Filed 6/25/26 P. v. Ramirez CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B344420
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA137658)
v.
NARCISO RAMIREZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Teresa P. Magno, Judge. Affirmed.
Narciso Ramirez, in pro. per.; and Ann Krausz, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Narciso Ramirez appeals from an order denying his
petitions for resentencing under Penal Code1 sections 1172.6 and
1172.1. His appellate counsel filed a brief under People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216. We directed counsel to provide
a copy of the record to Ramirez, and Ramirez submitted a
supplemental letter brief. As we now explain, our independent
review shows that counsel has complied with her duties and no
arguable issue exists.
BACKGROUND
In 2016, a jury convicted Ramirez of attempted voluntary
manslaughter with true findings on personal gun use and great
bodily injury allegations. (§§ 664, 192, subd. (a), 12022.5,
12022.7.) That same year, a court sentenced Ramirez to 18 years
6 months in prison. A court of appeal affirmed Ramirez’s
conviction in People v. Ramirez (Nov. 21, 2017, B271540)
[nonpub. opn.].
In May 2024, Ramirez petitioned for resentencing under
sections 1172.6 and 1172.1, as amended by Assembly Bill No.
600. In September 2024, Ramirez filed an “invitation for court to
recall and resentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.1.”
The trial court appointed counsel to represent Ramirez as to the
section 1172.6 petition only.
The People opposed the section 1172.6 petition on the
ground that section 1172.6 does not apply to attempted voluntary
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered
section 1170.95 to section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
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manslaughter, and even if it did, Ramirez’s jury was not
instructed on felony murder, the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or any other theory under which malice
could be imputed to a person based solely on the person’s
participation in a crime. The People submitted as exhibits the
jury instructions given to Ramirez’s jury and the verdict.
On January 28, 2025, the trial court denied Ramirez’s
section 1172.6 petition, finding that he had not made a prima
facie showing he was entitled to relief. The trial court also
denied his section 1172.1 petition, stating it was declining
Ramirez’s invitation to recall and resentence him.
This appeal followed. Ramirez’s appellate counsel filed an
opening brief that raised no issues and asked this court to
independently review the record under People v. Delgadillo,
supra, 14 Cal.5th 216. Ramirez filed a supplemental letter brief
in which he argued that his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel, a trial witness was not credible, and the
jury was manipulated.
DISCUSSION
I. Section 1172.6 petition
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) limited
accomplice liability under the felony-murder rule, eliminated the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to
murder, and eliminated convictions for murder based on a theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime. (See generally People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 959; People v. Gentile (2020) 10
Cal.5th 830, 842–843.) Senate Bill No. 1437 added section 189,
subdivision (e) (limiting application of the felony-murder rule)
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and section 188, subdivision (a)(3) (stating that “ ‘[m]alice shall
not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime’ ”). Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill
No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) expanded resentencing eligibility
to persons convicted of attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or manslaughter. (See generally
People v. Gallegos (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 434, 441.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 also created a procedure, codified at
section 1172.6, for a person convicted of murder, attempted
murder, or manslaughter under the former law to be resentenced
if the person could no longer be convicted of those crimes under
the current law. (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959;
People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.) A defendant
commences that procedure by filing a petition containing a
declaration that, among other things, the defendant could not
presently be convicted of those crimes under the current law.
(People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) At the prima facie
stage, the trial court takes as true the petitioner’s factual
allegations and assesses whether the petitioner would be entitled
to relief if those allegations were proved. (Lewis, at p. 971.) In
determining whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case
for relief, the trial court may look at the record of conviction,
including jury instructions, verdicts and closing argument, to
determine readily ascertainable facts such as the crime of
conviction. (People v. Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798, 815;
see, e.g., People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 56.) At the
prima facie stage, the trial court does not engage in fact finding
that involves weighing evidence or exercising discretion. (Lewis,
at p. 972.) If at the prima facie stage the record of conviction
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establishes that the petition is meritless, the trial court may
dismiss it. (Id. at p. 971.)
Here, the trial court properly dismissed Ramirez’s petition
at the prima facie stage because his jury was not instructed on
felony murder, the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
or any theory under which the jury could have imputed malice to
him. Accordingly, he did not make a prima facie showing of
eligibility for relief.2
II. Section 1172.1
Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1), provides that a trial
court may recall a defendant’s sentence and resentence the
defendant either (1) “on its own motion, within 120 days of the
date of commitment or at any time if the applicable sentencing
laws at the time of original sentencing are subsequently changed
by new statutory authority or case law,” or (2) “at any time upon
the recommendation of” specified law enforcement officials. The
statute further provides that defendants are “not entitled to file a
petition seeking relief from the court under this section. If a
defendant requests consideration for relief under this section, the
court is not required to respond.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (c).) Thus, a
defendant who files “an unauthorized request for resentencing
has no right to a ruling.” (People v. Hodge (2024) 107
Cal.App.5th 985, 996; accord, People v. Roy (2025) 110
2 Below, the People argued that section 1172.6 does not apply
to persons convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter.
People v. Luu (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1051, review granted July
16, 2025, S291235, held that section 1172.6 applies to defendants
convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter. Unlike here,
however, the Luu jury was instructed on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, and the case, even if correct, is
therefore distinguishable on that ground.
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Cal.App.5th 991, 998.) Therefore, the trial court did not err by
declining to exercise its discretion to recall and resentence
Ramirez. (See, e.g., People v. Brinson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th
1040, 1045–1046; People v. Faustinos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 687,
693; Hodge, at pp. 991, 996.)
III. Ramirez’s supplemental brief
Finally, to the extent Ramirez raises ineffective assistance
of his trial counsel and other errors at his trial, a section 1172.6
petition is not a vehicle to relitigate alleged trial errors. (See,
e.g., People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 549 [§ 1172.6 “is
not a means by which a defendant can relitigate issues already
decided”]; People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947 [“mere
filing” of § 1172.6 petition doesn’t afford petitioner new
opportunity to raise trial error claims or attack sufficiency of
evidence to support jury’s findings]; People v. DeHuff (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 428, 438 [§ 1172.6 is not a direct appeal].)
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ASHWORTH, J.*
We concur:
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
ADAMS, J.
* Retired Judge of the El Dorado Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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