Filed 9/30/26 P. v. Nyambi CA1/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A175742
v.
TITA NYAMBI, (Humboldt County
Super. Ct. No. CR2403930)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Tita Nyambi appeals from an order revoking his mandatory
supervision and requiring him to serve the remainder of his previously
imposed sentence based on his convictions for various drug offenses. His
appointed counsel filed a brief raising no issues and requesting that we
independently review the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979)
25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Counsel advised defendant he could file a
supplemental brief on his own behalf, but he has not done so. We conclude
the appeal is moot and therefore dismiss it.
BACKGROUND
On March 28, 2025, the People filed a first amended information
charging defendant with possessing methamphetamine for sale (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11378; count 1); possessing heroin after two or more specified
prior convictions (id., § 11395; count 2); and possessing methamphetamine
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after two or more specified prior convictions (ibid.; count 3). Three
aggravating factors were also alleged.
On April 1, a jury found defendant not guilty of count 1, but guilty of its
lesser included offense of misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). The jury also found defendant guilty
of counts 2 and 3.
On June 4, the parties stipulated to one of the aggravating factors
alleged. The trial court imposed a split sentence of two years, with one year
to be served in county jail, and the execution of the remaining time to be
suspended and made a period of mandatory supervision. (Pen. Code, § 1170,
subd. (h)(5).) His conditions of mandatory supervision required him to report
to probation within two days of his release from custody, obey all laws, and
not possess any controlled substances, among other conditions. The court
awarded defendant 297 days of custody credits.
Defendant appealed, and in August 2026, this court affirmed the
judgment. (People v. Nyambi (Aug. 8, 2026, A173508) [nonpub. opn.].)
Meanwhile, on July 5, 2025, defendant was released from custody and
placed under mandatory supervision.
On October 21, the probation department filed a second amended
petition to revoke defendant’s mandatory supervision. It alleged defendant
had violated the terms of his mandatory supervision by failing to report to
probation within two days of his release from custody and by committing new
drug possession offenses, which had been charged in a separate case
(no. CR2502431).
On January 22, 2026, in case no. CR2502431, a jury found defendant
guilty of possessing methamphetamine after two or more specified prior
convictions (Health & Saf. Code, § 11395) and possessing methamphetamine
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paraphernalia (id., § 11364, subd. (a)).
On that same day, the court held a hearing on the second amended
petition to revoke defendant’s mandatory supervision. The court found
defendant had violated the terms of his mandatory supervision based on his
convictions in case no. CR2502431 and, at the People’s request, dismissed the
remaining allegations in the petition. Defense counsel did not object to the
court’s finding or otherwise raise any arguments contesting the revocation
petition during the hearing.
On February 23, the court revoked defendant’s mandatory supervision
and ordered him to serve the remainder of his previously imposed sentence in
custody. After the court awarded defendant 688 days of custody credits, 42
days of his sentence remained, which by our calculation made April 6 the last
day of his sentence.
Defendant filed a timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant’s appellate counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues
and asking us to independently review the record pursuant to Wende, supra,
25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel advised defendant he could file a supplemental brief
on his own behalf, but he has not done so.
In Wende, our Supreme Court held that “Courts of Appeal must conduct
a review of the entire record whenever appointed counsel submits a brief on
direct appeal which raises no specific issues or describes the appeal as
frivolous.” (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 221 (Delgadillo).) The
Wende procedure applies “to the first appeal as of right and is compelled by
the constitutional right to counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 221.)
In Delgadillo, our Supreme Court held that a Wende review is not
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required in an appeal from a postconviction order denying a section 1172.6
petition for resentencing. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 222, 224–226,
229–231.) Nevertheless, in the interest of judicial economy, the court
exercised its discretion to conduct its own independent review of the record
given that the lower court’s “suboptimal” notice did not inform defendant that
his appeal might be dismissed as abandoned if he did not file a supplemental
brief. (Id. at pp. 222, 233 & fn. 6.)
Delgadillo addressed the application of Wende in the specific context of
a postconviction proceeding under section 1172.6. (See Delgadillo, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 231, fn. 5 [“[i]n this case, we are not deciding Wende’s
application to other postconviction contexts, which may present different
considerations.”].) However, we assume without deciding that the same
considerations apply here given that this is not defendant’s first appeal as of
right. We also elect to proceed with a Wende review. Having done so, we
conclude the appeal is moot because defendant completed his sentence for
violating mandatory supervision while the appeal was pending.
