Filed 8/27/26 P. v. Norton CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B338198
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA131685)
v.
WILLIE NORTON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. David C. Brougham, Judge. Affirmed.
Debbie Yen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jason Tran and Taylor Nguyen, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________________
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted defendant Willie Norton of one count of
carjacking. On appeal, Norton argues: (1) the People failed to
prove the force or fear and intent to deprive elements of
carjacking; and (2) the trial court prejudicially erred when it did
not instruct the jury on the defense of unconsciousness. We
reject Norton’s arguments and affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Early one morning in September 2022, Raul Valdez was
driving on the freeway in Los Angeles County when he saw
Norton’s car crash into a barrier and flip over. Valdez stopped
his car on the side of the freeway and walked toward the flipped
car. As he approached Norton’s car, Valdez saw that no one was
inside it. Valdez then saw Norton run across the freeway and
enter the driver’s side door of Valdez’s car.
As Valdez approached his car, Norton tried to start it by
pressing the ignition button. When Valdez opened the driver’s
side door, Norton pressed the ignition button again and the car
started. After Valdez reached inside the car and turned off the
engine, Norton repeatedly said “[t]his is my car.” Norton then
pushed Valdez’s shoulder or chest with a “stiff arm,” causing
Valdez to step back about a foot away from the car.
Norton started Valdez’s car again. Although Valdez
believed that Norton was going to take his car, Valdez did not
want to get into a fight on the freeway. Valdez asked Norton if
he could retrieve his phone and backpack from his car. Norton
handed Valdez his phone and a pocketknife that was in a front
cupholder. Norton also threw Valdez’s backpack at Valdez,
causing him to step another foot back from the car. Norton then
drove off with Valdez’s car.
2
Valdez noticed that Norton had a cut on his head. Valdez
had no medical training or expertise, but he assumed that Norton
may have been dazed or suffering from a concussion “due to his
cut on his forehead and what he kept repeating.”
The police recovered Valdez’s car later that morning at
Norton’s home in the city of Perris, about 40 miles from the scene
of the altercation.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The People charged Norton with one count of carjacking
(Pen. Code,1 § 215, subd. (a)). The People alleged that Norton
suffered two prior strike convictions. The People also alleged two
aggravating sentencing factors.
A jury found Norton guilty of carjacking. After the People
dismissed one of the prior strike allegations, Norton admitted the
other prior strike allegation and one aggravating sentencing
factor. The trial court sentenced Norton to 10 years in prison,
consisting of the middle term of five years for carjacking, doubled
under the “Three Strikes” law.
Norton appeals.
DISCUSSION
1. Substantial evidence supports Norton’s carjacking
conviction
Norton argues insufficient evidence supports his carjacking
conviction. First, he argues that the People failed to prove that
he used sufficient force or fear to take Valdez’s car. Second,
Norton argues that there was no evidence that he intended to
deprive Valdez of his car. Norton does not challenge any other
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
3
element of his conviction. As we explain, substantial evidence
supports Norton’s conviction.
1.1. Applicable law and standard of review
The crime of carjacking requires proof that: (1) the
defendant took a vehicle that belonged to someone else; (2) from
the immediate presence of a person who possessed the vehicle or
was a passenger in the vehicle; (3) against that person’s will;
(4) through the use of force or fear; and (5) with the intent to
temporarily or permanently deprive that person of possession of
the vehicle. (§ 215, subd. (a); People v. Magallanes (2009)
173 Cal.App.4th 529, 534.)
Carjacking requires proof of substantially the same force or
fear necessary to prove the crime of robbery. (People v. Hudson
(2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 831, 835 (Hudson).) Thus, cases discussing
that element in the robbery context provide guidance for
evaluating whether the People proved a defendant used sufficient
force or fear to complete the crime of carjacking. (Ibid.)
The terms “force” and “fear” have no technical meaning in
the law. (Hudson, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 836.) The amount
of force used to take the property need not be great. (Id. at
p. 835.) All that is required is force exceeding what is necessary
to seize the property, such as force sufficient to overcome the
victim’s resistance. (People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989,
995; Hudson, at pp. 835–836.)
Carjacking also requires proof that the defendant acted
with the intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the victim
of the vehicle. (People v. Gomez (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 609, 618,
disapproved of on other grounds in People v. Elizalde (2015)
61 Cal.4th 523, 538, fn. 9.) The intent to deprive “must exist
before or during the use of force or fear.” (Gomez, at p. 618.)
4
The necessary “intent to deprive the owner of possession of his
car may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances of the
particular case.” (People v. Green (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 165,
181.)
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, we view the record in the light most favorable to the
judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence
from which a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th
758, 806.) We make all reasonable inferences in support of the
judgment. (Ibid.) We do not reweigh the evidence or reevaluate
the credibility of witnesses. (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th
1, 27.) If the evidence reasonably justifies the jury’s findings, we
will not reverse the judgment even if the evidence also supports a
contrary finding. (People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 508.)
