Filed 9/10/26 P. v. Neal CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A172377
v.
THOMAS NEAL, (San Francisco County
Super. Ct. No. CRI-22001617)
Defendant and Appellant.
In March 2022, in San Francisco Superior Court, Thomas Neal pled
guilty to felony assault with a deadly weapon and admitted an allegation of
great bodily injury. The trial court imposed a five-year state prison term but
suspended execution of sentence and granted Neal probation with a referral
to the Veterans Justice Court (VJC). However, in July 2023, Neal’s probation
was violated in connection with his alleged commission in San Joaquin
County of another assault with a deadly weapon. Neal was separately
prosecuted in San Joaquin County and ultimately committed to state prison.
In March 2024, while imprisoned, Neal demanded “a hearing and trial” in the
San Francisco action under Penal Code, section 13811 that resulted in his
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Section 1381, which will be discussed in greater detail below, provides
expedited sentencing procedures for a defendant who has been convicted,
1
April 2024 transfer to San Francisco Superior Court. Neal was referred back
to VJC while his probation violation remained pending. After months of
court appearances and continuances, an evidentiary hearing was held in
October 2024, and Neal was found to have violated his probation. Thereafter,
Neal moved to dismiss the San Francisco action, arguing the court had lost
jurisdiction to execute the previously suspended sentence by failing to issue
its commitment order within the time constraints of section 1203.2a.2 The
court denied the motion and ordered Neal to serve the remainder of his
original five-year sentence consecutive to his San Joaquin County
commitment.
Neal now appeals under the same statute but with an alternative
argument. We are not persuaded and affirm the court’s order.
BACKGROUND
I. The Cases in San Francisco and San Joaquin Counties3
On December 24, 2021, Neal was arrested in San Francisco after a
“road rage incident” during which Neal purportedly threw a tire iron at
another car’s rear window, shattering it. When the driver of the other car
exited his vehicle and confronted Neal, Neal threatened, “ ‘You don’t want to
sentenced, and imprisoned in one case while there is another pending
criminal proceeding “wherein the defendant remains to be sentenced.”
2 As further discussed below, section 1203.2a provides a way for a
defendant on probation in one case, who is subsequently committed to prison
in another case, to request summary termination of probation and sentencing
concurrent with the prison commitment. (In re Hoddinott (1996) 12 Cal.4th
992, 999–1000 (Hoddinott).)
3 As the parties did, we take our background summary of the criminal
offenses from the probation department’s report prepared in advance of the
April 19, 2022 sentencing hearing and from the July 3, 2023 “Motion to
Revoke Probation,” both in the San Francisco action.
2
fuck with me,’ ” retrieved a 12-inch-long knife from his car, held it to the
driver’s throat, and stated, “I’ll fucking kill you,” before he drove away.
On February 15, 2022, San Francisco police officers were alerted to a
stabbing after a possible “hit and run.” Surveillance footage showed Neal
walking towards a dark SUV and speaking with someone inside the vehicle.
Neal opened the car’s rear doors, and the victim crawled out of the back
driver’s side door and limped across the street. Neal retrieved a metal pole
from the vehicle and followed the victim, striking him “on the leg, three times
on the head, and once in [his] left side” before Neal returned to his own car
and fled. The video also showed Neal wearing a knife with a sheath on his
hip. When Neal was stopped later that morning, officers discovered dried
blood in the rear seat of his vehicle and “three knives, a knife sharpener, a
metal pole, and another knife in a backpack.”
The two incidents served as a basis for a felony complaint filed in
February 2022, and in March, Neal entered into a negotiated disposition in
which he pled guilty to felony assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1); count 1) and admitted an allegation of great bodily injury
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Subject to a Harvey4 waiver, the remaining charges
were dismissed, as was an unrelated case from 2020 in which Neal was
alleged to have threatened a restaurant worker with a knife but had been
placed on pretrial division. In April 2022, the court sentenced Neal to five
years in state prison but suspended execution of the sentence pending his
successful completion of two years of probation, during which Neal was
4 People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 (facts underlying charges
dismissed as part of a negotiated plea may not, absent contrary agreement by
the defendant, be considered adversely in sentencing).
