Filed 8/31/26 P. v. Navar CA5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F089380
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF193804A)
v.
GIOVANNI TAPIA NAVAR, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. David R. Zulfa,
Judge.
Monica McMillan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ian Whitney and Christina
Hitomi Simpson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Defendant Giovanni Tapia Navar (defendant) was convicted of several crimes
arising from a physical altercation with his girlfriend while driving home from a party.
He argues on appeal that he was improperly subjected to a special finding under Penal
Code section 136.1, subdivision (c)(1) when no allegation to that effect was included in
the information, and that there was insufficient evidence he used force likely to cause
great bodily injury. We conclude the first contention was forfeited for failure to object
below and reject the second contention on its merits. We affirm the judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 20, 2024, the Kern County District Attorney filed an amended
information charging defendant with assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code,
§ 245, subd. (b), count 1),1 kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a), count 2), infliction of corporal
injury upon a person in a dating relationship causing a traumatic condition (§ 273.5,
subd. (a), count 3), discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle (§ 26100, subd. (d),
count 4), grossly negligent discharge of a firearm which could result in injury or death
(§ 246.3, subd. (a), count 5), and dissuading a witness or victim from reporting a crime
(§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1), count 6). As to counts 1, 2, 3, and 6, the information further
alleged defendant personally used a firearm. (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).) The information
further alleged that, as to count 2, defendant personally used a firearm under
section 12022.53, subdivision (b), and that he intentionally and personally discharged a
firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)).
The information also alleged aggravating sentencing factors under California
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(11), (b)(1), and (b)(2), as to all counts.
Finally, the information alleged a prior strike (§§ 667, subds. (c)–(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)–
(e)) and a prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)).
The allegations concerning defendant’s prior convictions were bifurcated, and
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2.
defendant waived his right to a jury trial as to those allegations.
A jury convicted defendant of the lesser included offense of assault with force
likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) on count 1. The jury also
convicted defendant of the lesser included offense of false imprisonment (§ 237) on
count 2. The jury convicted defendant on counts 3 and 6, and found the latter had been
accompanied by force or a threat of violence as stated in section 136.1, subdivision (c).
The jury acquitted defendant of counts 4 and 5, and found all of the section 12022.5,
subdivision (a) firearm enhancements not true.
On February 5, 2025, the trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss his
prior strike conviction. The court sentenced defendant to the low term of two years on
count 1, plus a consecutive term of eight months on count 2, plus a consecutive term of
three years on count 6, plus a stayed (§ 654) term of two years on count 3.
FACTS
On August 27, 2022, A.R. hosted a birthday party for her son at her home in
Bakersfield. Defendant attended the party with his girlfriend, T.E. Defendant was
drinking and appeared intoxicated.
T.E.’s Testimony
Defendant was intoxicated and acted in a manner that embarrassed T.E. She told
defendant he had embarrassed her and that it was time to leave. Defendant wanted to
stay and drink. Defendant was offering alcohol to others, including children.
T.E. finally left the party with defendant and her two children. The children got
into the backseat of her vehicle, T.E. got into the driver’s seat, and defendant got into the
passenger seat. During the drive home, defendant hit T.E. in the head with a gun and said
he was going to kill her. T.E. told defendant to put the gun away. At some point,
defendant told T.E., “ ‘Shut the fuck up, bitch, before I kill you.’ ” Also at some point,
defendant pointed the gun at T.E.’s head. T.E. believed he was serious and feared for her
life.
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Defendant wanted to get off the freeway, so T.E. pulled over to a fast food
restaurant. At one point, defendant put the car into reverse, reached his foot over to the
driver’s side, and stepped on the gas pedal. T.E. held onto the brake, which made
defendant angry. Defendant got in T.E.’s face, so she grabbed him by the face and
pushed him off. Defendant then bit T.E.’s finger.
