Filed 9/17/26 P. v. Ramsey CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B342899
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA086954)
v.
TYRONE ROSHAWN
RAMSEY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the County
of Los Angeles, Jacqueline H. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Michael C. Keller, and Lauren N.
Guber, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Tyrone Ramsey appeals from the trial court’s
judgment on resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75,1
arguing the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion
under People v. Romero (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero
motion) to dismiss his prior strike convictions. We affirm.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
“One of the owners of the Kokho Aquarium in El Monte
found defendant sitting at the owner’s desk on December 17,
2008. When questioned as to his purpose of being at the desk,
defendant claimed to be looking for a job. He put money
belonging to the aquarium into his pocket, pushed the owner
aside, ran from the store, and entered a truck. A customer from
the store attempted to pull defendant from the truck, but
defendant placed the car in reverse, causing the customer to
throw himself out of the way of the vehicle. The owner, who was
standing behind the truck, was hit and knocked to the ground.
Defendant had rented the truck one day before the robbery. The
robbery was captured on video cameras at the store. The
prosecution also presented evidence of two prior robberies
committed by defendant at businesses under circumstances
similar to the Kokho Aquarium robbery. Defendant called a
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The facts are taken from the unpublished opinion in the
direct appeal from the judgment, People v. Ramsey (July 19,
2011, B225454) [nonpub. opn.].)
2
psychologist to explain to the jury how memory operates and the
factors that go into the reliability of eyewitness identification.”
(People v. Ramsey, supra, B225454.)
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Conviction and Sentencing
In an information, the Los Angeles County District
Attorney charged defendant in count 1 with second degree
robbery in violation of section 211; and, in counts 2 and 3, with
assault with a deadly weapon in violation of section 245,
subdivision (a)(1). The District Attorney alleged as to all counts
that defendant suffered four prior strike convictions within the
meaning of sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d) and
667, subdivision (b) through (i). The District Attorney also
alleged that defendant had been convicted of six prior felonies for
which prison terms had been imposed within the meaning of
section 667.5, former subdivision (b) and had suffered four prior
serious felony convictions within the meaning of section 667,
subdivision (a)(1).
The jury found defendant guilty on counts 1 and 3, found
him not guilty on count 2, but found him guilty of the lesser
included offense of assault in violation of section 240. The jury
also found true all of the prior conviction allegations.
The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of
71 years to life, comprised of the following sentences: on count 1,
a 25-years-to-life sentence based on the prior strike convictions,
plus a consecutive 20-year term under section 667, subdivision
(a)(1) for the four prior serious felony conviction enhancements
and a consecutive one-year term under section 667.5, former
3
subdivision (b) for one of the prior prison term enhancements; on
count 2, a six-month term with credit for time served; and, on
count 3, a consecutive 25-years-to-life sentence based on the prior
strike convictions.
On direct appeal, a prior panel of this Division affirmed the
convictions. (People v. Ramsey, supra, B225454.)
B. Section 1172.75 Petition
On March 29, 2023, the trial court noted that defendant’s
name appeared in a Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (Department) list of persons eligible for
resentencing pursuant to Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.).3 (Stats. 2021, Ch. 728, § 3.) The court appointed counsel
and set the matter for hearing.
On August 15, 2023, the District Attorney filed an
opposition, arguing that, other than dismissing the section 667.5,
subdivision (b) prior prison term enhancement, the trial court
should not resentence defendant. Among other documents, the
District Attorney attached copies of defendant’s “RAP Sheet,”
probation report, and the Department’s rules violations report
which indicated that, between January 2004 and December 2018,
defendant had 10 prison rules violations.
3 “Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill [No.] 136 amended
section 667.5 by limiting imposition of the prior prison term
enhancement to prior terms for sexually violent offenses. Then,
in Senate Bill [No.] 483, effective January 1, 2022, the
Legislature made the change retroactive, enacting section
1172.75 … .” (People v. Terwilligar (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 585,
595.)
4
On April 2, 2024, defendant lodged a copy of a February 12,
2024, pathology report indicating that he had been diagnosed
with prostate cancer and documents showing his participation in
a “National Crime Victims’ Rights Week” program and Alcoholics
Anonymous. On April 18, 2024, defendant submitted a copy of a
PET scan report on his prostate cancer.
On August 20, 2024, defendant’s appointed counsel filed a
petition requesting the trial court to recall his sentence, dismiss
the section 667.5, subdivision (b) priors, and conduct a full
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75. Defendant argued
that, in addition to dismissing the prior prison term allegations
under section 667.5, subdivision (b), the court should exercise its
discretion under Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497 to dismiss his
prior strike convictions and also dismiss his four prior serious
felony conviction enhancements under section 667, subdivision
(a)(1).