3
required to successfully complete residential treatment through VJC and
abide by other probation conditions.
In November 2022, Neal failed to appear for a scheduled VJC hearing
after being discharged from his residential program, and a bench warrant
issued.
The night of May 31, 2023, Neal was reported as the assailant in an
“unprovoked” assault in San Joaquin County with “a weapon known as a
‘monkey fist’ described as a ‘ball on a chain.’ ” The victim had been talking
with a friend with his two minor children present when Neal hit him “with
the slung shot at least three times, once in the head, upper left back, and
right ear,” causing “moderate injuries.” Neal “walked away” from the scene
after the victim told somebody to call the police. A Ramey5 warrant for Neal’s
arrest issued the next day.
In June 2023, Neal was arrested and remanded to the custody of the
San Francisco County Sheriff’s Department pending his appearance in VJC
for possible placement.6 For the next several weeks, Neal continued to
appear in VJC pending placement.
However, in July 2023, having learned Neal was “named as a suspect
in a felony assault” in San Joaquin County, the San Francisco County
District Attorney filed a motion to revoke his probation.7 Neal continued to
5 A Ramey warrant authorizes a residential arrest of a suspect before
the filing of criminal charges. (Goodwin v. Superior Court (2001) 90
Cal.App.4th 215, 218, citing People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263 (Ramey).)
6 The San Francsico Superior Court also authorized Neal’s release on
his own recognizance (OR) on electronic monitoring if admitted into a VJC-
approved residential program.
7 Two identical motions to revoke Neal’s probation appear to have been
filed, one on July 3 and a second on July 12.
4
appear in VJC until July 25, when it was reported the San Joaquin County
Sheriff’s Department had arrested him on his outstanding Ramey warrant, so
San Francisco Superior Court revoked Neal’s OR status and issued a bench
warrant for his arrest.
Neal remained in custody in San Joaquin County until December 2023,
when he was convicted of felony assault with force likely to produce great
bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), felony possession of a slungshot (§ 22210),
and misdemeanor child endangerment (§ 273a, subd. (a)) and was sentenced
to two years in state prison.
On March 7, 2024, while serving his sentence in the San Joaquin case
in San Quentin State Prison, Neal filed a “Notice and Demand for Trial” with
the San Francisco County District Attorney pursuant to section 1381. The
form represented that Neal had been convicted and sentenced in San Joaquin
County to two years in state prison with a “Tentative Release Date/Minimum
Eligible Parole Date” of July 24, 2024. It further stated that Neal had
“reason to believe” he had a pending criminal action in San Francisco for a
violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1) under warrant No. 836103—the
bench warrant issued in connection with his motion to revoke probation—and
therefore demanded “a hearing and trial of said criminal action as prescribed
by section 1381 of the California Penal Code.” (Capitalization omitted.)
On March 22, 2024, the San Francisco County District Attorney
requested and the court ordered Neal transferred to San Francisco County
Jail pursuant to his section 1381 demand and for an April 10 hearing. On
April 10, Neal’s bench warrant was discharged with a finding of
“[n]o . . . contempt”; he was remanded to the custody of the San Francisco
County Sheriff’s Department, and a further hearing was set for April 17,
2024.
5
At the April 17 hearing “To Set Motion to Revoke Probation,” Neal’s
attorney represented, “What [Neal] really, really wants to do is deal with
these cases in [VJC] rather than being sentenced.” He stated that Neal’s
San Quentin commitment was “over,” and Neal “used the 1381 as a vehicle to
get here. I don’t think he is actually seeking to be sentenced on a five-year
ESS.”8 Counsel explained, “it is really not a 1381 because it is a probation
case.” When the district attorney insisted on setting a June 17, 2024,
deadline for hearing on Neal’s section 1381 demand, Neal’s attorney asserted,
“There is no ticking clock” and “There shouldn’t be a last day.” The court
agreed, “I don’t think there is a last day either,” but set the June 17 deadline
and referred Neal to VJC as his attorney had requested.
