Filed 10/5/26 P. v. Quinonez CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H052496
(Santa Cruz County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 21CR05850)
v.
RAYMOND CHARLES QUIÑONEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury convicted defendant Raymond Charles Quiñonez1 of felony robbery
and unlawful possession of ammunition based on his armed robbery of a Rite Aid
drugstore. Surveillance video captured nearly every step of the incident, showing
Quiñonez: (1) driving to and parking near the Rite Aid; (2) changing into all-black
clothing, donning a mask and hat; (3) walking to and entering the Rite Aid; (4)
pointing a gun at the cashier, and grabbing money from the register; (5) exiting the
Rite Aid and walking back to his car; (6) changing back to his original clothing,
and (7) driving away. After denying his Romero2 motion and declining to dismiss
a sentencing enhancement allegation, the trial court sentenced Quiñonez under the
1
The appellate record, including the abstract of judgment, frequently refers
to appellant as “Quiñones.” At his request, by order dated March 19, 2025, this
court adopted Quiñonez as the proper spelling.
2
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero).
Three Strikes Law to an indeterminate term of 35 years to life in prison. On
appeal, Quiñonez argues that the trial court erred by granting his Faretta3 motion
and committed sentencing error by declining to dismiss his strike priors and by not
dismissing the sentence enhancement for personal use of a firearm.
As we explain below, we conclude that none of Quiñonez’s arguments have
merit. We will affirm the judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Procedural background
On October 20, 2022, the Santa Cruz County District Attorney filed a first
amended information charging Quiñonez with one count of felony second degree
robbery (Pen. Code,4 § 211; count 1) and one count of felony possession of
ammunition by a felon (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 2). The first amended
information further alleged, as to count 1, that Quiñonez personally used a firearm
in committing the offense (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), that Quiñonez had two prior
strike convictions (§ 667, subds. (b) through (i)), and that several aggravating
factors, as set forth in the California Rules of Court,5 were applicable.
On July 23, 2022, the trial court granted Quiñonez’s oral motion to
represent himself pursuant to Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806. At Quiñonez’s
request, defense counsel was reappointed on October 25, 2022.
On May 7, 2024, following a jury trial, Quiñonez was found guilty on both
counts and the jury further found true the special allegation that Quiñonez
personally used a firearm in committing second degree robbery (count 1). In a
bifurcated proceeding on the aggravating factors, the jury found true the
3
Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).
4
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
5
Unspecified rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
2
allegations that: (1) the crime involved great violence, threat of great bodily harm,
or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness (rule
4.421(a)(1)); (2) the defendant was armed with or used a weapon at the time of the
commission of the crime (rule 4.421(a)(2)); (3) the victim was particularly
vulnerable (rule 421(a)(3)); (4) the manner in which the crime was carried out
indicated planning, sophistication or professionalism (rule 4.421(a)(8)); and (5)
Quiñonez has engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society
(rule 4.421(b)(1)). The following day, the jury found true the allegations that
Quiñonez had two prior strike convictions (§ 667, subds. (b) through (i)), that
Quiñonez’s prior convictions as an adult are numerous (rule 4.421(b)(2)), and that
Quiñonez had served a prior term in prison (rule 4.421(b)(3)).
On August 28, 2024, after denying Quiñonez’s Romero motion, the trial
court sentenced Quiñonez to an indeterminate term of 35 years to life, consisting
of the base term of 25 years to life on count 1 (§ 211) plus an additional term of 10
years due to the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). On count 2 (§
30305, subd. (a)(1)), the trial court imposed a concurrent term of two years and
eight months, consisting of the lower term of 16 months doubled due to the strike
priors.
As to fines and fees, the court imposed a $600 restitution fund fine
(§ 1202.4, subd. (b)) and an additional $600 parole revocation fund fine
(§ 1202.45), suspended pending successful completion of parole. In addition, the
court ordered Quiñonez to pay a court operations assessment of $80 (§ 1465.8)
and a conviction assessment of $60 (Gov. Code, § 70373). Finally, the court
ordered Quiñonez to pay restitution of $360 to Rite Aid (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)).
Quiñonez timely appealed.
3
B. Factual background
1. December 21, 2021 armed robbery (count 1)
On December 21, 2021, M.M.6 was working as a cashier at a Rite Aid in
Watsonville. Around 10:00 a.m., a masked man, wearing all black except for his
tennis shoes, sunglasses, and a black baseball hat, walked into the store. The man
pointed a black handgun at her and told her to give him the money in the register.
M.M. pushed a button that opened the register (and automatically alerted police),
whereupon the man grabbed the money,7 put it inside a grocery bag he had
brought with him and fled. At trial, M.M. authenticated a surveillance video
depicting the incident. That video was played for the jury and admitted into
evidence.
A.S. was a customer in line at Rite Aid on December 21, 2021, and saw a
man dressed all in black, with a neck gaiter covering his face, sunglasses, and a
black hat,8 walk in the store. The man, who was carrying a black semiautomatic
gun, went behind the counter and directed the cashier to open the drawer. After
A.S. saw the man run out, she went to assist the cashier.
