Filed 10/22/26 P. v. Munoz CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
THE PEOPLE, C101910
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 19FE022775)
v.
ROBERT MUNOZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
In two separate jury trials, defendant Robert Munoz was found guilty of the 2016
murder of Ruben Ambrus and the 2019 murder of Robert Santillano. On appeal,
defendant contends that the trial court prejudicially erred by excluding evidence of the
victim’s blood alcohol content (BAC) during the Santillano murder trial, and that the
evidence was insufficient to prove defendant was the person who murdered Ambrus. He
also challenges the trial court’s imposition of certain fines and assessments and seeks an
amendment to the abstract of judgment. We will remand for an amendment to the
abstract of judgment. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
1
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURE
The 2019 Murder of Robert Santillano
A. Prosecution Case
In 2019, defendant and his girlfriend, T.E.,1 were living on the streets. In the early
morning hours of December 18, 2019, defendant and T.E. began arguing loudly in a
parking lot near the intersection of Fair Oaks Boulevard and Marconi Avenue.
Across the street, a group of homeless men, including Z.R., J.P., E.E., and M.A.,
also known as “Dominic,” were congregated outside a Mexican restaurant. Most of the
men were drinking and/or using methamphetamine. The men heard defendant and his
girlfriend arguing and yelled at them to keep quiet, which angered defendant. Defendant
crossed the street and confronted the group, saying something like, “Do you want a piece
of Stabbing Rob?” and “Who wants to talk shit now?” Defendant pulled out a knife and
swung it at E.E.’s abdomen, but E.E. blocked it and did not suffer any cuts.2 Defendant
then lunged toward Dominic, stuck the knife into Dominic’s shoulder area, and said, “I
stabbed you.” Because Dominic had been wearing several layers of clothing, the blade
did not draw blood, but there was damage to the right shoulder area of Dominic’s jacket.
After the confrontation, defendant went back across the street and resumed
arguing with T.E. Defendant and T.E. were loudly yelling at each other, and the
argument was getting more animated.
1 To protect their privacy, we will refer to the witnesses by their initials. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.90(b)(10).)
2 The witnesses gave varying descriptions of the knife: E.E. described it as a “fake”
or “plastic” knife with a three-or six-inch blade. J.P. described it as a Bowie knife that
was about 12 inches long. Defendant described it as a sheetrock cutter/knife with a six-
inch serrated blade, but he claimed the knife was still in its sheath during his
confrontation with E.E.
2
The victim, Santillano, had been with the group of men gathered outside the
Mexican restaurant, but left to purchase beer before the confrontation with defendant.
All the witnesses agreed that Santillano had been consuming alcohol and was intoxicated,
but they gave conflicting accounts regarding Santillano’s degree of impairment. Z.R.
testified that Santillano was intoxicated and had slurred speech but did not seem
“unsteady” and was in good spirits. J.P. testified that Santillano “[h]ad a few drinks in
him,” “was buzzed,” and had yelled at a passing car at one point. Nevertheless, J.P. said
that Santillano was “[n]ot really” slurring his words, “held himself well,” and was
“totally mellow.” E.E. did not offer an opinion at trial but told police that Santillano was
“heavily intoxicated.” T.E., who was in custody at the time of the trial for failing to
appear at trial, described Santillano as drunk and acting belligerent.3
While defendant and T.E. were arguing, Santillano approached and yelled at
defendant to “leave her alone.” Although T.E. tried to tell Santillano not to get involved,
he pushed her out of the way and began fighting with defendant. At some point during
the fight, Santillano grabbed defendant’s shoulders and got him in a bear hug. T.E. then
saw what appeared to be defendant throwing a series of quick punches at Santillano’s ribs
and neck—she did not know at the time that defendant was stabbing Santillano with a
knife. Shortly thereafter, Santillano fell on his back, and T.E. could hear him gargling
blood. Defendant said, “Welcome to Carmichael, bitches,” and then it got silent.
After the stabbing, defendant and T.E. fled the scene. T.E. left with defendant
because he threatened, “if you don’t come, I’ll kill you, too.” She took his threat
seriously because of his demeanor and because he had “choked [her] out” several times
before.
