Filed 7/1/26 P. v. Olson CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B345037
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA018677)
v.
ERICA DAWN OLSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Hector M. Guzman, Judge. Affirmed.
William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Scott A. Taryle, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________
Defendant Erica Dawn Olson appeals from the denial of her
request for an evidence preservation proceeding under People v.
Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin). The trial court found
defendant was ineligible for a Franklin proceeding because she
had been sentenced to life without parole (LWOP), and was
therefore statutorily ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing
under Penal Code1 section 3051.
Defendant argues section 3051’s LWOP exclusion violates
equal protection and the California Constitution’s prohibition of
cruel or unusual punishment. Her arguments largely are
foreclosed by Supreme Court and Court of Appeal precedent. We
further conclude the equal protection analysis in People v. Briscoe
(2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479 (Briscoe) does not aid defendant
because defendant was convicted under the general felony
murder special circumstance, section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17),
whereas Briscoe’s holding was limited to the narrower major
participant/reckless indifference special circumstance under
section 190.2, subdivision (d).
Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND2
In 1994, defendant and three confederates burglarized
defendant’s former roommate’s apartment, during which the
former roommate was killed and her two children seriously
injured.
1 Unspecified statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
2 We grant the Attorney General’s request for judicial
notice filed June 17, 2026, and defendant’s request for judicial
notice filed June 18, 2026.
2
In 1995, a jury convicted defendant of first degree murder
and found true a special circumstance allegation that the murder
occurred during the commission of a residential burglary and
residential robbery that resulted in a person’s death. (See
§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) The jury also convicted defendant of
burglary and two counts of robbery.3 For the murder, the trial
court sentenced defendant to life in prison without the possibility
of parole. In 1997, we affirmed the judgment on direct appeal.
In 2024, defendant, in propria persona, filed a motion
under Franklin and In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 (Cook). In
the motion, defendant stated she was 20 years old when she
committed the murder, and requested an evidence preservation
proceeding in anticipation of a future youth offender parole
hearing under section 3051. The motion acknowledged section
3051 excludes offenders like defendant who committed their
offenses between the ages of 18 and 25 and were sentenced to
LWOP, but argued the exclusion violates defendant’s
constitutional right to equal protection and constitutes cruel or
unusual punishment.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion without a
hearing because defendant was ineligible for a Franklin
proceeding due to her LWOP sentence.
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues, as she did below, that she is entitled to a
Franklin proceeding and youth offender parole hearing under
3 In an earlier trial, the jury convicted defendant of
attempted murder and child abuse for the attacks on the two
children.
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principles of equal protection and her right against cruel or
unusual punishment. Our review is de novo. (People v. Laird
(2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469; People v. Torres (2024)
107 Cal.App.5th 513, 538.)
A. Youth Offender Parole Hearings and Franklin
Proceedings
In 2013 the Legislature enacted section 3051 “following a
series of court decisions identifying Eighth Amendment limits on
the sentencing of juvenile offenders.” (People v. Hardin (2024)
15 Cal.5th 834, 844 (Hardin).) “ ‘In language echoing the
holdings of these cases,’ the statute established youth offender
parole hearings to offer ‘ “a meaningful opportunity” for release
[citation], giving “great weight to the diminished culpability of
youth as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and
any subsequent growth and increased maturity” [citation].’
[Citation.]” (Briscoe, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 488.)
Originally, section 3051 granted youth offender parole
hearings “only for juvenile offenders incarcerated for crimes
committed before the age of 18.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 845.) Through a series of amendments, the Legislature later
expanded the statute to grant hearings to those who committed
their offenses before the age of 26. (Id. at pp. 845–846.) “In
expanding section 3051 beyond the constitutional minimum age
of 18 set out in [U.S. Supreme Court decisions], the Legislature
considered scientific evidence that neurological development,
particularly in areas of the brain relevant to judgment and
decisionmaking, continues beyond adolescence and into the mid-
20’s.” (Hardin, at p. 846.)
