Filed 9/9/26 P. v. Ramey CA1/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A172817
v.
RAMYA RAE RAMEY, (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 05001924778)
Defendant and Appellant.
After Ramya Rae Ramey was convicted of vehicular manslaughter and
reckless driving causing injuries, the trial court ordered her to pay
$303,362.04 in restitution. She appeals. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In December 2021, a jury found Ramey guilty of two counts of vehicular
manslaughter and two counts of reckless driving causing injuries. (Pen.
Code, § 192, subd. (c)(1); Veh. Code, §§ 23103, subd. (a), 23105; undesignated
statutory references are to the Penal Code.) The trial court sentenced her to
six years, 8 months in prison.
K.H. — who was an adult at the time of the collision — suffered severe
injuries and is disabled. The prosecutor sought restitution. As relevant here,
it requested $30,000 payable to the California Victim Compensation Board to
reimburse it for a vehicle it provided to K.H. to accommodate her disability.
The prosecutor also sought direct victim restitution to K.H. — specifically,
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$1,571.64 for lost wages while she was in the hospital, $134,400 for lost
wages after her release, and $8,539.46 to complete the vehicle modification.
And it sought restitution for M.H. — $4,930 for lost wages while K.H. was in
the hospital, and $100,000 for lost wages while she cared for K.H. after her
release. Finally, it sought to recover the family’s relocation expenses —
$127.03 for a rental truck, and $6,831 for a security deposit — incurred to
move to accessible housing.
The trial court ultimately ordered Ramey to pay $30,000.00 to the
California Victim Compensation Board for the vehicle under section 1202.4,
subdivision (f)(4)(A) (references to subdivisions without section designations
refer to this section); $135,971.64 to K.H. for lost wages pursuant to
subdivision (f)(3)(D); $8,539.46 to K.H. to modify the vehicle under
subdivision (f)(3)(K); a total of $104,930.00 to M.H. for lost wages under
subdivisions (k)(3)(A) and (f)(3)(D); and $6,958.03 to M.H. for relocation
expenses under subdivision (f)(3)(K).
DISCUSSION
Ramey challenges the restitution order. We “review the trial court’s
restitution order for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Giordano (2007)
42 Cal.4th 644, 663.) The standard “ ‘asks in substance whether the ruling in
question “falls outside the bounds of reason” under the applicable law and the
relevant facts.’ ” (Ibid.) “No abuse of discretion will be found where there is
a rational and factual basis for the amount of restitution ordered.” (People v.
Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1542.) “[W]hen the propriety of a
restitution order turns on the interpretation of a statute, a question of law is
raised, which is subject to de novo review on appeal.” (People v. Williams
(2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 142, 146.) “ ‘ “ ‘ “[A] ruling or decision, itself correct in
law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong reason.
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If right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be
sustained regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial
court to its conclusion.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 50.)
First, Ramey argues the trial court erred by ordering restitution to
M.H. for relocation expenses because subdivision (f)(3)(I) and (f)(3)(K) only
authorize restitution for “ ‘relocating away from the defendant’ ” or
retrofitting a residence. We disagree.
The trial court did not err by ordering restitution for the family’s
relocation expenses. (People v. Gemelli, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1542.)
Although Ramey is correct about the limitations found in subdivision (f)(3)(I)
and (f)(3)(K), subdivision (f) provides that, “in every case in which a victim
has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct, the court
shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in
an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by
the victim or victims or any other showing to the court.” (Subd. (f).) As the
case law she cites makes clear, “[w]hile subdivision (f)(3)(A) through (L) of
section 1202.4 list specific types of expenses that a court must include in a
restitution award if they were incurred as a result of the defendant’s criminal
conduct, the list is nonexclusive, as demonstrated by the introductory phrase
‘including, but not limited to’ in subdivision (f)(3).” (People v. Baudoin (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 1184, 1193.) Thus, economic losses that are not mentioned in
subdivision (f)(3)(A) though (L) may still be compensable under its general
provisions. (Baudoin, at p. 1194.) Here, K.H. and her mother did not move
to get away from Ramey, nor did they retrofit a residence, so the relocation
expenses are not governed by subdivision (f)(3)(I) or (f)(3)(K). Instead, they
moved to accommodate K.H.’s disability, and any restitution is authorized by
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the general language of subdivision (f). (Baudoin, at p. 1194; People v.
Mearns (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493, 503.)
Second, Ramey contends the trial court erred by ordering restitution to
M.H. for lost wages under subdivisions (f)(3)(D) and (k)(3)(A) because K.H.
was an adult at the time of the collision. Specifically, she contends that “[i]n
the context of lost wages . . . subdivision (f)(3)(D) of section 1202.4 permits
parents to receive restitution only ‘if the victim is a minor’ and the lost wages
are incurred ‘while caring for the injured minor.’ ” We disagree for the same
reason we rejected her challenge to the restitution for relocation — economic
losses that are not governed by subdivision (f)(3)(A) though (L) may still be
compensable under its general provisions. (People v. Baudoin, supra,
85 Cal.App.5th at p. 1194.) Although subdivision (f)(3)(D) authorizes
restitution to a parent for wages lost while caring for a minor child, it does
not preclude a restitution order for lost wages while caring for an adult child.
(Subd. (f)(3)(D).) Thus, such “economic loss” is still compensable under
subdivision (f). (Baudoin, at p. 1194.) Since M.H. is a victim under
subdivision (k)(3)(A), she is eligible for restitution for that loss. (Baudoin,
at pp. 1193–1194.)1
Finally, Ramey argues the trial court improperly ordered restitution to
the California Victim Compensation Board for the vehicle it provided to K.H.
because — in her view — K.H. was only entitled to the fair market value of a
vehicle she lost in the collision, not a car that can accommodate her
disability. Not so. Her disability is a direct result of Ramey’s conduct. Thus,
the court did not err by concluding K.H.’s need for the vehicle was an
1 Likewise, we reject Ramey’s contention that M.H. was not a victim
who was properly awarded restitution for the family’s move. (Subd. (k)(3)(A);
People v. Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 657; People v. Baudoin, supra,
85 Cal.App.5th at p. 1194.)
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economic loss resulting from Ramey’s conduct. (Subd. (f); People v. Gemelli,
supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1542.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
FUJISAKI, Acting P. J.
_________________________
PETROU, J.
A172817; People v. Ramey
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