Filed 8/11/26 P. v. Ramirez CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H052944
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C2113862)
v.
JONATHAN ARTHUR RAMIREZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Jonathan Arthur Ramirez was convicted after a jury trial of inflicting corporal
injury on his now-former fiancée and felony false imprisonment, and he was sentenced to
three years in prison. On appeal Ramirez contends that his false imprisonment conviction
should be reduced to a misdemeanor because there was insufficient evidence of violence
or menace to support a felony conviction. He also contends that the sentence for his false
imprisonment conviction should have been stayed under Penal Code section 654 and that
the trial court improperly instructed the jury on using charged conduct as evidence of
propensity to commit domestic violence under Evidence Code section 1109. Finally,
Ramirez contends that the trial court failed to credit him with actual custody credit for the
time spent in jail on the day of his arrest.
As explained below, we reject Ramirez’s challenges to his convictions and
sentence for false imprisonment. However, the People concede that Ramirez is entitled to
an additional day of actual custody credit, and we accept that concession. Accordingly,
we affirm the judgment, but order the sentencing minute order and abstract of judgment
amended to include an additional day of actual custody credit.
I. BACKGROUND
In accordance with the relevant standard of review, we recount the facts
underlying Ramirez’s conviction in the light most favorable to the judgment. (See, e.g.,
People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 715.)
A. Ramirez’s Relationship with S.R.
Ramirez met S.R. in 2014, and the two became engaged in 2017. (To protect the
victim’s privacy, we refer to her by her initials only. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.90(b)(4).)) Around the same time as the engagement, S.R., Ramirez, and his
mother began working together as a real estate team. In 2021, S.R. bought the business
where the three had been working. Working together did not strengthen S.R.’s
relationship with Ramirez because in S.R.’s estimation Ramirez was not really interested
in real estate. Indeed, in July 2021, S.R. sent Ramirez an email raising the possibility of
separation.
B. September 5, 2021
On September 5, 2021, Ramirez and S.R. attended a birthday party for a friend.
During the party, which lasted about seven hours, both Ramirez and S.R. had a number of
drinks, and when they decided to leave late in the evening, S.R. wanted to call a car to
take them home. However, Ramirez insisted that he was able to drive, and after some
bickering over the issue, Ramirez drove with S.R. back to the home where they lived
part-time with his parents.
In the car, S.R. admittedly continued “nagging” Ramirez about the decision to
drive home, and she complained about his unsafe driving. After a minute or so, Ramirez
attacked S.R. He punched S.R. in the left side of her head. Then, he grabbed her hair and
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shook her head back and forth, and later he repeatedly slapped S.R. in the face. Ramirez
also told S.R. that she was ugly and fat, and that she should shoot herself in the head like
her mother had.
Later, Ramirez pulled the car over so that he could punch S.R. even harder than
when he was driving. After he resumed driving, Ramirez continued punching, shaking,
and slapping S.R. Then Ramirez stopped a second time to hit S.R. harder.
This time, S.R. tried to leave the car. However, as S.R. was opening the door,
Ramirez accelerated the car forward so that the door slammed shut. He also began
swerving and moving extremely fast, which terrified S.R., who Ramirez knew had severe
car anxiety.
Around this time, S.R. told Ramirez that she wanted him out of the office. In
response, Ramirez grabbed his cellphone, held it to S.R.’s face, and tried to make her say
that he and his mother owned the business along with S.R. When S.R. failed to do so,
Ramirez became even more agitated, and he stopped the car for a third time. This time,
Ramirez got out of the car, went around to S.R.’s door, opened it, and punched her on the
right side of head. When S.R. tried to cover her face, Ramirez punched her in the ribs
and kicked her. Ramirez then returned to driving, again filming S.R., and when she still
would not say what he wanted, he once again punched her head and shook her by the
hair.
When the two arrived at the home of Ramirez’s parents, S.R. ran inside and called
for help. When S.R. went into the bedroom of Ramirez’s parents, Ramirez followed her,
threw her down on the bed, and then dragged her by the hair out through the adjoining
hallway. Later, Ramirez’s mother tried to intervene, but he shrugged his mother off and
knocked her down. Eventually, Ramirez’s cousin, who was in the house, stepped in
between Ramirez and S.R. Although Ramirez is over six feet tall and weighed
220 pounds, his cousin is even bigger, and Ramirez left the house.
