Filed 10/5/26 P. v. Nazemi CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D086729
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCD295178)
v.
FARRAH P. NAZEMI,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Robert O. Amador, Judge. Affirmed.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, and Eric A. Swenson and Christine Y. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Timothy V. Milner, State Public Defender, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Farrah P. Nazemi appeals from a judgment after her conviction for
three counts of filing a false instrument and one count of forgery of the name
of another person. Nazemi argues that the trial court committed structural
error requiring reversal because (1) her second Faretta1 waiver of the right to
counsel was invalid and (2) she lacked the mental capacity to undertake self-
representation.
We conclude Nazemi’s waiver of counsel was competent, knowing, and
intelligent. We further conclude substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s implicit finding that Nazemi was competent to represent herself. We
affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Underlying Crimes
Around September 2019, Nazemi’s home was sold at a foreclosure
auction. A few months later, Nazemi recorded two documents reconveying
the property to herself. Then around October 2021, Nazemi forged a deed to
a different property and recorded it.
B. Pre-Trial Proceedings
In June 2022, the People charged Nazemi with three counts of filing a
false instrument, (Pen. Code, § 115, subd. (a);2 counts 1, 2, and 3) and one
count of forgery of the name of another person, (§ 470, subd. (a); count 4).
Nazemi failed to appear multiple times, indicating twice she was too sick to
come to court. Nazemi was eventually arrested on a bench warrant.
1 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).
2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
At the arraignment in September 2022, the court appointed a public
defender. The next month, Nazemi indicated she wanted a private attorney
and the trial court continued the preliminary hearing to December 2022. On
that date, Nazemi indicated she was sick, and the hearing, as well as her
Marsden3 and Faretta motions, was continued to January 2023.
At the January hearing, the trial court denied Nazemi’s request to
represent herself without prejudice. A new attorney was eventually named
and the court set a new trial date for August 2023.
About two weeks before trial, Nazemi substituted another new
attorney. Trial was continued to January 2024, but about a month before
trial the new attorney declared a conflict.
C. First Faretta Waiver
In December 2023, Nazemi told the trial court (Judge Michael S.
Groch) that she wanted to represent herself. She submitted a Faretta waiver
in which she acknowledged her right to counsel and her desire to represent
herself “without the help of an attorney.” On the first page, she initialed
boxes indicating she understood the charges against her and the maximum
punishment that could be imposed. Nazemi described her highest level of
education as a B.S. in electrical engineering, asserting she had over 30 years’
employment in civil construction. She further noted she had proceeded pro
per in a bankruptcy filing and other civil cases.
On the second and third pages of the waiver, Nazemi initialed 15 boxes
recognizing the “dangers and disadvantages of self-representation,” including
that: “self-representation is almost always unwise;” she would get “no special
treatment;” she would be waiving her “constitutional right to claim
3 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
3
ineffective assistance of counsel as a possible ground for . . . appeal” if found
guilty; she might not be aware of “potential defenses;” she would not have a
“right to advisory, standby or co-counsel” or a “legal runner;” and she would
be required to handle all aspects of trial and be “governed by the same rules
that govern an attorney.” On the third page, she attested she had read and
fully understood the preceding warnings and was waiving her right to an
attorney “freely and voluntarily.”
After the trial court reviewed the form, it asked Nazemi whether the
initials were her own and whether she had read and entirely understood the
waiver before signing it. Nazemi responded affirmatively. When the court
asked Nazemi why it was in her best interest to represent herself, Nazemi
answered, “First-hand knowledge, your Honor.” The court told her that even
the “best criminal defense attorneys” and “judges” do not represent
themselves and asked Nazemi whether she had concerns given she lacked
formal legal training. Nazemi said, “I do a lot of studying, Your Honor, and I
read a lot, so I believe I will be able to handle it.” After confirming Nazemi
understood multiple of the form’s other warnings, the court found Nazemi
was “making a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of the right to
counsel” and granted her request.
D. Pro Per Pre-Trial Proceedings & Request For Re-Appointment of Counsel
The trial court scheduled a new trial date for March 2024. Over the
next several months, Nazemi filed various motions including motions to
dismiss, to suppress evidence, for discovery, and for additional continuances.
The court, while “skeptical of [Nazemi’s] multiple motions to continue,”
including one for a shoulder surgery in September, granted the requests and
eventually continued the trial until November 2024.