On December 21, 2021, around 10:00 a.m., Patrick Murray, a retired
inspector with the Santa Cruz County District Attorney, was driving his black
truck past the rear of the shopping center in which the Rite Aid was located. A car
started to pull out of the driveway quickly, and Murray could see that the driver
6
We refer to the civilian witnesses by their initials to protect their personal
privacy interests. (Rule 8.90(b)(10).)
7
J.M., who was the supervisor at the Rite Aid, testified that he did an audit
after the robbery and determined that Quiñonez took $368.
8
A.S. described the man’s clothing as “all blacked out gaiter, black sun
glasses [sic], black hat, black clothing, top to bottom, shoes.” On cross-
examination, defense counsel asked her to describe the man’s shoes and A.S. said
she only “saw them for a flash” and did not remember anything about them.
4
was looking in the other direction. Murray braked and swerved into the opposite
lane of traffic to avoid a collision. The man stopped his car, and Murray got “a
good look at” him as he passed. The man was not wearing a hat, sunglasses, or a
mask, and was driving a matte black Dodge Station Wagon Magnum with “light
colored rims.”9 Murray and the man-made eye contact, then Murray saw the man
driving behind him as he continued down the road. Murray made a right turn on
Green Valley Boulevard and saw the man make a left turn on that road, running a
red light in the process.
Watsonville Police Sergeant Tyler Wildey testified that he was the primary
detective on the December 21, 2021 armed robbery of the Rite Aid store. He
reviewed the surveillance videos obtained from the businesses in the same
shopping center, as well as Ring camera videos from Quiñonez’s home.
The Ring camera video showed Quiñonez leaving his house at 9:56 a.m.,
wearing a dark U.S. Marine sweatshirt, dark sweatpants, and light tan boots.
Video from other businesses in the same shopping center as the Rite Aid showed
Quiñonez’s vehicle entering the parking lot then parking behind a grocery store.
Quiñonez is then seen walking behind the grocery store, but he is now wearing a
different “gray or darker” sweatshirt and black sweatpants. He returns to his car,
grabs a red bag, and starts walking again. Quiñonez is now wearing “[a] black hat
and like a face mask.” Video from businesses between the grocery store and the
Rite Aid track Quiñonez as he walks through the shopping center. Quiñonez is
captured on video walking into the front entrance of Rite Aid with a bag in his
right hand and a handgun in his left hand. After leaving the Rite Aid with the
money from the register, surveillance video from the same businesses showed him
9
Murray was shown a photograph of Quiñonez’s car and identified it as the
car he saw that day.
5
retracing his route back to his car, at “maybe a little quicker pace than … when he
walked in.” When Quiñonez returns to his car, surveillance video shows him
“tak[ing] off his clothing, tak[ing] off his hat, tak[ing] off his sweatshirt.”
Quiñonez then drives off and, as he is exiting the parking lot, Murray’s truck can
be seen driving by.
Based on Wildey’s review of the surveillance videos, the “call-dial records”
tracking Quinonez’s location, information collected from Quinonez’s two cell
phones, and internet searches Quinonez made in the five hours after the robbery,10
Wildey concluded that Quinonez was the person who robbed the Rite Aid.
Watsonville Police officer Trevor Ihlen testified that, on December 22,
2021, he executed a search warrant for Quiñonez’s residence and car. Ihlen
cataloged and photographed the items seized in that search before booking them
into evidence. Quiñonez’s wife was home at the time and told Ihlen that the house
was equipped with Ring cameras. Quiñonez’s wife provided the log-in
information for those cameras and signed a form consenting to Watsonville police
accessing the videos they recorded.
Inside Quiñonez’s vehicle, Ihlen found a dashboard camera11 affixed to the
windshield, 18 $1 bills inside the glovebox, a pair of black fabric gloves, a black
Samsung smart phone in the center console, a black fabric magazine holster and a
matching fabric pistol holster in the trunk, a black “kind of nose and mouth mask,”
and a black t-shirt that had been cut and “maybe used as a makeshift gaiter-type
mask.”
10
Wildey testified that Quinonez made “multiple searches for Watsonville
RiteAid [sic] robbery, [and] Watsonville RiteAid [sic] robbery 2021” and his web
search history showed he was checking the “Watsonville Crime Safety News” and
the city of Watsonville’s Facebook page.
11
Ihlen testified that the dash cam did not have a memory card inside it
when he collected it.
6
In the back yard, Ihlen found 14 rounds of live ammunition inside a
cabinet. In a separate shed, Ihlen discovered two pistol magazines, each of which
were loaded with five rounds of live ammunition.
Quiñonez’s wife testified that Quiñonez is left-handed. The person shown
in the Rite Aid video is holding the gun in his left hand.
Quiñonez offered no evidence or testimony on his own behalf.
