Filed 7/14/26 P. v. Peyton CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B348723
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24PSCF00719)
v.
MARTIN PEYTON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Ramiro P. Cisneros, Judge. Affirmed.
Travis Daily, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and Patricia Rosman, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Martin Peyton appeals the denial of his motion for mental
health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36.1 Peyton
argues the trial court abused its discretion by relying on the facts
and circumstances of the charged offense and by disregarding the
remedial purpose of the diversion statute when it denied
diversion based, among other things, on its finding there was an
unreasonable risk to public safety that Peyton would commit a
super strike offense. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Offense and Information
In November 2024, Peyton lived with his mother and his
brother, Jacob F. At approximately 3:20 a.m. on November 4,
Peyton stabbed Jacob in the chest with a large kitchen knife after
a brief physical altercation. Peyton then ordered Jacob and his
mother to leave the house. Jacob sustained a deep laceration on
his chest, additional lacerations to his armpit and thigh, and
defensive wounds to his forearm.
Peyton was charged with the attempted murder of Jacob
(§§ 187, subd. (a), 664), with special allegations that he
personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury upon
Jacob (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The complaint also alleged Peyton
was previously convicted of two serious or violent felony
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
convictions under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j),
1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), namely two burglary convictions from
2013 and 2017 (§ 459).
B. Peyton’s Section 1001.36 Motion
In March 2025, Peyton petitioned for mental health
diversion under section 1001.36. The petition stated Peyton was
“diagnosed by a mental health expert with Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder, Substance Induced Psychotic Disorder, Hallucinogen
Use Disorder and Cannabis Use Disorder.” Peyton asserted that
he met the statutory criteria for mental health treatment: he
suffered from a qualifying mental health condition; the condition
“played a significant role in the commission of the charged
offense;” “[i]n the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, [he]
would respond to mental health treatment;” he agreed to comply
with treatment as a condition of diversion and waived his right to
a speedy trial; and he did not “pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to the community.”
Accompanying Peyton’s petition was a report from
Dr. Sherif Toma, a clinical psychologist, who conducted a
telephone evaluation with Peyton and reviewed his arrest report
and treatment history.2 Dr. Toma indicated that Peyton
2 Peyton’s petition for diversion and Dr. Toma’s report were
not filed under seal in the trial court, and the record on appeal
does not include a motion to seal or a sealing order as required by
California Rules of Court, rule 8.46(b)(2). Moreover, Peyton’s
publicly available brief quotes and summarizes Dr. Toma’s report
extensively. Accordingly, we do not deem the report “a record
sealed by order of the trial court” and determine we need not file
a public version of this opinion that redacts references to the
3
exhibited posttraumatic stress disorder, substance-induced
psychotic disorder, hallucinogen use disorder, and cannabis
(marijuana) use disorder, and that these conditions were a
significant factor in the charged offense. Peyton reported to Dr.
Toma that he started experiencing psychotic symptoms in 2023,
including hearing voices and experiencing visual hallucinations,
paranoia, and delusions. He further reported starting to use
marijuana at age 14 and he used it daily, including on the day of
his arrest. Peyton also described frequently using mushrooms
since 2021, including on the day before his arrest. Peyton also
reported using fentanyl weekly since 2023 and using ecstasy and
painkillers since age 15, but stated he did not use these
substances on the day of his arrest.
Dr. Toma reviewed Peyton’s medical records, including a
previous incident where Peyton was psychiatrically hospitalized
in July 2023 as a danger to himself and others. In that incident,
Peyton had an argument with his mother when he slashed his
own car tires and ran around with a machete. Peyton’s mother
stated that Peyton was bipolar and acted extremely aggressively.
Peyton reported that he was seeing things and had superpowers.
Peyton tested positive for marijuana use after this incident, and
he reported behavioral changes, hallucinations, and paranoia
among other symptoms. Peyton was prescribed mood stabilizers
and antipsychotic medication and reported he was feeling better
on the medication.
Following Peyton’s arrest in November 2024, mental health
evaluations in jail reported Peyton was likely mentally ill due to
contents of Dr. Toma’s report. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.46(b)(2), (g).)
4
paranoid and delusional thoughts, blunted affect, and suicidal
ideation. Peyton denied having a history of mental illness that
he could remember, although he admitted he might need
medication. Peyton was prescribed an antipsychotic medication,
but he requested the staff provide him an alternative medication
a couple months later. It does not appear a change was made.