3 During her police interview, T.E. never mentioned that Santillano appeared
intoxicated, though she did say he was unarmed.
3
When the fight ended, E.E. and Z.R. crossed the street to see if everyone was okay
and found Santillano bleeding and coughing up blood, with a large gash on his neck.
Z.R. tried to stop the bleeding, but Santillano refused help, got up, and walked away.
The following morning, a passing motorist found Santillano’s dead body lying on
the grass at a nearby church. His autopsy showed that he died from multiple stab
wounds, ranging from one to five inches in depth, including a fatal wound that severed
the carotid artery in his neck and punctured his throat.
The day after the murder, an acquaintance of T.E. drove her and defendant to a
vacant house in Antelope. Defendant did not appear to have any injuries. While they
were at the house, defendant repeatedly told T.E. that she “didn’t see anything,” which
was making her “crazy because [she] did see something.” Defendant was arrested at the
house the next day. Detectives found defendant’s bloody sweatshirt in the backyard.
Sometime after the murder—a few days or a few months later—T.E. went to
speak with Santillano’s father. According to Santillano’s father, T.E. said that she and
her boyfriend had been having a fight, that Santillano defended her, and that her
boyfriend stabbed Santillano.
B. Defense Case
Defendant testified on his own behalf. According to defendant, he and T.E. were
in a parking lot having a loud argument about their relationship and lack of heroin. After
several minutes of arguing, a group of homeless people across the street started yelling to
“ ‘leave her alone.’ ” Defendant went across the street to “engage them.” He tried to
intimidate them with a sheetrock cutter/knife, which had a six-inch serrated blade. He
took the knife out of his pocket but left it in its sheath. He said, “What’s up? Do you
guys want a piece of Stabbing Rob?” He waved the knife at E.E. and “might have”
touched E.E.’s stomach with it. He then removed the knife from the sheath and swung it
at Dominic, contacting Dominic’s shoulder and puncturing his clothing. The group
4
agreed to leave defendant alone, so defendant sheathed his knife and put it back in his
pocket.
Around the same time, defendant heard yelling from across the street. He looked
over and saw Santillano near T.E. in the parking lot. Defendant went back across the
street and got between them. He did not make any movements toward Santillano, who
appeared drunk and was staggering. Santillano moved toward defendant and yelled,
“What’s up, motherfucker. I want some.” Defendant did not want to fight Santillano
because he did not want to pick on an intoxicated person, so defendant put his hands up
and said, “I’m cool.” T.E. got between them and pushed them away from one another.
Santillano looked her up and down and said, “Ooh, ooh, baby…. [A]s soon as I’m done
with this fool I’m going to take care of you.”
Santillano started waving his hands like he was getting ready to fight. He then
pushed past T.E. and began throwing punches, a couple of which connected. Defendant
punched back. Santillano grabbed defendant’s shoulders and pulled him into a bear hug,
pushed his head down, and kneed him in the head. Defendant was stunned by the knee
strikes and scared that Santillano was going to knock him out or kill him and then hurt
T.E. Defendant pulled out his knife and “flailed” at Santillano. Because Santillano had
pulled his shirt over his head, defendant could not see what was happening. Defendant
was unsure of how many times he swung the knife before T.E. broke up the fight. As
defendant got up to leave, he heard Santillano say, “You can’t kill me” and “Welcome to
Carmichael, bitch.” Defendant had a couple of lumps from being kneed in the head, but
he was not struck or stabbed with any weapon. Defendant did not see Santillano’s
injuries or hear him gurgling, but his sweatshirt was covered in blood, so he knew it was
“pretty bad.”
After the stabbing, defendant and T.E. fled. Defendant never threatened T.E. to
make her leave with him. Defendant later buried the knife in the backyard of a vacant
house.
5
Defendant claimed he did not intend to kill Santillano and did not even know he
was stabbing him while flailing blindly. He only used the knife because he was losing
the fight.