At the conclusion of the April 17 hearing, the probation officer present
informed the court that “[a]ccording to [the] case notes” from an April 9 VJC
hearing, the probation department had recommended terminating Neal from
VJC in favor of proceeding on his motion to revoke probation and had also
“provided the court with an updated status on [Neal] serving his prison term
in San Quentin.”9
The matter was continued to April 19, 2024, and then again to May 3,
to secure “a copy of the [presentence report]” and “any information on the
status of [Neal’s] custody and his term at San Quentin and the underlying
allegations that are the basis of this motion to revoke.” No new report was
prepared, so, on May 3, the court continued the matter to May 17, directing
the probation department file a “short supplemental report” in the interim.
8 “ESS” refers to execution of sentence suspended.
9 No minute order or transcript from an April 9, 2024 VJC hearing is
included in the appellate record.
6
The short supplemental report filed on May 17 detailed Neal’s criminal
history, including his San Joaquin County conviction for which Neal had been
sentenced to two years in prison, and represented Neal “is currently in the
custody of the California Department of Corrections [and Rehabilitation] and
is expected to be released to Parole in July of 2024.” At the May 17 hearing,
Neal’s attorney requested a two-week continuance, which the court granted,
setting the matter for May 31, 2023, when the motion to revoke probation
was again continued. According to the record provided on appeal, the matter
was scheduled “To Set” seven additional times before an evidentiary hearing
was held on the motion to revoke probation on October 4, 2024.10
At the start of the October 4 hearing, Neal’s defense attorney
represented “to preserve that argument for appeal” that even though the 90-
day deadline under section 1381 “would have been June 17 of 2024,” he had
not moved to dismiss the action because “the DA . . . cited [Boles v. Superior
Court (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 479, 484]. And it does say that 1381 does not
apply when execution of sentence is suspended, as opposed to imposition of
sentence suspended, which under People v. Wagner -- which is a 2009
California [Supreme] Court case, 45 Cal.4th 1039. It says when it is
imposition of sentence suspended that a 1381 demand should be honored, or
has to be honored under the law.”
10 The record on appeal does not include the transcripts for the
intervening hearings, nor does it include minute orders or transcripts for
Neal’s appearances in other departments; however, the minute orders that
are provided suggest between May and October 2024 Neal was being
considered for both VJC and Behavioral Health Court. In fact, on September
17, 2024, it was reported that Neal “does not meet the diagnostic criteria for
Behavioral Health Court” but “does meet the diagnostic criteria for Drug
Court and would be an appropriate candidate for that.”
7
After the submission of evidence, the court found by a “preponderance
of the evidence that . . . Neal committed a willful violation of the terms of his
probation” because of his December 2023 conviction in San Joaquin County
and his failure to report to probation and to complete VJC. Regarding
sentencing, the court explained what it was “most concerned about” and
“most interested in” was “what are the proper credits? And whether and to
what extent Mr. Neal would be entitled to credits while he was in custody in
other jurisdictions.” Neal’s counsel clarified his position: “[I]t’s not that
Mr. Neal is entitled to credits, it’s about whether he should be given
concurrent versus consecutive time. And whether -- my argument is, just
because he did a 1381 demand as opposed to 1203.2(a) shouldn’t be the
dividing line. Because they’re both, essentially, requesting the same thing,
that he be sentenced and that he was in [California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation], and so he should ask for concurrent time.”
The court set a briefing schedule, and on October 17, 2024, Neal moved
to dismiss the probation revocation proceedings under section 1203.2a
because the court was “divested of jurisdiction,” or in the alternative,
requested probation be reinstated. Neal’s motion to dismiss argued “all three
jurisdictional clocks discussed in Hoddinott have been violated” based on the
probation department’s knowledge of Neal’s December 2023 prison
commitment, the triggering section 1381 demand from March 2024, and the
court’s failure to sentence Neal within 60 days of his return to San Francisco
on March 22, 2024.
On December 6, 2024, Neal filed a supplemental motion citing
additional authority and emphasizing the purpose of statutes such as
sections 1381 and 1203.2a was “to permit a defendant to obtain concurrent
sentencing.” He also analogized his case to In re Mancillas (2016)
8
2 Cal.App.5th 896 (Mancillas), arguing the court lost jurisdiction under
section 1203.2a because it had failed to sentence Neal within 60 days of his
section 1381 demand.