When Dr. Toma asked Peyton about the current charge,
Peyton stated he was looking for fruit in the refrigerator and he
was going to use a knife to cut the fruit, but his brother tried to
grab the knife from his hand in a threatening way. Peyton stated
he was hallucinating about why the fruit was not in season, he
believed the city was on fire and demons were coming out of the
woods, and he thought his brother was attacking him.
Dr. Toma opined that “Peyton’s behavior is correlated to his
untreated mental illness that was exacerbated by his drug use.
During the interview, he reported experiencing symptoms that
correlate to a diagnosis of bipolar disorder. He also mentioned
using cannabis as well as mushrooms. . . . His psychotic
symptoms, including paranoia, hallucinations, and disorganized
thinking, appear to have been directly correlated with his
cannabis use . . . [and] align[] with previous incidents where he
exhibited similar symptoms after cannabis use.” Dr. Toma
believed Peyton’s psychotic episodes were substance-induced, not
the result of a primary psychotic disorder, but noted Peyton’s
bipolar disorder was an underlying condition. “Given these
factors, it is important to recognize the parallel between
[Peyton’s] substance use and his violent outbursts, as well as the
likelihood that his bipolar symptoms exist independently of
substance use, meaning future episodes of mania or depression
could still occur even in the absence of drug use. This highlights
5
the importance of long-term psychiatric care, substance abuse
treatment, and mood stabilization strategies to prevent further
incidents.”
Dr. Toma concluded Peyton’s mental illness symptoms
would respond to appropriate mental health treatment, and that
if Peyton received appropriate treatment in the community, he
did not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.
Specifically, Dr. Toma recommended psychotropic medications
that could stabilize Peyton’s mood and prevent future episodes,
along with psychotherapy and substance abuse treatment.
Peyton’s motion also included a letter of acceptance into a
community reentry program offering substance abuse treatment
and mental health services.
The People opposed Peyton’s motion on the grounds that
Peyton posed an unreasonable risk of danger to the public if he
were treated for his mental illness in the community. The People
argued that considering the current offense and Peyton’s previous
psychiatric hold in 2023, “[t]he fact that [Peyton] was armed with
a knife in this case and was armed with a machete in the past is
concerning and demonstrates that he is impulsive, unpredictable
and a serious threat to the safety of the victim, his mother and
[his] community.”
The trial court held a hearing on Peyton’s section 1001.36
motion in August 2025. The court stated it had “read and
considered the defendant’s motion for mental health diversion,
which included the psychological report from Dr. Sherif Toma, a
qualified mental health expert. The court has also read and
considered the probation report and the treatment plan provided
by the department of mental health. The court has also
considered the People’s opposition.” The court found Peyton did
6
have a mental health disorder, but it determined Peyton was not
suitable for mental health diversion and denied the motion,
reasoning:
Defendant is charged with attempted murder. In this
case, it is alleged the defendant came into his
brother’s bedroom without warning or provocation
and stabbed him.
The defendant has a history of violent behavior
towards his family, which has resulted in a
psychiatric hold and hospitalization in July 2023. In
that case, the defendant slashed his own tires, was
acting aggressively, and was running around with a
machete and breaking things.
Given his past psychiatric hospitalization, the
defendant knew or should have known that he suffers
from a mental health illness that causes psychotic
episodes. Nevertheless, he continued to abuse drugs,
including mushrooms and marijuana, which may
have contributed to this incident, as in the opinion of
Dr. Toma.
The statute allows the court to consider the
defendant’s violence, the defendant’s criminal history
. . . [including] two prior strikes for first degree
burglary[,] and the facts and circumstances of the
current charge.
7
Based on those factors, the court finds the defendant
is not suitable for mental health diversion as he poses
an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as
defined under Penal Code 1170.18(c)[].
Peyton timely appealed from the denial of his motion
for diversion.
C. Conviction and Sentence
Pursuant to a plea bargain, Peyton pled guilty to assault
with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) and admitted a special
allegation of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and one
prior strike. Peyton received a total sentence of nine years in
prison consisting of the middle term of three years, doubled for
the prior strike, plus three years for the great bodily injury
enhancement.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
“Enacted in 2018, section 1001.36 authorizes pretrial
diversion for defendants with qualifying mental disorders.”
(People v. Braden (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791, 801.) “The stated
purpose of the diversion statute ‘is to promote . . . [i]ncreased
diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the
individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system
while protecting public safety . . . [and] [p]rovid[e] diversion that
meets the unique mental health treatment and support needs of
individuals with mental disorders.’ ” (People v. Frahs (2020)
9 Cal.5th 618, 626.)
8
“At any stage of the proceedings, the court may require the
defendant to make a prima facie showing that the defendant will
meet the minimum requirements of eligibility for diversion and
that the defendant and the offense are suitable.” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (e).) A defendant is eligible for pretrial diversion if he “has
been diagnosed with a mental disorder as identified in the most
recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders . . . excluding antisocial personality disorder and
pedophilia” and “[t]he defendant’s mental disorder was a
significant factor in the commission of the charged offense.”