The 2016 Murder of Ruben Ambrus
A. Prosecution Case
On January 13, 2016, at around 9:30 p.m., J.J., S.D., A.L., and R.B. were playing
disc golf at Carmichael Park. The disc golf course is in the northeast area of the park,
between Fair Oaks Boulevard and the tennis courts. There is a sidewalk between the disc
golf course and Fair Oaks Boulevard; a service road and post office to the south of the
course; and a dog park to the west of the post office. Lights from the tennis courts and
nearby streetlamps provided a small amount of ambient lighting, but the park was mostly
dark.
J.J. testified that while the group was playing, he heard a grunting sound, as
though a person had been hit. He turned toward the sidewalk and saw a man running
away. J.J. watched as the man ran south along Fair Oaks Boulevard, then cut into the
park, either just before or just after the utility building adjacent to the post office. The
man disappeared into the dark near the dog park area. According to J.J., the man was
about 45 yards away when he fled. J.J. described the assailant to police as a White or
Hispanic man, with short, dark colored hair, between five feet, eight inches and six feet in
height, medium build, and wearing a dark hooded sweatshirt and baggy clothes.
J.J. walked in the direction of the sound and found the victim, later identified as
Ambrus, lying face down on the ground with blood pooling beneath his head. Ambrus
was coherent but could not move. J.J. called 911 at 9:27 p.m.
S.D. testified that the group was playing disc golf near the bus stop area when the
sound of footsteps drew his attention. He saw one man walk up behind another, stop for
a second, and then take off running. The second man (Ambrus) dropped to the ground.
6
After checking on Ambrus and observing that the back of his neck had been “filleted
open,” S.D. chased after the attacker. The man ran south along Fair Oaks Boulevard,
turned right into the park near the service road, and then ran straight past the dog park.
The man was 20 to 30 yards ahead, and S.D. lost sight of the man as he ran into the
darkness near the post office.
According to S.D., the fleeing man was stocky, weighed about 180 to 210 pounds,
medium build, and was between five feet, ten inches and six feet, one inch in height.
S.D. described the man as wearing a black hooded sweatshirt, black pants, black gloves,
and a black facemask.
The disc golfers stayed with Ambrus for about 30 minutes until the paramedics
arrived. Ambrus was taken to the hospital, where he was placed in the intensive care
unit. A Sacramento County Sheriff’s deputy interviewed Ambrus at the hospital shortly
after midnight. Ambrus appeared a bit disoriented and was slow to respond to questions.
Ambrus told the deputy that he was walking north along Carmichael Park and saw a
white male walking in his direction. Ambrus did not recognize the man. He described
the man as being in his forties, approximately five feet, eight inches tall, and weighing
250 pounds with brown hair, but also kind of bald. The man did not say anything to him.
As soon as the man walked past him, he felt a sharp pain in the back of his head.
Ambrus suffered a penetrating wound to the back of his neck that partially severed
his spinal cord, rendering him incapable of moving his arms or legs, breathing on his
own, or regulating his blood pressure. To keep him alive, he needed a breathing tube, a
ventilator, and artificial blood pressure support. Four days after the attack, Ambrus’s
family removed him from life support, and he died. The cause of death was the stab
wound to the back of his neck. At the time of his death, Ambrus suffered from
schizophrenia and had very poor eyesight.
Sacramento County Sheriff’s detectives collected and reviewed surveillance
videos from the nearby post office and a dental office on Fair Oaks Boulevard. The
7
videos showed a person walking northbound at 9:23 p.m.; two bicyclists riding
southbound on Fair Oaks Boulevard at 9:25 p.m.; and a fire truck and ambulance going
northbound at 9:35 p.m. Detectives determined that one of the bicycles in the video
belonged to a bongo player who frequents the park.
T.E., who was in custody at the time of the trial for failing to appear at trial,
testified that she was in a relationship with defendant in 2016. She referred to defendant
as her fiancé at the time, and they remained together through 2019.
T.E. testified that she and defendant had prior encounters with Ambrus.