The People opposed the motions, arguing that “Because [Neal] never
asserted his right under Penal Code section 1203.2a to serve his suspended
sentence in the instant matter concurrently with his prison time on an
unrelated conviction, [Neal] does not qualify for the remedy of dismissal of
the instant matter that [he] invokes under section 1203.2a.” The People
further contended that Mancillas did not apply because Neal had not sent his
demand to the court and requested to be sentenced in absentia, he had sent a
section 1381 demand to the district attorney, and thus, no section 1203.2a
jurisdictional clock was triggered. Moreover, they claimed that because Neal
had asserted his rights under section 1381, he forfeited his rights under
section 1203.2a.
On January 3, 2025, after a chambers discussion, the court orally
issued a tentative ruling denying Neal’s motion to dismiss in view of the First
District case of People v. Hall (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 972 (Hall), and noted the
need for “a triggering event, and that is the court needs to have strict notice
of -- that the -- that the defendant was incarcerated . . . . [¶] And that is
notice from the probation officer or notice from a warden . . . of the prison in
which there was incarceration that defendant was incarcerated on another
offense. Absent those triggering events, the 60-day doesn’t begin to elapse.”
The court agreed with the district attorney that the section “1381
demand . . . is inconsistent with the now request from the defense that the
court should have summarily imposed the ESS notwithstanding their request
that the matter be contested and heard” and reminded Neal’s counsel that “in
terms of sentencing that you agreed that the sentencing could be put over so
9
that these matters could be briefed . . . .” Neal’s counsel countered, arguing
that the triggering event was either the March 2024 section 1381 demand or,
alternatively, the October 2024 probation revocation hearing, both of which
preceded the sentencing hearing by more than 60 days. Defense counsel
acknowledged, “I didn’t bring up these issues on the date of the hearing
because I wasn’t aware of them” “at the date of the hearing” but still
asserted, “it doesn’t matter. I -- the jurisdictional clock is the jurisdictional
clock. It’s not something that we waive by agreeing to more time. It’s not . . .
anything like that. It’s a clock. . . . [¶] [M]y position is it started well before
the hearing because Your Honor was aware, prosecution was aware, and I
was aware that Mr. Neal was incarcerated, committed to state prison on
another offense, far before the hearing.”
The court clarified that section 1203.2 is “not based on constructive
knowledge. It’s not even based on actual knowledge. It’s based on notice,
statutory notice.” To which Neal’s attorney responded, “Sure.” Finding “that
didn’t occur,” the court asked counsel, “if your position is true that . . . the
court should impose all ESSs once it has constructive notice that somebody is
incarcerated, notwithstanding that the defendant may not want . . . that ESS
imposed until they have an opportunity to be heard . . . whether the People
know about it, whether anybody else knows about it -- if the court has
constructive knowledge of that, then that 60 days . . . starts to run. [¶] And
even though it contradicts . . . how the parties want to proceed.” Neal’s
attorney responded, “And the point of the 1203.2 . . . is someone doesn’t have
the right to even be present. It’s supposed to happen in absentia. . . . [I]t’s
not what I think should happen; it’s just what the law is, that that is a
jurisdictional clock when it comes to an ESS.”
10
The court concluded, “I think as a practical matter it would be very
dangerous if . . . a jurisdictional clock begins to run based on inferences that
can be drawn from pleadings without meeting . . . what the statute defines as
notice to a court. [¶] So I deny the motion to dismiss on that ground.” The
court then heard the parties’ arguments on sentencing, after which it ordered
the execution of Neal’s previously suspended five-year sentence and that it
run consecutively to his San Joaquin County commitment.
Neal timely appeals.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Neal’s argument has shifted.11 Although he still relies on
section 1203.2a, he now contends the 60-day jurisdictional clock under
section 1203.2a was triggered by: (1) the oral notice of Neal’s custody status
that the probation department provided the VJC court on April 9, 2024; and
(2) the reference to Neal’s San Joaquin County prison commitment in the
short supplemental report filed by the probation department on May 17,
2024. We disagree and conclude neither “notice” triggered section 1203.2a’s
jurisdictional clock, and, even if triggered, Neal’s conduct waived any
potentially applicable time limitations.