The current version of section 3051, therefore, grants youth
offender parole hearings to most defendants who committed their
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offenses before the age of 26. (§ 3051, subd. (a)(1).) LWOP
defendants, however, are eligible for a youth offender parole
hearing only if they committed their controlling offenses before
they turned 18. (Id., subds. (a)(1), (b)(4).) The Legislature has
not expanded relief to LWOP defendants who committed their
controlling offense after they turned 18, and those defendants are
categorically ineligible for youth offender parole hearings. (Id.,
subd. (h).)
A defendant who qualifies for a future youth offender
parole hearing under section 3051 is entitled to a proceeding in
the trial court at which the defendant “may place on the record
any documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to cross-
examination) that may be relevant at his eventual youth offender
parole hearing.” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284; see Cook,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 451 [offender eligible under section 3051
may request Franklin proceeding despite sentence being final].)
B. Defendant Fails To Show Her Exclusion From
Section 3051 Violates Equal Protection
“ ‘Equal protection of the laws means that similarly
situated persons shall be treated similarly unless there is a
sufficiently good reason to treat them differently.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Munoz (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 143, 162.) “[W]hen a
statute involves neither a suspect classification nor a
fundamental right, the ‘general rule is that legislation is
presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification
drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.’ [Citations.]” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 847.)
This rational basis review applies to challenges to the
“constitutionality of law[s] prescribing different collateral
consequences for different types of criminal convictions,”
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including section 3051. (Hardin, at p. 847; see Briscoe, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 487.)
Defendant argues the Legislature has recognized through
the enactment of, and amendments to section 3051, that people
who commit crimes before the age of 26 are less culpable and
more capable of rehabilitation than older offenders. Given that
recognition, defendant contends there is no rational basis to
further divide the under-26 group by crime committed or age.
Yet section 3051 does so: The statute includes non-LWOP
murderers who offended between the ages of 18 and 26 but
excludes LWOP defendants in the same age range; and it
includes LWOP defendants who offended under the age of 18, but
excludes LWOP defendants who offended between the ages of 18
and 26.
As defendant acknowledges, our Supreme Court in Hardin
held section 3051 does not violate equal protection by granting
parole hearings to non-LWOP young adults while denying them
to young adults sentenced to LWOP for special circumstance
murder. (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 839.) This is because
“special circumstance murder is a uniquely serious offense,” and
“the Legislature could rationally balance the seriousness of the
offender’s crimes against the capacity of all young adults for
growth, and determine that young adults who have committed
certain very serious crimes should remain ineligible for release
from prison.” (Ibid.) Defendant is serving an LWOP sentence for
special circumstance murder. Hardin forecloses her equal
protection argument based on differential treatment of LWOP
and non-LWOP young adult offenders.
The Supreme Court has yet to address the argument that
section 3051 violates equal protection by dividing LWOP
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defendants by age, granting hearings to those who committed
their LWOP-eligible crimes before the age of 18 but not those who
committed their LWOP-eligible crimes between the ages of 18
and 26. Courts of Appeal have addressed the argument and
rejected it. (See People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 204
[collecting cases].) As explained in Sands, because the Eighth
Amendment limits LWOP sentences for juveniles but not young
adults, “the Legislature could rationally decide to remedy
unconstitutional sentences but go no further.” (Id. at p. 204.)
Similarly, In re Murray (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 456 observed the
United States and California Supreme Courts “have found the
line drawn between juveniles and nonjuveniles to be a rational
one” for purposes of criminal sentencing, and therefore the age
distinction under section 3051 is rational as well. (Id. at pp. 463–
464.)
We agree with these decisions. As Hardin recognized,
“special circumstance murder is a uniquely serious offense.”
(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 839). The Legislature rationally
may deny an opportunity for early release to special circumstance
murderers on that basis, while granting that opportunity to
juveniles serving LWOP sentences as required by the Eighth
Amendment.
Although not cited by defendant below or in her initial
appellate briefing, we requested and received supplemental
briefing from the parties as to the impact on this appeal of
Briscoe, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th 479. Briscoe held section 3051
violates equal protection as applied to a defendant sentenced to
LWOP under section 190.2, subdivision (d). (Briscoe, at p. 485.)
