Filed 9/22/26 P. v. Parry CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G065576
v. (Super. Ct. No. 19WF1024)
GEORGETTE MARIE PARRY, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Craig E. Robison, Judge. Affirmed.
James R. Bostwick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Kristine A. Gutierrez and Flavio Nominati, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
After defendant Georgette Marie Parry failed to follow through
on agreed conditions of a plea agreement, the trial court sentenced her to two
years of formal probation. During the probation period, the prosecution
moved to modify the previously ordered amount of victim restitution to align
with the victim’s losses stemming from Parry’s embezzlement of money from
her employer. Parry appeals from the court’s resulting order which increased
victim restitution by $100,000. She challenges the court’s jurisdiction and
authority to modify restitution, contends the court failed to order restitution
to the direct victim of her crimes, and argues there was insufficient evidence
to support the amount ordered. We conclude the latter argument is forfeited
and find no merit in the other two arguments. Accordingly, we affirm the
postjudgment order modifying victim restitution.
FACTS
While employed by a company, Parry embezzled upwards of
$100,000 by increasing her pay through her managerial access to the
company’s payroll system and depositing into her personal bank account a
check forged with the signature of the company’s owner.
In July 2023, Parry pled guilty to three counts: grand theft by an
employee (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (b)(3))1; forgery (§ 470, subd. (a)); and
passing a fraudulent check (§ 476). At the time, notwithstanding police
reports showing a greater loss to the victim, the parties indicated to the court
that victim restitution should be $30,000. Parry agreed to pay half that
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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amount at the time of her plea, and committed to pay the remaining $15,000
via monthly installments. The parties agreed to continue the sentencing
hearing for six months. If Parry made good faith efforts to satisfy the
payment obligations during that time, the prosecution would agree to an
additional six-month continuance of the sentencing hearing. If Parry were to
successfully complete the payments and not violate any laws, she would be
allowed to withdraw her plea as to the forgery and fraudulent check related
counts, and the prosecution would move to dismiss those counts and reduce
the remaining count to a misdemeanor. Otherwise, the court would sentence
her to two years formal probation, with the remainder of restitution to be
paid through probation.
Although Parry made the first $15,000 restitution payment, she
only paid a small amount toward the remaining $15,000 over the course of
the next year. Accordingly, in August 2024, the trial court sentenced her to
two years of formal probation and ordered her to pay the then balance of the
previously ordered victim restitution, which at the time was $13,700.
At some point, the company’s owner recovered $100,000 of
company losses related to Parry’s crimes through third-party insurance. The
insurance company notified the prosecution that the court’s victim restitution
order incorrectly omitted $100,000.
After receiving notice from the insurance company, the
prosecution moved to increase the victim restitution order by $100,000 so the
victim could be made whole. Attached to the moving papers were (1) a proof
of loss statement filed by the company’s owner with the insurance company
which indicated a total loss of $119,394, (2) proof of a $100,000 insurance
payment to the company’s owner in relation to the losses, and (3) a police
report detailing, inter alia, law enforcement investigation of, and
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quantification of, the company’s losses. Regarding the latter, and in addition
to a $1,236 forged check, the report provided two different estimates of the
payroll related losses. In one place, the investigator indicated a finding that
Parry embezzled $118,148 through payroll because her actual gross pay was
$249,208 but it only should have been $131,060. In another place which
summarized the overall report, the investigator indicted Parry embezzled
$131,060.
Parry filed a written opposition to the restitution modification.
She argued the insurance company was an indemnifier, not a direct victim,
meaning the insurance company was not entitled to restitution. In addition,
she construed the deficiency in the original restitution order as a prosecution
error and argued such an error could not authorize the court to modify
restitution because the court had failed to retain jurisdiction to modify the
amount after the original order.
The trial court held a restitution hearing at which it heard
argument from the parties. After taking the matter under submission, the
court ordered the amount of restitution due to the company’s owner to be
increased by $100,000, ordering a total remaining amount to be paid of
$113,575.
Parry timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Parry challenges the trial court’s modification of restitution,
arguing the court abused its discretion because it did not have jurisdiction to
modify the order and it was bound by the plea bargain. In addition, she
contends the court erroneously ordered restitution to the insurance company,
which was not a “direct victim” to whom restitution could be ordered, and she
argues the amount of the restitution order is not supported by substantial
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evidence. We conclude the latter argument is forfeited and the remaining are
without merit.
I.