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A few hours later, S.R. went to the emergency room. She had bruises and cuts on
her face, eye, and scalp, and she reported symptoms consistent with a concussion as well
as trouble breathing. S.R. was discharged the same day but returned three times for
further treatment. S.R.’s ribs were in pain for four months, and she had migraines for
eight months.
C. The Charges
The emergency room staff called the police, who interviewed S.R. Several
months later, on November 15, 2021, Ramirez was arrested and booked before being
released on bail later that day. In May 2023, the district attorney filed an information
charging Ramirez with two counts: (1) inflicting corporal injury on a person with whom
he had a dating relationship (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)) and (2) felony false
imprisonment (id., §§ 236, 237, subd. (a)). The information also alleged that both
charges involved personal infliction of great bodily injury during domestic violence. (Id.,
§§ 1203, subd. (e)(3), 12022.7, subd. (e).)
D. The Trial
The trial began on November 21, 2024 and lasted three days. The prosecution’s
primary witness was S.R., who described how “out of nowhere” Ramirez attacked her on
the way back from the party in September 2021. She described how Ramirez punched
her in the head, shook her head side to side by her hair, and repeatedly slapped her in the
face. She also described how he stopped the car three times to punch her even harder,
including the third time in which he got out of the car, punched her in the ribs as well as
the head, and then kicked her. Finally, S.R. described how Ramirez continued to assault
her when they arrived at his parent’s home until his cousin intervened.
S.R. also described how she tried to leave the car the second time that Ramirez
pulled over and how he prevented her from doing so by accelerating the car so fast that it
slammed the door shut. In addition, S.R. described how Ramirez tried to force her to say
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that she did not own the real estate business alone and how he became even more enraged
when she failed to do so.
In addition to S.R.’s testimony, the prosecution presented testimony from
Ramirez’s cousin who, among other things, testified that he saw injuries on S.R.’s face,
but no injuries to Ramirez. The prosecution also presented testimony from a police
detective who interviewed S.R. in the emergency room and from the emergency room
doctor who treated S.R.
Ramirez testified as the sole witness in his defense. He testified that S.R. had
wanted to drive home from the party on September 5, 2021, but when he was not fully in
the car, she had accelerated rapidly, and he “fell into the car.” According to S.R., a fight
ensued in which she bit his hand and began hitting him, including in the mouth. Ramirez
admitted that he “reacted” and “slapped her in the back of the head,” but he denied
punching her in the face or on the arm, and he said he had no idea how she had received a
black eye or the bruises on her arm
Ramirez also testified that S.R. told him that “she wanted me out of my office”
and that he tried to record her repeating this demand “to verify that she was wanting me
out of my own office.” On cross-examination, Ramirez admitted that in July 2021 S.R.
sent him an e-mail raising the possibility of ending their romantic relationship, but said
that he did not read the email until after the September 2021 incident.
On November 26, 2024, after deliberating for over three hours, the jury found
Ramirez guilty on both the corporal injury and felony false imprisonment counts as well
as finding the great bodily injury allegation true.
E. Sentencing
The trial court sentenced Ramirez on January 6, 2025. It struck the punishment
for the great bodily injury enhancement and imposed the middle term of three years on
the corporal injury count. On the felony false imprisonment count the trial court imposed
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a two-year term but ran it concurrently with the sentence on the corporal injury count.
Finally, the court awarded Ramirez 42 days of actual custody credits and six days of good
conduct credits.
Ramirez filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. False Imprisonment
Ramirez argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish felony false
imprisonment and his conviction for false imprisonment should be reduced to a
misdemeanor. As explained below, we disagree.
1. Elements
“False imprisonment is the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another.”
(Pen. Code, § 236.) False imprisonment has two general elements: (1) the intentional,
unlawful restraint, detention, or confinement of an individual, and (2) making an
individual stay or go somewhere against that person’s will. (CALCRIM No. 1242 (2026
ed.); see also People v. Agnew (1940) 16 Cal.2d 655, 659-660 [“ ‘Any exercise of force,
or express or implied threat of force, by which in fact the other person is deprived of his
liberty or is compelled to remain where he does not wish to remain, or to go where he
does not wish to go, is an imprisonment.’ ”].) The first element—restraint, detention, or
confinement—requires use of force or threat of force, but not confinement in an enclosed
space. (People v. Dominguez (2020) 180 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1357 (Dominguez).)
