Filed 8/27/26 P. v. Prince CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B348039
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA009207)
v.
THOMAS RAVON PRINCE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, David W. Stuart, Judge. Affirmed.
William Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Stephen D. Svetich, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Thomas Ravon Prince was convicted of first degree murder
with findings that the murder was committed in the commission
of a robbery and that Prince personally used a firearm during
both offences. The trial court sentenced Prince to life without the
possibility of parole (LWOP). Prince was 21 years old at the time
of the offenses. He appeals from a postjudgment order denying
his motion for a hearing under People v. Franklin (2016)
63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) and In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439
(Cook).1 The superior court determined Prince was ineligible for
a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051.2
Prince contends section 3051 violates his federal and state
constitutional rights to equal protection because young adult
offenders serving LWOP sentences for crimes they committed
when they were 18 to 25 years old are ineligible for youth
offender parole hearings, but young adult offenders serving non-
LWOP sentences and juvenile offenders who committed crimes
before the age of 18 serving LWOP sentences are eligible. Prince
1 In Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pages 283 to 284, the
California Supreme Court held a juvenile offender (i.e., under the
age of 18) who is eligible for a youth offender parole hearing
pursuant to section 3051 is entitled to a hearing to develop and
preserve evidence of his or her youth-related characteristics and
the circumstances at the time of the offense. In Cook, supra,
7 Cal.5th at page 451, the California Supreme Court further held
that “an offender entitled to a hearing under sections 3051 and
4801 may seek the remedy of a Franklin proceeding even though
the offender’s sentence is otherwise final.”
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
also argues his sentence constituted cruel or unusual punishment
in violation of the California Constitution. (See Cal. Const.,
art. I, § 17.) We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
In 1992, Prince was charged by information with first
degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), with the special circumstance
allegation that the murder was committed during the commission
of robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). Prince was also charged with
second degree robbery. (§ 211). The information alleged Prince
used a firearm in the commission of both offenses.4 (§ 12022.5,
subd. (a).) The parties agree Prince was 21 at the time of the
offenses.
At trial, the People introduced evidence Prince and another
man, Ricky Simuel, robbed a jewelry store and fatally shot the
owner, Norm Schumow. Arriving in a stolen white Oldsmobile
Cutlass sedan, Prince and his accomplice entered a jewelry store.
Prince held a gun; the other man held a sledgehammer. The
store manager, Donald Everette, moved to sound the store alarm,
but Prince told him to stop and ordered everyone in the store to
get on the ground. Simuel smashed the jewelry case open with
the sledgehammer. As Schumow moved to the front of the store,
Prince told Schumow, “I’m not kidding. Get down on the ground,”
and gunshots rang out. Schumow died of gunshot wounds.
3 We summarize the factual background from our previous
opinion affirming Prince’s convictions on direct appeal. (People v.
Prince (June 17, 1994, B075641) [nonpub. opn.].)
4 Prince was also charged with attempted murder, but this
count was dismissed before conclusion of the trial.
3
Another bystander to the robbery, Mollie Kallick, was shot in the
ribs and survived. Approximately $6,000 of jewelry was taken.
Law enforcement found the white Oldsmobile Cutlass sedan
abandoned near the scene, and it contained a sledgehammer and
other tools used in the robbery, but not the gun.
Several months later, a detective interviewed Prince, who
stated he did not know Simuel and that he entered the jewelry
store to buy a wedding ring. Viewing stills from surveillance
footage in the jewelry store, Prince ultimately admitted, “He
[Schumow] rushed me. The gun went off. He grabbed me. He
ran up on me.” Prince also stated he threw the gun away.
In 1993, the jury returned a guilty verdict on first degree
murder and second degree robbery, finding the murder was
committed during the commission of a robbery within the
meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17). The jury also found
true that Prince personally used a firearm in the commission of
both offenses. As relevant here, the trial court sentenced Prince
to LWOP. This court affirmed but ordered certain sentence
modifications.5
In 2021, Prince petitioned for resentencing under
section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6). The superior court denied
the petition, ruling that Prince failed to make a prima facie
showing he was eligible for relief because he was the “actual
killer.” This court affirmed. (People v. Prince (Dec. 7, 2023,
B319849) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2025, Prince filed a motion requesting a Franklin/Cook
hearing to preserve youth-related mitigating evidence for a
5 Specifically, Prince’s sentence was modified by staying the
sentence imposed on the robbery count and reducing the amount
payable to the restitution fund.
4
future youth offender parole hearing under section 3051. The
trial court denied Prince’s motion because his sentence of life
without the possibility of parole made him ineligible for relief.