As we explain, substantial evidence supports Norton’s conviction.
1.2. There was substantial evidence of force
Here, the evidence supports a finding that Norton used
sufficient force to complete the crime of carjacking. After Norton
entered Valdez’s car and started its engine, Valdez reached inside
the car to shut off the engine. Norton used a “stiff arm” to shove
Valdez’s shoulder and push Valdez out of the car, causing Valdez
to step about a foot away from the car. Norton then restarted the
car, removed Valdez’s belongings from the car, and drove away.
Valdez testified that he decided not to try to reenter his car or
otherwise regain possession of it after Norton pushed him
because he did not want to get into an altercation on the freeway.
Norton, therefore, used sufficient force to overcome Valdez’s
resistance.
5
Norton cites a series of cases affirming robbery and
carjacking convictions where the defendants used arguably
greater force to accomplish their crimes than what he used in this
case. (See, e.g., Hudson, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at pp. 836–840
[defendant driving off in stolen car while victim tried to prevent
the theft by opening car’s door and banging on the car’s trunk
was sufficient force for carjacking]; People v. Lopez (2017)
8 Cal.App.5th 1230 [defendant driving faster than was necessary
to move stolen car while the victim held on to the outside of the
car was sufficient force for carjacking]; People v. Gomez (2008)
43 Cal.4th 249, 265 [defendant shooting at the victim was
sufficient force for robbery].) Norton argues that because he used
less force than the defendants in these cases, the People failed to
prove he used sufficient force for carjacking.
Norton’s argument is misguided. None of the cases that he
cites holds that the force used by the defendant constitutes a
baseline or minimum amount of force necessary to establish
robbery or carjacking. The fact that those cases upheld robbery
and carjacking convictions where the defendants used arguably
greater force than what Norton used in this case does not mean
that Norton’s use of force here was insufficient to support a
carjacking conviction.
Indeed, other cases have held that a defendant’s use of less
force against a victim than what Norton used in this case was
sufficient to establish robbery. For instance, our colleagues in
Division Seven concluded that the defendant’s “rather polite” tap
to move the victim out of the way so that he could reach into a
cash register was sufficient force for robbery. (See People v.
Garcia (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1246, overruled on other
grounds by People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 365, fns. 2 &
6
3.) Similarly, our colleagues in the Third District held that the
defendant used sufficient force for robbery when he “nudged or
shoved” the victim at an ATM. (People v. Mullins (2018)
19 Cal.App.5th 594, 604.) As the court explained, the defendant
used sufficient force to overcome the victim’s resistance when he
“touched [the victim’s arm], cut in front of [the victim], and
prevented [the victim] from pushing the button to prevent
another transaction [at the ATM] from occurring.” (Id. at p. 604.)
In short, substantial evidence supports a finding that
Norton used sufficient force to support his carjacking conviction.2
1.3. There was substantial evidence of an intent to
deprive
The evidence also supports a finding that Norton intended
to deprive Valdez of his car. That Norton left his car and ran
across the freeway before entering Valdez’s car supports an
inference that Norton was aware he was in someone else’s car
when he took it. Likewise, Norton heard and responded to
Valdez’s request that Norton return Valdez’s belongings that
were inside the car, further supporting an inference that Norton
knew the car did not belong to him. An intent to deprive is also
supported by the facts that Norton physically prevented Valdez
from regaining possession of the car and soon after fled the scene
of the altercation in Valdez’s car before driving it more than
40 miles to his home in a different county.
2 Because there was substantial evidence to support a
finding that Norton took Valdez’s car by force, we need not
determine whether there also was substantial evidence to
support a finding that Norton took the car through fear.
7
Norton argues that the evidence more strongly supports a
finding that he did not intend to steal Valdez’s car because he
was confused, and likely concussed, following the crash and
believed that he was trying to drive away in his own car. Norton
points to evidence that he suffered an apparent head injury
during or after the crash, he claimed that Valdez’s car was his
own, and he returned Valdez’s belongings before fleeing the
scene. Norton made this same argument to the jury, however,
and the jury rejected it. As we just explained, the evidence,
including many of the facts that Norton relies on, amply supports
the jury’s finding that he intended to steal Valdez’s car. We
cannot second guess that finding simply because there also was
evidence to support a contrary finding. (See People v. Westerfield
(2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 713.)
2. The trial court was not required to instruct on the
defense of unconsciousness
Norton next contends that the trial court prejudicially
erred when it did not instruct on unconsciousness as a defense to
carjacking. Unconsciousness, if not voluntarily induced, is a
complete defense to a criminal charge. (People v. Rogers (2006)
39 Cal.4th 826, 887 (Rogers).) “To constitute a defense,
unconsciousness need not rise to the level of coma or inability to
walk or perform manual movements; it can exist ‘where the
subject physically acts but is not, at the time, conscious of
acting.’ ” (People v. Halverson (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 417
(Halverson).) Unconsciousness can result from “somnambulism,
a blow on the head, or similar cause.” (People v. Sedeno (1974)
10 Cal.3d 703, 717, overruled on other grounds by People v.
Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 175–178.)