By default, false imprisonment is a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 237, subd. (a).)
However, if false imprisonment is “effected by violence, menace, fraud, or deceit,” it
becomes a felony. (Ibid.) Violence and menace for purposes of false imprisonment are
defined broadly. “In this context, ‘violence’ means using physical force greater than the
force reasonably necessary to restrain someone.” (People v. Whitmore (2022) 80
Cal.App.5th 116, 130 (Whitmore).) Menace for purposes of false imprisonment is “a
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threat of harm expressed or implied by words or act.” (Dominguez, supra, 180
Cal.App.4th at p. 1359.) Typically, menace involves use of weapons or verbal threats.
(See People v. Matian (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 480, 485-486.) However, menace also may
involve implied threats from unauthorized physical contact and even circumstances in
which an individual is restrained, especially if those circumstances induce fear in the
victim. (Dominguez, at p. 1359; see also Whitmore, at p. 130 [“A jury properly may
consider a victim’s fear in determining whether the defendant expressly or impliedly
threatened harm.”].)
2. The Substantial Evidence Standard
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, reviewing
courts apply the substantial evidence standard. (See, e.g., People v. Bertsch and Hronis
(2026) 19 Cal.5th 183, 316.-317) Under this standard, courts “examine the whole record
in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) In examining the record, courts
“presume[] in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could
reasonably deduce from the evidence” (ibid) and “ ‘must accept logical inferences that
the jury might have drawn from the evidence even if the court would have concluded
otherwise.’ ” (People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 241.)
The substantial evidence standard is “ ‘deferential.’ ” (People v. Semaan (2007)
42 Cal.4th 79, 88.) Under the standard, “ ‘ “the power of an appellate court begins and
ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial
evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination . . . .” ’ ”
(Ibid.) Consequently, in applying the substantial evidence standard, a reviewing court
does not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence established guilt beyond a
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reasonable doubt. “ ‘Instead the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Johnson
(1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.)
3. Analysis
Ramirez does not dispute that there was substantial evidence that he restrained
S.R. against her will or that he was properly convicted of false imprisonment. Instead, he
contends that he should not have been convicted of felony false imprisonment because
there was insufficient evidence of either menace or violence. The Attorney General
responds that there was sufficient evidence of both menace and violence because Ramirez
used more force than necessary to keep S.R. in the car, because he used S.R.’s “car
anxiety” to frighten her, and because he implicitly threatened to harm S.R. We need only
address the theory that Ramirez menaced S.R. through implicit threat of harm.
The evidence presented at trial showed that when S.R. tried to leave the car,
Ramirez responded angrily. S.R. testified that, when Ramirez stopped his car for the
second time and hit her harder, she “tried to open the door to get out.” However, Ramirez
prevented S.R. from leaving by “floor[ing] it” and accelerating the car forward so quickly
that the door slammed shut. In addition, he began “driving extremely scary,” “swerving
and driving at an accelerated rate,” so that S.R. thought that Ramirez was going to kill
them both.
S.R. had good reason to fear that Ramirez would react even more angrily and
become violent if she tried to leave the car again. Before stopping the car, Ramirez had
brutalized S.R., punching her in the head, grabbing her hair and shaking her head back
and forth, and repeatedly slapping her in the face as well as stopping the car so that he
could punch her even harder. As this violence was apparently prompted by mere
complaints from S.R. about his driving, S.R. had good reason to fear that subsequent
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attempts to leave the car would prompt a similar, if not even more violent, reaction.
Indeed, when she refused to provide the statements about their business that he
demanded, Ramirez stopped the car a third time, got out, and assaulted her even further.
Consequently, a jury reasonably could infer from the circumstances that Ramirez
implicitly threatened further violence against S.R. if she again tried to leave the car.
In arguing that there was insufficient evidence of menace, Ramirez points to this
court’s recent decision in People v. Wagstaff (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1207 (Wagstaff). In
Wagstaff, as here, the defendant was charged with felony false imprisonment because
during an argument in his car he repeatedly struck his girlfriend, and he threatened to hit
her further if she opened the car door to get out. (Id. at pp. 1214-1215.) On appeal, this
court upheld the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on misdemeanor false
imprisonment because there was not substantial evidence of false imprisonment without
violence or menace. (Id. at pp. 1234-1235.) Ramirez argues that this case is
distinguishable because, unlike the defendant in Wagstaff, he did not expressly threaten to
harm S.R. While it is true that the evidence of menace in this case is weaker than in
Wagstaff—and, accordingly, an instruction on misdemeanor false imprisonment was
given in this case—it does not follow that there was insufficient evidence of menace here.
