Filed 8/19/26 P. v. Moore CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B343652
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA020188)
v.
ETIENNE MICHAEL MOORE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Alison S. Matsumoto, Judge. Affirmed.
Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorneys General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Mathews and Analee J. Brodie,
Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________
Etienne Michael Moore appeals the trial court’s order
denying his petition for vacatur of his conviction and
resentencing for the murder of Laurie Myles. The trial court
denied Moore’s petition following an evidentiary hearing held
pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). On
appeal, Moore contends that the trial court erred by basing its
conclusion that he was the actual killer on the jury’s finding that
Moore personally used a firearm in the commission of the
murder. The People assert that the court’s ruling was based on
the record as a whole—not the jury’s personal firearm use
finding—and that substantial evidence supports the court’s
findings.
We affirm the trial court’s order.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Evidence at Trial
In July, August, September, and October 1993, Moore and
his associates, including codefendants LeCedrick Johnson and
Shashonee Solomon, committed numerous “follow-home” armed
robberies. Moore regularly met Johnson and several other
friends during the summer and fall of 1993 and talked about
committing armed robberies. Moore and his cohorts would pick
out people driving nice cars and follow them home to rob them.
The robbers obtained guns and stole vehicles to use in the
robberies. One of the robberies in which Moore was involved
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
resulted in the shooting death of Laurie Myles.
At trial, J.M., who was nine years old at the time of his
mother Myles’s killing, testified to the following: In the evening
on September 15, 1993, J.M. and Myles drove to pick up J.M.’s
sister from Bible study. J.M. was sitting in the front passenger’s
seat. The street was very dark, which made J.M. nervous.
While Myles was parking, a large yellow or tan car with its
headlights off pulled up next to them. A man, who J.M.
identified at trial as looking similar to Moore, got out of the
passenger side of the car and stood on the driver’s side of Myles’s
car. Within seconds, J.M. heard his mother screaming. J.M. saw
a bullet-sized hole in the window, which had shattered the glass.
Myles tried to drive away and ground the car’s gears. Moore had
his hands on the window and was pushing the car to keep Myles
and J.M. from escaping.
Moore demanded Myles’s purse and a briefcase that was on
the floorboard. Moore was holding a gun and punching the glass
out of Myles’s window with his elbow. Myles had slumped down
in her seat and was gasping for air. Her tongue was turning
white. She gave Moore her purse, but she was unable to hand
the briefcase to him. J.M. saw that his mother did not have the
strength to hand over the briefcase, so he pushed it in Moore’s
direction. Moore told Myles to hurry up or he would shoot her in
the head. He reached into Myles’s car, grabbed the briefcase, and
threw it into his car. Moore got into the passenger side of the car
and banged the door against Myles’s car two or three times before
a second man, later identified as Johnson, drove the car away.
J.M. waited for Moore’s car to turn the corner before
checking to see if his mother was alright. Myles’s side was
covered in blood, so J.M. climbed into her lap and tried to perform
3
CPR. He also tried to put the car in gear and drive it, but was
unsuccessful. J.M. sought help from a passerby. It took more
than 10 minutes for the fire truck and paramedics to arrive.
The prosecution introduced evidence that Myles died of a
single gunshot wound from a hollow point bullet that penetrated
her arm, heart, diaphragm, and liver. Police recovered a .380
shell casing from the crime scene.
Kristina Patchis testified that she knew Moore from high
school and had dated him for a few weeks sometime in the fall of
her freshman year. There was an incident in which Moore
attempted to kick Patchis. Patchis transferred to a different high
school to get away from Moore and his girlfriend, with whom
Patchis was also having problems.
In the spring of 1995 or 1996, Moore called Patchis out of
the blue. Moore said he was in jail and kept asking if “anybody
had contacted [Patchis].” Patchis had no idea what he was
talking about. Moore asked Patchis if she knew about the
“Northridge situation.” When Moore mentioned a Bible study
class, Patchis knew that he was referring to the incident in which
Myles was killed. She had heard about the murder in the
newspaper and on the TV news. Patchis only “knew that there
was a mother waiting with her younger child for her daughter to
come out of Bible class and she had gotten killed.” Moore
mentioned that there had been a robbery, a little boy was
involved, and that the incident took place inside a vehicle. Moore
told Patchis “it was a robbery gone bad, it was something that
should have been real easy but it wasn’t.” Moore indicated that
there were at least two people who committed the robbery. He
said that the victim was shot because “she didn’t move fast
enough.” He told Patchis, “the mother had to get killed.”
