Filed 10/19/26 P. v. Nava CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B343247
(Super. Ct. No. 2021032886)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)
v.
SAUL C. NAVA,
Defendant and Appellant.
Saul C. Nava appeals after a jury convicted him of first
degree murder of A.E. (Pen. Code1, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189; count
1), aggravated mayhem of A.E. (§ 205; count 2), torture of K.M.
(§ 206; count 3), kidnapping of K.M. (§ 207, subd. (a); count 4),
assault with a deadly weapon of K.M. (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count
5), infliction of corporal injury on a dating partner, K.M. (§ 273.5,
subd. (a); counts 6-8), and possession of child pornography
(§ 311.11, subd. (a); count 9). The trial court sentenced appellant
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
to 39 years to life in prison plus a determinate term of 11 years,
eight months.
Appellant argues he cannot be separately punished for the
assault with a deadly weapon (count 5) because it was part of the
course of conduct in the kidnapping (count 4) and committed with
the same intent and objective. We will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
K.M. met appellant in August 2017, when she was 14 years
old and appellant was 17. About a year into their relationship,
K.M. moved in with appellant.
When K.M. was 16, she and appellant “took . . . a break” for
about a month. K.M. had sex with E. Shortly thereafter,
appellant “showed up” at the home of K.M.’s mother. K.M. went
back to appellant’s residence, where appellant questioned K.M.
about what happened with E. When appellant heard something
he did not like, he would hit K.M. with a belt. Appellant
“questioned [K.M.] for days.”
K.M. soon dropped out of school due to appellant’s jealousy
and abuse. Appellant “ended up putting [K.M.] in the closet
when he was at work.” Appellant would prop a chair against the
closet door handle. K.M. could open the door but was concerned
that appellant would know she left the closet if the chair were
moved. Appellant put K.M. in the closet every day for a month.
During this period, appellant continued to physically abuse K.M.
On one occasion, K.M. left the closet and went to a park.
K.M. heard her sister’s voice at a nearby shopping center and
walked to it. K.M. saw appellant arrive, and she began talking to
him. K.M.’s sister left after K.M. said she was okay. Appellant
2 This factual and procedural background is limited to
information relating to appellant’s argument on appeal.
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wanted K.M. to come home with him, but she did not want to do
so. Appellant entered his van, backed up, and sped toward K.M.
twice. One time, it appeared the van would have hit K.M. had
she not moved.
Appellant exited the van. He opened the passenger door
and “tried to get [K.M.] to go in,” but she did not want to do so.
Appellant pulled out a knife, put it to K.M.’s stomach, and “told
[her] to get in the car.” K.M. went with appellant because she
was scared.
Appellant testified that he “scared” K.M. with the car. He
“jerk[ed] the car about a foot or so” multiple times, blocking her
path. K.M. looked more frustrated than scared. Appellant exited
the car and told K.M. to get inside. K.M. said no. Appellant
opened the passenger door and “walked her into” it. He told K.M.
to get inside, and she said no. Appellant “turned [K.M.] around,”
pulled out his pocketknife, held it in front of her, and told her to
go in the car. K.M. went into the car.
The trial court sentenced appellant to eight years for the
kidnapping and imposed a concurrent term of four years for the
assault with a deadly weapon. In explaining its decision to
impose a concurrent term, the court stated that the assault with
a deadly weapon “is kind of a component of the kidnapping in the
sense that it occurred at the same time and place and was part of
kind of the similar objective, to get [K.M.] back to the residence
. . . .”
The court also stated: “I suppose there could be an
argument, maybe it’s 654, but I don’t think so because it’s not–
you don’t necessarily have to commit a 245 in order to commit the
greater kidnapping, but I will impose that as a concurrent
sentence.”
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DISCUSSION
“Section 654 prohibits punishment for two offenses arising
from the same act or from a series of acts constituting an
indivisible course of conduct.” (People v. Sok (2010) 181
Cal.App.4th 88, 99, fn. omitted.) “‘“‘Whether a course of criminal
conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act
within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and
objective of the actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one
objective, the defendant may [not] be punished . . . for more than
one.’”’” (People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 354.)
“Under section 654, ‘a course of conduct divisible in time,
although directed to one objective, may give rise to multiple
violations and punishment. [Citations.]’ . . . This is particularly
so where the offenses are temporally separated in such a way as
to afford the defendant opportunity to reflect and to renew his or
her intent before committing the next one, thereby aggravating
the violation of public security or policy already undertaken.”
(People v. Gaio (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 919, 935 (Gaio).)
“Whether section 654 applies in a given case is a question
of fact for the trial court, which is vested with broad latitude in
making its determination. [Citations.] Its findings will not be
reversed on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support
them.” (People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143.) We
“may . . . affirm the trial court’s ruling, if it is supported by
substantial evidence, on any valid ground.” (People v. Capistrano
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 886, fn. 14, overruled on other grounds in
People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 103-104.)
Even if appellant committed the kidnapping and assault
with a deadly weapon with a single intent or objective (i.e., to
return K.M. to his residence), separate punishment is still
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appropriate because substantial evidence supports the conclusion
that the crimes were divisible in time. Appellant committed the
assault with a deadly weapon when he drove his vehicle at K.M.
Appellant then exited his vehicle and, by his own account,
“walked [K.M.] into the passenger door . . . and . . . told her to get
inside.” Only after K.M. refused did appellant brandish the
knife, which caused her to relent and leave with appellant. The
period of time and action between the completed assault with the
vehicle and completion of the kidnapping afforded appellant the
“opportunity to reflect and to renew his . . . intent . . . .” (Gaio,
supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 935.)
Furthermore, “each offense created a new risk of harm.”
(People v. Goode (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 484, 493.) Appellant
could have immediately injured K.M. when he assaulted her with
his vehicle. By contrast, the kidnapping allowed appellant to
abuse K.M. in his home in the future, with less danger of outside
interference. Separate punishment in counts 4 and 5 “is
commensurate with [appellant’s] culpability.” (People v. Peyton
(2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1080.)
The trial court did state the assault with a deadly weapon
“is kind of a component of the kidnapping in the sense that it
occurred at the same time and place and was part of kind of the
similar objective . . . .” But this comment—made as the court
explained its imposition of a concurrent term—was not a finding
that, for purposes of section 654, a temporally indivisible course
of conduct existed. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.425(a) [factors
for imposing consecutive versus concurrent terms include
whether the “crimes were committed at different times or
separate places . . . .” and whether the “crimes and their
objectives were predominantly independent of each other”].)
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Indeed, the court’s ultimate finding was that section 654 did not
apply. We will not reverse that finding based on the court’s
explanation of its decision to impose a concurrent term.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CODY, P. J.
We concur:
YEGAN, J.
BALTODANO, J.
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Derek D. Malan, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Zachary John Crvarich, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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