Defendant pointed the gun at T.E. and said if she did not leave the parking area he
would kill her. T.E. did not want to be with defendant at this point and he was forcing
her to travel with him.
While driving, defendant again hit T.E. on the head with the gun and pointed the
gun at her. Defendant also fired the gun out of the window of the vehicle.
At one point, T.E. saw a sheriff’s vehicle. Defendant said not to signal him
because he was “going to go on a shoot-out with everybody.” T.E. did not contact the
officer and the sheriff’s vehicle drove by. Defendant again hit T.E. on the head.
When they returned home, defendant asked for T.E.’s cellphone. Defendant told
T.E. he would kill her if she said anything. T.E. did not call the police that day because
she was scared.
A short time later, T.E. sent a text message to defendant’s mother, telling her what
had happened. She also sent a picture of her injuries. Defendant’s mother did not tell her
to call police or go to the hospital, which made T.E. feel like nothing would get better.
That led T.E. to leave defendant three days after the incident.
T.E. did not call the police until September 7, 2022, because she was scared.
When T.E. contacted the police, they took pictures of her. The pictures showed bruising,
including substantial bruising on one of her fingernails. T.E. testified the bruises were
caused by defendant on the night in question. T.E. admitted that she had also hit
defendant that night but said it was in self-defense.
A prior incident occurred on October 12, 2019 in Salinas, when defendant grabbed
T.E. by the back of her neck after taking their child from the car seat and taking her
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phone. Following the incident, T.E. went to the neighbor’s house to ask for help and call
the police because defendant had taken her phone away.
A.E.’s Testimony
T.E.’s daughter, A.E., testified at trial when she was 12 years old. A.E. testified
that at the party in Bakersfield, defendant tried to give her three-year-old brother, G.N., a
beer. T.E. became angry and said they had to leave.
On the drive home, A.E. saw defendant hit T.E. a couple of times. A.E. initially
testified that defendant hit T.E. with the gun, but when asked again later, said she did not
remember whether he did. Defendant also fired the gun outside of the vehicle two or
three times. Defendant accused T.E. of cheating on him. A.E. did not want to be in the
vehicle with defendant. A.E. saw defendant bite T.E.’s finger.
A.E. said she was going to call the cops, which angered defendant. Defendant
started hitting A.E.’s tablet.
A.E. did not remember defendant threatening to kill T.E. T.E. was crying and
appeared scared.
Domestic Violence Expert
A domestic violence expert testified for the prosecution, explaining that it is not
uncommon for domestic violence victims to continue living with their batterer or to not
immediately go to the police.
Officer Contact with Defendant
After T.E. reported the alleged incident to law enforcement on September 7, 2022,
an officer contacted defendant, who asked, “ ‘Am I going to jail?’ ”
Defendant’s Testimony
Defendant denied giving his three-year-old son beer at the party in Bakersfield.
T.E. told defendant she was tired and wanted to leave, and they left around 10:00 p.m.
On the drive home, T.E. slammed on the brakes, causing defendant to hit his face and
“bust” his lip.
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T.E. asked defendant if the reason he did drugs was so he could fall asleep. The
two began to argue. Defendant told T.E. to put the window down so he could spit since
his lip was bleeding. As he was “pulling out the window to spit,” T.E. pulled him back
and scratched him. That caused defendant to “accidentally” bite her finger.
At trial, defendant introduced exhibits which he testified showed scratches and a
bite mark, both of which were caused by T.E. during the drive.2
Defendant denied striking T.E. with a firearm and denied possessing a firearm
between the hours of 7:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. that night. When asked if he physically
abused T.E. during the drive home, he testified, “No. I just pushed. I just pulled back.”
Defendant also denied damaging A.E.’s tablet.
Defendant said the allegations regarding the prior incident in October 2019 were
“false” and that the case against him was dismissed. Defendant testified that T.E. injured
herself to ruin his mother’s birthday.