(§ 1001.36, subds. (b)(1)-(2).) Additionally, the defendant must be
“suitable” for pretrial diversion, meaning (1) “[i]n the opinion of a
qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s symptoms of the
mental disorder . . . would respond to mental health treatment”;
(2) the defendant consents to diversion and waives his right to a
speedy trial; (3) the defendant “agrees to comply with treatment
as a condition of diversion”; and (4) “[t]he defendant will not pose
an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in
Section 1170.18, if treated in the community.” (§ 1001.36, subds.
(c)(1)-(4).)
Section 1170.18 defines an “ ‘unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety’ ” as “ ‘an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will
commit a new violent felony’ ” within the meaning of section 667,
subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv). “That clause, in turn, itemizes eight
categories of offenses—sexually violent offenses, oral copulation
with a child under 14, lewd or lascivious act with a child
under 14, homicide, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a
machine gun on a peace officer, possession of a weapon of mass
destruction, and any serious or violent felony punishable by life
imprisonment or death—colloquially referred to as ‘super
9
strikes.’ ” (People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1149
(Whitmill).) In determining whether a defendant may pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the
community, “[t]he court may consider the opinions of the district
attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and
may consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s
violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and
any other factors that the court deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c)(4).)
“If the defendant makes a prima facie showing that he or
she meets all the statutory eligibility and suitability criteria, the
trial court still has discretion to deny diversion.” (People v.
Tourville (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 439, 453; accord, People v.
Cabalar (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 41, 53 (Cabalar).) “This residual
discretion is not unfettered and must be exercised ‘ “consistent
with the principles and purpose of the governing law.” ’ ”
(Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 135
(Vaughn); accord, People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th
879, 891.) “ ‘Where the court chooses to exercise this residual
discretion to deny diversion, its statement of reasons should
reflect consideration of the underlying purposes of the statute
and explain why diversion would not meet those goals.’ ”
(Vaughn, at p. 135; accord, Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024)
98 Cal.App.5th 882, 893 (Sarmiento).)
We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s
decision to deny a motion for mental health diversion. (Vaughn,
supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 135; Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1147.) “ ‘A court abuses its discretion when it makes an
arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal
standard [citations], or bases its decision on express or implied
10
factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.’ ”
(People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1080 (Gerson);
accord, Cabalar, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 53.) The appellant
bears the burden of establishing an abuse of discretion on appeal.
(People v. Pacheco (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 207, 213 (Pacheco);
accord, People v. Bunas (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 840, 866.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying
Peyton’s Motion for Mental Health Diversion
Peyton argues the trial court abused its discretion in
several ways by finding diversion and treatment in the
community would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety.3
We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion. As an
initial matter, the court applied the correct legal standard from
section 1001.36, by considering whether Peyton “poses an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as defined under
Penal Code 1170.18(c)[].” As Peyton and the People argued at the
hearing, this required a determination of whether there was an
unreasonable risk that Peyton was likely to commit a super-
strike offense. The court also correctly identified that section
1001.36, subdivision (c)(4), permitted consideration of Peyton’s
“violence” and “criminal history,” as well as “the facts and
circumstances of the current charge.”
Additionally, the trial court had substantial evidence from
which to find that Peyton posed an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety if treated in the community, i.e., that there was an
unreasonable risk Peyton would commit a super-strike offense.
3 Peyton does not raise any argument regarding the other
suitability and eligibility criteria in section 1001.36.
11
First, Peyton’s current charge of attempted murder was itself a
super-strike offense. (See Gomez v. Superior Court (2025)
113 Cal.App.5th 671, 679 [attempted murder is a super-strike
offense]; accord, Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1150; see
also People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 790 (Graham)
[affirming denial of diversion where the charged crimes were
super-strike offenses].) Peyton’s current offense was violent,
involving a deadly weapon and multiple injuries to the victim.
