Filed 8/20/26 P. v. Perez CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B345013
(Super. Ct. No. 25CJCF00592)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)
v.
MANUEL SOLOMON PEREZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Manuel Solomon Perez appeals from the judgment after he
pleaded no contest to being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen.
Code,1 § 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and placed on probation. He contends
the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress because
the officer who conducted a “patdown” search lacked reasonable
suspicion. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Prosecutors charged Perez with being a felon in possession of
a firearm. (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1).) He was held to answer and later
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
filed a section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence recovered during
the detention, including the firearm.
At the hearing, Officer Oregel testified that he and his
partner were patrolling an area at night in Los Angeles County in
January 2025. Oregel said, “It’s an area is what we call R.V. Road.
There must be about 50, 60 R.V.’s lined up, high crime area known
for shootings, firearm possession, thefts.” Oregel saw an R.V. make
an illegal U-turn in front of him, a violation of the Vehicle Code,
and conducted a traffic stop. The driver was Perez.
Oregel asked Perez for his driver’s license, but he did not
produce one. Instead, Perez provided a piece of paper that was
“wet” and “torn up” and provided his “ID.” Oregel returned the
paper to Perez because he “couldn’t read it” and asked him to step
out of the vehicle. Oregel had recovered over 10 firearms from
R.V.’s located in the same area.
Perez exited the R.V. and Oregel stated, “I’m going to pat you
down for weapons. Is that cool[?]” He positioned Perez “in a
disadvantage” in order to pat him down by pulling his “oversized”
shirt up and down. Perez did not respond and Oregel then asked,
“Do you have any weapons?” Perez said he had a BB gun. After
Perez said he had a BB gun, Oregel conducted the patdown. He felt
“the shape and the weight of what [he] believed to be a firearm, not
a BB gun.” The detention, consisting of asking Perez for his license
through the patdown, took approximately 30 to 45 seconds.
In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court found that
once Perez said he had a BB gun it was “absolutely appropriate for
the officer, for his own safety, to reach in and find what appeared to
be a pat-down and find what appeared to be a weapon and retrieve
it.” Perez then pleaded no contest and was placed on probation with
credit for time served.
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DISCUSSION
Perez contends that the police officer patted him down
without reasonable suspicion in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. We are not persuaded.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement. (U.S.
Const., 4th Amend.; Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 8–9 (Terry).)
However, an officer may pat down a suspect for weapons if that
officer has reason to believe a suspect is armed and dangerous,
regardless of whether probable cause exists to arrest the individual
for a crime. (Terry, at p. 27.) “The officer need not be absolutely
certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a
reasonably prudent [person] in the circumstances would be
warranted in the belief that [their] safety or that of others was in
danger.” (Ibid.) An inchoate, unparticularized suspicion or hunch
is insufficient. (Ibid.) Instead, the officer must point to “specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” (Terry, at p.
21; People v. Medina (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 171, 176.)
We exercise our independent judgment to determine whether,
on the facts presented, the patdown search here was reasonable.
(People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 830.) “In doing so we do
not consider each fact in isolation. Instead, ‘we must consider “the
totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.” ’ ” (People v.
Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1043 (Flores).) We also consider that
“experienced police officers develop an ability to perceive the
unusual and suspicious, and [courts] recognize the right and duty of
officers to make reasonable investigation of such activities.” (People
v. Aldridge (1984) 35 Cal.3d 473, 477.)
The burden is on the prosecution to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence the facts justifying a warrantless
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search. (People v. Johnson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 717, 729.) In
reviewing a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court’s express
and implied factual findings that are supported by substantial
evidence. (People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 592.)
Substantial evidence must be “ ‘ “reasonable, credible, and of solid
value.” ’ ” (People v. Ayon (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 926, 937.)
We conclude the patdown here was lawful. Police may stop a
vehicle and detain the occupants based on a traffic law violation.
(People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 564 (Lomax) [illegal lane
change].) Perez concedes that he made an illegal U-turn, justifying
the stop. Perez then failed to produce a valid driver’s license in
violation of Vehicle Code section 12951, subdivision (a).
Having violated two Vehicle Code sections, Officer Oregel
lawfully ordered Perez to exit the vehicle. (Pennsylvania v. Mimms
(1977) 434 U.S. 106, 109–111; Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 564.)
Once Perez stepped outside his vehicle, Officer Oregel stated, “I’m
going to pat you down for weapons. Is that cool[?]” Perez did not
respond and when Officer Oregel asked him if he was armed, Perez
said he had a BB gun on his person. Because a BB gun can qualify
as a dangerous or deadly weapon (see, e.g., People v. Brown (2012)
210 Cal.App.4th 1, 7–8; People v. Lochtefeld (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th
533, 535), Perez’s admission could reasonably increase Officer
Oregel’s safety concerns.
And once Perez said he had a BB gun, Officer Oregel had
specific and articulable facts supporting a reasonable belief that
Perez could be armed and dangerous. (Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at
p. 24.) As our high court stated in Terry, the police officer “need not
be absolutely certain that the individual is armed.” (Id. at p. 27.)
Given Officer Oregel’s personal knowledge of firearm offenses in the
area, and that Perez admitted he had a weapon, it was not
unreasonable to conduct a weapons search. (Ibid.) To conclude
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otherwise would “deny [an] officer the power to take necessary
measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a
weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.” (Id. at p.
24.)
Perez nevertheless contends that his presence in a “high
crime” area at nighttime cannot justify the patdown. We agree that
these factors, alone, cannot justify a patdown. “But looking at
‘factors in isolation from each other does not take into account the
“totality of the circumstances.” ’ [Citation.] Instead, it employs a
segmented analysis that Terry precludes.” (People v. Esparza
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1092; see also Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at p. 1043.) And here, we conclude the motion to suppress was
properly denied based on the totality of the circumstances.2
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
CODY, P. J. YEGAN, J.
2 Exhibit 1 (body-worn footage of arresting officer) was
transmitted by the superior court and has been received by this
court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.224.) Accordingly, appellant’s
motion to transmit the exhibit is denied as moot.
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Laura F. Priver, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Justin Behravesh, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Michael J. Wise and
Margaret Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.