Filed 9/9/26 P. v. Norton CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B337186
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23CJCF00091)
MARCEL D. NORTON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Serena R. Murillo, Judge. Reversed.
Monique Hemli-Munoz, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Ryan M. Smith, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
INTRODUCTION
Marcel D. Norton burglarized Michelle Alexander’s home.
At the time, Alexander lived with her daughter-in-law,
Donnaysia Brinkley. Alexander’s daughter, Lanetta Stuckey,
used to live in the apartment, but she had moved out. When
Norton entered Alexander’s home, he asked Alexander where her
daughter was. Alexander, thinking Norton was referring to
Stuckey, told Norton that Stuckey was not there.
Norton was convicted of residential burglary under Penal
Code section 459.1 The trial court issued a 10-year protective
order under section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), protecting Alexander
and Brinkley from Norton. The court stated that the order was
appropriate because the motive for the crime was a prior dating
relationship between Norton and Stuckey and that Alexander
and Brinkley were “collateral” victims of prior domestic violence.
Section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), provides in relevant part
that, when a defendant is convicted of a domestic violence crime,
the trial court may issue “an order restraining the defendant
from any contact with a victim of the crime.” Norton argues, the
People concede, and we agree the trial court erred in issuing the
protective order because Norton’s burglary conviction is not a
domestic violence offense. Therefore, we reverse.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Norton Enters Alexander’s Home and Destroys
Property
Alexander lived with Brinkley and Alexander’s two
granddaughters. Stuckey used to live in the home, but she no
longer lived there. On November 1, 2023, at approximately
11:00 p.m., Alexander was in her bedroom, and Brinkley and the
granddaughters were in the living room. They heard a thumping
noise at the front door, and it broke open.
Norton entered, holding a metal rod. Norton struck two
windows and a television with the rod and asked Alexander, who
had come out of the bedroom, where her daughter was.
Alexander believed he was asking about Stuckey. She told
Norton that Stuckey was not there. Alexander returned to the
bedroom and called the police. Norton left the apartment.
B. Norton Is Convicted of Burglary and Sentenced
The People charged Norton with committing first degree
burglary with a person present. The case proceeded to trial, but
the jury was unable to reach a verdict, and the court declared a
mistrial. After the People asked the court to strike the
allegations that a person other than an accomplice was present
and that the offense was a violent felony within the meaning of
section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21), Norton pleaded no contest to
first degree burglary, and the trial court sentenced him to the
middle term of four years.
The trial court also issued a 10-year protective order under
section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), naming Alexander and Brinkley
as protected parties. The court found that, because of the
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relationship between Norton and Stuckey, Norton’s conviction
involved domestic violence. The court based this finding on the
testimony of two witnesses at the trial: Brinkley’s statement she
“had a speculation” Stuckey and Norton were “together” and the
apartment manager’s statements that he had seen them together
on multiple occasions and that he thought they were “boyfriend-
girlfriend.” The court ruled this evidence supported a finding
Alexander and Brinkley were victims of domestic violence within
the meaning of section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1). Norton timely
appealed, and the trial court granted his request for a certificate
of probable cause.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), provides, in relevant part:
“When a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime
involving domestic violence [as defined in enumerated statutes]
the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an
order restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim of
the crime.” Section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), “provides authority
for the imposition of postconviction protective orders where a
defendant is convicted of a qualifying domestic violence offense.”
(People v. Garcia (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 887, 901.)
Domestic violence is abuse committed against, among other
categories of victims, a person with whom the defendant had a
dating relationship (§ 13700, subd. (b); see also Fam. Code,
§ 6211 [“‘Domestic violence’ is abuse perpetrated against . . . [¶]
(a) [a] spouse or former spouse[;] [¶] (b) [a] cohabitant or former
cohabitant[;] [¶] (c) [a] person with whom the respondent is
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having or has had a dating or engagement relationship[;] [¶]
(d) [a] person with whom the respondent has had a child . . .[;] [¶]
(e) [a] child of a party . . .[; or] [¶] (f) [a]ny other person related by
consanguinity or affinity within the second degree.”].)