Prince timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Section 3051 Does Not Violate the Constitutional Right to
Equal Protection
Section 3051 “offers opportunities for early release to
certain persons who are incarcerated for crimes they committed
at a young age.” (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 838
(Hardin).) “Under the current version of the statute, most
persons incarcerated for a crime committed between ages 18 and
25 are entitled to a parole hearing during the 15th, 20th, or 25th
year of their incarceration. [Citation.] But not all [young adult]
offenders are eligible for parole hearings. The statute excludes,
among others, offenders who are serving sentences of life in
prison without the possibility of parole for a crime committed
after the age of 18.” (Id. at pp. 838-839; see § 3051, subd. (h); see
also People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99, 116; People v.
Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479, 484 (Briscoe).) Defendants
who were 18 to 25 years old at the time of their offenses but who
are ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing under
section 3051 due to their sentences are not entitled to a Franklin
hearing. (See People v. Mason (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 411, 415.)
Prince argues section 3501, subdivision (h), violates the
equal protection clause of the federal and state constitutions
because it treats young adult offenders serving LWOP sentences
differently than other young adult offenders sentenced to non-
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LWOP terms, and differently than juveniles sentenced to LWOP.
“We review these claims de novo” (People v. Morales (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 326, 345 (Morales)), and we apply a deferential
rational basis standard of review to a defendant’s equal
protection challenge to the youth offender parole statute. (See
Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 839.)
In Hardin, the California Supreme Court rejected the
argument that “section 3051’s exclusion of young adult offenders
sentenced to life without parole is constitutionally invalid under
a rational basis standard, either on its face or as applied” to
defendants “who are serving life without parole sentences for
special circumstance murder.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 839.) Prince acknowledges Hardin forecloses his equal
protection argument as between young adult offenders sentenced
to LWOP and young adult offenders who committed murder and
received non-LWOP sentences. But he argues Hardin did not
directly consider whether there is a rational basis to distinguish
between young adult and juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP.
Prince is correct that Hardin did not consider this equal
protection challenge. But Hardin observed that this court had
held it was unnecessary to address this argument because “the
Legislature acted reasonably in distinguishing between offenses
committed before and after the age of 18 because the Eighth
Amendment (and the law more generally) makes the same
distinction.” (Hardin, at p. 846.)
In all events, Prince fails to show the Legislature acted
irrationally by granting youth offender parole hearings to
juvenile offenders with a sentence of life without the possibility of
parole while denying such hearings to young adult offenders with
the same sentence. As People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th
6
193, 204 explained when rejecting a similar equal protection
challenge to section 3051, “The Legislature had a rational basis
to distinguish between offenders with the same sentence (life
without parole) based on their age.” (Sands, at p. 204.) Sands
reasoned that “the Legislature could rationally decide to remedy
unconstitutional sentences [imposed on juveniles] but go no
further.” (Ibid.; accord, In re Murray (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 456,
463-464 [rejecting equal protection challenge to § 3051 based on
the different treatment of juvenile and young adult offenders
sentenced to LWOP because “the United States and California
Supreme Courts have found the line drawn between juveniles
and nonjuveniles to be a rational one”]; Morales, supra,
67 Cal.App.5th at p. 347 [“for purposes of LWOP offenders, the
line drawn at 18 is a rational one”]; People v. Acosta (2021)
60 Cal.App.5th 769, 779 (Acosta) [“[T]here is a rational basis for
distinguishing between juvenile LWOP offenders and young
adult LWOP offenders: their age.”].)
B. Briscoe is Distinguishable
Prince next argues this case is like Briscoe, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th 479. Briscoe held that section 3051 violated the
equal protection clause in “the narrow factual context” of young
adult offenders “sentenced for special circumstance murder
during a robbery or burglary under section 190.2,
subdivision (d),” which applies to nonkiller participants in
specified felony offenses during which a murder occurred.
(Briscoe, at pp. 485, 490.) The defendant in Briscoe was convicted
of first degree murder as a nonkiller participant in the
underlying felonies of robbery and burglary, for which he was
sentenced to LWOP. (Id. at p. 485.) The defendant was 21 years
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old at the time of the offenses, and the trial court determined he
was ineligible for a section 3051 youth offender parole hearing.
(Id. at p. 486.)
The defendant successfully argued on appeal that
section 3051’s exclusion of young adult offenders convicted of
special circumstance felony murder as nonkillers under
section 190.2, subdivision (d), while including those convicted of
nonspecial circumstance first degree felony murder under
section 189, subdivision (e)(3), violated equal protection. (See
Briscoe, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 489-490 & fn. 5; see also
id. at p. 487 [noting that although “Hardin forecloses Briscoe’s
challenge to section 3051’s exclusion of youth special
circumstance murderers generally, . . . his narrower challenge
based on section 190.2, subdivision (d) survives”].)