To the contrary, it is well-settled that menace may be found based on implied as
well as express threats. (See Dominguez, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1359; Whitmore,
supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 130.) For example, in Whitmore, the defendant was charged
with felony false imprisonment of his ex-girlfriend P.S. Whitmore and P.S. were in a
hotel room with their two-year-old son. (Whitmore, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 121.)
When P.S. tried to leave, Whitmore stood between her and the hotel room door, snatched
her cellphone, and pushed her away from the door. (Ibid.) Although Whitmore did not
hit P.S. or expressly threaten P.S., the Court of Appeal found substantial evidence of
menace because she was intimidated by Whitmore, who was much larger than her and
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who had a history of verbally abusing her, physically assaulting her, and absconding with
their child. (Id. at p. 130.) Although there was no child involved in this case, like
Whitmore, Ramirez had prevented S.R. from leaving; moreover, Ramirez did so not just
by blocking S.R. and grabbing her cellphone, but by aggressively and dangerously
accelerating their car. In addition, like Whitmore with P.S., Ramirez was much larger
than S.R.; indeed, S.R. testified that he was more than a foot taller than her. Finally,
although Ramirez had not abused and assaulted S.R. in the past, only moments before he
had punched her in the head, pulled her by the hair, and slapped her in the face.
Consequently, the evidence of an implied threat of violence—and, thus, of menace—was
as strong, if not stronger, than the evidence found sufficient in Whitmore.
We therefore conclude that there was sufficient evidence of menace to support
Ramirez’s conviction for felony false imprisonment.
B. Penal Code Section 654
The jury convicted Ramirez of both corporal injury and false imprisonment, and
the trial court followed the probation report’s recommendation to make the false
imprisonment sentence concurrent with the corporal injury sentence because the two
were part of the same course of conduct. Ramirez contends that under Penal Code
section 654 the sentence for the felony imprisonment count should have been stayed
rather than imposed concurrently because the corporal injury and false imprisonment also
had the same objective and therefore are indivisible. The Attorney General disagrees. He
argues that the false imprisonment had a separate objective: “keeping [S.R.] in the car to
record her on his cell phone about their shared business.” Because there is substantial
evidence of this separate objective, we agree with the Attorney General.
Penal Code section 654 provides that, where an act or omission is “punishable in
different ways by different provisions of law . . . in no case shall the act or omission be
punished under more than one provision.” (Pen. Code, § 654, subd. (a).) This provision
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applies “not only where there was but one act in the ordinary sense, but also where there
was a course of conduct which violated more than one statute but nevertheless constituted
an indivisible transaction.” (People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 551.) “The
divisibility of a course of conduct depends upon the intent and objective of the actor, and
if all the offenses are incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any
one of them but not for more than one.” (People v. Bauer (1969) 1 Cal.3d 368, 376.)
Whether the defendant had one objective for a course of conduct is generally a factual
question (People v. Dowdell (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1414), and “ ‘[w]hen a trial
court sentences a defendant to separate terms without making an express finding the
defendant entertained separate objectives, the trial court is deemed to have made an
implied finding each offense had a separate objective.’ ” (In re L.J. (2021) 72
Cal.App.5th 37, 43; see also Dowdell, at p. 1414 [reviewing implied findings concerning
a defendant’s objective under the substantial evidence standard].)
The domestic violence in this case seems to have had no greater objective than
releasing pent-up frustration and rage. When Ramirez and S.R. were leaving the party,
they got into an argument about whether to drive home rather than calling an Uber. The
bickering continued after they got into the car, and S.R. started complaining about
Ramirez’s driving. Then, according to S.R., out of nowhere Ramirez began to assault
S.R., punching her in the head, pulling her head by the hair, and slapping her in the face.
Ramirez also became hateful and cruel, not only calling S.R. fat and ugly, but also telling
her that she should shoot herself as her mother had done. As Ramirez’s relationship with
S.R. was floundering at the time—only a few months before, S.R. had sent Ramirez an
email suggesting that they separate—there was substantial evidence that Ramirez
assaulted S.R. out of simple rage.