“Abuse” is “intentionally or recklessly causing or
attempting to cause bodily injury, or placing another person in
reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to
himself or herself, or another.” (§ 13700, subd. (a).) Section 136,
subdivision (3), defines “victim” as “any natural person with
respect to whom there is reason to believe that any crime as
defined under the laws of this state or any other statute or of the
United States is being or has been perpetrated or attempted to be
perpetrated.” Thus, “a postconviction protective order under
section 136.2[, subdivision] (i)(1) is authorized if: (1) the
defendant has been convicted of one (or more) of the statutorily
enumerated crimes; and (2) ‘the protected person qualifies as a
“‘“victim”’” of said crime(s).’” (People v. Walts (2025)
112 Cal.App.5th 127, 139.)
Protective orders under section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1),
“are limited to defendants convicted of crimes that qualify as
‘“‘domestic violence and where the protected person qualifies as a
“‘“victim”’” of said crime(s).” (People v. Lopez (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 227, 237.) Courts do not have inherent authority
to issue a criminal protective order absent a statute authorizing
such an order. (People v. Corrales (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 283,
286-287.)
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B. The Trial Court Erred in Issuing a Criminal
Protective Order for an Offense That Did Not Involve
Domestic Violence
Norton was not convicted of a domestic violence or other
offense that authorized the court to issue a protective order under
section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1). As the People concede, his
conviction did not justify a protective order. (See People v.
Garcia, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 901 [where the defendant’s
convictions “are not domestic violence offenses,” the court does
“not have statutory authority to impose [a] postconviction
protective order, and it must be stricken”].)
The trial court issued a protective order based on testimony
Norton and Stuckey had been in a dating relationship. The court
admitted the order was “a stretch,” but concluded the evidence
was “probably sufficient.” The court stated: “I do think the
motive for this crime was based on prior domestic violence and a
relationship with the victim’s daughter, Ms. Stuckey. And that
Ms. Brinkley and Ms. Alexander were victims of that and
collateral damage of that incident at their home, which was
motivated by domestic violence within the meaning of” People v.
Beckemeyer (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 461 and People v.
Delarosarauda (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 205.
Both cases are distinguishable. In Beckemeyer the
defendant was convicted of attempted murder of a woman he had
been dating and assault with a deadly weapon of her son. (People
v. Beckemeyer, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 464.) The court held
the victim’s son was a victim for purposes of a protective order
under section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), because the defendant
assaulted the son during a domestic violence incident.
(Beckemeyer, at 467.) In Delarosarauda the defendant was
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convicted of willfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a
traumatic condition upon a spouse or cohabitant, assault by
means likely to produce great bodily injury, assault with a deadly
weapon, and misdemeanor vandalism. (People v. Delarosarauda,
supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at pp. 207-208.) The court in
Delarosarauda held the trial court erred in issuing a protective
order under section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), that enjoined the
defendant from contacting his son and stepdaughter, absent
evidence the defendant harmed or attempted to harm them.
(Delarosarauda, at p. 212.)
Beckemeyer and Delarosarauda involved convictions for
crimes that involved domestic violence; Norton’s conviction for
burglary did not. As the People concede, “[w]hile the trial court’s
reliance on Beckemeyer and Delarosarauda did apply with regard
to the definition of a victim, neither case involved non-domestic
violence convictions.” And even if Norton’s actions were
“motivated” by some kind of dating history between Norton and
Stuckey, Stuckey was not a victim of the burglary. (See People v.
Pena (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 640, 648 [the Legislature amended
section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), in 2018 “to specify that ‘a victim’
is only a victim ‘of the crime’ the defendant was convicted of
committing”]; People v. Walts, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 143
[“[i]f there is no reason to believe that an enumerated
section 136.2[, subdivision] (i)(1) offense for which the defendant
was convicted ‘is being or has been perpetrated or attempted to
be perpetrated’ against a particular person, that person is not a
‘victim’ and may not seek, or be named as protected party by, a
protective order under section 136.2[, subdivision] (i)(1)”].)
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DISPOSITION
The order is reversed.
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J.
STONE, J.
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