(See People v. Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, 124 (Brown)
[affirming denial of diversion on public safety grounds, where
defendant “invoked extreme physical violence against a
vulnerable victim in response to a relatively minor altercation”
and “the trial court could reasonably infer that there was a
significant risk that [defendant] could commit an even more
serious, violent felony in the future, and therefore posed an
unreasonable risk under section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(4)”];
cf. Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 897 [no substantial
evidence that defendant was likely to commit a super strike
offense, where “the charged offense . . . involved no evidence of a
weapon or threat of violence”]; People v. Williams (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 990, 1003 [same, where current charges were “not
super-strike offenses, he poses a low risk to public safety in the
uncontroverted opinion of two mental health professionals, there
is no evidence he owned, possessed or had access to any
weapons,” and defendant had no prior criminal record and “never
actually assaulted anyone or engaged in any violence”]; accord,
Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 690 [same].)
Beyond the circumstances of the current charges, Peyton’s
background provided substantial evidence from which to find he
posed an unreasonable risk of committing a super-strike offense.
12
As noted by the court, Peyton had two previous strike convictions
for first-degree burglary. Dr. Toma described Peyton’s history of
bipolar disorder and psychosis since 2023, which led to a mental
health crisis and psychiatric hospitalization in July 2023. As
observed by the court, in the July 2023 incident, Peyton had an
argument with his mother where he “slashed his own tires, was
acting aggressively, and was running around with a machete and
breaking things.” As with the circumstances surrounding
Peyton’s attempted murder charge, Peyton’s previous episode of
mental illness involving aggressive use of a weapon during an
altercation with his family supports an unreasonable likelihood
that he could commit a super-strike offense if treated in the
community.
Peyton argues that the trial court lacked substantial
evidence to find that he was likely to commit a super-strike
offense. Specifically, Peyton argues “[t]he court placed heavy
weight on the [current] offense and prior incidents, including
[the] 2023 machete-brandishing incident and [psychiatric] hold,
while insufficiently weighing or explaining its rejection of
Dr. Toma’s uncontradicted expert opinion and treatment plan.”
Peyton asserts that the court “made no mention whatsoever of
Dr. Toma’s evaluation and findings that, with appropriate
community-based treatment, [Peyton] does not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.”
Peyton does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion on this
ground. “ ‘[T]here is nothing in section 1001.36, with respect to
. . . suitability, that precludes a trial court from relying primarily,
or even entirely, on the circumstances of the charged offense or
offenses in denying a motion for diversion.’ ” (Graham, supra,
102 Cal.App.5th at p. 799 [affirming dangerousness finding];
13
accord, People v. Bunas, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 862.)
Similarly, section 1001.36 does not “preclude[] a trial court from
rendering a dangerousness finding contrary to one expressed by a
mental health professional.” (Siam v. Superior Court (2026)
118 Cal.App.5th 67, 83.) This is because section 1001.36
expressly authorizes the trial court to consider “expansive”
criteria in evaluating a dangerousness finding (Siam, at p. 83),
including the “opinions of the district attorney[] [and] the
defense,” “the defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s
violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and
any other factors that the court deems appropriate” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c)(4)).
While Dr. Toma’s report concluded that Peyton could be
treated in the community without unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety, other considerations before the trial court
supported that Peyton was likely to commit a super-strike
offense, as discussed. “Although Dr. [Toma’s] opinion is evidence
that . . . [Peyton] would not continue to pose an unreasonable risk
if medicated[, ]it is not the only evidence that the trial court
considered. . . . [T]he existence of some evidence in support of
either conclusion is not a sufficient basis for this court to
supplant the findings of the trial court.” (See Brown, supra,
101 Cal.App.5th at pp. 123-124 [affirming dangerousness finding
because “under the applicable standard of review, we may not
substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court, and
instead must defer to the trial court’s weighing of the evidence”];
accord, Gerson, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1086.)
Peyton also asserts the court failed to “consider the
statutory factors of § 1001.36” by denying diversion. In Peyton’s
view, the court erred by finding Peyton “knew or should have
14
known that he suffers from a mental health illness that causes
psychotic episodes” and “[n]evertheless . . . continued to abuse
drugs . . . which may have contributed to this incident.” Peyton
contends this reasoning “shifted the focus from statutory
suitability and public safety toward moral culpability for relapse”
and “fail[ed] to properly consider how [Peyton’s] mental health
disorders contributed to this pattern of behavior.” Peyton
submits that his case “presents precisely the circumstances
where mental health diversion should be granted under the
Legislature’s broad remedial intent,” i.e., a “cycle of untreated
mental illness and substance abuse that the diversion statute
was designed to address.”4
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in this manner.