However, after Ramirez began hitting S.R., another issue arose. S.R. worked with
Ramirez and his mother in a realty business, which S.R. claimed to have bought earlier
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that year. At some point during Ramirez’s assault on her, S.R. told Ramirez that “she
wanted [him] out of my office.” Ramirez then began filming S.R. with his phone and,
according to S.R., demanding that she admit that the real estate business was owned by
Ramirez and his mother as well as S.R. Although Ramirez claimed to be seeking a
different statement, he admitted that he began filming S.R. because of what she said
during the car ride.
In light of this testimony, the trial court could have found that Ramirez wanted to
keep S.R. in the car not just to continue venting his rage upon her, but also for a separate
reason: to obtain a concession from her about their business. Ramirez does not attempt to
explain why the evidence in the record is insufficient to support a finding of such an
objective. Instead, he asserts that “his attempt to record her admission, like the false
imprisonment, was part and parcel of the domestic violence for which he was separately
punished.” However, Ramirez fails to offer any explanation for this assertion, and it is
well-settled that conclusory assertions unsupported by argument are insufficient. (See,
e.g., In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 845 [“ ‘ “Contentions supported neither by
argument nor by citation of authority are deemed to be without foundation and to have
been abandoned.” ’ ”]; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153. 206 [“Points
‘perfunctorily asserted without argument in support’ are not properly raised.”].)
We therefore conclude that the trial court’s implicit finding that Ramirez had a
separate objective for falsely imprisoning S.R. is supported by substantial evidence.
C. The Propensity Instruction
The trial court instructed the jury that, if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Ramirez committed one of the crimes charged, it could conclude from the evidence of
that crime that Ramirez was disposed to commit domestic violence and likely to commit
the other crime charged. Ramirez argues that this instruction was erroneous. While
Ramirez acknowledges that he did not object to the instruction at trial, he contends,
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among other things, that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to
object to it. In light of this contention, we exercise our discretion to reach Ramirez’s
challenge to the jury instruction despite the potential forfeiture. (See, e.g., People v.
Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6.) Reviewing the instruction de novo (see, e.g.,
People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 569), we conclude that this trial court did not err
in giving it.
Evidence of a criminal disposition or propensity is generally not admissible to
show conduct on a specific occasion. (See, e.g., People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114,
1147.) Under section 1101 of the Evidence Code, “evidence of a person’s character or a
trait of his or her character . . . is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct
on a specified occasion.” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) (Subsequent undesignated
statutory references are to the Evidence Code.) However, the Legislature has created
exceptions to this general rule for cases involving sex offenses, domestic violence, elder
abuse, and child abuse. (People v. Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1159 (Villatoro)
[discussing Evidence Code sections 1108 and 1109].) With respect to domestic violence,
the Evidence Code provides that where a defendant is accused of an offense involving
such violence, “evidence of the defendant’s commission of other domestic violence is not
made inadmissible by Section 1101 if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to
Section 352.” (Evid. Code, § 1109, subd. (a)(1).) Accordingly, using CALCRIM
No. 852B, the trial court instructed the jury that, “[i]f the People have proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant committed one or more of these crimes, you may, but are
not required to, conclude from that evidence that the defendant was disposed or inclined
to commit domestic violence offenses.”
This instruction applies to charged as well as uncharged conduct. In Villatoro,
supra, 54 Cal.4th 1152, the Supreme Court considered whether section 1108, which
permits propensity evidence in cases involving sex offenses, applies to charged conduct.
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(See Villatoro, at p. 1156.) Section 1108 states that “evidence of the defendant's
commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by
Section 1101.” (Evid. Code, § 1108, subd. (a).) Villatoro ruled that section 1108 applies
to uncharged conduct because, among other things, the section’s reference to “another”
sexual offense “contains no limitation, temporal or otherwise, to suggest that section 1108
covers only offenses other than those for which defendant is currently on trial.”