II. DISCUSSION
A. No error in granting Faretta motion
Quiñonez argues that, because his Faretta request was conditional on his
having “access to a laptop” to review discovery and conduct legal research and
those conditions were not met, his Faretta waiver was involuntary and coercive.12
The Attorney General counters that the trial court did not err in granting
Quiñonez’s request to represent himself. In the alternative, the Attorney General
argues that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
1. Additional background
a. Faretta motion
Quiñonez was represented by a public defender or an alternate public
defender from his arraignment on December 27, 2021, until July 21, 2022, when
Quiñonez made his oral Faretta motion. The court responded that, before it could
grant his request to represent himself, it had to ask Quiñonez some questions “and
make sure that [he] really underst[ood] what that means and what the
consequences could be.”
12
Quiñonez also asserts that the trial court’s advisement that he would not
be able to argue on appeal that his Faretta motion should not have been granted
was improper. We need not reach this question, because we are considering his
substantive arguments on appeal.
7
Quiñonez told the trial court that he had a high school diploma and “[l]ess
than two years of college courses while incarcerated” but no formal legal training.
Quiñonez confirmed that he had never previously represented himself in legal
proceedings.
Quiñonez told the court that he knew what offenses he was charged with
but had not yet looked up their elements, although he knew the prosecution had to
prove those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Quiñonez confirmed that “an
innocent person doesn’t have to prove their innocence” but also indicated he did
not know what defenses may be available to the charged offenses. He understood
that the prior strike allegations in the case could result in a sentence of 25 years to
life.
Quiñonez said he was aware he could have an appointed lawyer at no cost,
but he had “already been given three lawyers.” In his view, “none of [those
lawyers] done anything other than [say] we need more time, more time, more
time.” Quiñonez believed “there’s certain things [they] should be doing [in his
defense] and [ ] should have done from months ago [and they] haven’t.” When the
court asked if he understood that, “if you represent yourself, you’re going to have
to prepare your defense without the advice of a lawyer. You’re going to have to
do your own research, conduct your own investigation,” Quiñonez said that he did.
Quiñonez confirmed that he would be subject to the same rules as a
licensed attorney, would not be given special treatment by the court, and would be
facing an experienced prosecuting attorney. Quiñonez acknowledged that he
would have to “know the Evidence Code,” “pose proper objections,” participate in
selecting a jury, “ask proper questions of jurors,” and “understand how to exercise
any challenges for cause or peremptory challenges.” The court also asked if
Quiñonez understood that, if he were convicted, he could not claim on appeal that
8
the court should not have allowed him to represent himself “because you’ll have
made a knowing and intelligent decision to do that.” Quiñonez replied, “Yes.”
The court then stated that the prosecution had made an offer of six years,
which was “a whole lot different than 25 years to life.” The court continued that,
although it was not pressuring Quiñonez to take that offer, it wanted to ensure he
understood that it would be difficult for him to negotiate with the district attorney
on his own. Quiñonez again indicated that he understood.
Quiñonez said that he “underst[oo]d the process” as he had “been to jury
trial, [] [knew] in limine motions and what have you.” He said, “As long as I’m
given adequate access to a laptop and what I need because there’s no longer books
at the main jail and the Roundtree [sic] facility,” he would be capable of
adequately representing himself. Quiñonez continued, “I just want to exercise my
constitutional right to represent myself than have somebody appointed who is not
on the same—they don’t have a dog in the fight.”
Quiñonez reiterated that all he wanted was to “try to collect my evidence
and put my case in front of a jury” rather than “sit around in the county jail and
wait for it.” The court again asked if Quiñonez would accept appointed counsel if
counsel were ready to set the case for trial. Quiñonez said he would not because
“[w]e’ve had too many conflicts, there would be animosity, if not on [appointed
counsel’s] part, on my part.” Quiñonez asked, “What are my alternatives?” The
court replied that it could hold a Marsden hearing to see if he could have a
different appointed attorney or he could “take another few days to really think
about it.” Quiñonez refused both of those options and insisted that he wanted to
represent himself.
The court then granted Quiñonez’s Faretta motion, stating: “I don’t think I
have much other choice at this point, given … Quinone[z] clearly is mentally
capable of representing himself, he’s been fully informed about his right to
9
counsel, he appears to fully understand the implications of waiving his right to be
represented by an attorney, he’s voluntarily done that, he’s rationally done that.
So I’m satisfied that—although it’s against the advice of this Court, as well
apparently other people he’s spoken to—he’s fully advised and aware of the
pitfalls, dangers and consequences of acting as his own lawyer and so I’m going to
grant his Faretta motion and also grant him the rights that he needs in terms of
exercising that right to proceed in pro per while he’s incarcerated in jail at this
point.”
b. Quiñonez’s access to discovery and a laptop
At a subsequent trial setting hearing on August 9, 2022, Quiñonez
confirmed that he still wanted to represent himself. However, he informed the
court he was not ready to set a trial date because “there’s a hang-up on [] getting
the discovery, access to a laptop. … [¶] … [Y]ou made the order last time we were
in court for them to provide the discovery, the hard drive, videos, audio, nothing
has been provided.”