4
The way Moore talked about the incident suggested that he
had personal knowledge of the murder. Although he never
directly stated he was the shooter, Patchis testified that “[w]ith
the phone conversation that I had been—that I had gotten, the
impression was very obvious that that’s what had happened.”
Moore told Patchis “ ‘I took out someone’s mother[.]’ ” This made
Patchis think Moore was the shooter, though she could not be
certain.
Patchis did not report her conversation with Moore to the
police. She believed that Moore had called her to make sure that
she did not say anything bad about him. The police contacted
Patchis by phone about six months before the trial. Patchis told
the police that she did not want to be involved. She became
scared when she started receiving subpoenas. Moore had told
Patchis that if anyone crossed him “[t]hey would get screwed,
they would get the short end of the stick.”
B. Verdict
As relevant here, the jury found Moore and Johnson guilty
of conspiracy to commit robbery (§ 182, subd. (a)(1), count 1), the
first degree murder of Myles (§ 187, subd. (a)(1), count 2), and the
second degree robbery of Myles (§ 211, count 3). The jury found
true the special circumstance that the murder was committed in
the commission of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), and found
true the allegations that in the commission of the murder and the
robbery Moore personally used a .380 caliber semi-automatic
handgun (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)). Moore was also convicted of
conspiracy to commit murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1), count 4), the
first degree murder of Talin Kara Tarkhanian (§ 187, subd. (a)(1),
5
count 5) and the second degree robbery of Tarkhanian (§ 211,
count 6), which occurred in a separate incident.2 Finally, the jury
found true a multiple murder special circumstance. (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(3).)
The trial court sentenced Moore to life without parole plus
a determinate sentence of seven years.
C. Petition and Prima Facie Eligibility Determination
On May 24, 2023, Moore filed a petition for resentencing
utilizing a standard form. The court appointed counsel.3
In a hearing on July 12, 2024, the People conceded that
although the jury found Moore used a gun in Myles’s murder,
there was no jury finding establishing as a matter of law that
Moore was the actual killer.4 The court found Moore prima facie
eligible for relief, and issued an order to show cause.
2 Moore does not appeal the denial of his petition for
resentencing with respect to the murder of Tarkhanian in count
5, so we do not discuss it in this opinion.
3 Although the court referenced the People’s response and
Moore’s reply at the prima facie eligibility hearing, neither
pleading is contained in the record on appeal. Because the
matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing for which there was
additional briefing the prima facie stage pleadings are not
necessary to our review.
4 The trial court held the prima facie hearing based on the
People’s objection to issuance of an order to show cause for the
murder of Tarkhanian.
6
D. Order to Show Cause Pleadings
On November 22, 2024, Moore, through appointed counsel,
filed an order to show cause brief. Moore contended that the trial
court could not consider the parts of the record of conviction that
would not be admissible under current law. Specifically, Moore
argued that the testimony of a confidential informant was
inadmissible because it was not sufficiently corroborated.
Additionally, officer testimony regarding rap lyrics was
inadmissible pursuant to section 352.2, subdivision (a). Moore
also objected pursuant to People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518,
and Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123
(Aranda/Bruton), to the introduction of statements made by
codefendant Johnson. Finally, Moore observed that the law
pertaining to admissibility of gang evidence had changed
dramatically since his trial in the 1990’s, but he made no specific
objections based on that observation.
On December 20, 2024, the People filed a response to
Moore’s order to show cause brief. The People argued that Moore
personally shot and killed Myles. The People opposed exclusion
of the jailhouse informant testimony relating to Myles’s murder
because there was corroborating evidence—Patchis testified that
Moore made statements to her describing shooting a woman
under the same circumstances as those in the murder of Myles,
and J.M. testified that the murderer looked like Moore.
