Filed 8/17/26 P. v. Parson CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B346248
(Super. Ct. No. GA012116)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)
v.
TERRANCE LAMONT
PARSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
Terrance Lamont Parson appeals from the trial court’s
postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing
pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6.1 We appointed counsel to
represent appellant on appeal. After an examination of the
record, counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues and
requesting that we follow the procedures set forth in People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo). Appellant filed a
supplemental brief raising no arguable issues. We affirm.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Factual and Procedural Background
In July 1992, appellant entered a 7-Eleven store and
attempted to purchase beer. The clerk refused to sell appellant
beer because he did not have identification and was intoxicated.
Appellant left the store but returned approximately an hour to an
hour and a half later and again attempted to purchase beer.
When the clerk refused, appellant exited the store. He returned
moments later displaying a handgun in his waistband and asked
the clerk if he would sell him beer. The clerk attempted to
retrieve the key to the display door but appellant said they
should go in the back.
As the clerk placed the beer into a box, appellant held the
handgun to the clerk’s head and pulled the trigger. The gun
misfired. The clerk fled into a back room. He held the door
closed with his body as appellant tried to push it open. Appellant
fired a shot through the door, striking the clerk in the arm.
Appellant entered the room and a struggle ensued. The clerk
managed to flee the store. Appellant was subsequently arrested.
In September 1992, appellant was charged in an amended
information with second degree robbery (§ 211, count 1) and
attempted willful, deliberate, premeditated murder (§§ 664, 187,
subd. (a), count 2). As to both counts, the information alleged
appellant personally used a firearm (§§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1),
12022.5, subd. (a)) and intentionally and personally inflicted
great bodily injury (§ 12022.7). The information further alleged,
as to count 2, that appellant intentionally and personally inflicted
great bodily injury within the meaning of section 1203.075.
In December 1992, appellant pleaded guilty to both counts
and admitted the special allegation that he personally used a
2
firearm in violation of section 12022.5, subdivision (a). Appellant
was sentenced to 12 years in prison.2
In October 2022, appellant filed a form petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. The trial court found
the petition was facially valid, appointed counsel for appellant,
and set the matter for further proceedings.
In December 2024, counsel for appellant filed briefing in
support of appellant’s petition. The People filed an opposition,
arguing there is no indication that appellant was prosecuted
under any other theory except that of being “the sole actual
perpetrator” of the crime.
In March 2025, the trial court denied appellant’s petition
for resentencing.
Discussion
Where, as here, appointed counsel finds no arguable issues
in an appeal that is not from the first appeal after conviction,
appellant is not entitled to our independent review of the record
pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, or its federal
constitutional counterpart, Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
738. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 226.) He is, however,
entitled to appellate consideration of any contentions raised in
his supplemental brief. (Id. at p. 232.)
In his supplemental brief, appellant raises a number of
contentions challenging the trial court’s denial of his petition.
2 It appears from the record that after appellant was
released from prison in this case, he was convicted by jury in
another case for assault with a deadly weapon. (§ 245, subd.
(a)(1), case no. FVA1101104.) The trial court used the 1992
robbery and attempted murder convictions as “strikes” and
sentenced appellant to 25 years to life.
3
None has merit. For example, he contends (1) counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise “any mitigating factors,” including
that appellant “never intended to kill” the victim and counsel
never questioned the condition of the gun; (2) there are missing
police/medical/scientific reports from the record that would
establish appellant’s theory; (3) the trial court erred by relying on
the plea as a basis for denying the petition and failed to provide a
statement fully setting forth its reasons for doing so; (4) appellant
“wasn’t afforded the opportunity of a youth offender” pursuant to
subsequent changes in the law (Senate Bill Nos. 620, 621) even
though appellant was a 20-year-old youth at the time of the
crimes; (5) the 1992 conviction should be deemed a single strike,
not two strikes; and (6) the probation report prejudicially
“label[ed]” appellant a “gang member” in violation of the Racial
Justice Act.
All of appellant’s contentions, except his third contention,
boil down to an unauthorized collateral attack on the judgment,
which has been final for decades. Orders pursuant to section
1172.6 do not open a conviction to unlimited collateral attack.
(See People v. Nguyen (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 1154, 1157, 1167-
1168.) We review only those issues arising under section 1172.6.
In his third contention, appellant states: “the resentencing
court erred by not granting my order to show cause because it
relied on the information in the plea agreement as a basis for the
denial.” He argues section 1172.6 “clearly allows me . . . to
petition the courts rather [sic] I was convicted by trial or plea
bargain.” But the trial court did not deny appellant’s petition
based solely on his plea agreement. To the contrary, it
considered the “record of conviction,” including the victim’s
testimony at the preliminary hearing, as permitted by People v.
4
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971 (Lewis) and People v. Patton
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 564.
Appellant also contends “the [trial] court erred . . . by not
‘providing a statement fully setting forth its reasons’ ” for
declining to issue an order to show cause. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
On this record, however, any such error was harmless. (Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 973-974.)
We conclude appellant’s counsel properly complied with her
responsibilities in submitting a no-issue brief.
Disposition
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, J.
We concur:
CODY, P. J.
BALTODANO, J.
5
Darrell Mavis, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Heather J. Manolakas, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.