4
On the November 2024 trial date, Nazemi indicated she needed legal
representation because of the recent shoulder surgery and a minor stroke.
The trial court (Judge Robert O. Amador) denied the request, finding Nazemi
had been “manipulating the case” to delay prosecution. The court directed
the parties to appear the next day.
Nazemi, however, did not appear because she was in the emergency
room. The trial court trailed the matter to November 18. When Nazemi
appeared on that date, she said she had a migraine and could not see. She
presented a doctor’s note and her “provisionally retained” counsel, appearing
as a friend of the court, (hereinafter, provisionally retained counsel)4 read
Nazemi’s prepared statement, indicating she was currently taking narcotics
and the court had “no choice” but to appoint counsel. The court reviewed
Nazemi’s medical records in camera, and found “it was clear that [Nazemi
was] trying . . . [to avoid] trial.” The court noted, as examples, that Nazemi
had told the court she needed shoulder surgery, which she underwent in
September 2024, but the medical records revealed the surgery was elective;
and also that Nazemi’s MRI showed no brain changes, despite her claim that
she had suffered a stroke. Given Nazemi’s narcotics usage, however, the
court continued trial again to December 3.
On December 3, Nazemi again requested appointment of legal counsel
and sought a continuance. Her provisionally retained counsel added that re-
appointment of counsel would be proper, given that Nazemi’s medical issues
had made it difficult for her to “comply and understand the legalities of
things.” The trial court disagreed and, after making a record of the
4 Nazemi had entered into a contract for representation with attorney
Troy Owens, contingent on the trial being continued.
5
procedural history and Nazemi’s medical records, found Nazemi had been
“doing everything that she possibly can to not be prosecuted for the case.”
The court set trial for December 10.
On December 10, Nazemi once again said she “cannot be here” because
she was under the influence of medication. Provisionally retained counsel
volunteered his opinion that Nazemi was not “capable of doing the job that I
have to do for my other clients on her own behalf,” noting Nazemi’s speech
“cuts off in the middle” of conversations and she has to “regain her thoughts.”
When Nazemi indicated she was having trouble breathing and chest pains,
she was taken to the hospital.
The next day, Nazemi appeared in court and presented a doctor’s note
that she could “not go forward.” Because it believed Nazemi was
malingering, the trial court granted the People’s request to subpoena
Nazemi’s treating doctor, Dr. John Dawkins, who was a family medicine
physician, to testify about his medical examination of Nazemi.
At the hearing in mid-December 2024, Dr. Dawkins testified that,
around early December, Nazemi suffered an “extreme acute stress reaction
and panic attacks with cognitive somatic symptoms.” He explained the
symptomatology of this diagnosis is both cognitive and physical and would
make it “difficult for [the person] to perform . . . typical responsibilities.”
Dr. Dawkins said he had observed Nazemi occasionally struggle with finding
words, and had reported headaches and neck pain, but her physical exam
was normal and she was oriented to time and place. Dr. Dawkins declined to
opine whether Nazemi would be mentally competent to represent herself at
the time of the hearing, indicating a psychologist would be better suited to
answer that question. He noted he had referred Nazemi to psychotherapy to
address stress.
6
Based on the evidence, the trial court expressed “extreme concerns”
whether Nazemi was “malingering,” and found there was a “significant issue
in regards to her credibility as to her medical condition.” Nonetheless,
because Dr. Dawkins did not indicate Nazemi was in a “position to actually
move forward,” the court appointed Nazemi’s provisionally retained counsel
as attorney of record (hereinafter, defense counsel) and granted the
continuance. The court admonished Nazemi that defense counsel “will be
your last attorney. . . . And the Court does believe, based on the evidence I
have heard, that you will not be in a position to represent yourself in the
future because of the stress reaction you apparently have and are unable to
represent yourself completely.”
E. Trial & Second Faretta Waiver
Trial commenced six months later in June 2025. On the second day of
trial, defense counsel informed the trial court that Nazemi was unhappy with
his representation. Nazemi expressed her dissatisfaction with counsel’s
performance, outlining in detail his alleged inadequacies during cross-
examination of four witnesses and her dismay that counsel had not pursued
her theory of defense in an opening statement. Nazemi told the court, “I’m
here to save my life. I’m a licensed person, and [if convicted] I lose
everything,” and “at the end of the day, I’m the one who has to prove [my]
innocence.” The court confirmed Nazemi’s desire to represent herself and
directed her to complete another Faretta waiver.