“ ‘[A] case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no practical
effect or cannot provide the parties with effective relief.’ ” (People v. Rish
(2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1380.) “ ‘[A]n action that originally was based
on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the
questions have become moot by subsequent acts or events. A reversal in such
a case would be without practical effect, and the appeal will therefore be
dismissed.’ ” (People v. Herrera (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1198.)
The fact that a defendant completes his sentence during the pendency
of his appeal does not render the case moot if the resolution of the appeal
might prevent disadvantageous collateral consequences. (See People v.
Delong (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 482, 487–492.) In an analogous context, both
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the United States Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court have
held that an appeal from a parole revocation order was moot after the
defendant had completed a custody term imposed for the parole violation.
(See Spencer v. Kemna (1998) 523 U.S. 1, 12–14 (Spencer) and People v.
DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 645–646 (DeLeon).) Both Spencer and DeLeon
rejected the argument that the defendant faced “collateral consequences”
from the potential use of the parole revocation order in a future parole or
sentencing proceeding. (See Spencer, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 12; DeLeon, supra,
3 Cal.5th at p. 645.)
As explained in DeLeon, which in turn adopted the analysis in Spencer:
“The trial court’s finding that [the defendant] violated his parole does not
involve the same collateral consequences that attach to a criminal conviction.
Future consequences will not arise unless there is additional criminal
conduct. Even then, his parole violation is just one of many factors a court
may consider in deciding whether to grant probation, or what sentence to
impose. Under these circumstances, [the defendant’s] parole violation does
not constitute a disadvantageous collateral consequence for purposes of
assessing mootness.” (DeLeon, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 646, fn. omitted.) Thus,
the appeal was “moot because a reviewing court’s resolution of the issues
could offer no relief regarding the time [the defendant] spent in custody or
the parole term that has already terminated.” (Id. at p. 645; see also People
v. Armas (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 350, 353 (Armas) [applying DeLeon and
Spencer to dismiss as moot an appeal from an order revoking probation given
that the defendant completed probation during the pendency of the appeal].)1
1 Armas, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 357 noted two cases that have
reached different conclusions on the issue of mootness. (See People v. Nolan
(2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1213 (Nolan) [holding an appeal from order
revoking probation was not mooted by the defendant completing his sentence
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The reasoning of DeLeon and Spencer is highly relevant to the context
here. Just as in the parole violation context, any collateral consequences that
defendant violated the conditions of his mandatory supervision are too
remote to prevent a finding of mootness, because those consequences “will not
arise unless there is additional criminal conduct,” and “[e]ven then,” the
mandatory supervision violation “is just one of many factors a court may
consider in deciding whether to grant probation, or what sentence to impose.”
(DeLeon, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 646; see, e.g., Cal. Rules of Court, rules
4.414(b)(2) [criteria affecting the decision to grant or deny probation include
“[p]rior performance . . . on mandatory supervision”], 4.421(b)(5) [aggravating
factors for sentencing include that a “defendant’s prior performance
on . . . mandatory supervision . . . was unsatisfactory”].) Accordingly, as was
the case with the parole violation in DeLeon and Spencer, a mandatory
supervision violation “does not constitute a disadvantageous collateral
consequence for purposes of assessing mootness.” (DeLeon, at p. 646.)
In sum, because defendant has completed his sentence for violating
mandatory supervision, any challenges to the revocation order or sentence in
this appeal are moot. We will therefore dismiss it.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
because the appeal gave him an opportunity to possibly erase the “ ‘stigma of
criminality’ ”]; People v. Buell (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 682, 687–688 (Buell)
[following Nolan to hold an appeal from the revocation of mandatory
supervision was not moot despite the defendant having served his sentence].)
As Armas noted, the validity of these cases is questionable as they predated
and/or failed to consider DeLeon: “Buell[ ] . . . does not acknowledge or
discuss . . . DeLeon . . . , even though Buell was issued three months after
DeLeon. Nolan was decided . . . many years prior to . . . DeLeon and therefore
could not have taken DeLeon into account.” (Armas, at p. 357.)
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RICHMAN, J.
We concur.
STEWART, P. J.
MILLER, J.
(A175742N)
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