Briscoe observed that the Legislature amended section 189
by “directly incorporating the section 190.2, subdivision (d)
standard into the definition of first degree felony murder under
section 189, subdivision (e)(3).” (Briscoe, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th
at p. 491.) Thus, “[s]ection 190.2, subdivision (d) describes the
exact same circumstances and conduct that are now necessary to
support a conviction for first degree felony murder under
section 189, subdivision (e)(3).” (Id. at p. 492; see id. at p. 489
[“The two provisions employ the same standard of liability, ‘as
the former provision expressly incorporates the latter.’ ”].) Yet,
although both statutes involved the same underlying conduct, a
young adult offender convicted under section 189, subdivision
(e)(3), would be entitled to a Franklin hearing, while a young
adult offender convicted under section 190.2, subdivision (d),
would not. Briscoe reasoned that because “[t]he disparate
treatment of offenders who committed murder per these identical
8
provisions during the same underlying felonies cannot reflect any
difference in culpability” (Briscoe, at p. 492), it followed that
“[t]he result is an irrational distinction between equally culpable
youth offenders seeking parole that the Legislature did not
contemplate” (id. at p. 490). Accordingly, it held that offering
parole opportunities to young adult offenders convicted of
section 189, subdivision (e)(3), but not section 190.2,
subdivision (d), lacks a rational basis, and “[a]s applied to youth
offenders sentenced under section 190.2, subdivision (d) for
murder during a robbery or burglary, the statute violates equal
protection.” (Briscoe, at p. 495.) Briscoe reversed the order
denying the defendant’s motion for a Franklin hearing.
The People argue Briscoe is distinguishable because the
special circumstance finding in Briscoe was made under
section 190.2, subdivision (d), whereas in Prince’s case the
finding was made under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17).
According to the People: “Briscoe is distinguishable from the
instant case. Briscoe concerned a special circumstance allegation
under section 190.2, subdivision (d), which is applicable to major
participants in a non-homicide felony who acted with reckless
indifference to life but are not actual killers and did not have
intent to kill. In contrast, the evidence presented at trial
established that [Prince] was the murderer, not merely an
accomplice.” In other words, under section 190.2, subdivision (d),
a person could be convicted of special circumstance murder
without being the actual killer or having intent to kill, but a
conviction under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17), requires a
finding that the murder was committed as either the actual
perpetrator or accomplice. We agree with the People.
9
As stated, Briscoe involved a special circumstance finding
under section 190.2, subdivision (d). Briscoe did not address the
situation where, as here, a special circumstance finding was
made under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17). As relevant here,
section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17), provides for a penalty of death
or life without parole if the murder “was committed while the
defendant was engaged in, or was an accomplice in, the
commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate flight
after committing, or attempting to commit” certain specified
felonies, including robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)). Thus, while
section 190.2, subdivision (d) (at issue in Briscoe), expressly
applies only to nonkillers, that is not necessarily the case with
section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) (under which Prince was
convicted). That is because section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)
applies to actual killers and nonkillers who commit murder while
intending to commit a felony such as robbery. (See § 190.2(a)(17);
see also CALCRIM No. 730.)
C. Section 3051 Does Not Violate the State Constitutional
Prohibition Against Cruel or Unusual Punishment
Prince further argues the exclusion in section 3051 of
young adult offenders sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole who were 18 years old or older constitutes cruel or unusual
punishment under article I, section 17 of the California
Constitution. Prince did not raise this argument in the superior
court and it is forfeited. (See People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006)
39 Cal.4th 970, 991 [“ ‘[a] party cannot argue the court erred in
failing to conduct an analysis it was not asked to conduct’ ”].)
Even if Prince had not forfeited the argument, the
argument lacks merit. (See People v. Baker (2018)
10
20 Cal.App.5th 711, 733 [“[t]here is considerable overlap in the
state and federal approaches” to the Eighth Amendment and
article I, section 17 of the California Constitution, and
“ ‘[a]lthough articulated slightly differently, both standards
prohibit punishment that is “grossly disproportionate” to the
crime or the individual culpability of the defendant’ ”]; see also
Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 204 [sentence of LWOP “does
not violate the Eighth Amendment when imposed on an adult,
even an adult under the age of 26”]; Acosta, supra,
60 Cal.App.5th at p. 781 [Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460,
which held the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentencing a
juvenile to a mandatory term of life in prison without possibility
of parole, “applies to juvenile offenders sentenced to mandatory
LWOP terms, not 21 year olds”]; In re Williams (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 427, 439 [Eighth Amendment does not prohibit
imposing a sentence of LWOP on a 21-year-old defendant]; People
v. Montelongo (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1020, 1030-1032
[Eighth Amendment does not prohibit imposing a sentence of
LWOP on an 18-year-old defendant]; cf. People v. Flores (2020)
9 Cal.5th 371, 429 [Eighth Amendment does not prohibit
imposing a sentence of death on a 21-year-old defendant].)
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DISPOSITION
The order denying Prince’s request for a Franklin/Cook
hearing is affirmed.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
SEGAL, J.
FEUER, J.
12