Filed 8/18/26 P. v. Navarro-Rodriguez CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No.B343844
(Super. Ct. No. 23CR00930)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
JOSE RAMON NAVARRO-
RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appellant Jose Ramon Navarro-Rodriguez was found guilty
of corporal injury to a dating partner (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd.
(a))1 and dissuading a witness from reporting a crime (§ 136.1,
subd. (b)(1)). The trial court placed him on formal supervised
probation for 36 months, one condition of which was that he
submit all of his “personal electronic devices” to warrantless
searches for “electronic communication information.” Appellant
appeals the search condition, arguing that it is unreasonable to
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
impose such a term under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481
(Lent) because he did not use an electronic device to commit the
charged offenses. We disagree and will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the evening of February 7, 2023, deputies from the
Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Department responded to a
domestic disturbance at a house in Goleta. Outside the house
deputies encountered Rene and Jessica Mireles, the occupants of
the home, and appellant. Mr. and Mrs. Mireles informed the
deputies that a woman inside the house had come to them that
evening seeking help. One deputy waited outside with appellant
while the other entered the Mireles’s house.
Inside, the deputy contacted victim Y.R., who appeared to
have been crying. Y.R. had two prominent cuts on her face, one
above the right side of her upper lip, the other on the left side of
her chin. The cuts were still bleeding.
Y.R. stated that she and appellant were dating partners,
and that they were staying at a nearby house they were
remodeling. The couple had argued throughout the day as they
ran errands, and the argument escalated when they returned to
the house. During the argument appellant grabbed Y.R.’s face,
clawing her skin with his fingernails and inflicting the two cuts.
Y.R. stated that she then entered the kitchen, and
appellant followed her, crying and apologizing. Y.R. took out her
phone and told appellant that she intended to call the police.
Appellant told her not to and snatched the phone out of her
hands. Afraid that appellant would resort to further violence,
Y.R. ran out of the house and down the street.
Mrs. Mireles saw Y.R. standing in the street and offered
help. A few minutes later, appellant arrived in his truck. After
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deputies arrived and spoke with all parties at the scene, they
arrested appellant.
Y.R. was not available to testify against appellant at trial.
The People called another former girlfriend, D.I., to testify about
appellant’s acts of domestic violence against her. D.I. also
testified that appellant called her twice before trial—including
that morning—to ask if she wanted to go to court with him.
The jury convicted appellant of corporal injury to a dating
partner (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) and dissuading a witness from
reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)). The court sentenced
appellant to three years of formal supervised probation. One of
the conditions of probation was an electronic search term
subjecting appellant to warrantless “search and seizure of all
personal electronic devices for electronic communication.” All the
electronic devices named in the probation order were electronics
capable of either making calls or sending and storing messages,
including “computers, hard drives, . . . smart phones, i-Pads,
Notebooks, Chromebooks, electronic gaming consoles, and any
other electronic devices and the like . . . .”
A further condition of probation was that appellant not
molest, annoy, threaten, or harass Y.R. To that end, the court
entered a criminal protective order.
DISCUSSION
Probation is “‘an act of clemency,’” different in kind from
traditional forms of punishment such as fines or imprisonment.
(People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 402.) “Probation is not a
right, but a privilege.” (People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600,
608.) “Section 1203.1, subdivision (j) authorizes the trial court to
impose conditions of probation to achieve a variety of goals,
including reforming and rehabilitating the probationer and
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protecting public safety.” (People v. Bryant (2021) 11 Cal.5th 976,
983.) Trial courts have broad discretion to fashion “reasonable
conditions [on probation], as it may determine are fitting and
proper to the end that justice may be done.” (§ 1203.1, subd. (j).)
We review conditions for abuse of discretion and will only strike a
condition that is arbitrary and capricious. (Moran, at p. 403.)
Lent articulates a three-prong test for striking a condition
of probation: (1) the condition must have “no relationship to the
crime of which the offender was convicted,” (2) it must relate to
“conduct which is not in itself criminal,” and (3) it must require or
forbid “conduct which is not reasonably related to future
criminality.” (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) Lent’s three-
prong test is conjunctive. A reviewing court should strike a
probation term only if each prong is met. (People v. Olguin (2008)
45 Cal.4th 375, 379.)
The parties agree Lent’s second prong is not at issue. We
focus on the first and third prongs for this reason.
Lent Prong 1: Relation to Crime
Appellant contends there is no relationship between the
ability for probation officers to search appellant’s devices and his
underlying conduct of taking Y.R.’s phone to prevent her from
calling police. Lent’s requirement that the condition relate to the
underlying crime is a broad standard reflecting the court’s ample
discretion to craft terms of probation. (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at
p. 486.) That a defendant could use an electronic device to
commit a future crime does not justify an electronics search
condition where the defendant did not use a device to commit the
charged crime. (See In re Erica R. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 907,
912 [electronics search condition stricken in drug case where
nothing in record “connect[ed the defendant]’s use of electronic
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devices or social media to her possession of any illegal
substance”].)
People v. Ebertowski upheld a similar search condition after
the defendant pleaded no contest to resisting and threatening a
police officer. (People v. Ebertowski (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1170,
1173-1174.) The defendant had identified himself as a gang
member to intimidate the officer and prevent his arrest. (Id., at
p. 1173.) Although the defendant used no electronic devices to
commit the offense, Ebertowski concluded the condition satisfied
Lent because the defendant communicated his threats for the
benefit of the gang, and because he had previously promoted his
gang on social media. (Id., at pp. 1176-1177; compare with In re
J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 754, [electronics search
condition not related to petty theft in which defendant acted
alone].)
The search conditions here relate even more closely to
appellant’s crime of dissuading a witness. The actus reus was a
communicative act threatening the victim. Appellant told Y.R.
not to call the police after committing domestic violence. He then
physically prevented her from doing so by taking her phone.
Lent Prong 3: Relation to Future Criminality
Lent’s third prong requires “a degree of proportionality”
between the burden on the offender and the legitimate interests
the condition serves. (In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113,
1122.) The connection between a condition and future criminality
must be more concrete than “just an abstract or hypothetical
relationship.” (Id. at p. 1121.) A condition cannot be justified
merely on the grounds that it enhances the government’s ability
to supervise a probationer. (Id. at pp. 1122, 1125.) This
heightened standard is met where “the probationer’s offense or
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personal history” provides a “sufficient factual basis . . . [to]
determine that an electronics search condition is a proportional
means of deterring the probationer from future criminality.” (Id.
at pp. 1128-1129.)
The standard is met here. D.I. testified that appellant
twice called her about attending trial together. That he would
call a former girlfriend under these circumstances shows there is
more than an “abstract or hypothetical” possibility he will violate
the protective order by contacting Y.R. by phone. The search
condition is a reasonable means to ensure he obeys the order.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CODY, P. J.
We concur:
YEGAN, J.
BALTODANO, J.
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Michael J. Carrozzo, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Joshua Peter Visco, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy Attorney
General, and David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
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