Even though defendant believed they had a happy relationship, T.E. would ask
“out of nowhere” what would happen if they split. Once or twice per month, they would
have unpleasant conversations about who would get custody of G.N. T.E. asked
defendant if he would fight for his son if they split up. Defendant and his mother were
looking for a child custody lawyer before the party “in case” he and T.E. ever went to
court.
Defendant claimed T.E. sent him videos of her having G.N. drink alcohol.
2 Defendant did not have these exhibits included in the record on appeal.
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DISCUSSION
I. Defendant Forfeited his Claim the Information Failed to Allege a Violation of
Subdivision (c)(1) of Section 136.1
Contentions of the Parties
Defendant contends it was improper for him to be sentenced under section 136.1,
subdivision (c) when the information failed to include any allegations supporting
application of that provision.
Due process of law requires that an accused be advised of the charges against him
in order that he may have a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present his defense and
not be taken by surprise by evidence offered at his trial. (People v. Haskin (1992) 4
Cal.App.4th 1434, 1438.) As a result, a person can only be convicted of offenses charged
in the indictment or information, even if evidence at trial shows the defendant also
committed uncharged offenses.3 (Ibid.)
Generally, dissuading a witness carries a punishment of imprisonment in jail for
not more than one year. (§ 136.1, subds. (a), (b).) However, the punishment is increased
to two, three, or four years in prison if any of the circumstances listed in section 136.1,
subdivision (c) apply. (§ 136.1, subd. (c).) One such circumstance is when the
dissuasion “is accompanied by force or by an express or implied threat of force or
violence, upon a witness, victim, or any third person or the property of a victim, witness,
or any third person.” (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1).)
Here, the jury convicted defendant of dissuasion (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)), and made
a special finding that the act of dissuasion was “accompanied by force or by an express or
implied threat of force or violence, upon a witness or victim, as stated in section 136.1[,
subd. ](c).” The trial court sentenced defendant under the heightened triad of
section 136.1, subdivision (c). However, while the information charged defendant with
3 Except for lesser included offenses.
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the crime of dissuading a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)), it did not include a special
circumstance allegation under subdivision (c) of section 136.1.
Defendant correctly observes that it was improper to be sentenced under the
heightened triad established in section 136.1, subdivision (c) when the information failed
to include an allegation to that effect. However, the Attorney General contends this issue
was not preserved for review and we agree.
Law
“ ‘ “ ‘[A] constitutional right,’ or a right of any other sort, ‘may be forfeited in
criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a
tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘Ordinarily, a criminal
defendant who does not challenge an assertedly erroneous ruling of the trial court in that
court has forfeited his or her right to raise the claim on appeal.’ [Citation.] ‘ “The
purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial
court, so that they may be corrected. [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.] Additionally, ‘[i]t is both
unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of error on appeal that, if timely brought to the
attention of the trial court, could have been easily corrected or avoided.’ ” (People v.
McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593.)
Here, while the information did not include an allegation under section 136.1,
subdivision (c), the fact that the prosecutor was seeking a finding thereunder was made
clear by the jury instructions to that effect.
Additional Background
A jury instruction conference was held off the record on December 4, 2024. Later
that day, after the trial court instructed the jury, the court made a record regarding the
earlier conference, stating,
“We conducted our jury instruction conference as a group this
morning[;] in advance of that the Court prepared and submitted
electronically to the parties instructions for review. [¶] The following jury
instructions were given subject to that jury instruction conference. All
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numerical references are to the CALCRIM judicial counsel preferred jury
instructions unless otherwise noted.” (Italics added.)
The trial court went on to list the jury instructions, including CALCRIM
Nos. 2622 and 2623. CALCRIM No. 2622 outlines the elements of the offense described
in section 136.1, subdivisions (a) and (b). CALCRIM No. 2623 outlines the sentencing
factor described in section 136.1, subdivision (c).
The trial court discussed counsel’s objections that had been raised during the
conference, none of which were directed at CALCRIM No. 2623. The court then asked if
it had failed to recount any of the objections defense counsel had made at the conference,
and defense counsel replied, “No, sir.”