(Villatoro, at p. 1161.) Section 1109 contains much the same language: It states that
“evidence of the defendant’s commission of other domestic violence is not made
inadmissible by Section 1101 if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to
Section 352.” (Evid. Code, § 1109, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) Because section 1109
also addresses the same subject matter as section 1108—the admissibility of propensity
evidence—under well-settled principles of statutory interpretation, it should be
interpreted similarly. (See, e.g., Housing Authority for Van de Kemp (1990) 223
Cal.App.3d 109, 116 [“Words or phrases common to two statutes dealing with the same
subject matter must be construed in pari materia to have the same meaning.”]; see also
Villatoro, at p. 1161 [endorsing principle].) Accordingly, like section 1108, section 1109
has been interpreted to apply to charged offenses. (See, e.g., People v. Brown (2011) 192
Cal.App.4th 1222, 1233.)
Ramirez nonetheless contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury to
apply section 1109 on the grounds that the section is restricted to prior offenses and does
not apply to offenses committed during the same incident. Ramirez derives this
restriction from People v. Earle (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 372 (Earle), which noted that the
word “propensity” refers to a “predisposition or inclination” and that predisposition refers
to “ ‘a prior inclination or pre-existing tendency.’ ” (Id. at p. 398.) However, Earle did
not consider whether section 1109 applies only to prior acts or even whether it requires a
pre-existing tendency. Instead, Earle considered whether commission of indecent
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exposure suggested a propensity or predisposition to commit rape (Earle, at p. 398) and
concluded that it did not because “a propensity to commit one kind of sex act cannot be
supposed, without further evidentiary foundation, to demonstrate a propensity to commit
a different act” (id. at p. 399). Moreover, Earle’s statements concerning the meaning of
the word “predisposition” do not help Ramirez because Earle observed that propensity
refers to inclination or tendency as well as predisposition (id. at p. 398), and far from
suggesting that an inclination or tendency must be pre-existing, the decision noted that
tendency refers “to a constant, or at least recurring, [tendency].” (Ibid.) The prosecution
could have offered evidence of Ramirez’s infliction of corporal injury to show a constant
tendency to inflict domestic violence, and therefore a propensity to use violence or
menace against S.R. Thus, under Earle’s interpretation of propensity, Ramirez’s
infliction of corporal injury on S.R. was relevant under section 1109 and the propensity
instruction was properly given the jury.
Ramirez also argues that the propensity instruction was improper because the
corporal injury and false imprisonment charges against him were not similar. In
particular, Ramirez contends that whereas the corporal injury charge involved physical
beatings, the false imprisonment charge involved only him accelerating to prevent S.R.
from exiting his car. As shown above, Ramirez’s characterization of the false
imprisonment charge is too limited. While Ramirez may have accelerated his car to
prevent S.R. from exiting it, he also was accused of restraining her by means of
“menace,” which includes implicit threats of harm. (See Dominguez, supra, 180
Cal.App.4th at p. 1359; Whitmore, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 130.) As a consequence,
the relevant question is whether the beatings that Ramirez inflicted on S.R showed that he
was inclined to make implicit threats of harm. That is plainly the case.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in giving the propensity
instruction.
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D. Custody Credits
In sentencing Ramirez, the trial court awarded 42 days of actual custody credits
and six days of conduct credits. The 42 days of actual custody credits apparently reflect
the period between Ramirez’s conviction on November 26, 2024, when he was remanded
to jail, and his sentencing on January 6, 2025. Ramirez argues that he is entitled to one
additional day of custody credit for the time that he spent in jail in November 2021 on the
day of his arrest before posting bail. The People concede that he is entitled to this
additional day of custody credit, and we accept that concession. Presentence actual
custody credits include the day of arrest (People v. Rajnayagam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th
42, 48), and any day spent even partially in custody counts for a full day of credit (People
v. Valdes (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 953, 955). Accordingly, Ramirez is entitled to a day of
actual custody credit for the time that he spent in jail on the day of his arrest. As Ramirez
acknowledges, this extra day of actual custody credit does not affect his conduct credits,
which are limited to 15 percent of the actual custody credits. (See Pen. Code, § 2933.1,
subds. (a), (c).) Accordingly, we will order the judgment modified to reflect that Ramirez
is entitled to 43 days of actual custody credits and six days of conduct credits.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended
sentencing minute order and amended abstract of judgment stating that Ramirez is
entitled to total custody credits of 49 days, consisting of 43 days of actual custody credits
and six days of local conduct credit.
The trial court clerk is directed to forward a certified copy of the amended abstract
of judgment to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
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____________________________
BROMBERG, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
GREENWOOD, P. J.
____________________________________
DANNER, J.
People v. Ramirez
H052944