Filed 9/30/26 P. v. Perez CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D086487
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. SCD303831,
SCD307444)
v.
TERESA PEREZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Dwayne K. Moring, Judge. Affirmed.
Teresa Perez, in pro. per.; and Siri Shetty, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Teresa Perez appeals judgments entered in two criminal
cases following her guilty plea to petty theft with priors (Pen. Code1, §§ 484,
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
666.1; count 1) and possession of personal identifying information of another
person (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(2); count 3) after her probation was revoked for
committing new crimes.
Appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25
Cal.3d 436 (Wende) indicating counsel has not been able to identify any
arguable issues for reversal on appeal. Counsel asks the court to review the
record for error as mandated by Wende.
We advised Perez of the right to file her own brief on appeal.
(See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 120.) She filed two supplemental
briefs. Our independent review of the record confirms there are no arguable
issues on appeal. We, therefore, affirm the judgment.2
BACKGROUND
In November 2024, Perez was charged with five felony counts in case
number SCD303831: taking a vehicle without consent (Veh. Code, § 10851,
subd. (a); count 1), receiving stolen property (§ 496d; count 2), and three
counts of using personal identifying information of another person (§ 530.5,
subd. (a); counts 3–5).
Perez pleaded guilty to taking a vehicle without consent (Veh. Code,
§ 10851, subd. (a); count 1) and to one count of possessing and using personal
identifying information of another (§ 530.5, subd. (a); count 3). She admitted
an allegation that she committed count 3 when she was out of custody after
committing a prior felony. (§ 12022.1, subd. (b).) In exchange for the plea,
Perez agreed to a suspended four-year sentence, which would be executed if
2 In related petitions for writ of habeas corpus (case Nos. D086571 and
D087455), Perez raises similar issues. We considered the writ petitions with
this appeal and address the writ petitions by separate order.
2
she violated probation or committed a new offense, and the court dismissed
the balance of the charges.
At the sentencing hearing on February 25, 2025, the People informed
the court that after the change of plea, the San Diego Police Department
submitted new charges for Perez which also involved “auto burglaries with
the use of credit cards” for a different victim in the same time period as the
complaint. The People agreed not to file a new case, but, pursuant to a
waiver under People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754, sentencing could
consider the unfiled charges.
In accordance with the plea deal, the court granted Perez probation and
suspended the execution of a four-year sentence. The suspended sentence
was based on the middle term of two years for use of personal identifying
information of another (count 3) plus two years for the out-on-bail allegation.
The court imposed the middle term of two years for the unlawful use of a
vehicle (count 1) to run concurrent.
Within two months of sentencing, a new complaint was filed in case
number SCD307444, charging Perez with petty theft with two or more priors
(§§ 484, 666.1; count 1), grand theft of personal property (§ 487, subd. (a);
count 2), and possession of personal identifying information of another person
(§ 530.5, subd. (c)(2); count 3). The new charges involved new offenses
committed between March 26, 2025, and April 9, 2025.
To globally resolve the new charges in case number SCD307444 and
the probation violation for prior case number SCD303831, Perez pleaded
guilty on April 22, 2025, to petty theft with priors (§§ 484, 666.1; count 1) and
possession of personal identifying information of another person (§ 530.5,
subd. (c)(2); count 3) in exchange for a stipulated sentence of four years eight
3
months based on eight months for the current case and lifting the stay of
execution on her four-year sentence for the prior case.
The court granted the People’s motion to dismiss the balance of the
charges with a Harvey waiver. Based on the plea to the new charge, the court
found Perez in violation of probation in case number SCD303831. The court
denied her request for release from custody. The court noted she was now
facing four years eight months in prison after she reoffended two months
after the court suspended execution of a four-year sentence.
