Filed 7/29/26 P. v. Perez CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B350051
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. XEAKA113936)
v.
ERIC ARMENTA PEREZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mike Camacho, Judge. Affirmed.
Eric Armenta Perez, in pro. per.; John L. Staley, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
A jury convicted Eric Perez of first degree murder. Perez
petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1
The trial court denied the petition on the ground it was a
successive petition. Perez appealed from the order denying his
petition, his appellate counsel filed a brief under People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, and Perez filed a supplemental
brief. We independently review the record and conclude that
Perez is not entitled to resentencing.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of an incident during which Perez’s
uncle made offensive comments about women in public.2 His
uncle argued with the victim, who had taken umbrage at the
comments. At his uncle’s instruction, Perez retrieved a gun and
handed it to his uncle, who shot and killed the victim.
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
2 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of this division’s
opinion affirming Perez’s judgment of conviction on direct appeal,
People v. Perez (Jan. 28, 2021, B296242) [nonpub. opn.]. (Evid.
Code, § 452, subd. (a); see generally People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 972 (Lewis) [appellate opinion generally part of
record of conviction in § 1172.6 proceedings].) We reference the
evidence described therein only “for background purposes and to
provide context for the parties’ arguments.” (People v. Flores
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 978, fn. 2, disapproved on another
ground in People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 569.) We do not
rely on these facts in assessing whether the trial court properly
concluded that Perez failed to make a prima facie showing of
eligibility for resentencing. (Flores, at p. 988.)
2
In 2018, a jury convicted Perez of first degree murder with
true findings on allegations the murder was premeditated and a
principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). In
2019, the trial court sentenced Perez to 25 years to life and
stayed the sentence on the firearm enhancement.
In 2021, Perez filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6, which the trial court denied.3 A different panel of
this division affirmed that order denying Perez’s section 1172.6
petition, finding that Perez’s jury was not instructed on felony
murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine or on
a theory that allowed the jury to impute malice to him. (People v.
Perez (Jan. 8, 2024, B324095) [nonpub. opn.].)4
Thereafter, in 2025, Perez again petitioned for resentencing
under section 1172.6. On September 11, 2025, the trial court
summarily denied the petition because Perez had “previously
filed a petition” that was denied at the prima facie stage.
Accordingly, Perez “is barred from renewing a request under”
section 1172.6.
This appeal followed. Perez’s appellate counsel filed an
opening brief that raised no issues and asked this court to
independently review the record under People v. Delgadillo,
supra, 14 Cal.5th 216. We directed counsel to provide a copy of
the record to Perez. Perez then filed a supplemental letter brief
in which he appears to argue that the felony murder doctrine no
longer applies to his case, he could not be guilty of implied malice
3 The 2021 petition is not in the record on appeal.
4 We also take judicial notice of that opinion. (Evid. Code,
§ 452, subd. (a).)
3
second degree murder, and his youth was a relevant factor to
determine his mens rea for the crime.
DISCUSSION
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
1437) and subsequent related legislation limited accomplice
liability under the felony-murder rule, eliminated the natural
and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder, and
eliminated convictions for murder based on a theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime. (See generally People v. Reyes (2023) 14
Cal.5th 981, 986; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957, 959; People
v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile).)
Senate Bill 1437 added section 188, subdivision (a)(3),
which provides that “to be convicted of murder, a principal in a
crime shall act with malice aforethought” and malice “shall not
be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in
a crime.” Senate Bill 1437 also amended the felony-murder rule
by adding section 189, subdivision (e), which provides that a
participant in the perpetration of qualifying felonies is liable for
felony murder only if the person (1) was the actual killer, (2) was
not the actual killer but, with the intent to kill, acted as a direct
aider and abettor, or (3) the person was a major participant in
the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to
human life, as described in section 190.2, subdivision
(d). (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 842.)
Senate Bill 1437 created a procedure, codified at section
1172.6, for a person convicted of murder under the former law to
be resentenced if the person could not be convicted of those
crimes under current law. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959;
Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.) A defendant commences
4
that procedure by filing a petition containing a declaration that,
among other things, the defendant could not be convicted of
murder under current law. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 708.)
At this prima facie stage, the trial court takes as true the
petitioner’s factual allegations and assesses whether the
petitioner would be entitled to relief if those allegations were
proved. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) The trial court may
look at the record of conviction, including jury instructions,
verdicts, and closing argument, to determine readily
ascertainable facts such as the crime of conviction. (People v.
Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798, 815; see, e.g., People v.
Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 56.) If at the prima facie stage
the record of conviction establishes that the petition is meritless,
the trial court may dismiss it. (Lewis, at p. 971.)
The trial court here properly dismissed Perez’s petition.
Although successive petitions are not necessarily barred if they
rest on new legal authority, Perez cited no new authority. (See
generally People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 946–947.)
Also, the record of conviction established that Perez was
ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. The trial court did
not instruct his jury on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine or felony murder. Instead, the trial court instructed the
jury on direct aiding and abetting with CALCRIM No. 401.
Direct aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of murder after
the passage of Senate Bill 1437. (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp.
847–848.)
As to arguments Perez raises in his supplemental brief, the
jury did not convict him of implied malice second degree murder.
It convicted him of first degree murder with a premeditation
5
finding. (Compare with People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th
400, 416–417 [youth is relevant to whether defendant acted with
implied malice second degree murder].) To the extent Perez also
asks for appointment of new appellate counsel or otherwise raises
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, we reject the
argument and request for new appellate counsel. (See generally
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118; People v. Lyons (2009) 178
Cal.App.4th 1355, 1359, fn. 1 [appellate counsel is “ ‘ “captain of
the ship” ’ ” who alone decides what contentions are arguably
meritorious].)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Eric Perez’s Penal Code section 1172.6
petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ASHWORTH, J.*
We concur:
ADAMS, Acting P. J. HANASONO, J.
* Retired Judge of the El Dorado Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
6