
mild[ly] sedating. They could make you a little tired. But to compare them
to oxycodone and fentanyl and things that are . . . profound CNS inhibitors
and can actually put . . . patients in a comatose state with relatively low
doses, that is something that’s inappropriate.”
In addition to disagreeing with Atayee’s opinion about the similarity
between gabapentin, gabapentin and hydroxyzine, and opioids, O’Connell
opined that there was not enough gabapentin or hydroxyzine in Jane’s blood
samples to perform a retrograde extrapolation and determine amount of
medication that was in her blood at time of the alleged sexual assaults on
July 16, 2020.
12
DISCUSSION
I.
No Error Admitting Expert Testimony About Controlled Substance Analogs
Ranjbar moved in limine to exclude Atayee’s expert testimony. He
contends the trial court should have granted the motion because Atayee was
not a toxicologist and therefore not qualified to give an opinion about the
concentration of gabapentin and hydroxyzine in Jane’s system at the time of
the sexual assaults. In his view, this is a required element of proof to show
substantial similarity within the meaning of Health and Safety Code
section 11401, subdivision (b)(2). He contends the court’s error requires
reversal of the jury’s true findings that he administered a controlled
substance analog in the commission of four of the assaults within the
meaning of sections 667.61 and 12022.75.
Specifically, Ranjbar argues the trial court’s ruling “was a fundamental
error because it failed to distinguish between the two distinct expert roles
required to prove the enhancement. The prosecution’s burden required
proving not just that gabapentin can cause CNS depression in general, but
that the specific amount in the victim’s system would have caused effects
‘substantially similar’ to Schedule II opioids. This required two distinct types
of expertise: (1) a forensic toxicologist to reliably determine what
concentration was present at the time of the offense through retrograde
extrapolation . . . and (2) a clinical pharmacologist to opine on the effects of
that specific concentration.” (Italics added.)
Our review of evidentiary rulings is for abuse of discretion. (Sargon
Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747,
773.) “The trial court has considerable latitude in determining whether a
13
witness qualifies as an expert, and its ruling will not be disturbed absent a
showing of a manifest abuse of discretion.” (People v. James (1989)
208 Cal.App.3d 1155, 1164 (James).)
Ranjbar’s argument lacks merit because it is logically flawed and
premised on a misunderstanding of the law. As we explain, the prosecution
was not required to establish the concentration of gabapentin and/or
hydroxyzine in Jane’s system at the time she was sexually assaulted in order
to prove the drugs were controlled substance analogs.
Starting with the flaw in Ranjbar’s reasoning, he explains the details of
his argument in the opening brief as follows:
“[T]he prosecution had to prove not just that gabapentin
was present, but that it was present at a concentration
sufficient to produce effects ‘substantially similar” to
Schedule II opioids. This is impossible without first
determining the actual dose. The jury instructions
properly required proof that gabapentin had effects
‘substantially similar to’ specific opioids including
hydrocodone, oxycodone, and fentanyl. . . . But without
knowing whether Jane had 0.1 mg/L or 10 mg/L of
gabapentin [in her blood], any comparison to opioid effects
was pure speculation.”
The obvious problem with this analysis is that the effects of any drug,
including Schedule II drugs like hydrocodone, oxycodone, and fentanyl,
depend on the concentration. Just like gabapentin and hydroxyzine, the
effects of opioid drugs on a person will necessarily vary depending on the
concentration of the drug in the person’s system. Thus, Ranjbar’s reasoning
begs the question as to what level of concentration of hydrocodone, oxycodone,
or fentanyl constitutes the appropriate comparison point for effects of
whatever concentration of gabapentin (and/or hydroxyzine) was in Jane’s
system at the time of the assault. Should the effects be compared to the
14
effects of a trace amount of hydrocodone, oxycodone, or fentanyl? A moderate
amount? An amount just shy of overdose? Ranjbar provides no answer to
this question, and there is no analytically sound answer. The definition
Ranjbar proposes for determining substantial similarity, one that requires
retrograde extrapolation of a drug’s concentration at the time of the offense,
is thus a nonsensical and unworkable one.
Ranjbar’s proposed definition is also unsupported by legal authority.
Health and Safety Code section 11401, subdivision (b)(2) cannot be read to
make the definition of a controlled substance analog dependent upon the
concentration of a substance in the victim’s system at the time of the criminal
offense. There are no words to that effect in the statute. As noted, it
provides, “A substance that has, is represented as having, or is intended to
have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous
system that is substantially similar to, or greater than, the stimulant,
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a
controlled substance classified in Section 11054 or 11055 or a synthetic
cannabinoid compound defined in Section 11357.5.” (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11401, subd. (b)(2).) Any such interpretation, moreover, would make no
sense in the context of the illegal possession and sales statutes to which
Health and Safety Code section 11401 explicitly applies. (See Health & Saf.
Code, § 11401, subd. (a) [“A controlled substance analog shall, for the
purposes of Chapter 6 (commencing with Section 11350) be treated the same
as the controlled substance classified in Section 11054 or 11055 or the
synthetic cannabinoid compound defined in Section 11357.5 of which it is an
analog.”], italics added.)
