Filed 8/28/26 P. v. Pazpadilla CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E086277
v. (Super.Ct.Nos. BAF2300395 &
SWF2001232)
DIONISIO GERARDO PAZPADILLA,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Brian S. McCarville,
Judge. Affirmed.
Ariana D’Agostino, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley and
Britton B. Lacy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Defendant and appellant Dionisio Gerardo PazPadilla appeals from the judgment
entered against him by the Riverside County Superior Court. His sole contention is his
admission of a strike prior must be reversed because he did not voluntarily and
intelligently waive his right to a trial on that allegation. We will affirm.
BACKGROUND
In January 2022 defendant, who had been charged with three felony counts of
domestic violence, pled guilty to a felony charge of attempting to prevent or dissuade a
crime victim from reporting the offense to law enforcement, a violation of Penal Code
section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1), a strike offense.1 In keeping with the plea agreement,
the trial court placed defendant on probation for three years. One condition of
defendant’s probation was a prohibition on possessing any firearms or ammunition.
A. Defendant Violates His Probation and the Resulting Charges Include Prohibited
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition, and a Prior Strike Allegation
During a routine probation search of defendant’s home in April 2023, officers
discovered a pistol, three rifles (one was loaded), and multiple rounds of various
ammunition in the master bedroom. That discovery led to the filing of a complaint in
Riverside County Superior Court case No. BAF2300395 (No. BAF2300395) charging
defendant with two felony counts of unlawful possession of firearms (§ 29800, subd.
(a)(1), counts 1 & 2) with each charge including an allegation that defendant had been
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code and references to rules are
to the California Rules of Court.
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convicted in January 2022 for a felony violation of subdivision (b)(1) of section 136.1
and alleging a strike prior (collectively, the January 2022 conviction).
After a preliminary hearing on the complaint, an information was filed that
included the two counts alleged in the complaint and added two additional counts of
felony possession of firearms (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1), counts 3 & 4) as well as a fifth count
of felony possession of ammunition, with each count alleging defendant’s January 2022
felony violation of subdivision (b)(1) of section 136.1 (the prohibited possession
allegations). The information also included the January 2022 conviction as an alleged
strike prior (§§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) and alleged an aggravating
factor that defendant committed those offenses while on probation (rule 4.421(b)(4)).
A violation of probation allegation as to defendant’s 2022 section 136.1 conviction
was trailed under a different Riverside County Superior Court case No. SWF2001232
(No. SWF2001232), the probation violation.
B. Defendant Admits the Prior Strike and the Prohibited Possession Allegations
On May 13, 2025, when the jury trial was set to begin, the trial court asked
defendant’s counsel whether defendant intended to admit or bifurcate his status as a
convicted felon “at least on the charges,” counsel stated she again needed to speak with
defendant about that subject, noting the case had been sent out for trial really quickly.
The court stated, “[w]e have seven minutes” and a recess was taken. There is no record
of how long the recess actually lasted.
When the court reconvened, defendant’s counsel stated defendant “will be
stipulating to the felony part.” The court advised defendant of his right to a court or jury
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trial on the allegation of his 2022 conviction contained in the five unlawful possession
charges, and explained that, if defendant did not admit the prior conviction element, the
People had the right to prove up not only the unlawful weapon possession but also
defendant’s felony status. Thereafter, defendant admitted that he had been convicted of a
violation of section 126 as alleged in counts 1 to 5.
The court then turned to defendant’s strike, noting it was the same 2022 conviction
defendant had just admitted with respect to the five unlawful possession charges and, if a
court or jury found the strike true, the strike would have the effect of doubling any
potential punishment if he was convicted. Defendant waived his right to trial on that
issue and admitted the strike. He opted for a bench trial as to the alleged aggravating
factor of being on probation at the time he committed the prohibited possession offenses.
The jury found defendant guilty of four counts of being a prohibited person in
possession of a firearm and one count of being a prohibited person in possession of
ammunition.
The trial court found true beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating factor that
defendant committed each of the five offenses while he was on probation. It also found
that defendant had violated his probation as alleged in No. SWF2001232.
The court sentenced defendant to a state prison term of two years (the mid-term)
for each of the five unlawful possession counts, doubled on account of his admitted
strike, and a two-year prison sentence for the probation violation. The sentences were
ordered to run concurrently. Defendant appealed the judgments.
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DISCUSSION
On appeal, defendant claims his admission of his January 2022 conviction must be
reversed because, in view of the trial court’s failure to advise him either of his right to
remain silent or his right to confront witnesses against him, he did not voluntarily and
intelligently waive his right to trial on that issue. The People agree the court’s
advisement was deficient in those respects but argue defendant’s admission was knowing
and intelligent because he had previously and repeatedly been advised of his trial rights
before admitting the strike prior. We agree with the People.