On October 15, 2024, defendant filed a sentencing
memorandum that attached additional submissions and other
documents, including multiple correctional officer
recommendations and certificates showing his completion of
several other programs while incarcerated.
On October 30, 2024, the trial court held a resentencing
hearing, indicating at the outset that it had reviewed the parties’
submissions.
Defense counsel argued that, on the assault with a deadly
weapon count, defendant did not intend to use the truck as a
deadly weapon. Counsel then urged the court to consider
defendant’s behavior while incarcerated, characterizing it as
“outstanding.” Counsel emphasized that defendant had availed
himself of counseling while incarcerated, pointed to the correction
5
officer recommendations, and asserted that defendant was “not
the same man that stood before the court in 2010 at sentencing.”
Counsel also noted that defendant’s most recent strike had been
sustained nine years prior to his original sentencing and that he
was 17 and 21 years old at the time he sustained his two other
strike convictions. Finally, counsel reminded the court of
defendant’s prostate cancer diagnosis.
Following his counsel’s remarks, defendant addressed the
trial court. He claimed he was “not the same person [he] was
when [he] was here before.” Based on the programs he completed
during his incarceration, defendant believed he had gained
insight and now realized “that crime [did not] pay ... . [He was]
not a violent person. [He] never set out to hurt [anyone], none of
that.”
The prosecutor opposed defendant’s Romero motion,
maintaining that “this case squarely falls within the spirit of [the
Three Strikes law].”
Following further arguments from counsel, the trial court
proceeded to resentencing. It began by recalling defendant’s
June 21, 2010, sentence and striking the prior prison term
enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b). The court also
acknowledged that defendant was “entitled to a full re-sentencing
… .” But the court rejected defendant’s request to dismiss his
prior strike convictions under Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497,
based on his history of criminal convictions, prison terms, and
parole violations between 1983 and 2001, reasoning as follows: “I
do believe that at this time [defendant] does fall within the spirit
of the ... Three Strikes law. [¶] ... [¶] So in spite of the fact that
years had passed between those strikes, [defendant] was not
certainly a law abiding citizen during that, but was, in fact, in
6
prison or released and then sent back to prison. [¶] I believe
that this case does fall within the Three Strikes [law].”
The trial court acknowledged that defendant had “some
mitigation on his side at this point,” including his current age, his
age at the time he committed some of the strikes, his recent
behavior and progress in prison, specifying that he “brought his
points down from 60 to 19,” had “done a lot of programs in
prison,” had “a parole plan,” and had “been in [Alcoholics
Anonymous] since 2021.” And the court noted defendant’s
expressions of remorse during his remarks to the court. But the
court also observed that defendant’s most recent filings, including
the October 15, 2024, filing, showed he “still seems to be blaming
everybody and everything else necessarily besides himself as to
why he shouldn’t be held accountable for his actions, and that
does cause the court some concern here.”
The trial court then indicated that, “in weighing what [was]
in the interest of justice,” it intended to dismiss the four prior
serious felony conviction enhancements under section 667,
subdivision (a)(1) and to run “concurrently the two 25-years-to-
life prison sentences.” According to the court, based on those
reductions, defendant’s sentence would “go from 71-years-to-life
to 25-years-to-life, which seems a lot more in line with the
sentence that would be today.”
Accordingly, the trial court resentenced defendant as
follows: on count 1, the court imposed a 25-years-to-life term
pursuant to his prior strike convictions; on count 2, the court
imposed a concurrent six-month term; and, on count 3, it imposed
a concurrent 25-years-to-life term pursuant to his prior strike
convictions.
7
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial
court’s judgment after resentencing.
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his Romero motion. According to defendant, his
“criminal record is a static factor. But [his] dynamic factors,
including his demonstrable rehabilitation, evidenced by his
educational, self-help, work, and disciplinary records (all while
serving a sentence of 71-years-to life), and his community support
now place [him] firmly outside the spirit of the habitual offender
law.”
A. Legal Principles
1. Section 1172.75
“Subdivision (a) of section 1172.75 declares ‘[a]ny sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020’ for a
prior prison or jail sentence under section 667.5, former
subdivision (b), other than for a sexually violent offense, to be
‘legally invalid.’ If a court determines that an individual is
serving a term based on a judgment that ‘includes an
enhancement described in subdivision (a), the court shall recall
the sentence and resentence the defendant.’ (§ 1172.75, subd. (c);
see id., subd. (b).) In other words, a prior-prison-term
enhancement ‘imposed’ before 2020 is now invalid, and any
prisoner whose judgment includes such an enhancement is
entitled to resentencing under section 1172.75.” (People v.
Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1058.)
8
In People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, the court
concluded that, once a trial court recalls a sentence and proceeds
to resentence a defendant under section 1172.75, it has the
authority to exercise its discretion under section 1385,
subdivision (a) and Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 467 to strike any or
all of the defendant’s strike priors. “But section 1385[,
subdivision] (c), by its terms, applies only when a trial court is
considering whether to dismiss ‘an enhancement,’ and a sentence
under the Three Strikes law is not an enhancement.” (People v.
Dain (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 235, 247.)
In People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, our Supreme
Court “instructed: ‘[I]n ruling whether to strike or vacate a prior
serious and/or violent felony conviction allegation or finding
under the Three Strikes law, on its own motion, “in furtherance
of justice” pursuant to … section 1385(a), or in reviewing such a
ruling, the court in question must consider whether, in light of
the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior
serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of
his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be
deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence
should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted
of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.’ (Williams, [supra,
17 Cal.4th] at p. 161.) [The Court] contrasted factors ‘intrinsic’ to
the Three Strikes law with ‘extrinsic’ factors, such as ‘“‘judicial
convenience’”’ or ‘bare antipathy to the consequences for any
given defendant,’ that cannot be considered in deciding whether
to strike a prior strike. ([Id.] at pp. 161, 159.)” (People v. Dain
(2025) 18 Cal.5th 246, 256–257.)
“[A] court’s failure to dismiss or strike a prior conviction
allegation is subject to review under the deferential abuse of
9
discretion standard.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,
374.) “[A] trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing to
strike a prior felony conviction allegation in limited
circumstances. For example, an abuse of discretion occurs where
the trial court was not ‘aware of its discretion’ to dismiss
[citation], or where the court considered impermissible factors in
declining to dismiss [citation].” (Id. at p. 378.) “But ‘[i]t is not
enough to show that reasonable people might disagree about
whether to strike one or more’ prior conviction allegations.
[Citation.] Where the record is silent [citation], or ‘[w]here the
record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant
facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the
spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial court’s ruling, even if
we might have ruled differently in the first instance’ [citation.]”
(Ibid.) A trial court’s failure to strike can only constitute an
abuse of discretion in an extraordinary case “where no reasonable
people could disagree that the criminal falls outside the spirit of
the three strikes scheme … .” (Ibid.)
B. Analysis
Defendant argues that the trial court “abused its discretion
by failing to adequately consider what furthers justice as
individually and holistically applied to [defendant] now, rather
than [defendant] circa 2008, at the time of the offense, or 2010, at
the time of the original sentencing.”
Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the record of the
resentencing hearing reflects that, in ruling on the Romero
motion, the trial court weighed not only the nature and
circumstances of defendant’s current felony convictions and prior
10
strike convictions but the particulars of his background,
character, and prospects. (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161.)
At the outset of its analysis of the motion, the court confirmed
that it had considered the authorities cited by the parties in their
submissions “in weighing what is in the interest of justice … .”
The court then reviewed defendant’s criminal record, from his
first robbery conviction in 1983 through his current offenses in
2008. But the court also acknowledged mitigating factors,
including the age of the most recent strike, his current age, and
his age when he committed his first strike as a juvenile. The
court also noted defendant’s recent behavior and progress in
prison and weighed defendant’s recent statements in his
submissions, concluding that he was still blaming “everybody and
everything else” instead of taking responsibility for his own
actions. On this record, we find no abuse of discretion.
In arguing that the trial court abused its discretion on the
motion, defendant emphasizes his recent conduct in prison, his
current age, and his health issues, arguing that the trial court
largely ignored those factors while focusing almost exclusively on
defendant’s criminal history. According to defendant, the court
“denied [defendant’s] Romero request because [he] was previously
incorrigible. And while the court acknowledged certain
mitigating factors, the court did not sufficiently concern itself
with [defendant’s] current character and was not overly
concerned with his rehabilitative prospects.”
Defendant’s argument, at bottom, urges us to reweigh the
relevant factors on the Romero motion under section 1385,
subdivision (a). But our review is only for an abuse of the trial
court’s discretion, and here there was none. We therefore affirm
the ruling on the Romero motion.
11
V. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM (D.), J.
We concur:
BAKER, Acting P. J.
MOOR, J.
12