JURISDICTION TO MODIFY VICTIM RESTITUTION
Whenever “a victim has suffered economic losses as a result of
the defendant’s conduct, the court shall require the defendant make
restitution to the victim . . . based on the amount of loss claimed by the
victim . . . or any other showing to the court.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).) The
applicable statutory scheme mandates that the court order “full [victim]
restitution” (ibid.), meaning “a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully
reimburse the victim . . . for every determined economic loss incurred as the
result of the defendant’s criminal conduct.” (Id., subd. (f)(3).)
In a probation situation, the court may modify the amount of
victim restitution at any time during the period of probation. (See §§ 1202.4,
subd. (f)(1); 1203.3, subd. (b)(5).) Such a modification may be “on [the court’s]
own motion[,] or on the motion of the district attorney, the victim or victims,
or the defendant.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(1).)
Here, Parry was still on probation at the time the court increased
the restitution dollar amount. Indeed, the modification took place less than
one year into her two-year probation term. And, it was done pursuant to a
motion by the district attorney.
Parry’s reliance on People v. Rogers (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 88 is
misplaced. That case concerned a trial court’s jurisdiction to modify probation
terms, namely to add drug and alcohol related conditions, not to modify a
restitution order. (Id. at pp. 92–93.) Tellingly, section 1203.3, which governs
when and how a court may modify probation, expressly provides that it “does
not prohibit the court from modifying the dollar amount of a restitution order
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pursuant to subdivision (f) of [s]ection 1202.4 at any time during the term of
the probation.” (§ 1203.3, subd. (b)(5).)
Equally inapplicable is section 1202.46. That section specifically
concerns situations in which the amount of a victim’s loss cannot be
ascertained at sentencing. (See People v. McCune (2024) 16 Cal.5th 980, 991–
992.) In those situations, the trial court retains jurisdiction over the
defendant for purposes of imposing or modifying restitution “until such time
as the losses may be determined.” (§ 1202.46; see also McCune, at p. 1001.)
The case before us is not a situation in which no restitution amount was
specified at the time of sentencing due to the inability to ascertain the
victim’s losses at the time.
Because Parry was still on probation at the time the court
modified the amount of victim restitution, the court had jurisdiction to make
the change.
II.
PLEA BARGAIN
Next, Parry argues “the [trial] court itself was bound by the plea
agreement [reached by the parties] . . . and . . . [it] had no power to reject or
modify their contract.” However, as the Attorney General points out, a
victim’s right to restitution is both constitution and statute based. (Cal.
Const., art. I, § 28; § 1202.4; People v. Valdez (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1194,
1203.) It cannot be bargained away by the prosecution or the trial court,
meaning “it cannot properly be the subject of plea negotiations.” (Valdez, at p.
1203.) Accordingly, the plea agreement could not limit the trial court’s duty
to order full restitution for the victim. (See § 1202.4, subd. (f).)
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III.
DIRECT VICTIM
“A victim of a crime who incurs an economic loss as a result
of . . . a crime shall receive restitution directly from a defendant convicted of
that crime.” (§ 1202.4.) “[A] ‘victim’ is a person who suffers direct or
threatened physical, psychological, or financial harm as a result of the
commission . . . of a crime.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28(e).)
Parry concedes restitution was ordered to the company’s owner,
who was the direct victim, and the restitution order made no mention of the
insurance company. Nevertheless, she argues modification was unwarranted
because the company’s owner had already been fully compensated by
insurance, making the insurance company the true beneficiary of the
proceeds.
However, “direct victims of a crime have a statutory right to
restitution on the full amount of their losses without regard to the full or
partial recoupment from other sources (except the state Restitution Fund).”
(People v. Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 463, 468.) Stated differently, “trial
courts are not to consider whether the victim has been, or will be, reimbursed
from third parties in ordering victim restitution.” (In re Brittany L. (2002) 99
Cal.App.4th 1381, 1388; accord People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 246.)
Third parties include private insurance companies. (See Birkett, at p. 246.)
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in modifying victim restitution
notwithstanding the third-party insurance payment received by the
company’s owner.
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IV.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Parry’s final contention is that the modified restitution amount is
not supported by substantial evidence. But, she did not challenge the amount
of modified restitution requested by the prosecution below or any of the
evidence submitted in support thereof. As a result, she forfeited any claim
that the ordered amount was not warranted by the evidence. (See People v.
Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1075; People v. Garcia (2010) 185
Cal.App.4th 1203, 1218.)
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order is affirmed.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
SCOTT, J.
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