A. The Need for a Knowing and Voluntary Admission
If a defendant’s admission of a previous conviction allegation can subject the
defendant to an increased punishment, the admission must be made knowingly and
voluntarily. (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 (Cross).) To that end, the trial
court must inform the defendant of three constitutional protections and solicit a personal
waiver of each: the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a jury
trial, and the right to confront one’s accusers (the Boykin/Tahl admonitions2). (Cross,
supra, at p. 170.) The court must also advise the defendant of penalties and other
sanctions that could be imposed as a consequence of admitting the prior conviction. (Id.,
at pp. 170-171.)
If there are deficiencies in the court’s advisements of those protections (often
referred to herein as “trial rights”), the error is not reversable per se. (Cross, supra, 61
2 Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 243-244; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d
122, 130-133.
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Cal.4th at p. 171.) Instead, we review the entire record to determine if it affirmatively
shows the defendant’s admission of the prior conviction was intelligent and voluntary in
light of the totality of the circumstances. (Ibid.) A defendant’s past experience with the
criminal justice system is relevant to establishing their knowledge and sophistication
regarding their trial rights (id., at p. 180) so long as it can be reasonably inferred from the
record that the defendant was adequately advised of those rights in a prior proceeding
(People v. Kinnear (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1116).
B. Defendant’s Admission Was Knowing and Voluntary
Here, the record provides ample support for the conclusion that defendant had
knowledge of his trial rights and the specific consequences of his plea when he admitted
his January 2022 conviction during the unlawful possession proceedings.
When defendant admitted that offense at the time of his conviction in 2022, he was
fully advised of his rights and stated both in writing and on the record that he understood
them.
When, in May 2023 defendant was arraigned on the initial April 2023 unlawful
firearms possession complaint, his counsel waived a formal arraignment and stipulated
defendant had been advised of his legal and constitutional rights. Defendant also was
present at the August 12, 2024, preliminary hearing when his counsel cross-examined the
police officer who conducted the compliance check of defendant’s residence and found
the firearms in the master bedroom.
After the preliminary hearing, the People filed an information. In the course of the
August 26, 2024, arraignment on the information, the trial court advised defendant of his
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privilege against self-incrimination, and of his rights to a speedy and public trial by judge
or jury, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and to present evidence on his own
behalf. The court also advised him of the charges and consequences of his plea and
statutory sentencing. Based upon its inquiry and examination of defendant, the court
found defendant had the ability to understand, and that he understood his constitutional
rights.
And, at the May 2025 hearing, a recess was taken for defendant and his counsel to
again discuss the issue of making an admission. While neither that unreported discussion
nor defendant’s presence during his counsel’s cross-examination of the witness against
him at the preliminary hearing standing alone may be relied upon to establish a knowing
and intelligent admission (People v. Christian (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 688, 698), those
facts combined with the complete advisements given defendant on three occasions and
those given at the time of defendant’s admission of the strike lend support to our
conclusion that his admission of the prior conviction was intelligent and voluntary in
light of the totality of the circumstances.
Defendant argues reversal is required because (i) according to him, his prior
advisement occurred when he pled guilty to the strike offense in 2022, nearly three years
before he admitted he had suffered that strike; (ii) when the court accepted defendant’s
admission in 2022, it did not discuss those rights with him in open court; (iii) defendant
may have been confused when he admitted the prior strike; and (iv) “the trial court’s error
[was] compounded by [defendant’s] language barrier.” We are not persuaded.
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1. Defendant’s Stale and Inadequate Advisement Claim
Defendant posits his past experience in the criminal justice system cannot be relied
upon for establishing that he had knowledge of his trial rights because the only complete
advisement of those rights he had ever received was when he entered his guilty plea in
the 2022 felony strike case, “nearly three years before [defendant’s] instant case.”
Defendant is mistaken. The trial court had fully advised defendant of those rights on
August 26, 2024, less than nine months before defendant’s May 13, 2025 admission.
Defendant also argues the advisement given to him at the time he entered his
guilty plea in 2022 was deficient because the trial court did not “discuss” his trial rights
during the plea colloquy. His claim falls well short of the mark. Defendant, with his
counsel, reviewed and completed a two-page or double-sided Riverside County felony
plea form that not only set forth the advisement of his trial rights, but also provided a
comprehensive list of the consequences of the plea, the terms of the plea, a statement of
defendant’s understanding. Defendant signed the form indicating he had read and
understood the entire form.