Regarding Johnson’s testimony, the People asserted that on
direct appeal the court held that admission of the testimony was
not a violation of Aranda/Bruton. However, even if Johnson’s
testimony was excluded, overwhelming evidence supported the
7
finding that Moore was the actual shooter. Finally, consideration
of the rap lyrics and gang evidence was not necessary to the
finding that Moore was the shooter.
E. Section 1172.6 Evidentiary Hearing
At the evidentiary hearing on January 10, 2025, the People
lodged a copy of the reporter’s transcript of the original trial and
rested their case.
Moore then testified on his own behalf. In 1993, he was 19
years old and living in his mother’s house. He was a member of
the Original Valley Gangsters. Moore’s activities included
drinking, selling drugs, robbery, fighting, and going to parties.
Moore was involved in a series of approximately 12 “follow-home
robberies” over the course of three days. He and his codefendants
would drive around, find someone in a car, follow them home, and
rob them. One person drove and two other people would jump
out of the car to carry out the robbery. Moore drove his ex-
girlfriend’s car in the robberies. Moore only jumped out once or
twice during the robberies. He was not armed. Moore testified
that he was not involved in the robbery of Myles on
September 15, 1993. He learned about Myles’s murder on the
news.
The prosecutor objected to Moore’s testimony on relevance
grounds. The prosecutor argued that the purpose of a section
1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) hearing was not to re-litigate all
issues—it was limited by statute to the situation where the
defendant was no longer guilty of murder because of changes to
section 188 and 189. Moore could have raised the defense that he
was not at the scene of the murder at trial. Moore was estopped
8
from claiming that he was unarmed because the jury found that
he used a firearm in commission of the offense. Moore’s claim
that he was not present was legally inconsistent with the jury’s
true finding on the firearm use allegation.
Defense counsel responded that the petitioner could
introduce new evidence at an evidentiary hearing, and Moore had
not testified at trial. Moore then resumed his testimony. He
claimed he did not date Patchis and had no relationship to her.
The prosecutor argued that the jury found Moore used a
firearm in the commission of the crime and that with respect to
Johnson, the jury found that a principle was armed. The
prosecutor asserted that those findings combined with the
evidence that Myles was killed by a single bullet compelled the
conclusion that Moore was the shooter.
Defense counsel maintained that, in light of all of the
currently inadmissible evidence that was considered at trial—the
jailhouse informant testimony, rap lyrics, and Johnson’s
statements—there was insufficient evidence to convict Moore.
With respect to the admission of Johnson’s statements, the
prosecutor responded that the Court of Appeal had found that the
trial court had not violated Aranda/Bruton by admitting
Johnson’s statements, and that even if the trial court had erred,
the error was harmless. With respect to the rap lyrics, the
prosecutor did not object to the court excluding them from
consideration.
F. Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court stated that it did not consider the rap lyrics
or the confidential informant’s testimony when making its ruling.
9
The court considered J.M.’s testimony and recounted facts that
the court found significant and citations to those facts in the
reporter’s transcript. The court noted that, at trial, J.M.
identified Moore as looking similar to the shooter. The court
emphasized that Myles died of a gunshot wound that penetrated
her arm and chest, passing through her heart, lung, and
diaphragm. The police recovered a .380 shell casing from the
crime scene. The bullet that killed Myles was fired from the
same gun as bullets that struck three victims in other counts for
which the defendants had been tried. The court also considered
Patchis’s testimony that Moore called her from prison and
mentioned a robbery and shooting that involved a little boy and
took place in a vehicle. Moore said the victim did not move fast
enough and said something like “I took out somebody’s mother.”
Moore also said that the mother had to be killed.
After recounting this evidence, the court concluded,
“Considering the testimony at trial, including other testimony at
trial—but this is the main testimony regarding the injury, et
cetera—the court finds that the People have met their burden
beyond a reasonable doubt that [Moore] is guilty of count 2,
murder, in violation of Penal Code section 187[, subdivision] (a).
[¶] Also alleged were the firearms enhancements, in violation of
Penal Code sections 12022[, subdivision] (a)(1) and 12022.5. The
court finds proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the allegations
are true and that the special circumstance allegation within the
meaning of Penal Code section 190.2[, subdivision] (a)(17) of the
murder during the course of a robbery was alleged and finds
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the special circumstance
allegation is true. [¶] So the petition is denied.”