I. Applicable Law
Section 1203.2a permits a defendant who is on probation and is later
committed to prison on another offense to ask the original sentencing court to
11 As described, before the trial court, Neal argued the filing of his
section 1381 demand on March 22, 2024, and the testimony at the probation
revocation hearing on October 4, 2024, triggered section 1203.2a’s
“timeclock.” While matters not raised below are ordinarily forfeited, Neal’s
new section 1203.2a argument is not because it is a jurisdictional challenge.
(People v. Blanchard (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1842, 1847 [“section 1203.2a
argument is nonwaivable because it challenges the court’s jurisdiction to
impose any sentence on him in the instant case”].)
11
revoke probation and impose in absentia a previously stayed or suspended
sentence. (People v. Murray (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 149, 155, 157 (Murray)
[“The purpose of section 1203.2a is ‘to provide a mechanism by which the
probationary court [can] consider imposing a concurrent sentence, and to
“preclude[] inadvertent imposition of consecutive sentences by depriving the
court of further jurisdiction over the defendant” when the statutory time
limits are not observed’ ”].) “Unlike section 1381’s speedy sentencing
procedure under which the incarcerated probationer asks to be brought to
court to litigate the probation revocation and sentencing proceeding with
representation of counsel, section 1203.2a requires an incarcerated
probationer to give up the right to appear in court and the right to counsel
during the probation revocation and sentencing proceeding.”12 (People v.
Wagner (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1039, 1053, 1055 (Wagner) [holding that section
1203.2a provides “one procedure, but not a mandatory or exclusive procedure”
for a probationer to request speedy sentencing on the original offense].)
Under section 1203.2a, in exchange for giving up the right to counsel, a
petitioning probationer gains, “the right to obtain sentencing more quickly
than under . . . section 1381, and the right to have any term of imprisonment
imposed thereunder ‘commence upon the date upon which defendant was
delivered to prison under commitment for his or her subsequent offense.’ ”
(Wagner, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1054.) But, because pronouncing judgment
12 Section 1381 provides in relevant part that after a defendant “has
entered upon his or her term of commitment” when there is pending in
another court “any criminal proceeding wherein the defendant remains to be
sentenced, the district attorney of the county in which the matters are
pending shall bring the defendant to trial or for sentencing within 90 days
after the person shall have delivered to said district attorney written notice of
the place of his or her imprisonment or commitment and his or her desire to
be brought to trial or for sentencing.”
12
without the assistance of counsel violates a defendant’s constitutional rights
absent a clear request and waiver, “ ‘[R]equests for sentencing pursuant to
section 1203.2a must be in strict compliance with that section.’ ” (Ibid., citing
People v. Ruster (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 865, 871; see also Murray, supra,
155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 154, 157 [finding the letter from California’s
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to the probation
department “ ‘advising you of this inmate’s incarceration pursuant to
[section] 1203.2a’ ” demonstrated “strict compliance with the statutory
requirements”] and Hall, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 984 [holding that
appellant’s motion to dismiss for failure to comply with § 1381 was
insufficient to trigger § 1203.2a’s time limits “[u]nder the rule requiring strict
compliance with the statute”].)
Once a triggering notice has been adequately made, “section 1203.2a
provides for 3 distinct jurisdictional clocks: (1) the probation officer has 30
days from the receipt of written notice [from defendant] of defendant’s
subsequent commitment within which to notify the probation-granting court
[citation]; (2) the court has 30 days from the receipt of a valid, formal request
from defendant within which to impose sentence, if sentence has not
previously been imposed [citation]; and (3) the court has 60 days from the
receipt of notice of the confinement to order execution of sentence (or make
other final order) if sentence has previously been imposed [citation].”13
(Hoddinott, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 999.) “Failure to comply with any one of
13 Specifically, section 1203.2a provides in relevant part: “Upon being
informed by the probation officer of the defendant’s confinement . . . the court
shall issue its commitment if sentence has previously been imposed. . . . If
the case is one in which sentence has previously been imposed, the court shall
be deprived of jurisdiction over defendant if it does not issue its commitment
or make other final order terminating its jurisdiction over defendant in the
case within 60 days after being notified of the confinement.”
13
these three time limits divests the court of any remaining jurisdiction.”