When the court asked the prosecutor if discovery had been provided to
Quiñonez, the prosecutor replied, “I thought … Angel [i.e., Quiñonez’s former
appointed counsel] was going to provide that to him.” The trial court asked if
Quiñonez had access to a laptop to review the digital materials and Quiñonez said
he did not. Quiñonez said the court had previously ordered the prosecution to
provide the materials. Quiñonez explained that Angel “had volunteered to give
[Quiñonez]” the materials, but she was “under the impression she’s completely
relieved of the case, [and] the People are supposed to provide that.”
Angel subsequently appeared at the hearing and informed the court that,
due to Quiñonez’s concerns about whether she had all the discovery from the
prosecution, she had “asked the Court and the [prosecutor] to prepare the
discovery … so that he could make sure that he understood that that was the
10
complete package that they had. [¶] With regard to the investigation, … [she] had
asked in open court on [the day of the Faretta hearing] if [Quiñonez] wanted the
investigation reports and he had indicated that, no, he did not. If [Quiñonez has]
changed his mind now and he wants that, [she is] happy to send it to him. [¶]
[She] did receive a call from him this week when he wanted the prelim transcript
and [she] sent that to him.”
The court directed the prosecutor to “provide all discovery directly to []
Quiñonez” and that he be provided “at the jail with access to a laptop for viewing
of any digital discovery.” The court also ordered Quiñonez to “ask the jail for the
pro per packet that includes the form through which he can request that the Court
appoint an investigator.” Quiñonez replied that he was told they do not have the
pro per packets at the jail and he had to obtain it from the court. The court
responded that this was not accurate and “I will make it clear that I am ordering
the jail to provide … Quiñonez with the pro per paperwork packet, including the
request for investigator form and access to a laptop to perform legal research and
organize his defense.” The court continued the matter to “August 25th … for
further trial setting[,] … status of discovery[,] and investigator request.”
At the August 25, 2022 hearing (before a different judge), Quiñonez
confirmed that he had “received the discovery[] … [and] the hard drive, but …
[had] no way to use the hard drive without the laptop, and … they don’t know
what to do, how to get me the laptop.” Quiñonez said that he “might just want to
set a court date today” because he felt he was “getting railroaded.” The prosecutor
said that correctional officers at the Rountree facility had informed her that there
was laptop available for Quiñonez’s use. Quiñonez replied, “[I]t’s never been
provided. There is a laptop available for me, of course there is, but as far as being
provided … I should have the same capability and not be limited by the equipment
you guys give me.”
11
The court asked if he wanted to set a trial date and Quiñonez said he did.
The court scheduled trial for October 11, 2022.
c. Quiñonez’s concerns with standby counsel
At a subsequent hearing on October 5, 2022, when the court asked
Quiñonez if there had been “any progress in terms of working with an investigator
from [] Angel’s office[,]” Quiñonez replied, “I don’t want … Angel nowhere[]
near me with the case. [¶] I represent myself. … [¶] I don’t need her. [¶] I need
an investigator. [¶] I’m ready to proceed any time we’re ready to go for the jury
trial.”
Quiñonez went on to say that his previous interest in an investigator “was at
the suggestion of the prosecution … to help try to open up these files and all that
stuff. On second thought, I’m good, I don’t need an investigator. I don’t need …
Angel as my co-counsel.”
Angel informed the court that, with respect to an investigator, she had
contacted “at least six different investigators and left messages for several others
and didn’t get a call back. [¶] The answers I got from those investigators were
various, too short a timeline, they can’t get ready, not being paid enough … not
available, don’t want to work in a pro per situation because it creates a whole
different level of complication.” Angel said that an investigator who had been
previously retained in Quiñonez’s case “indicated that he could not do it at the $65
an hour county rate … because … working with a pro per is a greater level of
involvement than working with an attorney.”
Quiñonez said that it did not matter what videos the prosecutor had because
“[s]he gave me the videos, that means she’s going to play them at trial so that’s all
I need—and if it happens to be the body cam footage and whatever videos they got
at Pajaro Lane and Safeway. So if I can’t see those, then we’ll all see them
together.” When the trial court indicated that it would leave Angel in place as
12
standby counsel, Quiñonez objected saying he would not talk to her as she had
been “hoisted [sic] upon me by this Court.” Quiñonez agreed that he would “take
a different standby attorney” but did not want Angel. The court then held a
Marsden13 hearing.
At the Marsden hearing, Quiñonez repeatedly stated that he did not need
standby counsel or an investigator. Ultimately, after confirming that Quiñonez
understood the role of standby counsel, the trial court relieved Angel as standby
counsel and granted Quiñonez’s request to proceed without standby counsel. The
court advised Quiñonez that if he were to change his mind, he could ask for
appointment of standby counsel.
On October 19, 2022, at a trial readiness hearing, when asked if he was
ready to proceed to trial the following week, Quiñonez said there was a “hiccup.”