Specifically, in October or November 2015, T.E. and defendant had stayed for one or two
weeks in a vacant house on Oak Avenue that, unbeknownst to them, was owned by
Ambrus’s family. Ambrus and his father arrived at the house one day, told them to get
out, and called the police. Defendant later was arrested for an uncharged ankle monitor
and served a ten-day “flash incarceration.”
T.E. had a second confrontation with Ambrus a couple of days later when she
returned to the Oak Avenue house to retrieve her belongings. Ambrus showed up and
told her that he would break their necks if he saw them again. T.E. left the house and told
defendant about the threat.
On another occasion, T.E. saw defendant chase Ambrus in and out of traffic.
T.E. also recalled an incident sometime in January 2016 when she and defendant
were traveling south along Fair Oaks Boulevard in the vicinity of Carmichael Park. They
were slightly separated because she was on a bicycle and defendant was on foot. After
riding past a man walking north on the sidewalk adjacent to the park, T.E. stopped her
bicycle and waited by the service road for defendant to catch up. Shortly thereafter,
defendant ran up to her and said, “ ‘I put holes in that guy.’ ” Defendant then grabbed
her bicycle and rode away, past the post office. T.E. left on foot through the park.
At first, T.E. did not think anything of defendant’s statement about “put[ting]
holes” in the guy because defendant was using heroin and therefore would often say
8
“whacky” or delusional things. However, a week or two later, after she learned about
Ambrus’s murder, she became concerned that defendant might have been involved.
When interviewed by detectives, T.E. agreed to provide information but was
concerned that defendant would find out or that she would develop a reputation as a
“snitch.” She did not want to tell the detectives what defendant had said about putting
holes in someone and asked if she could write it down instead. She told detectives that
defendant knew the victim was Ambrus; that defendant was happy Ambrus was dead;
and that defendant told her not to talk about it. T.E. knew that defendant typically carried
a knife, although she did not see him with a knife on the night in question. T.E. also told
officers that defendant usually wears black clothing and had been wearing a black hoodie
on the night when he made the comment about putting holes in someone.
A Sacramento County Sheriff’s deputy contacted defendant about two weeks after
the murder. At the time, defendant stood five feet, nine inches tall and weighed about
150 pounds. Defendant’s clothing, collected from jail, was tested for DNA.
Presumptive, but unconfirmed blood stains on defendant’s black hooded sweatshirt and
navy shirt provided a DNA profile match to defendant but excluded Ambrus as a donor.
Defendant’s pants did not have any blood stains.
B. Defense Case
The defense called two disc golfers as defense witnesses: A.L. and R.B.
A.L. testified that while playing disc golf, he looked over and saw two men
walking toward each other on the sidewalk. The man walking north (Ambrus) was
casually strolling and smoking a cigarette; the man walking south seemed like a
“tweaker” (i.e., methamphetamine user) and was moving rapidly. As the two passed,
there was some movement, and Ambrus fell, producing a loud “thump.” The other man
then ran away, escaping through the park. A.L. described the man as having a “slim
build” and wearing loose-fitting clothes.
9
R.B. testified that after hearing a noise, he turned to look and saw two men, one
standing while the other approached. One of the men made a swinging motion towards
the other’s neck, and the second man (Ambrus) fell “like a sack of potatoes.” The
assailant ran away through the park. R.B. believed the assailant was White or Hispanic
and wearing dark clothing, including a hooded sweatshirt. R.B. did not see anyone on a
bicycle.
Verdict and Sentencing
Defendant was charged by information with the 2016 murder of Ambrus (Pen.
Code, § 187, subd. (a); count one)4 and the 2019 murder of Santillano (§ 187, subd. (a);
count two). As to each count, it was alleged that defendant personally used a deadly and
dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). It also was alleged as to both counts that
defendant had suffered two prior strike convictions within the meaning of the “Three
Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) and two prior serious felony
convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a). It was alleged as a
special circumstance that defendant committed multiple murders (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)).