In addition, a translator signed the form stating he had translated it for defendant
and defendant understood the form’s contents before he signed it, and defendant’s
counsel also executed a statement defendant understood his constitutional rights and was
aware a guilty plea waives those rights, and that defendant had an adequate opportunity
to discuss the matter with counsel. The trial court was provided with a copy of the
completed form and, before taking defendant’s admission, questioned defendant to be
certain he had gone over “everything on both sides” of the form, that defendant had
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personally signed the form, that he understood he was pleading guilty to a strike, and
confirmed that defendant had no questions about the ramifications of pleading guilty to a
strike offense and no questions about anything on the form except “[j]ust the fine.” It is
clear from the foregoing that the court did in fact discuss defendant’s rights with him and
was assured that defendant knew and understood them.
Defendant argues two cases, People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353 (Mosby) and
People v. Lloyd (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 49 (Lloyd) also support his stale and inadequate
advisement claim. We do not agree.
In Lloyd, as here, the trial court did not include the rights to confront witnesses
and to remain silent in the Boykin/Tahl admonitions given before the defendant admitted
having five prior felony convictions. (Lloyd, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.) There,
Division Three of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District found the admissions
were not knowing and voluntary because they were made almost 15 months after Lloyd
was advised of his trial rights and because the record did not include information about
how the five prior convictions were obtained so no inference of his having received
Boykin/Tahl admonitions at that time could be made. (Lloyd, at pp. 52, 59.)
Lloyd is readily distinguishable from this case. Here, as noted ante, there is ample
evidence that defendant was fully advised of his trial rights by the trial court when he
pled guilty to the strike offense in 2022, he was advised of those rights by counsel in
2023, and the trial court again gave defendant a full advisement in 2024, less than nine
months before defendant admitted the strike.
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In Mosby, the California Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim that his
admission of a strike prior was invalid because the trial court did not advise him of his
rights to remain silent and to confront witnesses when he admitted a strike prior. (Mosby,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 364-365.) Defendant argues Mosby is distinguishable from this
case because “[t]he lynchpin of the analysis in Mosby was that the defendant had ‘just’
exercised his Boykin-Tahl rights in his substantive trial” so he should have known he
would have the same rights in a trial on his prior conviction. Defendant’s reading of
Mosby is too narrow.
The Mosby court did include the fact that Mosby had undergone a jury trial just
before he admitted the strike prior and found he would have understood the right to
confront witnesses because he had through his counsel exercised that right at the trial.
(Mosby, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 364.) But that certainly was not the Supreme Court’s sole
consideration. In reviewing the totality of the circumstances in that case, it also found
that (i) unlike a trial on a criminal charge, trial on a prior conviction is simple and
straightforward, usually involving presentation by the People of a certified copy of the
prior conviction along with the defendant's fingerprints or photograph; (ii) Mosby was
represented by counsel; and (iii) he would have been given the Boykin/Tahl admonitions
when he pled guilty to the strike offense in May 1993, a plea entered six years before his
1999 arrest resulted in the admission being considered in the Mosby opinion. (Mosby, at
pp. 356, 359, 364-365.)
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2. Defendant’s Language Barrier Claim
There is simply no basis to believe that defendant’s comprehension of the
advisements he was given by the court or counsel was impeded because English is not his
primary language. He was provided with an interpreter at every hearing as well as when
consulting with his counsel.
3. The Confusion Claim
In support of defendant’s assertion that he could have been confused when
admitting his prior strike, he posits the prosecutor and the court’s clerk were “confused
about what happened” and, therefore, he must also have been confused. The contention
lacks merit. After defendant had admitted the 2022 conviction element in the five
prohibited possession counts, admitted that the conviction was a strike, and decided to
have a court trial instead of a jury determination as to the aggravating factor, the trial
court asked the parties if there was “anything else” to address before taking a lunch
break. That query resulted a request by the People and the clerk to confirm their
understanding of how the case was to proceed:
“MS. ALVARADO [for the People]: And I apologize, your Honor. Just briefly,
did he admit the strike prior, or we are utilizing a bench trial in regards to that, if it comes
to that?
“THE COURT: No. He just admitted the strike prior.
“MS. ALVARADO: That's what I thought.
“THE COURT: It's a bench trial with a factor in aggravation.
“MS. ALVARADO: Thank you, your Honor.
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“THE COURT: That is your understanding, as well, Ms. Chavez?
“MS. CHAVEZ [defense counsel]: Yes.
“THE CLERK: He waives the trial?
“THE COURT: On the factor in aggravation, he waives his right to a jury trial,
and it will be a Court issue only, if he is convicted, and he is admitting the strike prior.”
There is nothing in those exchanges to support the notion defendant or his counsel
suffered any confusion about defendant’s admission.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P. J.
We concur:
MILLER
J.
CODRINGTON
J.
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