After Nazemi completed and signed the form, which was the same as
the first one, the trial court again confirmed Nazemi’s knowledge and
understanding of the charges and maximum punishments, as well as the
dangers of self-representation. The court granted her request for self-
representation and appointed defense counsel as advisory counsel.
7
F. Nazemi’s Trial Performance
Trial continued with Nazemi representing herself and her appointed
advisory counsel present to assist her. Multiple prosecution witnesses
testified. Nazemi raised objections during direct examination and attempted
to discredit their testimony on cross-examination. On occasion, the trial
court directed Nazemi not to ask compound questions, make argument
during examination, or ask the same question multiple times.
After the first day of representing herself, Nazemi told the court she
did not feel well, but when the court offered her the opportunity to have
counsel step in, Nazemi declined. Nazemi again raised objections during
direct examination and attempted to discredit testimony on cross, on one
occasion using a prior statement.
Nazemi then put on her own case, introducing evidence and calling
witnesses, including a forensic document examiner. Nazemi also objected to
proposed jury instructions and the court removed at least two of them.
During closing argument, Nazemi argued her theory of the case that she was
the victim and walked the jury through her view of the evidence, despite
difficulty adhering to the rule not to argue facts not in evidence.
Ultimately, the jury convicted Nazemi as charged. The court sentenced
Nazemi to an aggregate term of two years in prison.
DISCUSSION
Nazemi claims the trial court erred by allowing her to waive her right
to counsel and represent herself at trial. We consider first whether Nazemi’s
Faretta waiver was valid and then address Nazemi’s additional claim that
she was not competent to represent herself during the proceedings.
8
A. Legal Standards
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees a
criminal defendant who faces incarceration a right to counsel at all critical
stages of the criminal process. (Iowa v. Tovar (2004) 541 U.S. 77, 80–81
(Tovar).) A defendant may also waive this right and personally represent
him or herself, so long as the waiver is valid. (Faretta v. California (1975)
422 U.S. 806, 821.) “A valid waiver requires that the defendant possess
[(1)]the mental capacity to [waive the right to counsel], and [(2)] that the
defendant waive the right knowingly and voluntarily.” (People v. Mickel
(2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 205 (Mickel); see also People v. Stewart (2004)
33 Cal.4th 425, 513 (Stewart).)
A defendant’s competence to waive the right to counsel is judged by the
same standard as competence to stand trial. (People v. Weber (2013)
217 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1051.) That is, the “defendant must have a
“ ‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding’ and . . . ‘a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him’ ” (Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th
at p. 513; see also Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402.) The focus is,
thus, on whether the defendant has “the mental capacity to understand the
nature and object of the proceedings against him or her.” (People v. Koontz
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1069 (Koontz).)
In contrast, the inquiry whether a waiver is knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent asks whether the “accused understands the significance and
consequences of the decision and makes it without coercion.” (Koontz, supra,
27 Cal.4th at p. 1070.) “[A] defendant ‘should be made aware of the dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish
that “he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.”
9
[Citation.]’ No particular form of words is required in admonishing a
defendant who seeks to waive counsel and elect self-representation; the test
is whether the record as a whole demonstrates that the defendant understood
the disadvantages of self-representation, including the risks and complexities
of the particular case.” (Ibid.)
Even when a Faretta waiver is constitutionally valid (when defendant
possesses the capacity to waive counsel and has done so knowingly and
voluntarily), California courts have limited discretion to deny certain
defendants the right to self-representation. (People v. Johnson (2012)
53 Cal.4th 519, 528 (Johnson); Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164, 177–
178 (Edwards).) Specifically, the Sixth Amendment permits courts to deny
the right to self-representation for “gray area defendants,” meaning “those
competent enough to stand trial . . . but who . . . are not competent to conduct
trial proceedings by themselves.” (Johnson, at p. 527.) Under Edwards and
Johnson, however, a trial court may deny such a defendant their right to self-
representation only if it determines the “defendant suffers from a severe
mental illness to the point where he or she cannot carry out the basic tasks
needed to present the defense without the help of counsel.” (Id. at p. 530;
Edwards, at p. 178.)