The trial court granted defendant’s motion to sever trial of the two counts. After
trial on count two (the 2019 murder), the jury found defendant not guilty of first degree
murder, but guilty of second degree murder. The jury also found the weapon
enhancement true. After the separate trial on count one (the 2016 murder), the jury found
defendant guilty of first degree murder and found the weapon enhancement true. The
court then conducted a bifurcated bench trial on the special circumstance allegation and
prior serious felony allegations and found them all true. The trial court also found several
factors in aggravation true.
4 Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
10
On August 23, 2024, the trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term
of life in prison without possibility of parole on count one; consecutive to an
indeterminate term of 45 years to life on count two; consecutive to a determinate term of
22 years (four five-year terms pursuant to § 667, subd. (a), plus two one-year terms for
the weapon enhancements). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
Exclusion of Santillano’s Blood Alcohol Content
Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of the
victim’s BAC during the Santillano murder trial. We disagree. We conclude that the
trial court properly exercised its discretion by excluding the evidence under Evidence
Code section 352.
A. Additional Background
During a bench conference in the Santillano murder trial, defense counsel notified
the trial court that the prosecution was objecting to the introduction of evidence showing
that Santillano’s BAC was 0.255 percent. Defense counsel argued that the victim’s BAC
was relevant because it would corroborate the testimony of witnesses who described
Santillano as heavily intoxicated and thereby bolster the defense’s theory that Santillano
was the aggressor. The prosecution had no objection to the jury hearing that Santillano
had consumed alcohol and was intoxicated but argued that the victim’s specific BAC was
irrelevant.
The trial court ultimately agreed with the prosecution and excluded the evidence
under Evidence Code section 352. The court reasoned that jurors knew Santillano had
been drinking alcohol and could assess how the alcohol might have affected Santillano’s
behavior in the moments leading up to his death. However, because alcohol affects each
11
person differently, the court ruled that Santillano’s specific BAC was not a sound basis
for the jury to draw inferences about his behavior and that the probative value of the
evidence was substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would
consume undue time, confuse the issues, and/or mislead the jury.
B. Standard of Review
Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible unless prohibited by statute. (Evid.
Code, § 351.) Relevant evidence is defined as evidence having “ ‘any tendency in reason
to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action.’ ” (Yan v. City of Diamond Bar (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 21, 30.) This is a
“notoriously ‘low threshold.’ ” (Ibid.) “It is satisfied as long as the proffered evidence
moves the proverbial needle, even slightly, in proving or disproving a disputed fact of
consequence.” (Ibid.)
Nevertheless, a trial court has discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to
exclude even relevant evidence “ ‘ “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the probability that its admission will … create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of
confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” ’ ” (People v. Merriman (2014)
60 Cal.4th 1, 60, quoting Evid. Code, § 352.) The scope of the trial court’s discretion
under this statute is “ ‘broad’ ” and will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear showing
of abuse of discretion. (Meeks v. AutoZone, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 855, 867; People
v. Young (2019) 7 Cal.5th 905, 931.) Under this standard, we give “ ‘abundant
deference’ ” to the trial court’s ruling. (People v. Williams (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1057,
1062.) The trial court’s evidentiary ruling will not be disturbed unless the court exercised
its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a
manifest miscarriage of justice. (Young, at p. 931.)
12
C. Analysis
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the
empirical evidence of Santillano’s BAC. He argues that such evidence was relevant
because it corroborated the testimony that Santillano was heavily intoxicated, which, he
contends, supports the defense theory that Santillano was the aggressor and that
defendant acted in self-defense. We find no abuse of discretion.
The California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th
514 (Stitely), is instructive. In Stitely, after the parties stipulated that the victim had a
0.26 blood-alcohol level and was intoxicated, the defendant complained that the
stipulation was inadequate absent additional evidence about the victim’s intoxicated state.
(Id. at pp. 548-549.) Defendant wanted the jury to know, for example, that (1) the
amount of alcohol consumed by the victim exceeded the statutory limit for drunk driving,
(2) the general effect of that BAC in lowering a person’s sexual inhibitions, and (3) the
general likelihood that a person whose inhibitions had been so lowered would have
consented to sexual relations. (Id. at p. 549.) The trial court declined to admit the
proffered evidence and the California Supreme Court affirmed. (Id. at p. 576.) The
Supreme Court found the evidence properly excluded under Evidence Code sections 210
and 352. (Stitely, at pp. 549-550.) The court observed that “[n]othing in the offer of
proof showed how [the victim’s] blood-alcohol content and intoxication affected her
judgment and behavior the night she was killed,” and that the defendant “essentially
wanted jurors to speculate on intoxication, inhibition, and impulse.” (Id. at p. 549.)