(Ibid.) But “ ‘[l]oss of jurisdiction over a convicted felon is a severe sanction
which courts have been unwilling to apply unless the sentencing court’s
jurisdiction has been ousted by strict compliance with the statute.’ ”14 (Hall,
supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 981; Wagner, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1054.)
Here, there is no dispute Neal’s original San Francisco sentence had
already been imposed with its execution suspended, thus, our analysis is
limited to the third jurisdictional clock.15 (See, e.g., Mancillas, supra,
2 Cal.App.5th at pp. 906, 910 [section 1203.2a’s third jurisdictional clock is
applied where execution of sentence has been suspended and the defendant
placed on probation]; Wagner, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1050 [section 1203.2a
“provides one set of procedures for probation with the imposition of sentence
suspended and other procedures for probation with the execution of sentence
suspended”].)
II. Triggering Notice
As stated, Neal now contends that section 1203.2a’s third jurisdictional
clock was triggered by: (1) oral notice the probation department provided the
VJC on April 9, 2024; and (2) the short supplemental report filed by the
probation department on or around May 17, 2024. He argues the trial court’s
failure to “execute the previously suspended sentence within 60 days of
probation’s notification to the court of Neal’s imprisonment for the unrelated
assault” divests it of jurisdiction. In response, the Attorney General asserts
14 The references to “jurisdiction” in section 1203.2a concern “the
sentencing jurisdiction” a court retains when it grants probation. (Hoddinott,
supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 994.)
15 Although Neal asserted below that the first two jurisdictional clocks
were also triggered, because he does not raise the same argument on appeal,
we only consider the third jurisdictional clock.
14
that because Neal initially invoked section 1381, and not section 1203.2a, the
jurisdictional clock under 1203.2a “never began running,” and thus, the court
could not lose jurisdiction. Although, we disagree with (without deciding) the
Attorney General’s suggestion that sentencing demands under section 1381
and section 1203.2a are “mutually exclusive,”16 we accept the parties’
acknowledgment that Neal’s section 1381 demand did not trigger a
jurisdictional clock under section 1203.2a. We then conclude that neither of
the “notices of imprisonment” asserted on appeal satisfy the statute’s “strict
compliance” necessary to trigger section 1203.2a’s jurisdictional clock and to
warrant the loss of jurisdiction.
Section 1203.2a, which is “not a model of clarity” (Murray, supra,
155 Cal.App.4th at p. 154),17 does not explicitly specify the form or content of
a triggering notice, but it appears to require a specific written demand from a
defendant or his counsel or a duly authorized representative of the warden or
of the prison where the defendant is housed that also represents the nature of
his commitment and his desire for speedy sentencing in absentia. (§ 1203.2a.)
For example, in Murray, at appellant’s request, the CDCR submitted a
letter to the probation department advising of the appellant’s CDCR
16 Wagner’s characterization of demands under section 1381 and
section 1203.2a as “alternative procedures” does not necessarily render them
“mutually exclusive” as long as section 1203.2a’s notice provisions are strictly
complied with. (Wagner, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 1052, 1054.) For example,
we can envision a scenario, where a probationer like Neal erroneously makes
a sentencing demand under section 1381 and, thereafter, notices a second
demand under section 1203.2a, waiving his right to appear and have counsel
and requesting immediate sentencing in absentia. But, as we discuss below,
that did not happen here.
17 See also People v. Holt (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 962, 965 [“The statute
reflects a disregard for careful drafting and contempt for the English
language”; its interpretation is “an unenviable chore”].
15
commitment and showing the arrest date, offense, length of sentence, and
case number for which appellant was on probation. (Murray, supra, 155
Cal.App.4th at pp. 153–154.) The letter further stated, “ ‘[W]e are advising
you of this inmate’s incarceration pursuant to [section] 1203.2a’ ” and “was
written under the name of a correctional case manager and was signed by a
correctional case records analyst.” (Id. at p. 154.) The probation department
did not act on the letter, and the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s
orders issued months later, holding that the trial court’s sentencing orders
were void for lack of jurisdiction because the CDCR letter “pursuant to
section 1203.2a” had demonstrated strict compliance with the statute. (Id. at
pp. 157–158.)