The Johnson court emphasized that “[t]rial courts must apply this
standard cautiously.” (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 531.) “Criminal
defendants still generally have a Sixth Amendment right to represent
themselves. Self-representation by defendants who wish it and validly waive
counsel remains the norm and may not be denied lightly. A court may not
deny self-representation merely because it believes the matter could be tried
more efficiently, or even more fairly, with attorneys on both sides. Rather, it
10
may deny self-representation only in those situations where Edwards permits
it.” (Ibid.)
We review de novo the “validity of the defendant’s waiver of the right to
counsel” taking into account the entire record. (Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at
p. 1070.) “A trial court’s determination regarding the defendant’s competence
to represent himself is reviewed for substantial evidence.” (People v. Orosco
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 348, 358 (Orosco).)
B. Valid Faretta Waiver
Nazemi appears to contend that her second Faretta waiver in June
2025 was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because she allegedly
lacked competence for self-representation. As we have explained, however, the
standard of competence to waive the right to counsel is the same as the
standard of competence to stand trial. (Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 513.)
“[T]he trial court may not ascertain a defendant’s competence to waive
counsel by evaluating the ability to represent himself or herself.” (People v.
Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 734.)
Applying the correct legal standards, we reject Nazemi’s argument that
her second Faretta waiver was invalid for lack of capacity to waive her right
to counsel or because she did not do so intelligently and knowingly.
First, there was never any question at any point in the proceedings
that Nazemi was competent to stand trial, and thus to also waive her right to
counsel. Nazemi is highly educated, possessing a professional degree in
engineering, speaks English, can read and write, and had represented herself
in other legal proceedings. At both Faretta hearings, Nazemi acknowledged a
factual understanding of the criminal charges against her and the potential
punishments, and indicated she recognized the gravity of her situation. Her
questions to counsel and rational responses to the trial court when
11
appropriate during the second Faretta hearing, reflect both that she
understood the proceedings and also had a sufficient ability to consult with
her lawyer. In short, Nazemi had the mental capacity to understand the
nature and object of the proceedings and was competent to waive her right to
counsel. (See Dusky, supra, 362 U.S. at p. 402.)
The record likewise supports that Nazemi’s second Faretta waiver was
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Nazemi filled out a new Faretta form on
the second day of trial. Her answers on the form were consistent with a
voluntary and intelligent waiver: she signed the form and checked all the
boxes regarding the rights she would be foregoing and the dangers she would
face by choosing self-representation. Nazemi’s clear desire to represent
herself was corroborated by her statements to the trial court. She told the
court she was dissatisfied with counsel’s performance and believed she was
better positioned to present her defense because “at the end of the day, [she
was] the one who ha[d] to prove [her] innocence.”
The verbal colloquy with the court regarding the contents of the form
was also consistent with a voluntary and intelligent waiver. After confirming
Nazemi understood the charges and possible punishments, the trial court
questioned Nazemi’s desire to represent herself by reviewing with Nazemi
the dangers of self-representation. The court asked Nazemi whether she
understood that: self-representation was almost always a bad idea; Nazemi
would be waiving any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal; she
would not be given special treatment or legal advice; she would be
responsible for bringing forth possible defenses; she would have to follow all
substantive and procedural rules of law; and, the prosecutor was a skilled
lawyer who would not “go easy on” Nazemi just because she was self-
represented. In each instance, Nazemi intelligibly and rationally confirmed
12
to the court that she was aware of these dangers and still wanted to
represent herself. Nazemi confirmed this desire yet again, after consultation
with her attorney, even after the court gave her a final caution by telling her
of a defendant who had received the death penalty as the result of his self-
representation.
In sum, our independent examination of the record as a whole supports
that Nazemi’s Faretta waiver was both competent and knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary. Nazemi has not demonstrated that her waiver of counsel was
invalid.5
C. Mental Competence For Self-Representation
We consider next Nazemi’s claim that she lacked the mental capacity to
represent herself at trial without the help of counsel. As evidence of her
incompetence to represent herself, Nazemi references the December 2024
remarks of her then-provisionally retained attorney that she was unable to
represent herself, Dr. Dawkins’ December 2024 testimony that she suffered
from an “acute stress reaction,” the trial court’s December 2024 statement
that she would be unable to represent herself in the future, and her
courtroom performance. On this basis, she contends the trial court was
required to deny her request for self-representation.