Here, as in Stitely, the jury was aware that the victim had been drinking alcohol
and was intoxicated—perhaps heavily intoxicated. And nothing prevented defendant
from arguing, or the jury from concluding, that Santillano’s intoxication affected his
behavior and caused him to provoke a confrontation with defendant. However, as the
trial court observed, because alcohol affects each person differently, a reasonable trier of
fact cannot draw conclusions about Santillano’s aggressiveness based on his BAC alone.
13
Expert evidence would be required to explain how his blood-alcohol level might have
affected his judgment and behavior, based on numerous factors, including his tolerance to
alcohol. Under the circumstances, the trial court was well within its discretion in
concluding that the probative value of the BAC evidence was substantially outweighed
by the probability that its admission would necessitate undue consumption of time or
create substantial danger of confusing the issues or misleading the jury.
Defendant contends that the trial court’s reliance on Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th 514
was misplaced because, in that case, unlike here, the jury was informed of the victim’s
BAC level. Defendant misses the point. Even if we agree that BAC evidence was, if
properly explained, relevant to prove Santillano was heavily intoxicated, nothing in
defendant’s offer of proof linked the victim’s degree of intoxication to his behavior.
Indeed, defense counsel essentially conceded below that we cannot determine a person’s
behavior based solely on the level of alcohol in his or her blood. Defendant wanted
jurors to assume that because Santillano’s BAC far exceeded the statutory limit for drunk
driving, Santillano was more likely to have been the aggressor. But this is precisely the
type of speculative inference that Stitely deemed improper. (Stitely, at pp. 548-550, 566-
567.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the evidence under
Evidence Code section 352.
II
Sufficiency of Evidence that Defendant Stabbed Ambrus
Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction
for the murder of Ambrus. We conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s
verdict.
14
A. Standard of Review
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we review the entire record to determine whether it contains substantial
evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
(People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.) In making this determination, we view the
facts in the light most favorable to the judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences in
support of the conviction. (Ibid.) We do not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in
the evidence, or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. (Ibid.) The test on appeal is not
whether we believe the evidence proves the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
but whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
(People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 701; see People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th
1215, 1258 [an appellate court must accept logical inferences that the jury might have
drawn from the evidence even if the court would have concluded otherwise].) Given our
limited role on appeal, the defendant bears an “enormous burden” in showing there is
insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. (People v. Sanchez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th
325, 330.)
B. Analysis
Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to prove that he was the person
who stabbed Ambrus. To support his claim, defendant relies on discrepancies in the
eyewitnesses’ descriptions of the perpetrator. Specifically, defendant points out that
Detective Peters described defendant as standing five feet, nine inches tall, and weighing
about 150 pounds at the time that Ambrus was killed. In contrast, the eyewitnesses’
descriptions of the perpetrator varied. S.D. described the perpetrator as tall and stocky,
standing between five feet, ten inches and six feet, one inch tall, and weighing between
15
180 and 210 pounds. J.J. described the perpetrator as between five feet, eight inches, and
six feet tall, with a medium build, and one to two inches of dark colored hair. And the
victim, Ambrus, described the perpetrator as a stocky man, approximately five feet, eight
inches tall, and weighing 250 pounds with brown hair, but also kind of bald.
Defendant also points out discrepancies in the witnesses’ accounts of how the
perpetrator fled the scene. All four of the percipient witnesses testified that the
perpetrator fled the scene on foot, running south before cutting into the park. Yet
defendant’s girlfriend, T.E., testified that defendant ran to her, grabbed her bicycle, and
rode off in a southerly direction, past the post office.