Following similar logic, in Hall, the defendant probationer was alleged
to have committed a new offense, which led the probation department to file
with the court a “ ‘Notice of Probation Violation and Court Action’ ” that
detailed the defendant’s arrest and said, “ ‘He was transferred to the
California Institut[e] for Men at Chino the same date.’ ” (Hall, supra,
59 Cal.App.4th at p. 978.) The following year, the probation department filed
an amended notice which listed an additional probation violation based on
the defendant pleading “ ‘guilty to a new violation . . . resulting from an
arrest in Long Beach, California . . . .’ ” (Ibid.) Shortly before the filing of the
amended notice of probation violation, the defendant had served on the
district attorney in his probationary county a demand for hearing and trial
pursuant to section 1381, and seven months later, he filed with the court a
motion to dismiss for failing to comply with section 1381. (Hall, at p. 978.)
In opposition to the motion to dismiss, the district attorney asserted section
1381 did not apply to the defendant who was on probation (like Neal) but
noted that “if the court deemed appellant’s motion to dismiss a request to be
16
sentenced under section 1203.2a, then appellant must be sentenced within 60
days . . . .” (Hall, at p. 978.) The court held the probation violation hearing
within 60 days and ordered execution of the previously imposed but stayed
sentence the following month. (Id. at pp. 978–979.)
On appeal, Division Two of the First District rejected Hall’s contention
that the court had lost jurisdiction to order execution of sentence, concluding
that neither notice of probation violation triggered section 1203.2a’s
jurisdictional clock because they “did not inform the court that appellant had
been committed to prison for another offense and thus did not qualify under
the statute.” (Hall, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 984.) Similarly, the
defendant probationer’s motion to dismiss for violation of section 1381 “did
not trigger the court’s 60-day jurisdictional clock” because, “To qualify under
paragraph three of section 1203.2a, the notice must be from the probation
officer or from the warden or other duly authorized representative of any
prison. There is no provision for notice from a defendant to the court.” (Hall,
at p. 984.) Therefore, “Under the rule requiring strict compliance with the
statute,” the Court of Appeal held “appellant’s April 22 motion insufficient to
invoke the 60-day jurisdictional time limit set forth in the third paragraph of
section 1203.2a.” (Ibid.)
Neal’s citation to Mancillas does not warrant a different conclusion.
Mancillas involved a probationer who was subsequently convicted of a new
offense out-of-state. (Mancillas, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 901.) While
serving his sentence, petitioner asked prison officials “ ‘for the appropriate
forms’ ” to request sentencing on his California cases and was provided with
and completed an eight-page packet entitled “ ‘Interstate Agreement on
Detainers,’ ” which included an “ ‘Inmate’s Notice of Place of Imprisonment
and Request for Disposition of Indictments, Informations or Complaints’ ”
17
and a “ ‘Certificate of Inmate Status.’ ” (Ibid.) In the forms, petitioner
requested “ ‘final disposition be made’ ” of his two California cases and
included information about his name, location, out-of-state sentence, and
California case numbers. (Ibid.) The forms were signed by petitioner, two
correctional officers, and the warrants coordinator and were sent to the trial
court and the district attorney’s office of the probationary county. (Id. at
pp. 901–902.) No action was taken, and approximately nine months later,
the probation department in California reported to the court that it had
received an e-mail from petitioner’s trial counsel including notification of the
out-of-state incarceration and requesting that petitioner be sentenced
pursuant to section 1203.2a. (Mancillas, at pp. 902–903.) Within 60 days,
the court ordered execution of the petitioner’s stayed prison sentence without
requiring an admission of the probation violation. (Id. at p. 903.) The Court
of Appeal subsequently declared the execution of sentence void for lack of
jurisdiction, as the original demand from the out-of-state department of
corrections had complied with section 1203.2a’s third prong and triggered the
jurisdictional clock. (Mancillas, at pp. 906, 910–911.)
Here, unlike the above cases, we do not have a triggering section
1203.2a demand from Neal or from a correctional facility. Instead, Neal now
argues that the purported April 2024 oral representation by a probation
officer in VJC that Neal was incarcerated for the San Joaquin offense
qualified as a 1203.2a demand, or, in the alternative, the probation
department’s reference to Neal’s San Joaquin-related incarceration in its May
2024 short supplemental report triggered the 60-day jurisdictional timeclock.