On June 12, 2025, after conducting and denying a Marsden motion,3
the court sentenced Perez to an aggregate term of four years eight months on
both cases. The court designated case number SCD303831 as the principal
term and imposed the middle term of two years for obtaining and using the
personal identifying information of another (§ 530.5, subd. (a); count 3) plus
two years for the on-bail enhancement (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)), along with a
two-year concurrent term for unlawfully taking a vehicle without consent
(Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 1). As to case number SCD307444, the
court imposed eight months for petty theft with two or more priors (§§ 484,
666.1; count 1) to run consecutive to the principal term plus another two
years concurrent for acquiring the personal identifying information of
another (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(2); count 3).
Perez appealed both cases and requested a certificate of probable cause.
The court granted a certificate of probable cause.
DISCUSSION
As we noted, appellate counsel filed a Wende brief and asked the court
to review the record for error. To assist the court in its review and in
3 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
4
compliance with Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), counsel
identified the following possible issue that was considered in evaluating the
potential merits of this appeal:
Was the April 22, 2025, guilty plea knowing and voluntary where
appellant disclosed that she had taken medications?
Perez filed supplemental briefs raising additional issues, which we
address. (People v. Kelly, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 110, 120, 124.)
Perez contends she was “under the influence” when she entered the
plea. We conclude this issue does not have arguable merit. The court twice
inquired of Perez and her attorney about the medications she was taking and
how they affected her. Both her counsel and the court confirmed, twice, that
they had no difficulties communicating with Perez. After Perez asked for a
break to discuss the terms of the plea with her counsel, Perez confirmed she
understood both the proceedings as well as the terms of the plea and the
stipulated sentence. She agreed she entered the plea freely because it was in
her best interest. The court found Perez made a knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent waiver of her rights and accepted the plea. The record and the
court’s observations provide substantial evidence to support the court’s
finding of Perez’s competence to enter a guilty plea. (People v. Jackson (2018)
22 Cal.App.5th 374, 392.)
Perez also contends (1) her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
request diversion; (2) the court could have used its authority to place her in a
dual diagnosis program or mental health diversion; and (3) the judge
improperly engaged in ex parte communication when he wrote a letter in
response to her requests for resentencing saying the court was unable to
modify her sentence based on a plea bargain. The last issue regarding a
postjudgment response to a request for resentencing is not properly before us
5
in this appeal of the judgment. We conclude the additional issues raised by
Perez have no arguable merit.
The record does not demonstrate that Perez’s counsel’s representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that Perez suffered
prejudice as a result of her counsel’s representation related to her plea.
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687–688.) Perez cites
section 666.1 in support of her contention that counsel should have sought
diversion. Under section 666.1, subdivision (b), only a prosecuting attorney
or probation officer may refer a person charged under section 666.1 to a theft
diversion or deferred entry of judgment program. Perez has an extensive
criminal history, and she was granted numerous opportunities over the years
for probation or parole supervision. She repeatedly violated her conditions by
failing to comply with conditions or by committing new offenses. She was on
formal probation for case number SCD303831 when she was arrested for the
offenses in case number SCD307444. Perez was also given multiple
opportunities over the years to seek treatment while on summary and formal
probation including in the weeks before her latest offenses. Yet, her criminal
conduct continued. Based on this record, there is no indication Perez would
have been suitable for diversion or that the prosecution would agree to
diversion even if she was eligible under any statute. In exchange for the plea
to a stipulated sentence, the prosecution agreed to dismiss a more serious
charge. Nothing in the record rebuts the general presumption that counsel
made reasonable tactical decisions and acted within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance. (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986,
1009.)
There is also no arguable issue that the court should have placed her in
diversion. The court could reject the plea deal but could not change the terms
6
of the agreement without the consent of both parties. (People v. Mitchell
(2026) 19 Cal.5th 729, 742.)
We have reviewed the entire record as required by Wende and Anders,
and considered the issues identified by Perez and her counsel. We have not
discovered any arguable issues for reversal on appeal. Competent counsel
has represented Perez on this appeal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, J.
KELETY, J.
7