Given these discrepancies in the witnesses’ accounts, defendant argues that no
reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the person who
stabbed Ambrus. We disagree.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, we conclude
there was substantial evidence to support finding that defendant was the person who
stabbed and killed Ambrus. Such evidence includes T.E.’s testimony that shortly after
riding her bicycle past a man walking north on the sidewalk, defendant ran up to her and
said, “ ‘I put holes in that guy,’ ” and then fled on her bicycle. T.E.’s account of the
incident is supported by the surveillance video footage, which showed two bicyclists
riding southbound along Fair Oaks Boulevard about two minutes before the 911 call.
One of the bicyclists was believed to be the bongo player who frequented the park, but
the jury reasonably could have inferred that either T.E. or defendant was the other. That
the disc golfers did not see defendant grab T.E.’s bicycle is of no moment. The jury
could have concluded that the golfers did not see the bicycle due to the poor lighting
conditions, or that T.E. was mistaken as to where defendant was when he took her
bicycle.
In addition to T.E.’s account of the incident in the park, the jury reasonably could
have relied on T.E.’s testimony that she and defendant had prior encounters with Ambrus,
16
which included Ambrus threatening to break their necks, and defendant chasing Ambrus
through traffic. And the jury could have relied on T.E.’s statements to detectives that she
and defendant talked about what happened in the park; that defendant knew it was
Ambrus; that defendant was happy Ambrus was dead; and that defendant told her not to
talk to other people about it. With this evidence, the jury reasonably could have inferred
that defendant had a motive to kill Ambrus due to the prior encounters; that he
recognized Ambrus in the park and decided to kill him; and that he demonstrated
consciousness of guilt by fleeing the scene and telling T.E. not to talk about it.
Additional circumstantial evidence connecting defendant to the killing is that
witnesses described the perpetrator as wearing dark clothing and a hooded sweatshirt, and
T.E.’s statement that defendant usually wears black clothing and was wearing a black
hoodie on the night of the incident.
Although the witnesses’ descriptions of the perpetrator were often imprecise, and,
in some cases, inconsistent, this goes to the weight of that evidence and does not mean
that all such testimony was insubstantial. (People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7,
43; Martin Potts & Associates, Inc. v. Corsair, LLC (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 432, 444.) It
is well settled that, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently
improbable, the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction.
(People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181; People v. Lucero (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th
370, 411.) Further, the trier of fact may reject some parts of a witness’s testimony and
accept the remainder. (People v. Williams (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354, 364; People v. Ibarra
(2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1191; CALCRIM No. 226.) The trier of fact also may
combine the accepted portions with bits of testimony or inferences from the testimony of
other witnesses, thereby “ ‘ “weaving a cloth of truth out of selected available
material.” ’ ” (In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 591.)
Here, in reviewing the whole record, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to
support the jury’s verdict. (In re Michael D. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 115, 126
17
[substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences
drawn from that evidence]; People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87 [circumstantial
evidence is as sufficient as direct evidence to support a conviction].) Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the person who murdered Ambrus.
III
Fines and Fees
Defendant also asks us to strike certain fines and fees that, he contends, were
improperly imposed because the trial court erroneously concluded they could not be
waived.
A. Additional Background
During the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered direct victim restitution in
the amount of $13,534.64. Defense counsel requested that the trial court “strike any
restitution fine or only impose the minimum required by law” to maximize the
probability that the victim restitution award will be paid. The trial court granted defense
counsel’s request. The court ruled: “With respect to the restitution fine, in order to
ensure that the restitution, itself, is repaid in full the [c]ourt will waive all but the
mandatory restitution fine amount.” The court then continued, “[F]or the same reasons[,]
that is … to ensure restitution is paid in full[,] [the court] will waive any other waivable
fees [listed in the probation report] to the extent that they are legally waivable…. To the
extent that they are not waivable[,] then the [c]ourt will impose those fees.” The
probation report identified two fees that were, at the time, considered mandatory: an $80
court operations assessment (§ 1465.8), and a $60 court facility assessment (Gov. Code,
§ 70373).