But an oral statement from a probation officer—particularly one not
included in the record on appeal—is not sufficient to provide notice under
section 1203.2a, which requires strict compliance. (Pompi v. Superior Court
18
(1982) 139 Cal.App.3d 503, 507 [“in the absence of a defendant’s strict
compliance with the statutory requirements [of section 1203.2a], no ouster of
jurisdiction will result”].)
And the single sentence reference in the seven-page short supplemental
report stating that Neal had been convicted of the San Joaquin offense and
was “currently in the custody of the [CDCR] and is expected to be released to
Parole in July of 2024,” cannot trigger section 1203.2a’s jurisdictional
timeclock when it neither references the statute by name nor in any way
indicates that Neal wished to waive his rights to counsel and to appear in
court and instead wanted his previously suspended sentence ordered
executed immediately, in absentia. (See Wagner, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1054
[“ ‘[R]equests for sentencing pursuant to section 1203.2a must be in strict
compliance with that section. [Citations.] . . . [I]f the court pronounces
judgment in the absence of such a request and waiver, it violates the
defendant’s constitutional rights to have the assistance of and to be
personally present with counsel’ ”].)
Moreover, to the extent either statement by the probation department
might be considered to be a triggering demand under section 1203.2a, Neal’s
conduct has waived any associated timeclock. (People v. Martinez (1975)
46 Cal.App.3d 736, 740, fn. 1, 742 [the time limitations of section 1203.2a
“may, of course, be waived”; a defendant’s request of the court to “ ‘make
disposition of my probation as required by law’ ” is “not the same as
requesting the court to ‘impose sentence’ ”].) At the time Neal now asserts he
was demanding the execution of his suspended San Francisco County prison
commitment, the record shows directly contrary conduct, which involved
months of represented court appearances where Neal and his attorney
repeatedly sought readmission into VJC and Behavioral Health Court.
19
(People v. Davidson (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 79, 85 [the “record makes it
unmistakable that . . . appellant personally and through his counsel waived
any sentencing requirement that might have been applicable by Penal Code,
section 1203.2a”].)
Moreover, Neal’s counsel repeatedly represented to the court, “There is
no ticking clock”; “There shouldn’t be a last day.” And explained in direct
contradiction to a section 1203.2a demand, “I don’t think he is actually
seeking to be sentenced on a five-year ESS.” Neal cannot now fault the
court’s acceptance of his own representations. (See People v. Midell (2025)
113 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1072 [“ ‘ “[W]hen a party by its own conduct induces
the commission of error, it may not claim on appeal that the judgment should
be reversed because of that error” ’ ”].) Indeed, had the court separately
ordered Neal’s sentence executed under section 1203.2a despite his multiple
appearances with counsel requesting sentencing alternatives, such an order
would likely have amounted to constitutional error our Supreme Court
warned against in Wagner. (Wagner, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1054.)
Accordingly, neither mention of Neal’s San Joaquin commitment by the
probation department qualified as “notice” triggering section 1203.2a’s
jurisdictional clock,18 and even if interpreted as a demand under section
1203.2a, Neal’s conduct waived any associated time limits.
18 On appeal, Neal appears to have abandoned his alternative
argument before the trial court that his October 2024 mention of section
1203.2a at the probation violation hearing triggered the 60-day jurisdictional
clock. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [appellate court may
disregard issues not properly addressed in the briefs and may treat them as
having been abandoned or waived].) Even so, the argument has no merit, as
the request by Neal’s defense attorney for additional time for briefing and a
further continuance for sentencing also waived any jurisdictional clock and
demonstrated a desire to continue being represented by counsel despite any
20
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s January 3, 2025 commitment order lifting the stay of
execution of Neal’s five-year sentence imposed on April 19, 2022, is affirmed.
reference to section 1203.2a. (People v. Martinez, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d at
p. 742; People v. Davidson, supra, 25 Cal.App.3d at p. 85.)
21
DESAUTELS, J.
We concur:
STEWART, P. J.
RICHMAN, J.
People v. Neal (A172377)
22