The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 2622 and 2623, without
objection by defense counsel.
Analysis
Here, defendant had notice the prosecutor was seeking a jury finding on
section 136.1, subdivision (c)(1) because he was presented with the proposed jury
instruction to that effect (i.e., CALCRIM No. 2623). Yet, he did not raise any objections
concerning the inadequate charging document. Because he “did not raise an objection in
the trial court, he has forfeited this claim on appeal.” (People v. Houston (2012) 54
Cal.4th 1186, 1228 (Houston).)
The case of Houston, supra, 54 Cal.4th 1186, is instructive. In that case, the
defendant was charged with 10 counts of attempted murder. At the time, section 664,
former subdivision (1) provided for a greater sentence if the attempted murders were
“ ‘willful, deliberate, and premeditated.’ ” (Houston, at p. 1225.) However, the
indictment did not contain an allegation under that provision—i.e., it did not allege the
attempted murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated. (Id. at p. 1226.)
Nonetheless, during trial, the court presented the parties with a preliminary draft of
the verdict forms, which indicated it would ask the jury to determine whether the
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attempted murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated. (Houston, supra, 54
Cal.4th at p. 1226.) The court stated it understood the prosecution to be pursuing a
premeditated attempted murder charge and said if that was not right, “ ‘you should tell
me right now.’ ” (Italics omitted.) One week later, the court said it intended to have the
verdict form list deliberate and premeditated attempted murder as a special finding. The
court later instructed the jury to determine whether the attempted murders were willful,
deliberate, and premeditated. Defense counsel did not object. The jury found beyond a
reasonable doubt that the attempted murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated.
The Attorney General conceded the indictment failed to allege that the attempted
murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated, but argued the claim was forfeited by
failure to object. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that “[b]ecause defendant had
notice of the sentence he faced and did not raise an objection in the trial court, he has
forfeited this claim on appeal.” (Houston, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1228.)
Defendant argues the present case is distinguishable from Houston because there
was no evidence in the record of any discussions of the uncharged section 136.1,
subdivision (c)(1) allegations until the jury was instructed. But as we recounted above,
the trial court and counsel held a jury instruction conference in the morning before
instructions were given to the jury. And sometime before that conference, the proposed
jury instructions to be discussed were sent to counsel. Those proposed instructions
included CALCRIM No. 2623, which solely concerns submission of the section 136.1,
subdivision (c)(1) issue to the jury. Consequently, it is clear that defense counsel was
aware of the instruction before it was given to the jury yet did not object.
Defendant notes the parties discussed other legal issues surrounding the jury
instructions, but did not discuss section 136.1, subdivision (c)(1). But this cuts against
his position. It shows he had an opportunity to raise an objection but did not do so.
Defendant also observes that there was no “verbal notice” akin to the trial court’s
statements in Houston. In this respect, he argues the present case is closer to People v.
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Arias (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1009, where defense counsel failed to object to jury
instructions but it was “unclear when the trial court issued its proposed jury instructions
and verdict forms to the parties and whether this issue was discussed.” (Houston, supra,
54 Cal.4th at p. 1229.) Here, however, it is clear that defense counsel was aware of the
proposed jury instructions before they were given to the jury. In any event, once a
defendant is aware of a potential error subject to objection, the fact that he was made
aware by a document (e.g., proposed jury instructions) rather than a verbal statement is
immaterial in our view. The fact remains that defendant was made aware that the
prosecution was seeking a special finding that had not been included in the charging
document, and he made no objection thereto.