The court asked if the parties wished to say anything
10
further. The prosecutor added that although he had espoused the
theory that Moore was the actual killer and that the jury’s
findings supported that conclusion, the evidence also established
beyond a reasonable doubt that Moore was guilty of murder
because he was a major participant in the robbery who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.
Defense counsel argued against giving weight to Patchis’s
testimony. He stated that there was no evidence Moore made a
call to Patchis from prison despite the fact that prison calls are
typically recorded. Moore had testified that he had no
relationship to Patchis.
The court responded that it was considering the record as a
whole, of which Patchis’s testimony was a small part. The court
stated, “The court is basing its decision primarily on the findings
of the jury, which included the personal use of the handgun at the
time, the fact that the victim was ultimately killed by a single
gunshot wound during the course of the robbery. The court
would say that that was the Kristina Patchis—I guess the court
would describe it as corroborative of all of the evidence during the
course of trial, including the identification describing the
defendant by the child witness who testified at trial, along with
all of the other findings and findings of overt acts that were made
by the jury as well. [¶] . . . [¶] I mean obviously there is a lot of
testimony during the course of this lengthy trial. The court just
cited some of the testimony, a very small amount, given the
length and the overall scope of the trial.”
11
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Principles
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) amended sections 188 and 189—the felony murder
rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it
relates to murder—to “provide[] that except for first degree felony
murder ‘in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime
shall act with malice aforethought. . . .’ [Citations.]” (People v.
Basler (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 46, 54, fn. omitted.) In the case of
felony murder, “[a] participant in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of [an enumerated] felony [(including robbery)] in
which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the
following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶]
(2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to
kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited,
requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of
murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life . . . .” (§ 189, subd. (e).)
Pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (a), a person
convicted of murder may file a petition to have the murder
conviction vacated and to be resentenced if “(1) A complaint,
information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that
allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony
murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a
12
crime . . . . [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of murder . . .
following a trial. . . . [and] [¶] (3) The petitioner could not
presently be convicted of murder . . . because of changes to
[s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the
petitioner is entitled to relief, the trial court must issue an order
to show cause. If an order to show cause issues, the court then
“hold[s] a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder . . .
conviction and to recall the sentence and resentence the
petitioner on any remaining counts,” unless the parties “waive a
resentencing hearing and stipulate that the petitioner is eligible
to have [his or her] . . . conviction vacated and to be resentenced.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1)–(2).) “At the hearing . . . the burden of
proof . . . [is] on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder . . . under California
law as amended by the changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
On appeal from a trial court’s order denying a section
1172.6 petition following a subdivision (d)(3) hearing, this court
evaluates the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s
determination using the substantial evidence standard of review.
(People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 747.) “ ‘[W]e look
to whether the prosecution has introduced sufficient evidence of
“ ‘ “reasonable, credible, and of solid value” ’ ” to “support a
finding beyond a reasonable doubt” ’ that petitioner was guilty.
([People v.] Clark [(2016)] 63 Cal.4th [522,] 618 [(Clark)].)”
(People v. Henley (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1017.) “We
examine the record in the light most favorable to the judgment
and defer to the trial court’s implicit credibility findings.
[Citation.] ‘ “A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted
13
unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support” ’ the [fact finder]’s
verdict.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Diaz (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th
545, 558.)
B. Analysis
Moore contends that the trial court’s order must be
reversed because in contravention of People v. Hart (2025) 113
Cal.App.5th 1099 (Hart), the court erroneously relied on the
jury’s findings to find that Moore would still be guilty of felony
murder as the actual killer. The People respond that the trial
court relied on the record in its entirety and that Moore is placing
undue weight on the court’s isolated comment that it was “basing
its decision primarily on the findings of the jury[.]” Alternatively,
the People argue that even if the court relied on the jury’s
findings it did not violate Hart in doing so. We agree with the
People that the trial court based its findings on the evidence as a
whole and that its ruling was not inconsistent with Hart.