He explained that when he was “transported from Rountree to the main facility …
[t]he hard drives … with all the discovery” had been “lost or misplaced.” The
court asked if Quiñonez wished to continue the trial due to these issues, but
Quiñonez replied, “I’m ready. Let’s go.” Before the hearing concluded, Quiñonez
brought up his motion to dismiss.14 The court responded that it was denying the
motion without argument.
d. Quiñonez agrees to appointment of counsel
On October 24, 2022, the matter was called for trial, but the minute order
notes that Quiñonez refused transport from the jail. The trial court granted the
prosecutor’s motion to continue the proceedings for one day.
13
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
14
On October 4, 2022, Quiñonez filed a hand-written motion to dismiss the
information based on “loss or destruction of evidence [and] malicious
prosecution.” The prosecution filed an opposition to this motion on October 17,
2022.
13
On October 25, 2022, Quiñonez appeared for trial. The trial court
explained its prior decision to deny Quiñonez’s motion to dismiss, stating that “it
was just incomprehensible to me. … [¶] It clearly expressed your complaints
about the investigation, but I didn’t see anything in there that would warrant a
dismissal at this point. The evidence may come in differently and I may
reconsider it.” Quiñonez replied that he was unable to file motions in limine
because he was in transit and he “got thrown for a loop” when the court denied his
motion to dismiss. He said that he was “overwhelm[ed].”
The trial court again offered to appoint counsel to represent Quiñonez and,
after Quiñonez conferred with his wife, he accepted the offer of appointed counsel.
The trial court vacated the trial date, and Quiñonez agreed to waive time.
Defense counsel was reappointed on October 26, 2022 and the trial
ultimately commenced on April 22, 2024. Quiñonez was represented by counsel
at all times after October 26, 2022.15
2. Applicable legal principles
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
criminal defendants the right to represent themselves if the defendant knowingly
and intelligently elects to relinquish his or her right to counsel and “many of the
traditional benefits associated with” that right. (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835;
People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 20 (Marshall).)
“ ‘A trial court must grant a defendant’s request for self-representation if
three conditions are met. First, the defendant must be mentally competent, and
must make his request knowingly and intelligently, having been apprised of the
dangers of self-representation. [Citations.] Second, he must make his request
15
On three subsequent occasions in 2023, specifically on January 19,
March 1, and October 20, Quiñonez succeeded in having defense counsel relieved
by way of Marsden motions.
14
unequivocally. [Citations.] Third, he must make his request within a reasonable
time before trial.’ ” (People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 931–932 (Stanley);
Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835.) A defendant's “ ‘ “technical legal knowledge”
is irrelevant to the court’s assessment of the defendant’s knowing exercise of the
right to defend himself.’ ” (People v. Dent (2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 217; see also
Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 400 (Godinez) [holding that a
“defendant’s ability to represent himself has no bearing upon his competence to
choose self-representation” (italics omitted)].) Rather, “the competence that is
required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to
waive the right, not the competence to represent himself.” (Godinez, at p. 399.)
We review de novo whether the defendant’s invocation of the right to self-
representation and waiver of the right to counsel were knowing, intelligent, and
unequivocal. (People v. Orosco (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 348, 358; People v.
Miranda (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 978, 984 (Miranda); People v. Best (2020) 49
Cal.App.5th 747, 762, fn. 6.) In doing so, we must “review the entire record—
including proceedings after the purported invocation of the right of self-
representation.” (Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 24; Miranda, at p. 984.) We
“must indulge every reasonable inference against waiver of the right to counsel.”
(Marshall, at p. 20; Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 933; People v. Ruffin (2017) 12
Cal.App.5th 536, 545.)
3. Analysis
Our de novo review of the record shows that Quiñonez’s invocation of his
right to represent himself and waive his right to appointed counsel was knowing,
intelligent, and unequivocal. The trial court inquired into his familiarity with the
legal system, as well as his understanding of the charges and potential
consequences if convicted. The trial court cautioned him regarding the hazards of
representing himself and reminded him he would have to do his own research and
15
investigation, as well as proceed with jury selection and trial without the
assistance of an attorney, all of which Quiñonez said he understood. As the trial
court aptly stated, based on Quiñonez’s responses, there could be no question that
he was “mentally capable of representing himself, … [had been] fully informed
about his right to counsel, … [and] appears to fully understand the implications of
waiving his right to be represented by an attorney” which he has done
“voluntarily” and “rationally.” The trial court, mindful that a Faretta motion
made “in passing anger or frustration” is not unequivocal and may be denied
(Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 23), confirmed with Quiñonez that he was
making the request because he understood it “to be the best thing for [him.]”
