Filed 8/24/26 P. v. Ramirez CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B348258
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. GA075509)
v.
DARIO DANIEL RAMIREZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael Villalobos, Judge. Affirmed.
Patricia A. Scott, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and Michael C.
Keller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
In 2011, a jury found Dario Daniel Ramirez guilty of second
degree murder, mayhem, and attempted voluntary manslaughter
(as a lesser included offense of attempted murder). The
convictions related to Ramirez’s involvement in gang-related
violence in which he was not the actual shooter. At Ramirez’s
trial, the court instructed the jury on aiding and abetting and the
natural and probable consequences theories of liability. The
court sentenced Ramirez to 15 years to life for the murder, plus
25 years to life for a firearm enhancement; a consecutive term of
four years for mayhem, plus 25 years to life for a firearm
enhancement; and a term of three years (which the court stayed
pursuant to Penal Code2 section 654) for the attempted voluntary
manslaughter. (People v. Ramirez (Mar. 26, 2013, B232114)
[nonpub. opn.].)
In 2019, Ramirez filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6.3 In 2022, the superior court determined Ramirez
had made a prima facie showing for relief as to the murder
conviction and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. The
court also determined Ramirez had not made a prima facie
showing as to either mayhem or attempted voluntary
1 See California Standards of Judicial Administration
section 8.1.
2 Unspecified statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
3 As initially enacted the law was codified in section
1170.95. Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was
renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.) For ease of reference, we use the current citation
throughout.
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manslaughter, concluding that section 1172.6 did not apply to
those convictions. After the evidentiary hearing, the court denied
the petition for resentencing, finding the prosecution had proven
beyond a reasonable doubt that Ramirez acted with malice
aforethought as a direct aider and abettor of the murder.
Ramirez appealed the denial of resentencing relief as to his
attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction, and we affirmed.
(People v. Ramirez (Sept. 25, 2024, B328259) [nonpub. opn.].) We
rejected Ramirez’s claim that his trial conviction for attempted
voluntary manslaughter qualified for relief under section 1172.6
because the statute’s plain language does not enumerate it as
eligible for relief. (Ibid.; see § 1172.6, subd. (a)(2) [requiring
petitioners who went to trial to have been “convicted of murder,
attempted murder, or manslaughter”].)
On April 24, 2025, the Fourth District Court of Appeal,
Division Three decided People v. Luu (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th
1051, review granted July 16, 2025, S291235. Recognizing the
plain language of section 1172.6 does not reference attempted
manslaughter, Luu held that a person charged with attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine
who is then convicted at trial of the lesser included offense of
attempted voluntary manslaughter is eligible for relief under
section 1172.6 because “[a] contrary rule would frustrate the
intent of the Legislature” and “manifestly lead to unjust and
‘ “absurd results.” ’ ” (Luu, at pp. 1055-1056.)
Approximately one month later, on May 23, 2025, Ramirez
filed another section 1172.6 petition in the superior court. The
court denied the petition, stating, “The petition presents a claim
that was raised and rejected in a previous petition . . . . The trial
court’s denial of the petition was upheld on appeal on
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September 25, 2024, and the remittitur was issued on
December 3, 2024.”
Ramirez now appeals the denial of his second section
1172.6 petition, again focusing only on his attempted voluntary
manslaughter conviction. He asserts the law of the case doctrine
does not bar his successive petition because Luu constitutes an
intervening change in law, and adhering to our prior decision
denying him relief will result in an unjust decision.
We are not persuaded. Ramirez had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate whether section 1172.6 applied to his
attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction, and we decided
that it did not. The law of the case doctrine applies in criminal
cases, and promotes finality and judicial economy by preventing a
party from relitigating questions previously decided by a
reviewing court. (People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 196.) The
rule is not an ironclad one. We do not adhere to the law of the
case doctrine “ ‘where its application will result in an unjust
decision, e.g., where there has been a “manifest misapplication of
existing principles resulting in substantial injustice” [citation], or
the controlling rules of law have been altered or clarified by a
decision intervening between the first and second appellate
determinations’ [citation]. The unjust decision exception does not
apply when there is a mere disagreement with the prior appellate
determination.’ ” (Id. at p. 197, quoting People v. Stanley (1995)
10 Cal.4th 764, 787.)
These exceptions do not apply here. We did not manifestly
misapply the principles of law that existed at the time of our
prior decision regarding Ramirez’s section 1172.6 petition. Nor
have the controlling rules of law been altered since the time of
our prior decision. Luu is pending before our Supreme Court;
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despite Ramirez’s suggestions to the contrary, the high court has
not yet weighed in on the merits of Luu’s reasoning. Until it
does, a single decision from a sister court—which is not binding
on us—does not constitute a change in the controlling rules of law
sufficient to avoid the bar on relitigation of issues already
decided. (People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 787; Prime
Healthcare Management, Inc. v. Superior Court (2025) 117
Cal.App.5th 127, 146.)
The law of the case doctrine thus bars Ramirez’s attempt to
relitigate an issue already decided against him in People v.
Ramirez, supra, B328259. We express no opinion on what
remedies might be available to Ramirez should the Supreme
Court eventually agree with Luu’s reasoning.
DISPOSITION
The order denying resentencing relief is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
BENDIX, J.
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