Section 190.2, subdivision (d) permits a court to impose an LWOP
sentence when a defendant, although “not the actual killer,”
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“with reckless indifference to human life and as a major
participant, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits,
requests, or assists in the commission of [an enumerated felony]
which results in the death of some person or persons.” (§ 190.2,
subd. (d).)
The Briscoe court determined that, following Senate Bill
No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), the elements of section 190.2,
subdivision (d) are now identical to the elements of non-LWOP
felony murder under section 189, subdivision (e)(3). (Briscoe,
supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 491.) The court concluded
section 3051 therefore “violates equal protection by excluding
youth offenders sentenced for special circumstance murder under
section 190.2, subdivision (d) . . . while including those convicted
of nonspecial circumstance first degree felony murder for the
same specified felony offenses per the exact same standard under
section 189, subdivision (e)(3).” (Briscoe, at p. 485.) The court
therefore “reform[ed]” section 3051 “to include youth offenders
like Briscoe who were sentenced to life without parole under
section 190.2, subdivision (d) for murder during a robbery or
burglary.” (Briscoe, at p. 496.)
Unlike in Briscoe, defendant here was not sentenced to
LWOP under subdivision (d) of section 190.2, but rather the
general special circumstance felony murder provision,
section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17). Subdivision (a)(17) is a special
circumstance that makes a murder LWOP- or death-eligible if the
murder “was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or
was an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission
of, or the immediate flight after committing, or attempting to
commit” enumerated felonies, including robbery and burglary.
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A), (G).) Section 190.2, subdivision (d)
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narrows subdivision (a)(17) to the extent the defendant was
neither the actual killer nor had intent to kill, and requires the
additional proof that the defendant was a major participant in
the enumerated felony and acted with reckless indifference to
human life.
Defendant argues it is immaterial that she was convicted
under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) rather than
subdivision (d) because the rationale of Briscoe applies to all
special circumstance felony murder regardless of the theory
under which it was proven.
Defendant fails to support this argument. Briscoe
concluded the major participant/reckless indifference elements of
section 190.2, subdivision (d) are identical to the elements under
section 189, subdivision (e)(3), and therefore there is no rational
basis to treat someone convicted under the former statute as less
deserving of section 3051’s leniency than someone convicted
under the latter. As the Attorney General observes, however,
special circumstance felony murder under section 190.2,
subdivision (a)(17) does not have identical elements to standard
felony murder under section 189. Courts have imposed an
additional requirement on special circumstance felony murder,
namely that it applies “only if the murderer had a felonious
purpose independent of, or concurrent with, the murder.” (People
v. Andreasen (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 70, 81.) “If the defendant
committed the felony for the sole purpose of effectuating the
killing, the felony-murder special circumstance does not apply.”
(Ibid.; see Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 860 [robbery-murder
special circumstance does not apply “ ‘when the defendant’s
intent is not to steal but to kill and the robbery is merely
incidental to the murder.’ ”].) Courts have held nonspecial
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circumstance felony murder under section 189 does not have this
independent felonious purpose requirement. (Andreasen, at
p. 82, fn. 7.)
Briscoe itself does not support defendant’s assertion that
Briscoe’s rationale applies outside the context of section 190.2,
subdivision (d). Briscoe avoided deciding whether the
independent felonious purpose requirement distinguishes
section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) from standard felony murder.
Instead, Briscoe concluded more narrowly that the independent
felonious purpose requirement does not apply to section 190.2,
subdivision (d) because offenders convicted under that provision
are “neither the actual killer nor acted with an intent to kill.”
(Briscoe, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 495.) We need not decide if
that is a correct statement of law, because, again, in this case
defendant was not convicted under section 190.2, subdivision (d),
but subdivision (a)(17), which encompasses actual killers and
aiders and abettors with intent to kill, and to which the
independent felonious purpose requirement applies.