The trial court based its ruling on testimony in the trial
transcripts, which the court described at length and for which the
court provided page citations. In its ruling, the court made no
mention of the jury’s findings. The court discussed only the facts
that supported its conclusion that, beyond a reasonable doubt,
Moore was guilty of felony murder and the allegations and
special circumstances were true. The court did not reference the
jury’s findings in its ruling.
It was only after the court permitted the parties to offer
their final thoughts that the court mentioned the jury’s findings.
The court made its reference to the jury’s findings in response to
14
the prosecutor’s argument that even if Moore was not the actual
killer he was guilty of felony murder as a major participant in the
robbery who acted with reckless indifference to life. The court
explained that it was making an actual killer finding rather than
a major participant finding—i.e., that the court’s guilty finding
was based on the same theory that the jury had relied upon.
Significantly, the court did not state that it was bound by the
jury’s findings as Moore contends, but rather that the court found
the jury’s findings were supported by the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The court’s ruling was not inconsistent with Hart, supra,
113 Cal.App.5th 1099. In that case, Hart and his codefendant
went to an apartment where the victim and his girlfriend lived.
(Hart, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1103.) Hart’s girlfriend
testified that the victim went into the hallway outside the
apartment with both defendants. (Ibid.) Soon afterward, she
heard a gunshot. (Ibid.) When she opened the door, Hart was
crouched over the victim, who had died from a single close-range
gunshot. (Id. at p. 1104.) Hart looked surprised. Hart’s
codefendant ran away and Hart ran after him. (Ibid.) The
victim’s girlfriend did not see either man holding a firearm.
(Ibid.) Hart’s girlfriend also testified. She had told police that
Hart came to her apartment with blood on his face and said he
shot and killed someone. (Ibid.) At trial, Hart’s girlfriend
recanted her statement. (Ibid.) She testified that Hart came to
her apartment looking for his wife and did not say anything
about killing anyone. (Ibid.) The jury found Hart guilty of
murder, but found not true the allegation that Hart had
personally used a firearm in the commission of the murder.
(Ibid.)
15
Years later, Hart filed a petition for resentencing pursuant
to section 1172.6. (Hart, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1104.) The
court held an evidentiary hearing at which new evidence was
presented, including a comprehensive risk assessment conducted
by a state forensic psychologist. (Id. at pp. 1104–1105.) The
psychologist included in the assessment that Hart admitted to
her that he had killed the victim. (Id. at p. 1105.) Hart had been
advised that the evaluation was voluntary and that it was not
confidential. (Ibid.) The trial court denied Hart’s petition. The
court found Hart guilty of felony murder as the actual killer
based on the comprehensive risk assessment and Hart’s
girlfriend’s statements. (Id. at pp. 1105–1106.) Alternatively,
the court found Hart guilty of felony murder as a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
(Ibid.)
On appeal, Hart contended that under the doctrine of issue
preclusion the trial court was collaterally estopped from relying
on the theory that he was the actual killer because the jury found
not true the personal firearm use allegation. (Hart, supra, 113
Cal.App.5th at p. 1104.) The Court of Appeal held that issue
preclusion did not apply because whether Hart had used a
firearm was not an “ ‘ultimate fact’ ” necessary to the murder
conviction—the prosecution did not have to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Hart used a firearm to find him guilty of
murder. (Id. at p. 1110.)
The trial court’s ruling in the instant case is not contrary to
the holding in Hart. In this case, the trial court was not estopped
from finding that Moore used a firearm, nor was it estopped from
finding that Moore did not use a firearm, because just as in Hart,
the issue was not an ultimate fact necessary to the murder
16
conviction—the jury also found Johnson guilty of murder,
although it was not asked to find whether he personally used a
firearm in the commission of the murder. To the extent Moore
asserts that Hart stands for the proposition that a trial court may
not rely on a jury’s finding when new evidence is presented at an
evidentiary hearing, we disagree with his interpretation. That
issue was not presented in Hart—there, the court made a ruling
contrary to the jury’s finding. Regardless, in Moore’s case the
court never indicated that it was constrained by the jury’s
findings. The court simply observed that the evidence supported
the jury’s findings, which the court agreed with, beyond a
reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did
not err when making its ruling.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying Moore’s Penal
Code section 1172.6 petition.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
17