He also claims that defense counsel in Houston received verbal notice “prior to
trial.” We do not read Houston that way. The first notice of the issue in Houston appears
to have occurred during the defendant’s presentation of his case at trial. (Houston, supra,
54 Cal.4th at p. 1226.) In any event, if counsel had made a proper objection, the trial
court could have allowed the defense to reopen its case as it permitted amendment of the
information. But even that probably would not have been necessary because the
prosecution’s only theory of dissuasion appears to have been predicated on a threat of
violence. It is difficult to envision what additional evidence the defense would have
wanted to add that it did not already have incentive to introduce without the
section 136.1, subdivision (c)(1) allegation.
Defendant observes that Houston pointed out several ways the case of People v.
Arias, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th 1009 was different. However, the court expressly said it
was not deciding whether Arias was correctly decided. (Houston, supra, 54 Cal.4th at
p. 1229.) In other words, the Houston court was saying that while there were differences
between the two cases, it was not saying those differences warranted a different outcome
(i.e., whether Arias was correctly decided).
Houston next distinguished Arias on the grounds that the properly instructed jury
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made an express finding that the special allegation applied. In contrast, the verdicts in
Arias “did not include any special findings with regard to premeditation and deliberation,
but rather found ‘first degree attempted murder’ as to both victims, even though
attempted murder is not divided into degrees.” (Houston, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1228.)
In this respect, the present case is closer to Houston than Arias. The jury here was
instructed on the section 136.1, subdivision (c)(1) issue and made an express finding
thereon.
Defendant argues for application of People v. Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 946. In
that case, the defendant argued that unauthorized sentences can be challenged at any time
without objection and that, under People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, “the
imposition of an unpleaded enhancement necessarily results in an unauthorized
sentence.” (Anderson, at p. 961.) Anderson responded, “But as subsequent cases make
clear, Mancebo does not stand for the broad proposition that imposition of an unpleaded
enhancement necessarily results in an unauthorized sentence that may be raised, and
corrected, for the first time on appeal.” (Anderson, at pp. 961–962, italics added.) The
Anderson court noted that the rule permitting challenging unauthorized sentences without
objection applied to sentences that could not be imposed under any circumstances and
which were correctable without referring to factual findings. Imposing “unpleaded
sentence enhancements is an error of a different variety, a point we made clear in
[Houston, supra,] 54 Cal.4th [at p.] 1227 .…” (Anderson, at p. 962.) “By affirming on
forfeiture grounds, Houston effectively rejected the notion that a pleading defect
necessarily results in an unauthorized sentence.” (Ibid.)
The Anderson court observed, however, that it retained discretion to disregard the
failure to object and chose to exercise that discretion. (People v. Anderson, supra,
9 Cal.5th at pp. 962–963.) Anderson is clearly a full endorsement of Houston. The
decisions of Houston and Anderson make clear that appellate courts may, but need not,
excuse the failure to object to sentences predicated on an unpleaded allegation. We
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decline to excuse the failure to object here.
More broadly, we note that defendant misunderstands the Attorney General’s
position on this issue. He says the Attorney General is arguing that “sufficient notice was
provided by means of the jury instructions and verdict forms.” It is not that the jury
instructions and verdict forms provided sufficient notice such that an amendment of the
information was unnecessary. Proposed jury instructions and verdict forms are no
substitute for amending the information. Instead, the reason the jury instructions and
verdict forms are important is that they provided sufficient information to trigger
counsel’s duty to object to the relevant error. In sum, we do not conclude that there was
no error here. Instead, we conclude that the claim of error was forfeited by failure to
object.
II. Defendant has not Established Prejudicial Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant next argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
uncharged special finding and being sentenced thereon.
In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must
show counsel acted deficiently and that he was prejudiced thereby. (People v. Goldman
(2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 950, 957 (Goldman).) “ ‘Prejudice is shown when there is a
“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
“It is not necessary for us to consider the performance prong of the test before
considering whether the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s alleged
deficiencies. [Citation.] ‘If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, … that course should be followed.’ ” (Goldman,
supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at pp. 957–958.)
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For example, defense counsel’s failure to challenge a charging document might be
deemed harmless because an amendment to the information would have cured the issue.