To the extent Quiñonez now argues that his alleged lack of access to
discovery and a laptop during his period of self-representation violated what he
characterizes as a “conditional” Faretta request, we are not persuaded. Angel
represented to the court that, during the time she represented Quiñonez, she “had
gone into the jail and he had viewed [the videos] on my computer.” Angel had
also given him a transcript from the preliminary hearing and would provide him
with her investigative reports. By August 25, 2022, Quiñonez confirmed that he
had received the digital discovery from the prosecution although he continued to
claim he lacked access to a laptop to review it.16 Regardless of whatever
technological hurdles Quiñonez faced during his three months of self-
representation, by October 25, 2022 he was again represented by counsel who, by
all accounts, was fully capable of reviewing all the discovery, investigating, and
conducting legal research sufficiently in advance of the April 22, 2024 trial.
16
Somewhat confusingly, Quiñonez also stated “[t]here is a laptop
available for me, of course there is, but as far as being provided … I should have
the same capability and not be limited by the equipment you guys give me.”
16
We are also not persuaded that Quinonez was deprived of the right to
counsel in preparing his unsuccessful motion to dismiss such that the judgment
against him must be reversed. We assume without deciding that this particular
pretrial proceeding was a “critical stage” at which Quinonez had the right to
counsel. (See People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 465
[“A criminal defendant has the right under the state and federal Constitutions to be
… represented by counsel at all critical stages of the trial. … [A] critical stage is
one ‘in which the substantial rights of a defendant are at stake’ [citation], and ‘the
presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant’s basic right to a fair
trial’ [citation].”].) However, Quiñonez was not denied representation by counsel
during this proceeding; he elected to proceed as his own counsel, as was his right.
As the trial court found during the Faretta hearing, Quiñonez had been “fully
advised and aware of the pitfalls, dangers and consequences of acting as his own
lawyer” and one of those “dangers” is that he could not advocate on his own
behalf as successfully as a trained, experienced criminal defense attorney.
Furthermore, once counsel was appointed again in October 2022, that counsel
could have certainly filed a renewed motion to dismiss. It is telling that Quiñonez
does not separately argue on appeal that his appointed counsel provided
ineffective assistance in any way, including for failing to renew that motion to
dismiss.
Because we conclude there was no error in the trial court granting
Quiñonez’s request to represent himself and waive his right to appointed counsel,
we need not and do not reach the question whether any such error was prejudicial,
under any standard.
B. No sentencing error
Quiñonez argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
request that it strike the two prior strike conviction allegations. In his view, those
17
prior strike convictions are sentencing enhancements and thus subject to dismissal
pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (c), as amended by Senate Bill 81. He also
argues the trial court erred in declining to dismiss the firearm use enhancement
because it applied the wrong legal standard in finding that dismissing the
enhancement would endanger public safety. We disagree with both arguments.
1. Additional background
At sentencing, the trial court addressed Quiñonez’s Romero motion.
Defense counsel argued that Quiñonez’s first strike conviction was from 1989
when he was 17 years old. As to the second strike prior, defense counsel argued
that it should be stricken because Quiñonez, who is “African American,” received
a disproportionate sentence of 23 years compared to his codefendant, identified by
counsel as “a fair skinned Hispanic,” who was sentenced to three years. In
defense counsel’s view, this discriminatory sentencing violated the Racial Justice
Act (§ 745). Finally, defense counsel argued that Quiñonez was not a violent
person, stating that he “has been jumped three times in jail” but did not fight back.
The prosecutor argued that the Romero motion should be denied because
even though Quiñonez’s first strike was a robbery from 1989, that offense, like the
current robbery, involved the use of a deadly weapon. In addition, after he was
released from custody for the 1989 conviction, Quiñonez had many other
subsequent convictions in the 1990s, leading up to his second-strike conviction in
2001, which “involved the attempted robbery of [a] travel agency after the
planting of bombs around the City of Watsonville as a distraction.” In addressing
the applicable legal principles, the prosecutor indicated that the court had the
authority to deny the Romero motion if it found Quiñonez presented a danger to
public safety. With respect to Quiñonez’s Racial Justice Act claim, the prosecutor
pointed out that Quiñonez’s codefendant entered a plea agreement before trial and
18
cooperated with the prosecution, all of which would provide a nondiscriminatory
reason for the disparity in sentencing.
Following argument, the court indicated that Quiñonez had failed to meet
his initial burden of proof under the Racial Justice Act to show that the sentencing
disparity in the 2001 second strike conviction was racially motivated, given the
evidence that Quiñonez was the person who planned the offense.17
The court also declined to dismiss either of Quiñonez’s prior strikes,
explaining that it understood that it could “look at various factors in deciding
whether or not it is in the interest of justice that somebody be taken out of a two-
or three-strike sentencing scheme.” In addressing Quiñonez’s 1989 strike, the
court noted that, following that strike conviction, “there has been a course of
conduct that has led him to five prior prison convictions and five prior prison
terms, ... [¶] … a course of conduct that has gotten worse, has gotten more severe,
has gotten more sophisticated with time.” Quiñonez’s second strike involved
“planning and sophistication” and the instant offense also involved planning and
committing an armed robbery in broad daylight, threatening a cashier with a gun
with other customers also at risk. The court indicated that the jury found true all
of the alleged aggravating factors and that there were no factors in mitigation. The
court concluded that “this is an extremely aggravated case, and there’s absolutely
no interest of justice that would be served” by dismissing either of Quiñonez’s
prior strikes.