18
Subsequently, the trial court issued an abstract of judgment, which listed the $80
court operations assessment, $60 court facility assessment, a $300 restitution fine
(§ 1202.4), and a $300 suspended parole revocation fine (§ 1202.45).
B. Analysis
Defendant argues that the parole revocation fine was erroneously included in the
abstract of judgment because that fine was not part of the trial court’s oral
pronouncement of judgment. The People concede the error. We accept the concession
and shall order the parole revocation fine stricken from the abstract of judgment. (People
v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185; People v. El (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 963, 967.)
Defendant also argues that because the trial court expressed “its desire that
[defendant] should pay no additional fines or costs above those that [are] non-waivable,”
this court should strike the restitution fine, court security fee, and court facility fee. He
points out that revocation fines are waivable under section 1202.4 for “ ‘compelling and
extraordinary reasons,’ ” and contends that prioritizing payment of victim restitution is a
compelling and extraordinary reason.
Further, defendant contends that under People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, a court
may waive otherwise mandatory costs or assessments if the defendant lacks the ability to
pay them. Relying on Kopp, defendant asserts that the court security fees and court
facility fees are “ ‘waivable,’ ” and therefore should be stricken to further the trial court’s
intent to waive any fees that legally could be waived.
The People argue that the trial court properly imposed the restitution fine and
court assessments. We agree with the People.
Although section 1202.4 permits a court to waive imposition of a restitution fine if
it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for doing so and states those reasons on the
record, section 1202.4 also explicitly provides that “[a] defendant’s inability to pay shall
not be considered a compelling and extraordinary reason.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (c), italics
19
added.) Here, despite having the opportunity to do so, the trial court did not find that
facilitating payment of the victim restitution award was a “compelling and extraordinary”
reason not to impose the minimum restitution fine. Thus, the record does not support any
inference that the court intended such a result. Indeed, if the court had considered victim
restitution to be a “compelling and extraordinary” reason to waive the fine, it presumably
would have said so expressly.
Defendant’s Kopp argument fares no better. Contrary to defendant’s assertion,
Kopp did not hold that a court always must consider a defendant’s ability to pay before
imposing ancillary costs or assessments. Rather, Kopp held that equal protection
principles require that criminal defendants have the same opportunity to demonstrate an
inability to pay as indigent civil litigants. (People v. Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at pp. 25,
29-30.) Thus, “upon request,” a court must consider a defendant’s inability to pay before
imposing ancillary costs or assessments. (Id. at pp. 9, 30.)
Here, defense counsel did not specifically object to the trial court’s imposition of
the court operations and facility assessments based on a perceived inability to pay.
Counsel only requested that the court strike or impose a minimum restitution fine, as to
maximize the probability that the victim restitution award will be paid. Since defendant
did not specifically object to imposition of the assessments based on ability to pay, he
forfeited the right to challenge those assessments on appeal.5 (People v. Ramirez (2023)
98 Cal.App.5th 175, 224-225; see People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 867.) In any
event, recent legislation has mooted defendant’s concerns about ensuring payment of the
victim restitution award. Assembly Bill No. 1213 (2025–2026 Reg. Sess.), effective
5 It matters not that defendant’s sentencing predated the Kopp decision because both
People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, overruled in part by People v. Kopp,
supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 23, fn. 17, and People v. Son (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 565, would
have alerted defendant to these issues before his sentencing.
20
January 1, 2026, amended section 1202.4, subdivision (i), to provide that an order for
restitution shall have payment priority over all other fines and fees associated with a
criminal conviction. (Stats. 2025, ch. 184, § 3.) As a result, it is unnecessary to strike or
reduce fines, costs, or assessments to maximize the probability that a victim restitution
award will be paid. Accordingly, we decline defendant’s invitation to strike the two
mandatory assessments.
DISPOSITION
The case is remanded to the trial court with directions to correct the abstract of
judgment by deleting the suspended parole revocation fine. After the amendments have
been made to the abstract of judgment, the trial court clerk is directed to forward a
certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
\s\
KRAUSE, J.
We concur:
\s\
RENNER, Acting P. J.
\s\
MESIWALA, J.
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