(E.g., Goldman, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 958.)
In Houston, the Supreme Court observed: “Had [the] defendant raised a timely
objection to the jury instructions and verdict forms at any of these stages of the trial on
the ground that the indictment did not allege that the attempted murders were deliberate
and premeditated, the court could have heard arguments on whether to permit the
prosecutor to amend the indictment. [Citation.] If the trial court was inclined to permit
amendment, [the] defendant could have requested a continuance to permit him to prepare
a defense.” (Houston, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1227.)
Here, if defense counsel had made a timely objection, the trial court would have
likely permitted amendment of the information. As defendant notes, leave to amend after
a defendant’s plea is subject to the court’s approval. A court may “permit an amendment
of an indictment, … for any defect or insufficiency, at any stage of the proceedings .…”
(§ 1009.) While defendant is correct that leave to amend is not automatic, we think it far
more likely than not the trial court would have permitted amendment here. It is important
to note this is not a situation where the prosecution was changing its factual theory of the
case at the last minute. At the preliminary hearing, T.E. testified that she waited to report
the incident because defendant had “threatened to kill” her. This is similar to T.E.’s
testimony at trial concerning the alleged dissuasion. Consequently, this is not a case
where defendant would have needed to mount a last-minute defense against a new theory
of culpability. Indeed, we fail to see how defendant would have defended his case any
differently if the information had included an allegation under section 136.1,
subdivision (c). In the unlikely case the defense could have formulated the need for
additional evidence, the court could have permitted the defense to reopen its presentation
of evidence. (See People v. Riley (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 754, 764 [trial courts have
broad discretion to order a case reopened and allow the introduction of additional
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evidence].)
In sum, we do not believe there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
proceeding would have been different if counsel had made the proper objections.
III. Sufficient Evidence Supported the Jury’s Conclusion that Defendant Used Force
Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury
Law
Section 245, subdivision (a)(4) criminalizes “assault upon the person of another by
any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury.” (§ 245, subd. (a)(4).) Since
this type of assault applies to application of force likely to produce great bodily injury, it
“may be committed without infliction of any physical injury.” (People v. Wells (1971) 14
Cal.App.3d 348, 358.)
On substantial evidence review, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the judgment, and will affirm if there is reasonable and credible evidence from which
the jury could have relied in reaching its verdict.” (People v. Miranda (2011) 192
Cal.App.4th 398, 408.)
Analysis
Defendant argues that the not true findings on the gun enhancements and
acquittals on gun-related charges mean that the jury rejected the testimony that he used a
gun. As a result, he summarized “the remaining content of the trial testimony that
described the use of force by the appellant not involving the use a firearm.”
This is not the correct approach. Substantial evidence review for one count is
“ ‘ “ ‘independent of the jury’s determination that evidence on another count was
insufficient.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.] “An inconsistency may show no more than jury
lenity, compromise, or mistake, none of which undermines the validity of a verdict.” ’ ”
(People v. Price (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 409, 452; see People v. Miranda, supra, 192
Cal.App.4th at pp. 405–407.)
In his reply brief, defendant acknowledges Price and argues the evidence was
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insufficient even when including T.E.’s testimony related to the gun use, because of the
“minimal bruising in the photos presented and the minimal descriptions of the nature of
the force used .…” We disagree.
There was evidence defendant hit T.E. multiple times in the head with a gun and
bit her. A jury could reasonably conclude that striking someone in the head multiple
times with a firearm constitutes force likely to cause great bodily injury, regardless of
whether it actually caused great bodily injury here. The head is a sensitive area of the
body and striking it repeatedly with a weapon is likely to cause great bodily injury.
Moreover, the bruising on T.E.’s finger, as shown in the photograph admitted at trial, was
substantial and raises an inference of significant bite force. Taken all together, the
evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s decision.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
GUERRA, J.
WE CONCUR:
MEEHAN, Acting P. J.
HARRELL, J.
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