At sentencing, the court acknowledged that it must consider, pursuant to
section 1385, subdivision (c), whether to dismiss the personal use of a firearm
enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) found true in connection with Quiñonez’s
17
Quiñonez does not renew his claim that his 2001 sentence violated the
Racial Justice Act.
19
robbery conviction (§ 211; count 1). The court stated that it would not dismiss
that enhancement because: (1) this was the only enhancement involved in the case
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B)); (2) applying the enhancement would not result in a
sentence in excess of 20 years (id. at subd. (c)(2)(C); (3) the offense was not
connected to mental illness, prior victimization, or childhood trauma (id. at subds.
(c)(2)(D), (E)); (4) the associated offense is a violent felony (id. at subd.
(c)(2)(F)); (5) Quiñonez was not a juvenile when he committed the offense that
triggered the enhancement (id. at subd. (c)(2)(G)); (6) the enhancement is not
based on a prior conviction over five years old (id. at subd. (c)(2)(H)), and (7) it
could not determine whether the firearm used in the offense was inoperable or
unloaded since it was never found (id. at subd. (c)(2)(I)). The court also noted that
it had discretion to dismiss an enhancement in furtherance of justice, but it was
denying the request to dismiss, finding that striking the enhancement would
endanger public safety. Accordingly, the court imposed an indeterminate term of
35 years to life as detailed above.
2. Applicable legal principles
The California Supreme Court has held that, under section 1385,
subdivision (a), a trial court’s authority to dismiss “an action” includes the
authority to dismiss allegations of prior strikes in the furtherance of justice,
considering “ ‘ “both … the constitutional rights of the defendant, and the interests
of society represented by the People … .” ’ ” (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p.
530, italics omitted; see also People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161
(Williams) [identifying factors to be considered in determining whether a
defendant “may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part”].)
We review the grant or denial of a Romero motion for abuse of discretion.
(Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 162.) We will affirm the trial court’s refusal to
dismiss a prior strike allegation unless it can be shown that decision was arbitrary
20
or irrational. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376–377.) “ ‘ “ ‘An
appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment
for the judgment of the trial judge.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 377.)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill 81 amended section 1385 “ ‘to
specify factors that the trial court must consider when deciding whether to strike
enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in the interests of justice.’ ” (People v.
Johnson (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1074, 1091 (Johnson); see also § 1385, subds.
(c)(2), (7).) However, the addition of these mandatory factors did not operate to
displace the trial court’s obligation to exercise its overarching discretion in
assessing whether dismissal is “in furtherance of justice.” (§ 1385, subds. (c)(1)–
(2); Johnson, supra, at p. 1091 [enactment of Senate Bill 81 “reinforced”
conclusion that “Legislature intended to confer on trial courts a range of
sentencing options and broad discretion to choose among them”].)
Specifically, Senate Bill 81 added subdivision (c) to section 1385, which
provides, in subdivision (c)(1), “[n]otwithstanding any other law, the court shall
dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if
dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.” Section
1385, subdivision (c)(2) directs that, “In exercising its discretion under
[subdivision (c)], the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence
offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in [the
subparagraphs to subdivision (c)(2)] are present. Proof of the presence of one or
more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would
endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that
the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious
danger to others.”
21
3. Analysis
a. No error in not dismissing prior strikes under Romero
Quiñonez has not met his burden to prove, on this record, that the trial court
abused its discretion in declining to strike either of his prior strikes. At the hearing
on Quiñonez’s Romero motion, the trial court considered the appropriate factors
and reached a reasonable conclusion that dismissing the allegations concerning the
1989 and 2001 convictions would not be in furtherance of justice. Examining “the
nature and circumstances of the defendant’s present felonies” and his prior
felonies (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161), the court reasoned that this was
“an extremely aggravated case, and there’s absolutely no interest of justice that
would be served” by dismissing either of the prior strikes. From this record,
Quiñonez has not met his burden to demonstrate the trial court abused its
discretion in concluding that he was a recidivist who planned to commit violent
offenses, that he was likely to commit significant crimes in the future, and thus
posed exactly the sort of danger to society which the Three Strikes law was
designed to address.
b. Three Strikes Law sentence not an enhancement
We also reject Quiñonez’s argument that the trial court erred by not
dismissing his prior strikes pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (c). The law is
clear that the Three Strikes Law provides an alternate sentencing scheme, not an
enhancement subject to dismissal under section 1385, subdivision (c). (People v.
McDowell (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1147, 1154 (McDowell).)