Alternatively, defendant argues Briscoe applies to her
because the evidence at her trial as well as the opinions from her
prior appeals establish the jury found the special circumstance
true on the theory she was a major participant acting with
reckless indifference to human life, thus effectively convicting her
under section 190.2, subdivision (d).
We are not in a position to assess the evidence from
defendant’s trial. We do not have that evidence before us. Even
if we did, defendant did not present the evidence in the trial court
and the People have not had a chance to address it.
What record we do have does not preclude the possibility
defendant was convicted as an actual killer or aider and abettor
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in the killing. The jury instructions included aiding and abetting,
deliberate and premeditated murder, and felony murder. The
special circumstance instructions included the major
participant/reckless indifference elements “[i]f [the jury] find[s]
the defendant was not the actual killer,” as well as the
independent felonious purpose instruction. The verdict forms for
the special circumstance referenced section 190.2, subdivision
(a)(17), not subdivision (d).
We acknowledge two of our prior unpublished opinions,
which concerned defendant’s petition for resentencing under
former section 1170.95 (now numbered section 1172.6), stated
defendant was convicted of the special circumstance as a major
participant acting with reckless indifference. (See People v.
Olson (Dec. 20, 2022, B300206); People v. Olson (Aug. 26, 2020),
B300206, ordered vacated Sept. 28, 2022, S264322.) Those
statements appear to have followed from the resentencing court’s
conclusion that defendant was ineligible for relief because
defendant was convicted as a major participant acting with
reckless indifference, a conclusion we reversed in the 2022
opinion because the resentencing court had not held an
evidentiary hearing. We do not read our prior opinions as
definitively deciding the theory under which defendant was
convicted.
In sum, defendant has not shown her exclusion from
section 3051 violates equal protection.
C. Defendant’s LWOP Sentence Is Not Cruel or Unusual
Punishment
Defendant argues her LWOP sentence violates the
California Constitution’s prohibition against cruel or unusual
punishment. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.) This argument is
11
foreclosed by Supreme Court and Court of Appeal precedent. Our
Supreme Court has held, “Neither the Eighth Amendment and
equal protection clause of the federal Constitution nor the
corresponding provisions of the California Constitution per se
prohibit death as punishment for crimes committed when 18
years of age.” (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 404.) If
both the federal and state constitutions permit death sentences
for crimes committed at age 18 or older, it follows they permit
LWOP sentences as well. (See In re Williams (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 427, 439 [“If the Eighth Amendment does not
prohibit a sentence of death for 21 year olds, then most assuredly,
it does not prohibit the lesser LWOP sentence.”].) Courts of
Appeal expressly have held LWOP sentences for young adult
offenders are not cruel or unusual under the state Constitution.
(See People v. Cortez (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1201, 1215–1216;
People v. Ellis (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 536, 550–551.)
Defendant states she does not contend her sentence was
cruel or unusual when it was imposed, but argues the
Legislature’s subsequent recognition that those who offend
between the ages of 18 and 25 are, like juveniles, less culpable
than older offenders has caused her sentence to become “grossly
disproportionate.” Defendant cites no authority suggesting the
Legislature can override the Supreme Court’s constitutional
interpretation. Further, “[w]e decline [defendant’s] invitation to
conclude new insights and societal understandings about the
juvenile brain require us to conclude the bright line of 18 years
old in the criminal sentencing context is unconstitutional. Our
nation’s, and our state’s, highest court have concluded 18 years
old is the bright-line rule and we are bound by their holdings.”
(People v. Perez (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 612, 617 (Perez).)
12
Defendant argues Perez is not instructive because it
concerned the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment rather than the California Constitution’s
prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment. We disagree. Perez
began its discussion by citing both the federal and statute cruel-
and/or-unusual standards, and adopted the reasoning of People v.
Argeta (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1478, which upheld an 18-year-old
offender’s sentence under both the federal and state standards.
(Perez, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at pp. 616–617; Argeta, at p. 1482
[“Argeta’s sentence is not cruel and/or unusual”].)
DISPOSITION
The order denying the motion for a Franklin evidence
preservation proceeding is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
We concur:
WEINGART, J.
M. KIM, J.
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