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The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the
defense of unconsciousness if it appears the defendant is relying
on that defense, or if there is substantial evidence to support the
defense and it is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of
the case. (Halverson, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 417.) When
determining whether a defense instruction is supported by
substantial evidence, “the trial court does not determine the
credibility of the defense evidence, but only whether ‘there was
evidence which, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to raise a
reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982.)
“A criminal defendant has the burden of producing evidence that
he was unconscious if he wishes to rely upon that defense.”
(People v. Froom (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 820, 830.)
Here, Norton never asked the trial court to instruct on
unconsciousness. Although Valdez testified that Norton
appeared dazed or concussed, no witnesses testified that Norton
was unconscious at any time leading up to or during the
carjacking. And while defense counsel argued to the jury that
Norton lacked the intent to steal Valdez’s car because he likely
was concussed and confused throughout his altercation with
Valdez, counsel never argued that Norton was unconscious.
Thus, the court was obligated to give an instruction on
unconsciousness only if substantial evidence supported it.
(Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 887.) As we explain, there was
insufficient evidence to support such an instruction.
Immediately after he crashed his car, Norton was able to
engage in the following conduct: (1) exit his car, run across the
freeway, and locate Valdez’s car; (2) enter the driver’s seat of
Valdez’s car and press the ignition button to start the car’s
engine; (3) recognize that Valdez was trying to regain possession
9
of the car and push Valdez away from the car after Valdez turned
off the car’s engine; (4) restart the car’s engine after pushing
Valdez away from the car; (5) respond to Valdez’s request to
return Valdez’s personal belongings that were still in the car; and
(6) drive the car over 40 miles from the scene of the altercation to
his home in a different county. This type of “complicated and
purposive” conduct “makes clear that [Norton] did not lack
awareness of his actions during the course of the offense[],” such
that the record did not support an unconsciousness instruction.
(Halverson, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 418; see also People v. Carlson
(2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 695, 704 [evidence that defendant entered
and started car, navigated roads and highways, and later
responded to questions demonstrated that unconsciousness
instruction was not warranted].)
Norton’s reliance on People v. Gana (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th
598 (Gana) is misplaced. One of the victims in that case testified
that the defendant’s eyes were wide open and her face lacked
emotion when she shot her husband. (Id. at p. 609.) An
investigating officer reported that the defendant had “ ‘a
thousand mile stare,’ ” and paramedics stated that the defendant
remained silent when asked a series of standard questions.
(Ibid.) The defendant also presented medical expert testimony.
(Id. at pp. 603–604, 609–610.) Before the shooting, the defendant
had been prescribed multiple drugs and steroids that could cause
psychosis. (Ibid.) A psychiatrist testified that on the day of the
shooting, the defendant suffered from a psychotic depression and
“was experiencing a delirium, which is a kind of fluctuating level
of consciousness.” (Id. at pp. 604, 610.) In addition, a
psychologist testified that the defendant was suffering from
10
clinical depression when she committed the charged offenses.
(Id. at p. 604.)
The reviewing court in Gana concluded that the trial court
should have instructed on unconsciousness because the evidence
supported such a defense. (Gana, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 609–610.) The reviewing court concluded that any error was
harmless, however, because the jury was afforded the
opportunity to consider how the defendant’s medical condition
and prescriptions affected her ability to form the requisite intent
and malice, and its verdicts and findings showed that it “clearly
‘rejected defendant’s [mental state] defense.’ ” (Id. at pp. 610–
611.)
Gana is distinguishable from this case. Here, there was
scant evidence addressing Norton’s mental condition leading up
to and during the carjacking. Norton did not testify that he was
unconscious during, or could not otherwise remember the events
surrounding, the carjacking. While Norton repeatedly stated
that Valdez’s car was his (Norton’s) car, that evidence suggests,
at most, that Norton was confused about whose car he was trying
to take, not that he was unaware of his actions. Indeed, as we
already discussed, Norton was aware of Valdez’s presence and
able to respond to Valdez’s requests to return Valdez’s
belongings, and Norton engaged in a series of complicated and
purposeful conduct throughout his altercation with Valdez. In
addition, although Valdez testified that Norton had a cut on his
head and appeared to be concussed or dazed, Valdez did not
testify that Norton appeared to be unconscious or otherwise
unaware of his actions leading up to and during the carjacking.
In any event, Valdez later testified that he had no medical
training or expertise “with respect to evaluating head injuries”
11
and that he simply “made an assumption that [Norton] might
have a concussion.” No doctors or other medical experts testified
that Norton suffered a head injury before the carjacking or that
he otherwise exhibited any signs of being unconscious when he
took Valdez’s car.
In short, the evidence did not support an unconsciousness
defense. The trial court, therefore, did not err by not instructing
on that defense.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.
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