In People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237 (Burke), the court explained
that the plain language of section 1385, subdivision (c), expressly applies to
dismissal of an “enhancement.” (Burke at p. 243.) “The term ‘enhancement’ has
a well-established technical meaning in California law. [Citation.] ‘A sentence
enhancement is “an additional term of imprisonment added to the base term.” ’ ”
22
(Ibid.) However, “the Three Strikes law is not an enhancement; it is an alternative
sentencing scheme for the current offense.” (Ibid.; quoting Romero, supra, 13
Cal.4th at p. 527 [the Three Strikes law “articulates an alternative sentencing
scheme for the current offense rather than an enhancement”]; People v. Williams
(2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 733, 744 (Williams).) Burke reasoned the Legislature was
presumptively aware of this distinction and did not otherwise define the term
“enhancement” in section 1385. (Burke, at p. 243; see People v. Escobar (1992) 3
Cal.4th 740, 750 [when the Legislature amends a statute without disturbing a
settled judicial interpretation of its operative language, courts presume the
Legislature has ratified that interpretation].) Because “the statutory language is
clear and unambiguous,” the plain meaning controls. (Burke, at p. 243, quoting
People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1276 [“If the language is clear and
unambiguous, we follow the plain meaning”].) Burke therefore concluded
“section 1385, subdivision (c)’s provisions regarding enhancements do not apply
to the Three Strikes law.” (Burke, at p. 244.)
Following Burke, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th 237, every published opinion that
has since considered whether section 1385, subdivision (c) applies to prior strike
convictions has reached the same conclusion. (People v. Grandberry (2026) 118
Cal.App.5th 14, 18–19; People v. Dain (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 235, 247; People
v. Dowdy (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1, 9–10; People v. Olay (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th
60, 64 (Olay); see also McDowell, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1154 [§ 1385, subd.
(c) inapplicable to alternative penalty provision of § 236.1, subd. (c)(2)].) As
explained further by McDowell, “ ‘[t]he term “enhancement” has a well-
established technical meaning in California law’: it is ‘ “ ‘an additional term of
imprisonment added to the base term.’ ” [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (McDowell,
supra, at p. 1154.) “By its terms, section 1385, subdivision (c) applies only to an
‘enhancement.’ [Citation.]” (McDowell, at p. 1154.)
23
We agree with the analysis and conclusions set forth in these opinions. By
its plain language, section 1385, subdivision (c) only applies to “enhancements,”
and the Three Strikes law is an alternative sentencing scheme, not an
enhancement.18 “If the Legislature had wanted section 1385, subdivision (c) to
apply to prior strikes as well as to enhancements as legally defined, it would have
said so.” (Olay, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 67.)
Consistent with the overwhelming weight of authority, we conclude section
1385, subdivision (c) does not apply to prior strike convictions. Because the trial
court had no basis to dismiss the prior strike convictions on this ground, there was
no sentencing error.
c. Personal use of a firearm enhancement
Again, the record shows that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to dismiss the personal use of a firearm enhancement allegation found
true by the jury. At the Romero hearing, the trial court listed the various
mitigating factors set forth in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) and concluded that
none of them applied. Specifically, the court found: 1) the personal use of a
firearm enhancement was the only enhancement19 involved in the case (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2)(B)); (2) imposing the (10-year) enhancement would not result in a
18
As explained in Williams, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 744, the Three
Strikes law “provides for an alternate sentence (25 years to life) when it is proven
that the defendant has suffered at least two prior serious felony convictions.”
(Italics added.) A sentence imposed under the Three Strikes law “is not an
enhancement because it does not add an additional term of imprisonment to the
base term.” (Ibid.)
19
Quiñonez argues that this was not true since the strike prior allegations
were also enhancements. We have rejected this argument in section B.3.b., ante,
thus the trial court was correct that there was only one enhancement alleged in this
case.
24
sentence in excess of 20 years20 (id. at subd. (c)(2)(C); (3) the underlying robbery
was not connected to Quiñonez’s mental illness, prior victimization, or childhood
trauma (id. at subds. (c)(2)(D), (E)); (4) the armed robbery is a violent felony (id.
at subd. (c)(2)(F)); (5) Quiñonez was not a juvenile (id. at subd. (c)(2)(G)); (6) the
enhancement was not based on a prior conviction over five years old (id. at subd.
(c)(2)(H)), and (7) it was unknowable whether the firearm Quiñonez used in the
offense was inoperable or unloaded (id. at subd. (c)(2)(I)). Quiñonez has neither
established through the record that the trial court was incorrect in concluding that
none of the mitigating factors set forth in section 1385, subdivision (c) applied,
nor that it abused its discretion in finding that striking the sole enhancement would
endanger public safety.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
20
Quiñonez posits that the trial court’s analysis of this factor was flawed
because his prior strikes—which necessitated a sentence of 25 years to life under
the Three Strikes law—were also enhancements subject to dismissal under section
1385, subdivision (c). Again, the Three Strikes law provides an alternate penalty,
not a sentence enhancement. (See section, ante, B.3.b.)
25
___________________________
WILSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________
LIE, Acting P. J.
_____________________________
BROMBERG, J.
People v. Quiñonez
H052496