5 Nazemi contends that her high level of education does not
automatically mean she was both competent to waive counsel and to
knowingly and voluntarily do so, citing Tovar. We agree with the general
proposition that whether a waiver is valid depends on numerous case-specific
factors, not a singular one like education. (Tovar, 541 U.S. at p. 88.) Yet,
there is no indication that the trial court erroneously predicated its
acceptance of Nazemi’s Faretta waiver solely on Nazemi’s educational
attainment.
13
As we have explained, a trial court has only limited authority to deny a
request for self-representation made by a “gray area” defendant who is
mentally competent to stand trial and has voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waived his or her right to counsel. (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th
at p. 530; Orosco, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 358–360.) To deny a Faretta
request in these circumstances based on the defendant’s incompetence to
represent himself or herself, the defendant must be suffering from a “severe
mental illness to the point where he or she cannot carry out the basic tasks
needed to present the defense without the help of counsel.” (Johnson, at
p. 530.) The Faretta request cannot lawfully be denied in the absence of such
a severe mental illness. (Orosco, at p. 360.)
Here, the trial court had no reason to doubt Nazemi’s competence for
self-representation under this standard. There is no evidence Nazemi
suffered from a severe mental illness that made it impossible for her to carry
out the basic tasks needed to defend herself. Absent from the record is any
expert psychological or psychiatric opinion on this point or any other
indication of a severe mental illness. Although there is evidence that Nazemi
was suffering from “extreme acute stress reaction and panic attacks with
cognitive somatic symptoms” as of December 2024, there is no indication she
was still suffering from this condition six months later when she made her
second request for self-representation. (See Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at
p. 175 [noting that mental illness “can vary over time” and “interferes with
an individual’s functioning at different times in different ways”].) By
definition, an “acute” disease is one of “relatively short duration.” (Merriam-
Webster Dict. Online (2026) <https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/acute%20disease>.) On this record, therefore, it
would have been error for the trial court to deny the Faretta request.
14
(Orosco, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 359–363 [trial court violated
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights by finding he was incompetent to
represent himself in absence of any evidence of severe mental illness].)
Even as of December 2024, the record did not establish as a matter of
law that Nazemi suffered from a mental illness so severe that it would
prevent her from carrying out the tasks necessary to represent herself.
Dr. Dawkins testified that Nazemi’s acute stress response would have made
tasks difficult and he observed her having occasional trouble with finding
words. But he noted Nazemi’s physical exam was normal and she was
oriented to time and place. Then-provisionally retained counsel volunteered
a similar observation, noting Nazemi’s speech “cuts off in the middle” of
conversations and she has to “regain her thoughts.” He did not think Nazemi
was “capable of doing the job that I have to do,” but the same could fairly be
said of virtually all criminal defendants without legal training. Neither
evaluation demonstrates a severe mental illness such that Nazemi could not
perform the basic tasks needed to represent herself. (People v. Ghobrial
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 271 [“[E]vidence of mental illness alone is not sufficient
to raise a doubt about a defendant’s competence to stand trial.”] (Ghobrial).)
In fact, Nazemi’s subsequent request to represent herself and her trial
performance in June 2025 show the opposite. Her request for self-
representation was articulate and well-reasoned: she indicated why she was
dissatisfied with counsel’s representation, outlining his alleged failures in
cross-examination and failure to pursue her defense theory in an opening
argument. After she was permitted to represent herself, Nazemi was
respectful, cooperative, and articulate. Nazemi conducted cross-examination,
made objections, put on her own case, introduced evidence, and made a
closing argument tailored to her theory of the case. Her questions to
15
witnesses, while sometimes requiring rephrasing, were rationally in
furtherance of her view of the case, and her closing argument was coherent.
Nazemi later prevailed in her objections to at least two jury instructions.
And, while Nazemi often had to be redirected to follow court rules and her
performance did not meet the standards of an attorney, the record is replete
with examples showing she was capable of undertaking the basic tasks of
self-representation.
Under these circumstances, nothing in the record suggests that Nazemi
was incompetent to represent herself under the Edwards/Johnson standard.
Because substantial evidence supports the court’s implicit finding that
Nazemi was competent to undertake self-representation in June 2025, the
court did not err by granting her request to exercise her Sixth Amendment
right to represent herself at trial.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
16