It is true that a “court’s assertion that ‘addicts relapse[]’ . . .
cannot, without more, be used to deny a person mental health
diversion when one of the diagnoses rendering them eligible for
4 Citing case law on trial courts’ residual discretion under
section 1001.36, Peyton argues the court was required to exercise
its discretion “ ‘ “consistent with the principles and purpose of the
governing law.” ’ ” (See Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th
at p.893 [“Where the court chooses to exercise this residual
discretion to deny diversion, its statement of reasons should
reflect consideration of the underlying purposes of the statute
and explain why diversion would not meet those goals.”].) But
here the court denied diversion on the basis of its finding that
Peyton posed an unreasonable risk to public safety, an express
statutory suitability criterion, and it did so based on the legal
standard and considerations laid out in section 1001.36,
subdivision (c)(4). For this reason, the court did not rely on its
residual discretion to deny diversion. (See Vaughn, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 135 [discussing residual discretion].)
15
diversion is an alcohol or other substance related disorder.”
(Cabalar, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 57.) But “[t]he obligation
to determine whether a defendant will pose an unreasonable risk
of danger to the public if granted diversion necessarily includes
determining whether the defendant will abandon treatment. . . .”
(People v. Superior Court (Taylor) (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1153,
1169 (Taylor).)
Considering the circumstances presented here, Peyton
began experiencing psychotic symptoms in 2023 and was
psychiatrically hospitalized in July 2023. Peyton was prescribed
psychiatric medication during this hospitalization, but there is no
indication that Peyton was treated or took medication after his
hospitalization. Rather, Dr. Toma attributed Peyton’s prior
violent behavior to his “untreated mental illness that was
exacerbated by his drug use.” Peyton was additionally prescribed
antipsychotic medication while incarcerated on the current
charges, but he requested that he be given an alternative
medication. Peyton was incarcerated at the time of his interview
with Dr. Toma on March 19, 2025, and Dr. Toma noted Peyton
was “not receiving any antipsychotic medications in jail and is
reportedly doing well.” Dr. Toma believed it was “essential” that
Peyton receive “psychotropic medications that can help stabilize
his mood and prevent future episodes,” including the medications
Peyton was prescribed while hospitalized and incarcerated.
Peyton also disclosed a history of using marijuana daily
since 2009, ecstasy and painkillers since 2010, mushrooms since
2021, and fentanyl since 2023. Dr. Toma opined that “cannabis
use” contributed to Peyton’s 2023 hospitalization, “when he
tested positive for THC and was also experiencing significant
psychiatric distress.” Peyton continued use of these substances
16
after the 2023 hospitalization, despite acknowledging to
Dr. Toma that his drug use “leads to paranoia and auditory
hallucination.” Dr. Toma opined that Peyton’s substance use
“appear[s] to have been directly correlated” with his psychotic
symptoms, “his violent behavior may have stemmed from a
combination of cannabis-induced paranoia and irritability,” and
treatment must entail “long-term abstinence from cannabis and
other psychoactive substances.” “Without proper intervention,”
Dr. Toma believed “there is a high likelihood that [Peyton’s]
symptoms will return, potentially leading to future psychiatric
hospitalizations, legal issues, or further deterioration in his
mental health.” Dr. Toma also stated that “continued clinical
intervention and maintenance of psychiatric symptom
stabilization could prevent possible future violen[ce] and
accompanying victimization of others.”
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining
these circumstances did not support diversion in light of Peyton’s
history of untreated mental illness and drug use that caused him
to engage in violent behavior, even after he had been hospitalized
and prescribed antipsychotic medication.5 (See Pacheco, supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 213-214 [affirming denial of diversion on
public safety grounds, given mental health expert’s opinion that
defendant needed to abstain from drug use which exacerbated his
psychotic symptoms, and defendant’s long history of drug use
despite previous incidents]; cf. Taylor, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1168-1169 [reversing grant of diversion where “the record
supports a reasonable inference that [defendant] would abandon
5 In light of our holding the trial court did not abuse its
discretion, we need not address Peyton’s remaining contention
that the court’s decision was prejudicial.
17
aspects of the mental health regimen experts testified were
crucial for him not to pose an unreasonable danger to the public,
with potentially catastrophic consequences,” because he
previously “failed to take his medications,” and “no substantial
evidence support[ed] the court’s implied finding that [defendant]
was suitable for mental health diversion”]; Whitmill, supra,
86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1151-1152 [no substantial evidence that
defendant would not “abstain from substance abuse such that he
won’t commit a super strike,” because defendant relapsed due to
a family member’s cancer diagnosis, found past substance abuse
treatment to be helpful, and was very willing to participate in
future treatment].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J.
STONE, J.
18