Nor do sections 667.61 and 12022.75 provide a basis for Ranjbar’s
proposed definition and test. These code sections provide for an alternate
15
sentence of 15 years to life when a defendant is found to have “administered”
a controlled substance to the victim. (§§ 667.61, 12022.75.) There is no
requirement that the controlled substance—or controlled substance analog as
is the case here—be present in the victim’s system at a concentration of
“therapeutic range” during the sexual assault. To read the statutes
otherwise is to read in an element that does not exist.
Ranjbar’s other contentions about Atayee’s expert testimony about the
substantial similarity between the three drugs also lack merit. He concedes
that she was qualified to testify about the effects of gabapentin, hydroxyzine,
and opioid drugs, and we conclude her testimony that the drugs cause similar
effects on the CNS was nonspeculative. As she explained, she based her
opinion on her knowledge that gabapentin and opioids both cause increased
levels of GABA in the brain, both can cause respiratory depression, and both
can cause dizziness, sleepiness, blurred vision, confusion, and memory loss,
and can make a patient “feel[ ] foggy or like a zombie.” O’Connell’s opinion to
the contrary goes to the weight of the evidence and was a question for the
jury to decide. (James, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 1164 [“The degree of the
witness’s knowledge goes to the weight of the evidence, not to its
admissibility.”].)
For all of these reasons, the trial court correctly allowed Atayee to
provide her professional opinion that gabapentin and gabapentin together
with hydroxyzine have a depressant effect on the CNS that is substantially
16
similar to controlled substances listed on Schedule II without determining
the level of concentration of those substances in Jane’s system.4
II.
No Error Denying Ranjbar’s Motion for a New Trial
After the jury found Ranjbar guilty, he filed a motion for a new trial
under section 1181, subdivision (6) seeking reversal of the one strike
allegations. He asserted, “Due to the gravity of the charge and Dr. Atayee’s
clear inexperience and reliance on outside experts in making her novel
opinions, the [trial] Court should have serious doubts about her testimony
regarding gabapentin and hydroxyzine being ‘substantially similar’ analogs
to hydrocodone, oxycodone, and fentanyl.” He contends the trial court erred
when it denied his motion for a new trial because it failed to independently
evaluate the evidence.
“A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion for a new trial,
and there is a strong presumption that it properly exercised that discretion.”
(People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 524 (Davis).) A trial court abuses its
discretion when it applies an incorrect legal standard for a motion for a new
trial under section 1181, subdivision (6). (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th
139, 156.)
Ranjbar contends the trial court’s statements on the record when ruling
on his motion demonstrate that it did not apply the correct standard to assess
4 Because there was no requirement that Atayee perform a retrograde
extrapolation to opine on substantial similarity, the alleged problems
Ranjbar identifies with Atayee’s testimony about dosage and the likely
concentration of gabapentin at the time of the sexual assaults, while
potentially relevant to other issues like consent and credibility, are not
relevant to the determination of a controlled substance analog. We therefore
do not reach them.
17
the evidence. When ruling on a motion brought under section 1181,
subdivision (6), a trial court “must give the defendant the benefit of its
independent conclusion as to the sufficiency of the credible evidence.” (People
v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 759–760.) The court is “guided by a
presumption in favor of the correctness of the verdict and proceedings
supporting it.” (Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 524.) But the court
“independently examines all the evidence to determine whether it is
sufficient to prove each required element beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Porter
v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 125, 133.) “In doing so, the judge acts as
a 13th juror who is a ‘holdout’ for acquittal.” (Ibid.)
The trial court’s statements on the record plainly show it applied the
correct standard. The court began by reciting the standard itself:
“Section 1181, subsection 6 . . . requires this Court, as the trial judge, to
independently review the evidence and act as the 13th juror.” The court then
compared the testimony by the two experts, Atayee and O’Connell, and said
that it found both experts credible. The court then stated that its evaluation
was “guided by the presumption in favor of the correctness of the jury’s
verdict,” and concluded, “I do find that there was sufficient evidence, and I do
find that the elements of the allegation have been met.” (Italics and boldface
added.) We see nothing about these statements that “reveal” the court “used
the presumption of the verdict’s correctness as a substitute for analysis, not
as a starting point for it,” as contended by Ranjbar. They reveal the court
correctly conducted an independent review.
Nor is it plausible, as asserted by Ranjbar in his reply brief, that the
trial court conflated the standards for assessing motions for a new trial under
section 1181, subdivision (6) and the standard for assessing a motion for
acquittal under section 1118.1. To the contrary, the court specifically denied
18
a motion for acquittal brought by Ranjbar at the close of the prosecution’s
case and recited the correct standard on the record at the beginning of its
ruling: “Looking at the standard for the 1118[.1] motion,” it is “whether
there’s evidence in the record, including reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom, [such that] there is substantial evidence of [the] existence of every
element of the offense charged.” (See People v. Watts (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th
102, 112, fn. 10 [confirming this is the correct standard].) There is thus no
basis for inferring the court did not know the difference between the two
standards or mistakenly applied the wrong one.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DO, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
RUBIN, J.
19